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For possible reference, here is the latest production forecast for tank production that I could find before the BoF:Getting back to the cost question.
The British in 1938-39 don't know that France will collapse in such a spectacular fashion they may think they need several thousand tanks over several years in France. Plus tanks for North Africa/mid east/far east in small numbers.
Large numbers of cheap (or inexpensive ) tanks or fewer numbers of expensive tanks?
The British did wind up getting a fair return on the Matilda but it was a slow start.
Only 2 in service at the start of Sept 1939. They built 2,987 of them total with production ending in Aug 1943 and 4 different companies built them at some point.
Interestingly they built 1,330 in 1942 alone so numbers in 1940-41 were never really high. Depending on source 1084 were sent to Russia but only 918 got there.
Britain was equipping themselves with American tanks and shipping a lot of their own tanks (Matildas and Valentines) to Russia in 1941-42.
The doctrine was not to fire whilst moving but that one could fire whilst moving and live fire trials found it was feasible to do so if needed. It allowed the tank to keep moving and maintain its status as a mobile target with a constantly altering range and possible jinking so making it a mobile target laterally also. Only then possible because the small size and weight of the period gun with its balance at the interior mantlet could be kept on target by the shoulder elevation of the gunner. What it could not do was hit an HE target given the gun in question which is a whole other matter. Once the gun got larger and heavier the shoulder elevation was no longer possible so the doctrine had to move to the same as other tank users. ie firing from the halt.Then we can throw in the stupid "fire while moving doctrine" that crippled long range shooting, even by the co-ax machine guns. had.
The transmissions/gearboxes on the Matilda II seems to be working in a decent order.Were Merlins realistically available for tank engines in the time period in question? Or was the Liberty the best option? Or a 3rd engine? The British wasted a lot of money on the large Meadows engine in the Covenanter. The engine in the Churchill worked but was it really better than an alternative.
What transmission/steering gear options do you really have? The 15-20 ton tanks can make do with clutch and brake steering. As the tank gets heavier a more sophisticated steering system becomes increasing desirable. Soviets made do with clutch and brake. They also broke down a lot. British used two alternatives to Clutch and Brake. Redundant or they didn't know?
The thread is about everything British, not just about a better tank. A better tank cannot save France, however the better tanks + self-propelled guns + SP AA vehicles + the better towed guns + the better AT guns + the better fighters + the better bomber might've seen Germans paying a far greater cost already in May of 1940, with knock-on effects as the war drags out.We have the hindsight of knowing that the British would get kicked out of France in June 1940 and not be engaged in any major tank warfare until the Greek campaign (not that they did much) and then the beginning battles in NA.
We also have the knowledge that no matter what kind of WW II tank(or even modern tank) the British had sent to France or Greece it wouldn't have made any difference (or more than a couple of days).
We also have the hindsight to know that many of the problems in NA were caused be not enough development/testing and lack of training and poor tactics and doctrine.
Would a better tank have changed that? or was a combination of better equipment and better training and better tactics/doctrine needed?
Would a tank using a medium 75 been able to bull it's way through the Halfaya defenses? Larger tank with less armor depending on it's own to 75mm guns to make up for the lack of artillery support against dug in (or behind stone/mud walls) or would it just have caused more German causalities without actually forcing it's way through the position?
Senior commanders had broken the Matilda regiments into squadron (company) sized detachments and then set up an unrealistic time table.
The "attack" was supposed to have begun at 5:40 but the battery Assigned to C squadron had gotten bogged down in the sand and didn't reach it's firing position. At 6:00 with firing going on to west the Commander of C company decided to attack without artillery support. It took the Germans a few hours but they destroyed 12 out 13 Matildas.
British want HE firing tanks to prevent another repeat, But supply of HE tank ammo doesn't solve the problem of poor deployment (using a single squadron/company to take a key defensive position) poor communications (was another artillery battery within range to support the key attack if it's own assigned battery ran into problems), a stick to the time table mentality. Then we can throw in the stupid "fire while moving doctrine" that crippled long range shooting, even by the co-ax machine guns. The lack of effective local smoke, only a few 4in smoke throwers (the 2in smoke mortar was not mounted in Matildas.)
Getting back to the cost question.
The British in 1938-39 don't know that France will collapse in such a spectacular fashion they may think they need several thousand tanks over several years in France. Plus tanks for North Africa/mid east/far east in small numbers.
Large numbers of cheap (or inexpensive ) tanks or fewer numbers of expensive tanks?
It also de-emphasized long range shooting and used a lower powered telescope (although going from 2.4-2.5 down to 1.9 is not a lot) with pretty much only cross hairsThe doctrine was not to fire whilst moving but that one could fire whilst moving and live fire trials found it was feasible to do so if needed. It allowed the tank to keep moving and maintain its status as a mobile target with a constantly altering range and possible jinking so making it a mobile target laterally also. Only then possible because the small size and weight of the period gun with its balance at the interior mantlet could be kept on target by the shoulder elevation of the gunner. What it could not do was hit an HE target given the gun in question which is a whole other matter. Once the gun got larger and heavier the shoulder elevation was no longer possible so the doctrine had to move to the same as other tank users. ie firing from the halt.
The Matilda used a 6 speed Wilson epicyclic pre-selector gearbox which certainly eased the drivers work load and if kept in adjustment, beat up the transmission less.The transmissions/gearboxes on the Matilda II seems to be working in a decent order.
I Don't see a problem, the original Kestrels ran on 73-77 octane and the next versions ran on 77 octane. Maybe I am wrong but using lower compression pistons and accepting 400-450hp doesn't seem that difficult.The Kestrel, if it can be run on the pool petrol also gets a nod.
Using twin engines requires more volume and it can make maintenance more difficult. It was done but it was not ideal.Twinning the AEC petrol engine (= 270 HP) from the Valentine also gives more than what Matilda II had.
Most of the better ground stuff would not have cost the Germans much and just given the Germans better stuff to use later.The thread is about everything British, not just about a better tank. A better tank cannot save France, however the better tanks + self-propelled guns + SP AA vehicles + the better towed guns + the better AT guns + the better fighters + the better bomber might've seen Germans paying a far greater cost already in May of 1940, with knock-on effects as the war drags out.
Yes and it took until mid 1942 to get them into the production and they had a considerable trouble getting them to work.In 1940, they have plans for buying 40 ton tanks,
Agreed.Using twin engines requires more volume and it can make maintenance more difficult. It was done but it was not ideal.
I Don't see a problem, the original Kestrels ran on 73-77 octane and the next versions ran on 77 octane. Maybe I am wrong but using lower compression pistons and accepting 400-450hp doesn't seem that difficult.
Now maybe the British could have used a larger truck and used paired .5in Vickers guns? or perhaps, given much earlier production of Oerlikon guns a single 20mm in the back the truck? But changing the air war over France or doing a lot to protect the British army in France? You are going to need hundreds of more SP AA guns, which means hundreds more left in France.
An issue with the Kestrel is that the production line has been given over to making Merlin's. New tank Kestrels will need a new factory with new tooling etc. Existing Kestrels are being used in trainers as the aeroplanes come out of front line service. A good engine choice but it is not as simple as keeping on making a tank version of the Kestrel on the same production line. Ironically the older Napier Sea Lion is still in production for high speed motor boats and tank landing craft up into 1956.The Kestrel, if it can be run on the pool petrol also gets a nod.
Getting back more specifically to tanks. A 25 ton tank (give or take a few tons) that did 25mph with a medium 75mm gun (US M2ish?) would certainly have been a world leader in 1939-41. But could the British afford them in the numbers needed? Perhaps. They certainly spent a lot of money on tanks they could not use or shouldn't have used.
Were Merlins realistically available for tank engines in the time period in question? Or was the Liberty the best option? Or a 3rd engine? The British wasted a lot of money on the large Meadows engine in the Covenanter. The engine in the Churchill worked but was it really better than an alternative.
Would a better tank have changed that? or was a combination of better equipment and better training and better tactics/doctrine needed?
A 75mm armed tank may have been able to put smoke in front of the Germans and close range with fewer/no causalities. But it does not solve many of the other issues that the British had.
Sure, no objection there. It's easy to forget even the best tank in the world isn't worth much if it's employed incorrectly. It needs to be part of a well thought out combined arms system. OTOH without at least a half decent tank even a good combined arms doctrine will falter.
Of course, the doctrine informs which kind of tank is to be designed. And a good tank will allow the development of doctrine to make use of it. And combat experience will show whether peace time thought is worth anything, and (hopefully?) lead to better doctrine and equipment. So we have a chicken, an egg, and a potato; which comes first?
That flat 12 was also derived from a 6-cylinder Meadows so your "twinned" six functionally happened. I will note that twin engine setups can be pretty damn complex even compared to the work of designing a V12 derivative, and even new V12s, at least per Harry Ricardo which had quite some experience with engines (let alone tank ones!).The rational for a 12 cylinder 165hp engine for a light tank rather escapes me
A 'twined' version of the 88hp six used in the earlier light tanks?
High P/W ratios can be useful for things over than speed. That said, we indeed run into the whole issue of the incremental development of heavy duty suspensions to use the excess power. The A31 was the heaviest "Heavy Cromwell" with the OG suspension (32 tons). A44 was "Heavy Cromwell" Stage II with Comet suspension but a reinforced Cromwell turret because the production of Comet hulls would precede that of the turret. A32 at 34.5 tons was the heaviest "Heavy Cromwell" with straddle mounted pivot shaft bearing Christie, but the Heavy Comet (A35) weighed 36 tons so that was at least the actual maximum for that suspension. Ofc Comet itself was a demonstration of possible weights with its suspension.Meadows built well over 1700 of the 280hp flat 12s for the Covenanter. Vauxhall built over 5600 (plus spares) of the "twin six" for the Churchill.
The two flat 12s offered the supposed easy solution of combining parts of existing 6 cylinder engines. It didn't work so well in practice. And while that offered a way to get into production quick when the size of the orders were small, when orders start to get into the low thousands and you have tied yourself to a compromise engine things don't look so good.
The other factor came in when the Army (war ministry ?) decided they absolutely, positively, without a shadow of doubt, needed 20hp per ton in their tanks and thus needed a 600hp engine in a 30 ton tank. 40mph Cromwells would rule the battlefield. That ruled out anything smaller than the Merlin. With hindsight we know that the suspensions were nowhere near capable of stand up to the strain of moving at those speeds despite some very widely copied photos.
A problem for the British was that feedback was broken/delayed.Jokes aside, the real answer is of course that it's an iterative process with feedback loops. All three affect each other.
yes, a Twin 6 sounds easy...............but turning two vertical sixes into a flat 12 is harder than making a V-12. In the V-12 you know you need a left and right block and left and right cylinder heads and a common crankcase and crankshaft. But at least the coolant and oil flow pretty much the same way.That flat 12 was also derived from a 6-cylinder Meadows so your "twinned" six functionally happened. I will note that twin engine setups can be pretty damn complex even compared to the work of designing a V12 derivative, and even new V12s, at least per Harry Ricardo which had quite some experience with engines (let alone tank ones!).
There was no racing class that limited tank engines to a specific displacement. Both the Meadows DAV and the Bedford performed a little better in terms of power per displacement compared to the Liberty, but that didn't translate well to actual installed volume or weight.
It helps with hill climbing and obstacles. It means that the tank transmission can use fewer gears and the tank driver can concentrate on driving and not shifting gears like a madman.High P/W ratios can be useful for things over than speed.
It's pretty much the result of picking the Mark IV Dragon and Ford V8 as the main automotive elements instead of A10 or other commercial elements. The book doesn't imply that any lower operational weight limit existed than 18 tons. So it was probably allowed to go heavier than the 11 tons of the A11.The British had built over 142 light tanks with one man turrets from 1931-1935 for both British and colonial use, exports are later.
The British had time to figure out the problems with one man turrets and indeed had switch to 2 man turrets in the light tanks in 1936 with the MK V with 22 produced, quickly followed by the MK VI light in 1936 with a larger turret.
Going back to the one man turret in the A 11 was certainly a retrograde step even if it bought thicker armor.
Back when the Valentine/A10 "super" were mooted in early 1938, the debate was whether to go through with them or ordering another batch of 60 A11s, later increased to 79 to provide training vehicles to TA formations. Had they chosen Val/A10 "super", their production would most likely have started straight after the first batch of A11s in mid/late 1939.It may have been cheap but it's actual combat value was small for the what it did cost.
How many more A 10s or A 10 "supers" could have been built? Fewer tanks but more capable?
Agreed. It is very apparent that even with the 340 hp of the Liberty the Cruisers could have done much better. They could have easily achieved at least the minimum armor level approved for Infantry tanks (60mm) in a frontal arc even if not in the >180° arc of the actual I tanks. And good 2 pounder ergos and vision with provisions for 6 pdr.The weight constraint for the A 13 III (Covenanter) and A 15Crusader really doomed the designs. The smaller hull and turret saved weight but not enough forcing problems with the drive trains and yet not providing enough protection. Also didn't provide enough room for growth. Also sacrificed vison for the commanders.
I believe that by April 1937 when the A14 and A15 were mooted, Class 25 bridges were alraedy in development for A12.They had viable paths to follow, they turned away from them in the interest of Cheapness.
The confusion is also shown by the A 14 and A 16 which were supposed to operate independently of the Infantry but were well over the weight limit of the existing bridges? Why spend money on prototypes then? and why restrict later designs to lower weight because of Bridges? unless the bridge restriction was cover for another reason?