British 1936-42 purchase options, logistics and export/import of military hardware

[Shortround6]

Getting back to the cost question.
The British in 1938-39 don't know that France will collapse in such a spectacular fashion they may think they need several thousand tanks over several years in France. Plus tanks for North Africa/mid east/far east in small numbers.
Large numbers of cheap (or inexpensive ) tanks or fewer numbers of expensive tanks?
The British did wind up getting a fair return on the Matilda but it was a slow start.
Only 2 in service at the start of Sept 1939. They built 2,987 of them total with production ending in Aug 1943 and 4 different companies built them at some point.
Interestingly they built 1,330 in 1942 alone so numbers in 1940-41 were never really high. Depending on source 1084 were sent to Russia but only 918 got there.

Britain was equipping themselves with American tanks and shipping a lot of their own tanks (Matildas and Valentines) to Russia in 1941-42.

 

[Elan Vital]

Getting back to the cost question.
The British in 1938-39 don't know that France will collapse in such a spectacular fashion they may think they need several thousand tanks over several years in France. Plus tanks for North Africa/mid east/far east in small numbers.
Large numbers of cheap (or inexpensive ) tanks or fewer numbers of expensive tanks?
The British did wind up getting a fair return on the Matilda but it was a slow start.
Only 2 in service at the start of Sept 1939. They built 2,987 of them total with production ending in Aug 1943 and 4 different companies built them at some point.
Interestingly they built 1,330 in 1942 alone so numbers in 1940-41 were never really high. Depending on source 1084 were sent to Russia but only 918 got there.

Britain was equipping themselves with American tanks and shipping a lot of their own tanks (Matildas and Valentines) to Russia in 1941-42.

For possible reference, here is the latest production forecast for tank production that I could find before the BoF:

I have yet to compare with actual production these years. A10 production was cut well short of the forecasted 344 by August 1942 to make way for more Valentines.

Of note that as of April 1940, production of the Mark VI light tanks had already ended. The A20 was superseded by A22.

Monthly production would thus rise from about 98 tanks/month over the 4 month-period April-August 1940, 188/month over the next 6-month period, 244/month over the next, 268/month over the next, and finally 280/month over the period February to August 1942, after 3 years of war.

Highest and most recent objectives for sustained French production between October 1940 and March 1941 (so compared to the 188/month of the British) were 156/month for battle tank equivalents (B1 and Somua), and 420/month for light tanks which were easier to produce but individually far less capable than British ones, for a total of 576/month. Somewhat less over August-February period. But you can see that in spite of a much later start, British industry could at least crank out a little more "battle tank" equivalents than the French.

Over the August-February 1941 period, the Germans actually cranked out 1029 tanks or 171.5/month, over 75% being the Panzer III or IV (rest being the 38(t)). Might be higher if the French campaign had continued. Up to August 1942, no more than 90 light tanks (Pz II variants and 38(t)) per month and usually less than that, Pz III ramps up from 90 to as much as 246/month (less on average), Pz IV ramps up from 52 to 176/month.

More analysis would obviously be needed for the real production numbers on the Allied side (or planned for Germans) and the French situation beyond March 1941 is pretty much unknown territory, as is the German reaction, but one can see the British quickly pull a good weight after August 1940 in terms of battle tanks and when added to the French they counter the Germans well, in fact even outpacing the Germans many times even without assuming any greater French production rates beyond March 1941.

British targets for their fleet of combat tanks were already pretty high even well before the war, from what I recall. There just was no funding and no tanks ready to order until 1938, and in numbers until 1939.

 

[yulzari]

Then we can throw in the stupid "fire while moving doctrine" that crippled long range shooting, even by the co-ax machine guns. had.

The doctrine was not to fire whilst moving but that one could fire whilst moving and live fire trials found it was feasible to do so if needed. It allowed the tank to keep moving and maintain its status as a mobile target with a constantly altering range and possible jinking so making it a mobile target laterally also. Only then possible because the small size and weight of the period gun with its balance at the interior mantlet could be kept on target by the shoulder elevation of the gunner. What it could not do was hit an HE target given the gun in question which is a whole other matter. Once the gun got larger and heavier the shoulder elevation was no longer possible so the doctrine had to move to the same as other tank users. ie firing from the halt.

 

[tomo pauk]

Were Merlins realistically available for tank engines in the time period in question? Or was the Liberty the best option? Or a 3rd engine? The British wasted a lot of money on the large Meadows engine in the Covenanter. The engine in the Churchill worked but was it really better than an alternative.
What transmission/steering gear options do you really have? The 15-20 ton tanks can make do with clutch and brake steering. As the tank gets heavier a more sophisticated steering system becomes increasing desirable. Soviets made do with clutch and brake. They also broke down a lot. British used two alternatives to Clutch and Brake. Redundant or they didn't know?

The transmissions/gearboxes on the Matilda II seems to be working in a decent order.
Liberty of 340 HP should've been a better thing than a 190 HP double engine on the Matilda II. Twinning the AEC petrol engine (= 270 HP) from the Valentine also gives more than what Matilda II had. The Kestrel, if it can be run on the pool petrol also gets a nod.

We have the hindsight of knowing that the British would get kicked out of France in June 1940 and not be engaged in any major tank warfare until the Greek campaign (not that they did much) and then the beginning battles in NA.
We also have the knowledge that no matter what kind of WW II tank(or even modern tank) the British had sent to France or Greece it wouldn't have made any difference (or more than a couple of days).
We also have the hindsight to know that many of the problems in NA were caused be not enough development/testing and lack of training and poor tactics and doctrine.

Would a better tank have changed that? or was a combination of better equipment and better training and better tactics/doctrine needed?

The thread is about everything British, not just about a better tank. A better tank cannot save France, however the better tanks + self-propelled guns + SP AA vehicles + the better towed guns + the better AT guns + the better fighters + the better bomber might've seen Germans paying a far greater cost already in May of 1940, with knock-on effects as the war drags out.

Would a tank using a medium 75 been able to bull it's way through the Halfaya defenses? Larger tank with less armor depending on it's own to 75mm guns to make up for the lack of artillery support against dug in (or behind stone/mud walls) or would it just have caused more German causalities without actually forcing it's way through the position?
Senior commanders had broken the Matilda regiments into squadron (company) sized detachments and then set up an unrealistic time table.
The "attack" was supposed to have begun at 5:40 but the battery Assigned to C squadron had gotten bogged down in the sand and didn't reach it's firing position. At 6:00 with firing going on to west the Commander of C company decided to attack without artillery support. It took the Germans a few hours but they destroyed 12 out 13 Matildas.
British want HE firing tanks to prevent another repeat, But supply of HE tank ammo doesn't solve the problem of poor deployment (using a single squadron/company to take a key defensive position) poor communications (was another artillery battery within range to support the key attack if it's own assigned battery ran into problems), a stick to the time table mentality. Then we can throw in the stupid "fire while moving doctrine" that crippled long range shooting, even by the co-ax machine guns. The lack of effective local smoke, only a few 4in smoke throwers (the 2in smoke mortar was not mounted in Matildas.)

There was a good deal of the ww2 in the N.A. before the British tried to push trough Halfaya pass for the second time. Italians and Germans enduring greater losses in 1940 and 1941 should've meant that British have easier task in 1942, with Axis still trying to dislodge them from Tobruk in late 1942 instead of trying to do the same at El Alamein, hundreds of miles to the East.
A big gun by default removes the mounts that used shoulders to get the elevation to the gun, and by extension the 'fire on the move' idea.

I'm all for the British to improve on their tactics.

 

[tomo pauk]

Getting back to the cost question.
The British in 1938-39 don't know that France will collapse in such a spectacular fashion they may think they need several thousand tanks over several years in France. Plus tanks for North Africa/mid east/far east in small numbers.
Large numbers of cheap (or inexpensive ) tanks or fewer numbers of expensive tanks?

British were okay with buying both expensive and cheap tanks. There was no such thing as either-or. In 1940, they have plans for buying 40 ton tanks, while Germans had no such firm plans.
IMO, a prudent thing is to focus on the heavier stuff, while the production lines unable to make these will be making lighter tanks. British have had the coin and industrial might to do it.

 

[Shortround6]

The doctrine was not to fire whilst moving but that one could fire whilst moving and live fire trials found it was feasible to do so if needed. It allowed the tank to keep moving and maintain its status as a mobile target with a constantly altering range and possible jinking so making it a mobile target laterally also. Only then possible because the small size and weight of the period gun with its balance at the interior mantlet could be kept on target by the shoulder elevation of the gunner. What it could not do was hit an HE target given the gun in question which is a whole other matter. Once the gun got larger and heavier the shoulder elevation was no longer possible so the doctrine had to move to the same as other tank users. ie firing from the halt.

It also de-emphasized long range shooting and used a lower powered telescope (although going from 2.4-2.5 down to 1.9 is not a lot) with pretty much only cross hairs

And those side scales to "assist" the gunner.
Now if I want to use the MG for firing at an AT gun at 1200yds (assuming I know that the range is 1200 and not 1100 or 1300) trying to pick out the proper point on the Vertical line is rather difficult, even if I am not bouncing around the inside of the tank.
German gun sight allowed for the 1200yd/meter range to be set and then the gunner only had to put the aiming mark on the target. If he was over or under he could reset the sight and put the aiming mark back on the target. British gunner had to keep trying to hold using different points on the vertical line, While the gun moved due to recoil and the gunner's inability to to keep his shoulder dead steady while he breathed.
In a moving tank at close range the gunner doesn't have time to fiddle with the range settings and at close range it doesn't matter a whole lot.
The British system might have worked out fine in Europe with small fields and lots of woods keeping ranges short (mostly) but once they went to the dessert they were screwed.

Germans also had 3 scales for setting the range. One for AP, one for HE and the 3rd for the MG. The gunner could see which was selected in his sight to help prevent mistakes.
British, even if they had HE, would have needed a 3rd scale but it doesn't provide for the more exact aim at longer ranges.

The idea that the moving tank provides a more difficult target to the stationary gunner than the moving tank hinders it's own gunner is sheer wishful thinking (stupidity).
The British stopped using the shoulder controlled elevation, not only because of larger guns but because it didn't work, or required a standard of training/practice that the British army could not achieve with wartime training.

 

[Shortround6]

The transmissions/gearboxes on the Matilda II seems to be working in a decent order.

The Matilda used a 6 speed Wilson epicyclic pre-selector gearbox which certainly eased the drivers work load and if kept in adjustment, beat up the transmission less.
Using 6 gears (? some times the lowest gear is only used in bad terrain?) ) to go 15mph allowed for using the low powered engines in a 25 ton tank. Steering was still primitive.

The Kestrel, if it can be run on the pool petrol also gets a nod.

I Don't see a problem, the original Kestrels ran on 73-77 octane and the next versions ran on 77 octane. Maybe I am wrong but using lower compression pistons and accepting 400-450hp doesn't seem that difficult.

Twinning the AEC petrol engine (= 270 HP) from the Valentine also gives more than what Matilda II had.

Using twin engines requires more volume and it can make maintenance more difficult. It was done but it was not ideal.

The thread is about everything British, not just about a better tank. A better tank cannot save France, however the better tanks + self-propelled guns + SP AA vehicles + the better towed guns + the better AT guns + the better fighters + the better bomber might've seen Germans paying a far greater cost already in May of 1940, with knock-on effects as the war drags out.

Most of the better ground stuff would not have cost the Germans much and just given the Germans better stuff to use later.
But for instance this was the 'standard' British SP AA gun in France in 1940.

A single Bren gun, it was later doubled. Gunner was seated and used his legs to traverse the mount. 100 round drums were often issued.
Now maybe the British could have used a larger truck and used paired .5in Vickers guns? or perhaps, given much earlier production of Oerlikon guns a single 20mm in the back the truck? But changing the air war over France or doing a lot to protect the British army in France? You are going to need hundreds of more SP AA guns, which means hundreds more left in France.

In 1940, they have plans for buying 40 ton tanks,

Yes and it took until mid 1942 to get them into the production and they had a considerable trouble getting them to work.

as far as the cheap or expensive mix goes, the British were trying to build both cheap and expensive infantry tanks, both cheap and expensive cruisers and even expensive light tanks.
The rational for a 12 cylinder 165hp engine for a light tank rather escapes me
A 'twined' version of the 88hp six used in the earlier light tanks?

 

[tomo pauk]

Using twin engines requires more volume and it can make maintenance more difficult. It was done but it was not ideal.

Agreed.

I Don't see a problem, the original Kestrels ran on 73-77 octane and the next versions ran on 77 octane. Maybe I am wrong but using lower compression pistons and accepting 400-450hp doesn't seem that difficult.

Also agreed.

Now maybe the British could have used a larger truck and used paired .5in Vickers guns? or perhaps, given much earlier production of Oerlikon guns a single 20mm in the back the truck? But changing the air war over France or doing a lot to protect the British army in France? You are going to need hundreds of more SP AA guns, which means hundreds more left in France.

Early adoption of the Oerlikon guns always gets my vote. Even the non-perfect S cannons were heads and shoulders abvoe the best LMGs, as far as the air defense is the topic.
If there is a lot more of good AA guns, fighters and better bombers in France, there will be no need that British make the speedy exit since the Germans will took more time to advance, and the advance would've been more costly thing. A more orderly exit would've meant that British extract a good deal of their gear from the Continent.

 

[yulzari]

The Kestrel, if it can be run on the pool petrol also gets a nod.

An issue with the Kestrel is that the production line has been given over to making Merlin's. New tank Kestrels will need a new factory with new tooling etc. Existing Kestrels are being used in trainers as the aeroplanes come out of front line service. A good engine choice but it is not as simple as keeping on making a tank version of the Kestrel on the same production line. Ironically the older Napier Sea Lion is still in production for high speed motor boats and tank landing craft up into 1956.

 

[Shortround6]

In absolute terms (dictator powers) there is no reason the Kestrel could not have been used and built in it's own factory.
Meadows built well over 1700 of the 280hp flat 12s for the Covenanter. Vauxhall built over 5600 (plus spares) of the "twin six" for the Churchill.
The number of Liberties built was considerably larger and it went through several major changes.
But in practical terms (politics, money, pride, etc) the Kestrel needed a major change in thinking.
The two flat 12s offered the supposed easy solution of combining parts of existing 6 cylinder engines. It didn't work so well in practice. And while that offered a way to get into production quick when the size of the orders were small, when orders start to get into the low thousands and you have tied yourself to a compromise engine things don't look so good.
Back during WW I somebody had Rolls had said he would rather go to jail than see R-R engines built under license. Given the absolute disaster that some British companies made of the Hispano V-8 engine he had a valid point.

The other factor came in when the Army (war ministry ?) decided they absolutely, positively, without a shadow of doubt, needed 20hp per ton in their tanks and thus needed a 600hp engine in a 30 ton tank. 40mph Cromwells would rule the battlefield. That ruled out anything smaller than the Merlin. With hindsight we know that the suspensions were nowhere near capable of stand up to the strain of moving at those speeds despite some very widely copied photos.

There are photos taken of the same jump from different angles.

 

[z42]

Getting back more specifically to tanks. A 25 ton tank (give or take a few tons) that did 25mph with a medium 75mm gun (US M2ish?) would certainly have been a world leader in 1939-41. But could the British afford them in the numbers needed? Perhaps. They certainly spent a lot of money on tanks they could not use or shouldn't have used.

Such a tank at the start of the war is perhaps pushing credulity a bit far. Note however though that the Soviets had almost 1000 T-34s in service at the start of Operation Barbarossa in mid 1941. British tank designers and industry should have been capable of producing something similar in the same time frame.

Were Merlins realistically available for tank engines in the time period in question? Or was the Liberty the best option? Or a 3rd engine? The British wasted a lot of money on the large Meadows engine in the Covenanter. The engine in the Churchill worked but was it really better than an alternative.

Meteor was successfully tested in spring 1941. In a production tank by the end of the year? (If you otherwise have a good tank design, lengthen the hull a bit to fit the Meteor?)

Would a better tank have changed that? or was a combination of better equipment and better training and better tactics/doctrine needed?

A 75mm armed tank may have been able to put smoke in front of the Germans and close range with fewer/no causalities. But it does not solve many of the other issues that the British had.

Like I mentioned back on page 8 of this thread (British 1936-42 purchase options, logistics and export/import of military hardware ):

Sure, no objection there. It's easy to forget even the best tank in the world isn't worth much if it's employed incorrectly. It needs to be part of a well thought out combined arms system. OTOH without at least a half decent tank even a good combined arms doctrine will falter.

Of course, the doctrine informs which kind of tank is to be designed. And a good tank will allow the development of doctrine to make use of it. And combat experience will show whether peace time thought is worth anything, and (hopefully?) lead to better doctrine and equipment. So we have a chicken, an egg, and a potato; which comes first?

Jokes aside, the real answer is of course that it's an iterative process with feedback loops. All three affect each other.

 

[Elan Vital]

The rational for a 12 cylinder 165hp engine for a light tank rather escapes me
A 'twined' version of the 88hp six used in the earlier light tanks?

That flat 12 was also derived from a 6-cylinder Meadows so your "twinned" six functionally happened. I will note that twin engine setups can be pretty damn complex even compared to the work of designing a V12 derivative, and even new V12s, at least per Harry Ricardo which had quite some experience with engines (let alone tank ones!).

Ironically, this one was probably the only instance of a WW2 flat engine actually being beneficial, as it managed to fit above the transmission to save quite some length. Judging by the final weight of the Covenanters, the DAV didn't appear to yield any real savings. Both the Meadows DAV and the Bedford performed a little better in terms of power per displacement compared to the Liberty, but that didn't translate well to actual installed volume or weight.

In hindsight it's quite possible that they would have been even better off as 90 or 60 degree V12s, height wasn't really improved for the Bedford at least, as the studies for Meteor in the Black Prince showed you could fit the engine easily. The problem was more that the layout of the engine bay and transmission weren't practical to use the same setup as the A27 family.

Meadows built well over 1700 of the 280hp flat 12s for the Covenanter. Vauxhall built over 5600 (plus spares) of the "twin six" for the Churchill.

The two flat 12s offered the supposed easy solution of combining parts of existing 6 cylinder engines. It didn't work so well in practice. And while that offered a way to get into production quick when the size of the orders were small, when orders start to get into the low thousands and you have tied yourself to a compromise engine things don't look so good.


The other factor came in when the Army (war ministry ?) decided they absolutely, positively, without a shadow of doubt, needed 20hp per ton in their tanks and thus needed a 600hp engine in a 30 ton tank. 40mph Cromwells would rule the battlefield. That ruled out anything smaller than the Merlin. With hindsight we know that the suspensions were nowhere near capable of stand up to the strain of moving at those speeds despite some very widely copied photos.

High P/W ratios can be useful for things over than speed. That said, we indeed run into the whole issue of the incremental development of heavy duty suspensions to use the excess power. The A31 was the heaviest "Heavy Cromwell" with the OG suspension (32 tons). A44 was "Heavy Cromwell" Stage II with Comet suspension but a reinforced Cromwell turret because the production of Comet hulls would precede that of the turret. A32 at 34.5 tons was the heaviest "Heavy Cromwell" with straddle mounted pivot shaft bearing Christie, but the Heavy Comet (A35) weighed 36 tons so that was at least the actual maximum for that suspension. Ofc Comet itself was a demonstration of possible weights with its suspension.

All of those entered the stage where you could actually carry tactically useful armor against 75mm PaK 40, 4.5" on the turret and 4" on the hull for A31. Even Cromwell itself had been approved for 89mm frontal basis. Unfortunately, production would go forwards with 64mm on the hull and 64+13mm on the turret.

The late expansion of the A27 family doomed a lot of useful applications of the Meteor. Tanks with armor between Churchill and Heavy Churchill (Mark VII) included, sometimes with Comet turret or a 17pdr turret. Some of those may even have made it to the second half of 1944, but in late 1943 it was decided to gamble on a brand new Cruiser (A41) instead and to make do with Churchill family, Black Prince and Infantry Centurion (A45).

 

[Shortround6]

Jokes aside, the real answer is of course that it's an iterative process with feedback loops. All three affect each other.

A problem for the British was that feedback was broken/delayed.
A few days of fighting France with the Germans holding the battlefields didn't give much information back to the British.
The Early desert campaign against the Italians didn't provide much useful information. The vast majority of Italian tanks at the time being the 2 man tankettes armed with machine guns.
Italian use of radios was limited.
The Trip to Greece didn't add much to the British knowledge base, except for some things not to do.
The real British learning curve didn't start until the summer of 1941 and getting the real message from Egypt back to England seems to have taken a while.
Field commanders were screaming for HE ammo, capped AP, even AP machine gun bullets for over a year before they showed up. More spare parts instead of incomplete or not fully equipped new tanks (one tank showed up with only a tow rope for equipment, no tools of any sort).
A number of Crusaders had their engines damaged on the loading docks in England (running without coolant just before loading onto ships).
Granted it was several months to go around Africa with the supply ships but Field commanders were asking for stuff in the summer of 1942 that they should have been given in the fall of 1940. Not in new tanks but just ammo and spare parts and mechanical improvements of exiting designs.
Even a General who had been one of the leading proponents of "firing on the move" in the 1930s (before he had been posted to Egypt) was calling for the British to stop that kind of training in in 1942(?) as it wasn't working in the desert. It took a while for that to sink in in England.

 

[Shortround6]

That flat 12 was also derived from a 6-cylinder Meadows so your "twinned" six functionally happened. I will note that twin engine setups can be pretty damn complex even compared to the work of designing a V12 derivative, and even new V12s, at least per Harry Ricardo which had quite some experience with engines (let alone tank ones!).

yes, a Twin 6 sounds easy...............but turning two vertical sixes into a flat 12 is harder than making a V-12. In the V-12 you know you need a left and right block and left and right cylinder heads and a common crankcase and crankshaft. But at least the coolant and oil flow pretty much the same way.
In a flat twelve you also need left and right blocks and heads, or you have to be really tricky flipping the blocks and cylinders end for end. and now you have to figure out the carbs, and the oil flow, and the coolant flow and the distributer locations.
Some of the Meadows 6 cylinder engines used dual ignition. One plug in each side of the head. Meadows 6 used overhead valves it also had the intake and exhaust on opposite sides of the head. Churchill tank engine used flat heads with the dual ignition spark plugs in the top of the heads. It also had the intake and exhaust on the same side of the block (both were upper side of of engine in the tank for easier access). When you start redesigning things for easier access (the engine in the Covenanter was not based on any existing Meadows engine) you are not saving much.

. Both the Meadows DAV and the Bedford performed a little better in terms of power per displacement compared to the Liberty, but that didn't translate well to actual installed volume or weight.

There was no racing class that limited tank engines to a specific displacement

High P/W ratios can be useful for things over than speed.

It helps with hill climbing and obstacles. It means that the tank transmission can use fewer gears and the tank driver can concentrate on driving and not shifting gears like a madman.

I do wonder how the 21.25 liter Kestrel (or a Kestrel like engine) would compare the US Ford GAA engine of 18 liters that powered later Shermans and M-26 tanks of 36-37 tons and 46 tons respectively. The M-4s used a 5 speed transmission.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Meteor tank engine deliveries September 1942 to September 1944, table 27, from the September 1944 Ministry of Aircraft Production Statistical Bulletin, the table is also in October 1944 report, after that they drop the reporting.

September to December 1942, 10, 35, 30, 66

1943 per month, 87, 88, 79, 77, 70, 49, 71, 87, 97, 142, 132, 107

1944 per month, 160, 112, 147, 190, 243, 257, 220, 173, 195, 111,

According to Rolls Royce, 217 conversions to Kestrel XXX in 1939, 499 in 1940, 232 in 1941 and 11 January/February 1942. The Ministry of Aircraft Production says 228 Kestrel (mark not given) built Q2 and Q3/1940. Not sure whether the MAP figures are extra but probably not.

 

[Elan Vital]

A Spanish translation of a German meeting before the Battle of Barbarossa is rather funny in regards to the British:

Apuntes sobre lo discutido con el Führer en el Berghof el 26.05.41 (Chef H.Rüst.u.BdE., 31.05.1941)

La Panzerwaffe en base documentos originales

www.panzer-elmito.org

It becomes apparent that German development of more powerful AT weapons (long 5cm in Panzer IV, 88mm, 75mm conical bore, 105 and 128mm self-propelled) was not actually linked to any anticipated Soviet tanks, but to the anticipation that the British would realize the Matilda II was vulnerable to the 5cm and that the 2 pounder was obsolete, and as such that the British would deploy more powerful tanks. It was observed that the Italians performed poorly in part due to the lack of powerful AT weapons.

But as it turns out, more powerful British tanks didn't show up as early and as powerful as the Germans expected.

On my previous post regarding comparative production, now I have the German plans back in late June 40 (so representative of reactions to the French campaign):

Producción de carros de combate (Wi Rü Amt, 20.06.1940)

La Panzerwaffe en base documentos originales

www.panzer-elmito.org

 

[Elan Vital]

Having finished P.M. Knight's book on the A11 Infantry Tank Mk I, there are some interesting takeaways:

- E.M.C. Clarke started his discussions with Rolls-Royce for a tank Kestrel as early as December 1933, but since the Air Ministry had priority and the design staff was already fully engaged, so the War Office would have had to pay the full rate for any redesign and development work.

- Since April 1934 discussions on heavier armor to withstand AT weapons (the reference being a Vickers 20mm gun requiring up to 40mm of armor to withstand at close range), the main weight limit was the Class 18 bridge. The initial proposal was a 1" armour basis which led to A10E1 (which thus started as an Infantry tank), with provisions for 30mm under discussion. The A9 already existed in 1934 as a lighter alternative to the A7E3 which could use a single commercial engine. 30mm later became a standard for Medium Tanks in 1936. The A13 Cruiser was the oddball since it still started with 14mm bulletproof plate in 1936.

- The guidelines for what became A12 started in September 1936, initially with a preference for a single engine, enough power to achieve high average speeds even if the top speed remains limited, a 3-man crew (so 2 in the turret), and a 50mm armour basis. Later updated to 70mm basis and 3-man turret seemingly bypassing 60mm. The Class 25 bridge was likely developped after that change, since the initial idea was under or over 14 tons. Once again, the merit of starting even just the Meadows/Bedford "commercial" V12s earlier is apparent. I note that Covenanter was also meant to have a diesel engine option which if brought forward would have met the needs of A12 even better. After the Battle of France, the need for a more powerful engine for A12 was one of the post-battle assessments.

- The idea to make a lighter and simpler alternative to A12 using A10 components loaded to the maximum reliable weight of 16 tons (Valentine) were sketched out between January and April 1938. 50mm armour basis with 3-man turret, 60mm with 2-man turret. Both rejected due to either the 50mm armor or 2-man turret being undesirable. It's not until a year later in April 1939 that Valentine finally is accepted as is.
This is probably the most impactful change one could make with existing programs as going forward a year early would place it in early production in Summer 39 with probably several dozen in the BEF by the time of the Battle of France, with production already ramped up enough to recover more quickly after Dunkirk. This alone could easily multiply the number of available 2pdr-armed I tanks by 2 to 5.
Theoretically, Val could even have been conceptualized as early as A11 if Vickers had embarked on an I tank based on a 16 ton A10, or September 1936 if they had been informed of the early A12 spec.

- The Fa(s)t Mediums A14/15 start in April 1937, followed by the A16 and all get renamed to Heavy Cruisers. The Infantry Tanks were all the result of the "pessimists" who want tanks to have good protection like Sir Hugh Elles, Alexander Davidson and EMC Clarke, while the Cruisers and Fast Mediums were the result of the "optimists" like Percy Hobart, "Q" Martel and Liddel-Hart who thought speed would pay off and were also fond of the Medium tank concept with multiple turrets. The latter would eventually "coup" the tank research services.

- Tied to the aforementionned "coup", the non-negligible Continental Committment doctrine for the British Army was replaced by the "Limited Liability" doctrine promoted by Chamberlain, Liddel-Hart and Hore-Belisha. This deleted the Continental Committment, instead focusing further on air and naval rearmament while making major cuts in the Army and especially the Tank Programme, and emphasized the Middle East, and thus Cruisers instead of Infantry Tanks. The policy was only reversed in January 1939 with the Dutch War Scare which showed that France didn't want to intervene without British support, and the occupation of Czechia.
It is apparent that the year-long policy change did not allow the British to focus on warfare in Western Europe as much as they could have with a consistent policy, even if 1938 probably wouldn't have seen all that many more tank orders given the interim nature of A9-10-11 and the still recent development of A12 and A13.

This also shows the nuance in the claims that the Munich Agreements were all about saving time to rearm: it would be several more months before the Army itself got a beneficial policy reversal.

 

[Shortround6]

The British had built over 142 light tanks with one man turrets from 1931-1935 for both British and colonial use, exports are later.
The British had time to figure out the problems with one man turrets and indeed had switch to 2 man turrets in the light tanks in 1936 with the MK V with 22 produced, quickly followed by the MK VI light in 1936 with a larger turret.
Going back to the one man turret in the A 11 was certainly a retrograde step even if it bought thicker armor.
It may have been cheap but it's actual combat value was small for the what it did cost.
How many more A 10s or A 10 "supers" could have been built? Fewer tanks but more capable?
The A 9 was another example of trying to do a lot for not much money. The two Aux mg turrets were bad idea even on paper.
They needed to figure out what they wanted tanks to do and then design accordingly. A 9 had 3 Vickers machine guns which sounds impressive for shooting up infantry and soft targets,
However it only held 3000 rounds of MG ammo. The A 9 held 4000 round (?) and the MK VI light held 2500 rounds for it's .303 and 400 rounds for it's .5in
A 10 could hold 4000 rounds for it's two machine guns.
Did the British want to scare the enemy with lots of guns or did they want to fight for a longer period of time before having to pull back to re-arm?

The weight constraint for the A 13 III (Covenanter) and A 15Crusader really doomed the designs. The smaller hull and turret saved weight but not enough forcing problems with the drive trains and yet not providing enough protection. Also didn't provide enough room for growth. Also sacrificed vison for the commander.

They had viable paths to follow, they turned away from them in the interest of Cheapness.
The confusion is also shown by the A 14 and A 16 which were supposed to operate independently of the Infantry but were well over the weight limit of the existing bridges? Why spend money on prototypes then? and why restrict later designs to lower weight because of Bridges? unless the bridge restriction was cover for another reason?

 

[Elan Vital]

The British had built over 142 light tanks with one man turrets from 1931-1935 for both British and colonial use, exports are later.
The British had time to figure out the problems with one man turrets and indeed had switch to 2 man turrets in the light tanks in 1936 with the MK V with 22 produced, quickly followed by the MK VI light in 1936 with a larger turret.
Going back to the one man turret in the A 11 was certainly a retrograde step even if it bought thicker armor.

It's pretty much the result of picking the Mark IV Dragon and Ford V8 as the main automotive elements instead of A10 or other commercial elements. The book doesn't imply that any lower operational weight limit existed than 18 tons. So it was probably allowed to go heavier than the 11 tons of the A11.

It may have been cheap but it's actual combat value was small for the what it did cost.

How many more A 10s or A 10 "supers" could have been built? Fewer tanks but more capable?

Back when the Valentine/A10 "super" were mooted in early 1938, the debate was whether to go through with them or ordering another batch of 60 A11s, later increased to 79 to provide training vehicles to TA formations. Had they chosen Val/A10 "super", their production would most likely have started straight after the first batch of A11s in mid/late 1939.

Naturally if the idea had come up even earlier than early 1938, even more could be built by May 1940, but I think that once Limited Liability is cancelled the orders will pile up fast enough to avoid any gaps beyond the small order that may have happened in 1938. Logically Val/A10 "super" development would take place entirely in peacetime instead of partly wartime OTL, and early production may also start in peacetime, so you wouldn't get a literal "one year offset". Nonetheless it means that alt-May 1940 would look much closer to IRL late 1940 or early 1941 for Val production, and it will further add up later on.

I am curious about development as well. Earlier end of development for Mark I Val may mean that Vickers could proceed with the 3-man 2-pounder turret and other improvements possibly just shy of the Declaration of War, meaning that they may show up well earlier. This would make the 3-man 2 pdr turret a much more important milestone as 6 pdr production itself would still not be affected (unless we combine "early Val" timeline with 6 pdr with more ressources).

I don't know if Vals would really affect operations in France since historically, the Arras offensive didn't meet the bulk of German armor so the 2pdr wouldn't be all that important. Maybe the higher speed of Val compared to A11 and the 2-man turret could have some modest effect? Maybe given that Val is much more useful than A11, Vickers would have had the ressources and orders to ramp up production faster than A11 alone and this would increase the number of tanks in the BEF and not just their average quality?

But overall unless the British "I" tanks end up meeting large amounts of German armor, they probably wouldn't affect events on the ground enough. After France though, the benefits of early Val would allow either faster recovery and training of British Army Tank brigades and maybe allow increased "I" tank reinforcements to North Africa and Greece early in the war.

The weight constraint for the A 13 III (Covenanter) and A 15Crusader really doomed the designs. The smaller hull and turret saved weight but not enough forcing problems with the drive trains and yet not providing enough protection. Also didn't provide enough room for growth. Also sacrificed vison for the commanders.

Agreed. It is very apparent that even with the 340 hp of the Liberty the Cruisers could have done much better. They could have easily achieved at least the minimum armor level approved for Infantry tanks (60mm) in a frontal arc even if not in the >180° arc of the actual I tanks. And good 2 pounder ergos and vision with provisions for 6 pdr.

They had viable paths to follow, they turned away from them in the interest of Cheapness.
The confusion is also shown by the A 14 and A 16 which were supposed to operate independently of the Infantry but were well over the weight limit of the existing bridges? Why spend money on prototypes then? and why restrict later designs to lower weight because of Bridges? unless the bridge restriction was cover for another reason?

I believe that by April 1937 when the A14 and A15 were mooted, Class 25 bridges were alraedy in development for A12.
Maybe with the lighter Cruisers they believed that they wouldn't obtain enough Class 25 bridges and/or wanted the ability to use Class 18 and low capacity civilian bridges?

 

[hobbes154]

Going back to the wider topic of "What to make at home, what to import, what to export", this thread has gone more into improving aircraft and tank designs. Anyone think there are big macro-level changes in what the British should be producing themselves vs importing?

Worth remembering munitions were only a minority of Lend-Lease (scroll down for charts). Of that minority, aircraft were the biggest, then ammunition, then tanks.

If you make a better tank you don't need to import so many from the US, but that's only economically significant at the very end of our period.

I think the British should be producing a somewhat different mix of weapons themselves - more single seat fighters and fewer light bombers, more medium and fewer light tanks (and although it's strictly outside the topic, fewer big gun ships to free up resources for more tanks: those 1000 light tanks translate into perhaps 500 mediums which is max. 2 divisions without spares).

I don't think this implies big changes in imports. Don't want to cancel the Mustang, certainly! The P-40s, Hudsons, Catalinas, Marylands, Baltimores etc. all filled useful roles (though in the bigger scheme of things I wonder if it was worth Lockheed thinking about anything aside from sorting out the P-38 ASAP).

A few small thoughts after reading a lot of the posts:

• Mainly for cost reasons, but also a bit more power and reliability, I would licence produce the R-2600 in at least some of the factories that made the Hercules.
• (I could have sworn US towed 3" AT ammo was different from the AA gun & M10 but apparently I'm wrong.)
• Liberty was chosen over Lion as a tank engine for better running on low octane fuel, apparently this was an ignition system issue not compression ratio (which IIRC was lowered for the trials). I suppose the same might apply to the Kestrel but should be fixable with a bit of time and work?
• As someone said, whatever tank engine is chosen, it will need a new factory like the Liberty did.
• For tank guns, I think a hypothetical MV 6-pdr like Tony Williams' makes sense if you're stuck with historical British turret ring sizes, as long as it could fit and still keep a 3-man turret.
• If you're starting in 1936 with a clean sheet for both tank and gun I don't see any reason to go smaller than a 75mm/3" MV gun in about a 60" turret ring.
• The old 13-pdr 6cwt horse artillery gun was a very close match to the French 75 so a new gun loaded to higher pressures should be close to the 75mm QF. Old guns and ammo, if usable, would be a bit anaemic but I think still a decent option for most of our period. 1600 fps is not fantastic but still better than the 3/3.7" CS guns or the KwK 37 (going by the latter with APCBC, should easily beat the 2-pounder for penetration, assuming you can get a hit).
• Shortround, it's a bit funny to disparage the HE power of these options while also arguing 2-pdr HE was a big missed trick!
• For artillery, I like the idea of new build 4.5" and 6" howitzers just to reduce the number of calibers, also using larger calibers for a given weight shell and propellant gives you more velocity and less barrel wear. (Early WW2 British guns tended to use smaller calibers for given weight shells for reasons I've never understood, except for fitting the 25-pounder on the 18-pounder mountings.) The 6" at least had a fairly modern 86-pound shell. Newer guns could be loaded to higher pressure, have longer barrels and better range up to whatever weight limit you were willing to live with and what the shells could take.
• Submachine guns, sooner.

In general 1936-42 sounds like a lot of time but anything starting with a clean sheet at the beginning of that period is only going to be in service in sufficient numbers and reliability to make a difference near the end. I don't think any new combat aircraft designs with engines < Merlin will justify themselves. I remember Tony Williams' Foresight War had a POD in 1934 which allowed a few more changes.

Of course, all this depends on your preferred war strategy - are you just trying to perform better in the historical battles roughly as they happened (as FW did) or are you going for a big change like fighting over the Sudetenland in '38 or trying to win in France in '40? If the former you can take a bit more time to get e.g. your ideal tank right, if the latter then it's really just allocating priority and small tweaks to existing designs.