Can some of the explanation for the P-38's greater success in the Pacific be attributed to poorer Japanese pilots? (1 Viewer)

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Regarding the OP's question, I can't speak to the IJA, but IJN flight/maintenance crews didn't start seeing dangerous depletion until after the Solomons carrier battles. Of course they had losses at CS and Midway, but it didn't start biting them in the ass until after Santa Cruz, by my readings. Add in the fact that their pilot-training was so exacting and the need for pilots is increasing. By spring or summer of 43, I think they started seeing the effects. Remember too that Bettys sank USS Chicago in Jan of that year. Those guys weren't rookies.

That in no way negates GregP GregP 's point that you couldn't count on any opposing pilot being a rookie. Only a fool would do that.
 
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Regarding the OP's question, I can't speak to the IJA, but IJN flight/maintenance crews didn't start seeing dangerous depletion until after the Solomons carrier battles. Of course they had losses at CS and Midway, but it didn't start biting them in the ass until after Santa Cruz, by my readings. Add in the fact that their pilot-training was so exacting and the need for pilots is increasing. By spring or summer of 43, I think they started seeing the effects. Remember too that Bettys sank USS Chicago in Jan of that year. Those guys weren't rookies.

That in no way negates GregP GregP 's point that you couldn't count on any opposing pilot being a rookie. Only a fool would do that.
Good points, Thumper. :)
 
Which was how you killed an A6M, dive on him, force him to break and try and dive away, he died.
Once F4F pilots grasped not to turn with a Zero, it was a zero.
Same lesson the RAF spitfires learned hard defending the Darwin area.
 
The Japanese warplanes were quite effective and the P-38 engine issues and lack of initial training in twins were worked out by the time it got to the Pacific in numbers.
Actually Greg, the first deployments of P-38s to the SWP did not have the same issues as encountered in the ETO. First, many early P-38 drivers either had considerable time in the aircraft or were veterans who transitioned from P-39s and P-40s, these from the 39th and 9th fighter squadrons. They made a good account of themselves on Dec. 27, 1942 over Port Moresby and this action was a sign of things to come. IIRC this was Bong's first aerial combat. I believe at the time they were flying P-38Gs and Hs and did not receive J models until 1944. Even before getting the "J," 5th AF P-38s dominated most areas where they operated from.
 
I was just stating that I wouldn't agree that the success of the P-38 had any relation to the over all decline in skill of Japanese pilots. If the way I stated that belief offended you in some way, I am very sorry and will attempt to watch the way I word any future responses to your posts.
Nope, no offense taken at all. Just wasn't clear about your point. Thanks for explaining.
 
Regarding the OP's question, I can't speak to the IJA, but IJN flight/maintenance crews didn't start seeing dangerous depletion until after the Solomons carrier battles. Of course they had losses at CS and Midway, but it didn't start biting them in the ass until after Santa Cruz, by my readings. Add in the fact that their pilot-training was so exacting and the need for pilots is increasing. By spring or summer of 43, I think they started seeing the effects. Remember too that Bettys sank USS Chicago in Jan of that year. Those guys weren't rookies.

That in no way negates GregP GregP 's point that you couldn't count on any opposing pilot being a rookie. Only a fool would do that.
Thanks. This is beginning to get into the actual question I am asking: when did pilots (on either side) begin to notice that Japanese effectiveness overall was declining?
 
Actually Greg, the first deployments of P-38s to the SWP did not have the same issues as encountered in the ETO. First, many early P-38 drivers either had considerable time in the aircraft or were veterans who transitioned from P-39s and P-40s, these from the 39th and 9th fighter squadrons. They made a good account of themselves on Dec. 27, 1942 over Port Moresby and this action was a sign of things to come. IIRC this was Bong's first aerial combat. I believe at the time they were flying P-38Gs and Hs and did not receive J models until 1944. Even before getting the "J," 5th AF P-38s dominated most areas where they operated from.

Yah, you're right.

Early Allison had the infamous backfire screens ... or not; depended on the crew chief and pilot. The screens worked, but robbed the engine of power progressively as the backfire screens got clogged slowly. Fuel pooled in the early intake manifolds. In reality, the Allison only backfired if you tried to start it lean. As long as you were rich, no backfires. Later, with the -87 and beyond, the turbulator was installed and the fuel intake pooling disappeared ... and so did the need for backfire screens.
 
Yah, you're right.

Early Allison had the infamous backfire screens ... or not; depended on the crew chief and pilot. The screens worked, but robbed the engine of power progressively as the backfire screens got clogged slowly. Fuel pooled in the early intake manifolds. In reality, the Allison only backfired if you tried to start it lean. As long as you were rich, no backfires. Later, with the -87 and beyond, the turbulator was installed and the fuel intake pooling disappeared ... and so did the need for backfire screens.
From what I understand some units removed the backfire screens in the field although I never seen any documented confirmation of this. By the time the early P-38s were in the SWP, the pilots knew how to deal with this, maybe it came from their crew chiefs or input from field reps. During the early 80s I worked with a few guys who were inspectors on the P-38 flightline. They told me the biggest issue they had while starting was fuel vapors igniting in the intercooling during starting. I was told you kept cranking the engine and slowly pulled the mixture back to cut-off. They never specified what model this was on.
 
Thanks. This is beginning to get into the actual question I am asking: when did pilots (on either side) begin to notice that Japanese effectiveness overall was declining?

I have to assume -- and we know the dangers involved in that exercise -- that the Japanese noticed it first. They were the ones having to accelerate training, after all. I've only seen reference to it in Sakai's autobiography where he talks about recovering from his wounding over Guadalcanal and upon return to active-duty finding the younger fliers subpar; but that was 1944, and it was also only one man's view. But I think the Japanese knew certainly by Philippine Sea and perhaps even in the air combat over Rabaul and surroundings by late 1943.
 
Yah, you're right.

Early Allison had the infamous backfire screens ... or not; depended on the crew chief and pilot. The screens worked, but robbed the engine of power progressively as the backfire screens got clogged slowly. Fuel pooled in the early intake manifolds. In reality, the Allison only backfired if you tried to start it lean. As long as you were rich, no backfires. Later, with the -87 and beyond, the turbulator was installed and the fuel intake pooling disappeared ... and so did the need for backfire screens.
The Allison's backfired in the P-40s and maybe the P-39s and early P-51s? It wasn't just the P-38s.
More than one early P-40 was lost due to backfires setting fire to the aircraft. At least one had the upper cowl (the long air intake) blown off in flight.
Early fixes included a heavier construction intake manifold system to contain small backfires inside the manifolds. Another fix for this problem was changing the valve lash/clearance tolerance. Increasing the valve clearance from 0.010 to 0.015 solved a lot of the backfire problems with the very early Allisons. Getting rid of the back fire screens took a lot longer.

The backfire screens caused as much trouble as they solved. How fast the screens degraded depended on the fuel and local conditions. In some cases the colored dye in the fuel was contributing to the plugged screens let alone dust and dirt. In some cases inspection showed the backfire screens had broken or ruptured and were no longer giving the protection they were supposed to while still degrading performance. In some cases the crews were soaking the screens in fuel to clean them (no spare screens) and if not properly dried might lead to problems (at the least with more rapid build up of dirt.)
 
Actually Greg, the first deployments of P-38s to the SWP did not have the same issues as encountered in the ETO. First, many early P-38 drivers either had considerable time in the aircraft or were veterans who transitioned from P-39s and P-40s, these from the 39th and 9th fighter squadrons. They made a good account of themselves on Dec. 27, 1942 over Port Moresby and this action was a sign of things to come. IIRC this was Bong's first aerial combat. I believe at the time they were flying P-38Gs and Hs and did not receive J models until 1944. Even before getting the "J," 5th AF P-38s dominated most areas where they operated from.
My Uncle Jimmy was transferred to a P-39 training unit after Pearl Harbor and he hated every minute of it and when he had the opportunity to sign on to P-38 training, he jumped at it.
He was well trained on the P-36 and had some time on the P-40, but it seems to the family that according to his memoirs, that he was willing to try anything to get away from the P-39, which he did not like at all.
 
My Uncle Jimmy was transferred to a P-39 training unit after Pearl Harbor and he hated every minute of it and when he had the opportunity to sign on to P-38 training, he jumped at it.
He was well trained on the P-36 and had some time on the P-40, but it seems to the family that according to his memoirs, that he was willing to try anything to get away from the P-39, which he did not like at all.
P39 Expert just woke from a nightmare in a cold sweat.

Well done.
 
P39 Expert just woke from a nightmare in a cold sweat.

Well done.
Remember, any pilot who actually flew a P-39 and had a negative view of the aircraft was to be dismissed as "hearsay" and "third party opinion" according to the expert. :lol:

My Uncle did have high praise for the P-38, however.

Of course, I suppose this could be considered "hearsay" and "third party opinion", too...

:evil4:
 
The A6M pilot had an instinctive desire to turn into the fight, but he can't - he has to try and get away from the faster plane - and then his crappy controls lock up

Turning into the fight was not an option for an A6M pilot of the other guy kept his speed up.
Macandy,

The best defense is a good offense. Stolen quote but appropriate. If you are bounced by a plane with a speed advantage, the one thing you aren't going to do is get away by diving. Diving away slows things down for the offender and helps him sweeten his gun shot. Should our unlucky Zero pilot pick up the incoming P38 (or F6F/ F4F/F4U) his best avenue for survival is to turn into his attackers (with enough range), or do a guns defense (they are shooting or about to) then try to go offensive or get into a defensive crouch. Surviving the initial skirmish is paramount, and now that you are aware it changes the game a bit.

The Zero pilot will not go into a high speed defensive dive as he knows his controls get very stiff at higher speeds (that can equal a death sentence) and plays away from his strengths (slow speed maneuvering type fight). The reason the heavy controls are mentioned is for when Allied pilots get bounced, or in an unfavorable position, the leaving option might be applicable and once going fast enough a few check turns should keep the Zero from bringing his guns to bear (bare?).

I have no doubt that what you described did occur, but should not have with adequate training.

Cheers,
Biff
 
The P-38 was a bit of an cursed plane for Asia-Pacific USAAF aces, they lost Lynch, Goodrich, Duke, Westbrook, McGuire in a 10 month period 1944/45. It was a trend that surprised me when I began following the trail.

Also several P-38's and at least one P-38 ace was lost in the Battle of the Bismark sea, which otherwise was a overwhelming allied victory. A surviving pilots account said he was shocked when the P-38 flight leader led them into a low altitude fur ball with many Japanese fighters.

The P-40 ace DeHaven (who later flew P-38's) says " if the speed bled off a P-38 which happened very easily, it could be in very serious trouble against a Japanese fighter, many of our men found out the hard way...."
 
The P-38 was a bit of an cursed plane for Asia-Pacific USAAF aces, they lost Lynch, Goodrich, Duke, Westbrook, McGuire in a 10 month period 1944/45. It was a trend that surprised me when I began following the trail.
I don't know your point or the significance of this. Each one was lost under different circumstances. These guys, besides being top aces were flying in combat and sometimes you die. Count how many aces made it home.
 
I just haven't seen another US fighter type which lost so many aces in 1944/45.

The P-38 was simply much faster than Japanese planes and had great range for the pacific. It may have had mild low speed characteristics due to its contra-rotating props but it might have built up false confidence. Reminds me of a B-52 pilot who was keen on hot-dogging it till he augered it in.
 
I just haven't seen another US fighter type which lost so many aces in 1944/45.
P-51 ETO

Hoffer 325th FG

357 FG
Preddy
Adams
Browning
Hiro
Murphy
Pierce

Just a very small example of a few units and I could probably triple that list. You need to do some research and explore HOW these aces were killed. BTW, the P-38 was the primary AAF fighter in the PTO until the P-51 came along so I think you're going to see high attrition numbers based on the quantity of aircraft being operated in theater.

The P-38 was simply much faster than Japanese planes and had great range for the pacific. It may have had mild low speed characteristics due to its contra-rotating props but it might have built up false confidence.
OK - I'll be blunt - total BS! Once again explore the training and the pilot experience of those who flew the aircraft in the PTO. I suggest reading 2 books, "Peter Three Eight" By John Stanaway and P-38 Lightning at War by Ethel and Christy. You're making a lot of assumptions with little or nothing to back up your statements.
Reminds me of a B-52 pilot who was keen on hot-dogging it till he augered it in.
Not even close to the same thing! You really need to step away from the flight sim games!!!!
 
Macandy,

The best defense is a good offense. Stolen quote but appropriate. If you are bounced by a plane with a speed advantage, the one thing you aren't going to do is get away by diving. Diving away slows things down for the offender and helps him sweeten his gun shot. Should our unlucky Zero pilot pick up the incoming P38 (or F6F/ F4F/F4U) his best avenue for survival is to turn into his attackers (with enough range), or do a guns defense (they are shooting or about to) then try to go offensive or get into a defensive crouch. Surviving the initial skirmish is paramount, and now that you are aware it changes the game a bit.

The Zero pilot will not go into a high speed defensive dive as he knows his controls get very stiff at higher speeds (that can equal a death sentence) and plays away from his strengths (slow speed maneuvering type fight). The reason the heavy controls are mentioned is for when Allied pilots get bounced, or in an unfavorable position, the leaving option might be applicable and once going fast enough a few check turns should keep the Zero from bringing his guns to bear (bare?).

I have no doubt that what you described did occur, but should not have with adequate training.

Cheers,
Biff

I'm no pilot, but I reckon turning into the attack makes target acquisition harder and shortens firing time for the attacker as well. Both are good things when you're being bounced, I bet.
 

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