Can some of the explanation for the P-38's greater success in the Pacific be attributed to poorer Japanese pilots?

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Actually, I didn't mean like Tommy Lynch. He was hit in an engine by ground fire while strafing a barge and bailed out too close to the ground for his parachute to open. He didn't ignore Japanese pilots or consider them inferior, at least while fighting them.

Most pilots that are hit by ground fire don't watch the tracer all the way to their airplane ... they get hit by shells that aren't tracers and they never see them until they are hit, so it's tough to dodge what you can't see coming at you.

I was talking more about guys who got ambushed air-to-air and never saw their attacker, or who decided the Zero they were about to attack was easy meat, and so didn't assume the opponent was any good ... and turned out to be completely wrong. Sometimes they got away with it; sometimes they didn't. Same goes for less-than-aware Axis pilots. You HAVE to assume your opponent is at least as good as you are and his airplane is running perfect that day, or you may make bad mistakes. The margin for bad mistakes is generally low.

It's better to be proven wrong 40 times (he wasn't such a good pilot, after all) and be a top Ace than to be proven right (Damn! He IS good!) once and die.
 
You mean like Tommy Lynch?
I thought you were talking about my earlier comment when I mentioned him, my bad

Actually, I didn't mean like Tommy Lynch. He was hit in an engine by ground fire while strafing a barge and bailed out too close to the ground for his parachute to open. He didn't ignore Japanese pilots or consider them inferior, at least while fighting them.
:thumbright:
 
Regarding ground fire, I have mentioned an instructor in the USAF told us of flying spotter missions in a T-6 over Korea. He said the AAA was fascinating to watch. It looked like ping pong balls floating up, until you realised they were floating right through your wing.
 
Given that the P-38 enjoyed much greater success in the Pacific than it did in Europe, is it reasonable to wonder whether at least part of that success was due to the Japanese air forces already suffering from reduced pilot competence by the time P-38s began to arrive?

It seems to be universally accepted that the last vestiges of combat effectiveness in Japanese aviation disappeared with the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. But the results of that battle were so one-sided that it seems that Japanese aviation was already ineffective by mid-1944. And I have read several items lately that suggested that Midway not only deprived the Imperial Navy of most of its good aircraft carriers, but also dealt a heavy blow to the air wing of the navy. And given that Japanese aviation training was far below the quality of American training even in 1942, it seems reasonable to suppose that by early '43 and the abandonment of Guadalcanal, a great many inadequately trained new pilots were mingled with the few remaining good veteran pilots, and the overall decline in Japanese pilot quality would already have been apparent.

That's what I'm thinking, anyway. Anybody here with more knowledge than I have care to chime in? What were the pilots themselves (on both sides) saying in 1943?
I'm going to have to go against your premis and say the P-38 was a good design evolving into a great one, which entered the war early enough to face quality pilots. If I remember correctly, there were P-38s flying with the Cactus Airforce out of Henderson…probably the earliest land based field hosting offensive operations against the Japanese, all else being carrier initiated.
 
I'm going to have to go against your premis and say the P-38 was a good design evolving into a great one, which entered the war early enough to face quality pilots. If I remember correctly, there were P-38s flying with the Cactus Airforce out of Henderson…probably the earliest land based field hosting offensive operations against the Japanese, all else being carrier initiated.
I'm not quite clear about which part of my premise you don't completely agree with.
I don't dispute that the P-38 was a great design (although there were some problems caused by the complexity of the plane, making for high pilot workload). But although it was used in Europe, it was not considered a great plane by the high brass there, whereas in the Pacific theater it was much more effective. I'm just wondering whether part of that success was due to the Japanese air forces already suffering from a drop in quality, even as early as early 1943. And I'm posting this as a question, not as an argument that I am prepared to defend.
 
I think a lot has to do with the relative performance of the opposing aircraft.
The P-38 did not have much of a speed edge against German fighters, and was not as maneuverable. Then you have the mission profile, close escort, which limits your tactics and gives the initiative to the interceptor.
In the Pacific, the P-38 was superior to anything the Japanese had, and they had a greater freedom of action.
 
I think a lot has to do with the relative performance of the opposing aircraft.
The P-38 did not have much of a speed edge against German fighters, and was not as maneuverable.

This actually surprised me (as quoted from Wikipedia):
". . .a dogfight with the twin-engined fighter was daunting because its turning radius was much smaller, and it could quickly get on the tail of the Bf 109. Franz Stigler, an ace with 28 kills, flew Bf 109s against the P-38 in North Africa. Stigler said the Lightning "could turn inside us with ease."

However, the roll rate left a lot to be desired, at least at first. So "maneuverability" has more than one component.
 
Northern Europe in wintertime, especially, and at high altitudes, gets COLD, which caused a lot of well-known issues discussed here ad nauseum.
Southeast Asia had no issues like that, and the P-38 worked a lot better under those conditions, the engines worked better, and the pilots didn't get frostbite, either. Everything that caused problems in Northern Europe didn't happen in the tropics.
 
We'll just overlook that whole Aleutians campaign.
Of course, there the only opposition were a few floatplanes. And the weather.
The Aleutians were cold, wet and miserable. but they were not European cold.
Dutch Harbor is rarely colder than freezing, however it only gets above 50 degrees F for about 4 months and since it rains a lot of the time (dry period has 40% chance of rain every day) and it is windy working on aircraft when it is 40-50 degrees, raining and windy is not pleasant. But you don't run into quite the same temperatures they flying over Europe in mid winter.
 
This actually surprised me (as quoted from Wikipedia):
". . .a dogfight with the twin-engined fighter was daunting because its turning radius was much smaller, and it could quickly get on the tail of the Bf 109. Franz Stigler, an ace with 28 kills, flew Bf 109s against the P-38 in North Africa. Stigler said the Lightning "could turn inside us with ease."

However, the roll rate left a lot to be desired, at least at first. So "maneuverability" has more than one component.



I knew Gunther Rall pretty well. He said below 15,000 they couldn't touch a P-38. Above 15,000 and the '109 was a tad bit superior (F Model) above 22,000 and the 109 was a bit more than a tad superior. However, he said if you found yourself in front of the guns you were in deep trouble. The firepower concentration was so great that if the P-38 got a piece of you, it usually got all of you.
 
I'm not quite clear about which part of my premise you don't completely agree with.
I don't dispute that the P-38 was a great design (although there were some problems caused by the complexity of the plane, making for high pilot workload). But although it was used in Europe, it was not considered a great plane by the high brass there, whereas in the Pacific theater it was much more effective. I'm just wondering whether part of that success was due to the Japanese air forces already suffering from a drop in quality, even as early as early 1943. And I'm posting this as a question, not as an argument that I am prepared to defend.
I was just stating that I wouldn't agree that the success of the P-38 had any relation to the over all decline in skill of Japanese pilots. If the way I stated that belief offended you in some way, I am very sorry and will attempt to watch the way I word any future responses to your posts.
 
I think a lot has to do with the relative performance of the opposing aircraft.
The P-38 did not have much of a speed edge against German fighters, and was not as maneuverable. Then you have the mission profile, close escort, which limits your tactics and gives the initiative to the interceptor.
In the Pacific, the P-38 was superior to anything the Japanese had, and they had a greater freedom of action.
I agree with much of what you say. Another factor that I believe held back the performance of fliers in P-38s was due to the lack of a really good program to put pilots into the twin-engine fighters after spending all of their previous hours in single engine planes. Pair sub-standard training with needed improvements in the controls/instruments that are beyond the scope of my non-pilot mind and not immediately available to me right now and ETO pilots weren't getting all they could from the P-38s.

In the PTO, the greater freedom of action, less crowded skies, and long distances needed to fly likely have these pilots more time to settle in and learn the plane. A positive wildcat factor impossible to measure, for pilots in the Pacific is the instruction given to various units by Charles Lindbergh.
 
I was thinking of the other Tommy, McGuire.

Agree. I'm not so sure he took the Japanese pilot lightly as much as he forgot to jettison tanks before the fight. Might be the same thing, I can't really say, but could well be. He was known to be a bit arrogant, ot at least "filled with self-confidence." Perhaps he didn't think it would be much of a fight because he felt he was unseen or something. It might be in the MACR (I mean any radio communication verbage of the attack). It could well be that he just didn't think he would be turning tightly and could attack and get away easily.

It obviously didn't work out quite as he expected.
 
I think a lot has to do with the relative performance of the opposing aircraft.
The P-38 did not have much of a speed edge against German fighters, and was not as maneuverable. Then you have the mission profile, close escort, which limits your tactics and gives the initiative to the interceptor.
In the Pacific, the P-38 was superior to anything the Japanese had, and they had a greater freedom of action.

The A6M and Ki-43 were much more maneuverable than anything in the ETO. You might recall they sent some Spitfires to Darwin and the Spits didn't fare so well against the A6M. In fact, they were handed their collective hats. The Japanese warplanes were quite effective and the P-38 engine issues and lack of initial training in twins were worked out by the time it got to the Pacific in numbers. When the P-38J-20 came out, with hydraulic ailerons, it could also out-roll anything around and, while it couldn't quite turn-match a Zero, it was no slouch, either, and could turn well enough to get in some hits while escaping by climbing away easily.

The German Luftwaffe might very well have had trouble with the Japanese if they had fought each other. I think they would have prevailed, but it wouldn't have been a cake-walk.
 
The A6M pilot had an instinctive desire to turn into the fight, but he can't - he has to try and get away from the faster plane - and then his crappy controls lock up

Turning into the fight was not an option for an A6M pilot of the other guy kept his speed up.

Turning to face the attack was a major point of Boelcke's Dicta. I'd bet the Japanese too understood that guns are useless if not pointed at the enemy. Not only that, they could hope to catch the American as he recovered his dive and started his zoom?
 

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