Glider
Captain
Forgive the brainstorm. For 30mm read 1.1, it was the 1.1 that was a poor gun.
Carriers!!
- Thread starter MP-Willow
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
syscom3
Pacific Historian
I would like to clarify my statement about the IJN not shooting down one US airplane at Midway using their AAA.
I should have said, "during the USN carrier based aircraft torpedo and dive bombing attacks in late morning on June 4, the IJN AAA accounted for no shootdowns".
I should have said, "during the USN carrier based aircraft torpedo and dive bombing attacks in late morning on June 4, the IJN AAA accounted for no shootdowns".
Glider
Captain
I have seen the official review that the IJN prepared after the battle and they certainly claims a number of planes. I know all AA guns overclaimed but in a battle like that I admit to being suprised that they didn't hit a thing.
carpenoctem1689
Airman 1st Class
- 285
- Sep 10, 2005
Obviously they must have hit something, with that many guns firing they were bound to have hit something. Regardless of firing arcs and loading speeds on the IJN 25mm which i know werent great, but come on, with that many men firing for their lives, someone would have to get lucky.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/25_60.htm
http://www.combinedfleet.com/13_76.htm
those are some links to IJN AAA guns, the top being 25mm and differing mounts and specs, and the bottom one being 13mm..as you can tell by the specs, nither were spectacular, but hey, their rifles, tanks, aircraft (later on) or grenades werent so hot either, but they all did their fair share of damage
http://www.combinedfleet.com/25_60.htm
http://www.combinedfleet.com/13_76.htm
those are some links to IJN AAA guns, the top being 25mm and differing mounts and specs, and the bottom one being 13mm..as you can tell by the specs, nither were spectacular, but hey, their rifles, tanks, aircraft (later on) or grenades werent so hot either, but they all did their fair share of damage
syscom3
Pacific Historian
In the spring of 1942, AAA of both the US and IJn was still lacking. The US had the edge with the 5". But the 1.1" and 25mm guns were essentially useless.
One thing to remember about the IJN guns...... the effective rate of fire was way low due to the constant need to have to reload them. Plus they were short range weapons.
Plus, IJN naval doctrine had the carriers give themselves "lots of searoom" between the escorts and each carrier. Essentially, there was little if any mutual AA support.
Also couple in the few escorts afforded the carrier group, and its easy to see why AA accounted for nothing. All USN loss's were due to the Zero fighters.
One thing to remember about the IJN guns...... the effective rate of fire was way low due to the constant need to have to reload them. Plus they were short range weapons.
Plus, IJN naval doctrine had the carriers give themselves "lots of searoom" between the escorts and each carrier. Essentially, there was little if any mutual AA support.
Also couple in the few escorts afforded the carrier group, and its easy to see why AA accounted for nothing. All USN loss's were due to the Zero fighters.
gordon ingham
Recruit
- 3
- Apr 19, 2006
on my time on vengeance it was dwscribed as a light fleet carrier.bu the time i joined escort carrier rajah the hanger had been converted to bunks for the purpose of bringing home servicemen for demob
gordon ingham
Recruit
- 3
- Apr 19, 2006
excuse the spelling on my previous.getting old you know
HealzDevo
Staff Sergeant
But the whole idea of the aircraft I thought was to be able to extend gunnery range and act as spotters as well as help out in air-defence. It wasn't that bad a concept being able to use aircraft to spot targets. This is the predecessor of the whole modern concept of having guided missile destroyers with helicopter decks on them don't forget. It was the best way they could do it as they really didn't have the ability to make useful helicopters for this task. The Germans did have ideas to do this but the helicopters were not really suitable for sea operations let alone land ones under fire...
Glider
Captain
The concept of using aircraft to assist with the spotting of gunfire did exist and that was why Battleships and Cruisers were equipped with aircraft. Spotting is a highly skilled task depedent on close co-operation between the plane and the ship. As far as I am aware it only worked a couple of times during the war. Once at the Battle of River Plate and once in Norway when the Warspite used a floatplane to warn of enemy ships when she went down the Fijord and attacked a U Boat that was inside.
Carriers Prewar as far as the UK were concerned were to attack and slow down the enemy BB ships to allow our BB's to catch and attack the enemy ships.
The USA and IJN were way ahead of the RN in their tactical thinking already equipping and training their carriers with planes capable of destroying enemy fleets.
Interesting note. The RN did not rely on the fighter aircraft to defend the carrier from air attack. They would launch what they had, but the main defence was based on the AA guns on board the carriers. This is why the British ships carried far more AA guns than USN and IJN vessels pre war and why the 4.5in guns on the Invincible class could fire across the flight deck. In theory an attack from one side of the ship could be met by the fire of all 16 4.5in guns. This alone shows how backward the RN was in its tactical thinking before the war.
Carriers Prewar as far as the UK were concerned were to attack and slow down the enemy BB ships to allow our BB's to catch and attack the enemy ships.
The USA and IJN were way ahead of the RN in their tactical thinking already equipping and training their carriers with planes capable of destroying enemy fleets.
Interesting note. The RN did not rely on the fighter aircraft to defend the carrier from air attack. They would launch what they had, but the main defence was based on the AA guns on board the carriers. This is why the British ships carried far more AA guns than USN and IJN vessels pre war and why the 4.5in guns on the Invincible class could fire across the flight deck. In theory an attack from one side of the ship could be met by the fire of all 16 4.5in guns. This alone shows how backward the RN was in its tactical thinking before the war.
HealzDevo
Staff Sergeant
Okay, but wouldn't that be dangerous to the launching pilots who are launching from the carrier?
syscom3
Pacific Historian
The USN used it to good effect in the pre-invasion bombardments of many a Pacific atoll.
Glider
Captain
The fighters would be launched before the enemy aircraft started the bombing but you are of course correct. If the carrier had to land aircraft on during a raid, then the guns would have to be carefully controlled.
One particually gutsy Itanian fighter once joined the hurricanes landing on during a raid, joined the circuitm lowered his flaps and undercarridge, then dropped his bomb as he overflew the carrier. Not a gun fired at him and one witness said they were almost glad to see him get away with it for his nerve. The bomb bounced off the armoured deck and went over the side before exploding so no harm was done to either side.
HealzDevo
Staff Sergeant
Still it goes to show a big problem with this method, separating out the enemy from the friendly...
R Leonard
Staff Sergeant
Doctrine, doctrine, doctrine.
Not to sound snippy, but I wonder if there is some doubt as to whether anyone had thought of this before.
IFF was installed on USN carrier aircraft starting in the spring of 1942. By the fall of 1942 all carrier aircraft had IFF. Fighters got the first IFF units, and in the early days, since availability was limited, section and division leaders flew the planes that had the units. This was helpful not only in identifying good guys from bad, but, and this was the primary purpose, it allowed the fighter direction officer (FDO) to identify specific CAP divisions and sections for interceptions. Eventually all fighters had IFF and the VB and VT types went through the same process.
Standard USN doctrine was for non-CAP aircraft to orbit at a defined location away from the AAA envelope if the carrier task group was under air attack. Generally, this location was also away from the already determined direction(s) of the enemy attack. This would also tend to keep them clear of the defending CAP and eliminate wasted effort in chasing down friendlies. Witness Yorktown's returning SBD strike on the IJN carriers at Midway being ordered away from the Task Force area as a Japanese attack force approached. They, mostly, ended up landing aboard Enterprise and Hornet . . . none were shot down by friendly fire.
Even before the US carriers entered combat the danger to CAP aircraft entering their own AAA envelope was well recognized. This danger had, in the absence of firm established doctrine had to be balanced with the immediacy of each situation. What was not clear was at what point should the CAP break off and let the AAA take over. Most of the senior fighter pilots were well aware of the deficiencies in capability of the 5in 25cal dual purpose gun with the Mk 19 director and the overall reliability problems of the 1.1 inch AA batteries. For close in work there were .50 cal machine guns most of which were on their way to, if not already, replacement by 20mm cannon. In some squadrons it was felt the CAP had better chance of taking out attacking aircraft than AA fire. Witness the statements of then Lieutenant Noel Gayler who had flown in both VF-3 and, at Coral Sea, in VF-2 in an interview with BuAer on 16 June 1942:
. . .
"Q. What's the doctrine on fighters getting away from AA fire?
A. We're trying like the devil to get our AA to knock off firing when they see our fighters actually attacking enemy planes, but they haven't been doing it and we've been disregarding the AA.
"Q. You haven't any doctrine about fighters pulling off when they get to certain sector?
A. No, we don't. We talked that problem over and Jimmy Thach decided – and we all agreed with him – that when the enemy planes were in that position the AA was not going to stop them, and as we were the only thing that was going to stop them, we might as well pursue the attacks right on in, which is what we did."
. . .
This willingness to enter the AA envelope led Thach, himself to comment on 18 August 1942 in hid BuAer interview:
. . .
"Q. What is the effectiveness of enemy anti–aircraft fire?
A. The enemy anti–aircraft fire is not quite as effective as out own anti–aircraft fire, that is, the anti–aircraft fire from our carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. I have done, roughly, two–thirds of my fighting in our own anti–aircraft fire and the other third in the Jap anti aircraft fire, and I think that is of little value in stopping determined attack. They may shoot down a few planes, but both the Japanese and our attacking pilots ignore it completely. Our USF 74 during peacetime was written with major emphasis on tactics to avoid enemy anti–aircraft fire. We have discovered that the enemy fighter is the thing to fear, instead of anti–aircraft fire.
"Q. What coordination, if any, is employed with friendly anti–aircraft fire?
A. Well we like to coordinate our attacks with friendly anti–aircraft fire, but to date have been unable to prevent anti–aircraft fire from opening up at our airplanes when the enemy is in the vicinity."
Of course from the ship drivers' point of view, if an enemy plane approaches it should be taken under fire as soon as possible, which, of course, conflicts with the fighter pilot's perception that his plane is the best weapon for the protection of the ship(s). The fallacy in theory of fighter plane only defense was that the average fighter squadron on a US carrier prior to June 1942 was about 18 planes. Rarely, never actually, were all 18 in the air at once for the purpose of repelling an enemy attack. Usually, not more than six were up at a time and that number was, more often than not (discounting a few rather spectacular successes) insufficient to dispose of all incoming attackers. So, that's where the AAA fire comes in. At Midway, USN VF squadrons were averaging about 27 F4Fs each, but the same situation prevailed, some aircraft on strike escort, some on CAP, some ready for launch, and some being serviced, - the result of CAP rotation - never was an entire squadron in the air at one time on one CAP mission.
Eventually, like every thing else, practices became standard procedures and the best, or the ones that made the most sense, were written into doctrine. By the end of 1943, standard USN doctrine was for CAP aircraft, controlled by the FDO, to conduct their interceptions outside the AAA envelope. It was recognized that the CAP pilots were responsible for their own safety in this regard. Improvements in AAA had a lot to do with this. The appearance of the 5 in 38 cal dual purpose gun (especially in dual mounts), the 40 mm AA gun and the galleries of 20mm cannon, not to mention the general increase in the number of AAA mounts, generally, per ship; and such developments as the VT fuse, made approaching a task group, or even an individual ship, that was expecting trouble just a bit dicey. Not to say there were not instances where individual CAP aircraft pursued their targets into the AAA envelope, but such a practice was by then greatly discouraged as shipboard gunners, having precious little time to distinguish identities of aircraft approaching at 300 plus mph, were already weapons free and more than willing to engage anything with wings.
Late war USN doctrine was for returning strike aircraft to return to the task group by a roundabout course, i.e., not a direct return course; with IFF on approach a picket destroyer; perform a prescribe approach maneuver; and be visually inspected (this was referred to as "de-lousing") to ensure there were no enemy aircraft tagging along. Failure to engage the IFF and perform the maneuver of the day meant approaching aircraft would be brought under fire and CAP vectored to dispose of those leaking from the picket's AAA envelope. Every now and then somebody would forget and every now and then they would pay the price.
With regard launching, or recovering, planes into the AAA envelope by a carrier, generally, a carrier maneuvering to avoid incoming attacks does not have time to steady up into the wind and launch or recover aircraft; it did not pay to run along in a predictable straight line while enemy aircraft are queuing for their runs, so it was not done. CAP aircraft were already aloft, not launched as the enemy came in, non CAP were ordered elsewhere as above. Plus, of course, everyone knew any aircraft an active AAA envelope was just a target.
Really, all of this was thought of by the folks involved. Early on there was little integration of AAA and CAP and in spite of enthusiasm to pursue incoming raider up to the very last second the CAP folks and the FDOs really knew that the fighters needed to get clear as incoming attacks approached the envelope. FDOs would warn off their CAPs and sent them off to more profitable targets, by the same token, non CAP aircraft would be sent somewhere out of the line of fire. As time went on and radar control improved and coordination improved, the break off of the CAP and hand off to the task group AAA batteries became more controlled, allowing the attackers little breathing space between the end of fighter interceptions and a lot of lead coming their way from the water's surface.
So, in a nutshell, carrier operations amidst AAA fire were no mystery. Everyone understood the danger and, for the most part, adhered to practices which tended to reduce the danger to friendly aircraft.
Rich
Not to sound snippy, but I wonder if there is some doubt as to whether anyone had thought of this before.
IFF was installed on USN carrier aircraft starting in the spring of 1942. By the fall of 1942 all carrier aircraft had IFF. Fighters got the first IFF units, and in the early days, since availability was limited, section and division leaders flew the planes that had the units. This was helpful not only in identifying good guys from bad, but, and this was the primary purpose, it allowed the fighter direction officer (FDO) to identify specific CAP divisions and sections for interceptions. Eventually all fighters had IFF and the VB and VT types went through the same process.
Standard USN doctrine was for non-CAP aircraft to orbit at a defined location away from the AAA envelope if the carrier task group was under air attack. Generally, this location was also away from the already determined direction(s) of the enemy attack. This would also tend to keep them clear of the defending CAP and eliminate wasted effort in chasing down friendlies. Witness Yorktown's returning SBD strike on the IJN carriers at Midway being ordered away from the Task Force area as a Japanese attack force approached. They, mostly, ended up landing aboard Enterprise and Hornet . . . none were shot down by friendly fire.
Even before the US carriers entered combat the danger to CAP aircraft entering their own AAA envelope was well recognized. This danger had, in the absence of firm established doctrine had to be balanced with the immediacy of each situation. What was not clear was at what point should the CAP break off and let the AAA take over. Most of the senior fighter pilots were well aware of the deficiencies in capability of the 5in 25cal dual purpose gun with the Mk 19 director and the overall reliability problems of the 1.1 inch AA batteries. For close in work there were .50 cal machine guns most of which were on their way to, if not already, replacement by 20mm cannon. In some squadrons it was felt the CAP had better chance of taking out attacking aircraft than AA fire. Witness the statements of then Lieutenant Noel Gayler who had flown in both VF-3 and, at Coral Sea, in VF-2 in an interview with BuAer on 16 June 1942:
. . .
"Q. What's the doctrine on fighters getting away from AA fire?
A. We're trying like the devil to get our AA to knock off firing when they see our fighters actually attacking enemy planes, but they haven't been doing it and we've been disregarding the AA.
"Q. You haven't any doctrine about fighters pulling off when they get to certain sector?
A. No, we don't. We talked that problem over and Jimmy Thach decided – and we all agreed with him – that when the enemy planes were in that position the AA was not going to stop them, and as we were the only thing that was going to stop them, we might as well pursue the attacks right on in, which is what we did."
. . .
This willingness to enter the AA envelope led Thach, himself to comment on 18 August 1942 in hid BuAer interview:
. . .
"Q. What is the effectiveness of enemy anti–aircraft fire?
A. The enemy anti–aircraft fire is not quite as effective as out own anti–aircraft fire, that is, the anti–aircraft fire from our carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. I have done, roughly, two–thirds of my fighting in our own anti–aircraft fire and the other third in the Jap anti aircraft fire, and I think that is of little value in stopping determined attack. They may shoot down a few planes, but both the Japanese and our attacking pilots ignore it completely. Our USF 74 during peacetime was written with major emphasis on tactics to avoid enemy anti–aircraft fire. We have discovered that the enemy fighter is the thing to fear, instead of anti–aircraft fire.
"Q. What coordination, if any, is employed with friendly anti–aircraft fire?
A. Well we like to coordinate our attacks with friendly anti–aircraft fire, but to date have been unable to prevent anti–aircraft fire from opening up at our airplanes when the enemy is in the vicinity."
Of course from the ship drivers' point of view, if an enemy plane approaches it should be taken under fire as soon as possible, which, of course, conflicts with the fighter pilot's perception that his plane is the best weapon for the protection of the ship(s). The fallacy in theory of fighter plane only defense was that the average fighter squadron on a US carrier prior to June 1942 was about 18 planes. Rarely, never actually, were all 18 in the air at once for the purpose of repelling an enemy attack. Usually, not more than six were up at a time and that number was, more often than not (discounting a few rather spectacular successes) insufficient to dispose of all incoming attackers. So, that's where the AAA fire comes in. At Midway, USN VF squadrons were averaging about 27 F4Fs each, but the same situation prevailed, some aircraft on strike escort, some on CAP, some ready for launch, and some being serviced, - the result of CAP rotation - never was an entire squadron in the air at one time on one CAP mission.
Eventually, like every thing else, practices became standard procedures and the best, or the ones that made the most sense, were written into doctrine. By the end of 1943, standard USN doctrine was for CAP aircraft, controlled by the FDO, to conduct their interceptions outside the AAA envelope. It was recognized that the CAP pilots were responsible for their own safety in this regard. Improvements in AAA had a lot to do with this. The appearance of the 5 in 38 cal dual purpose gun (especially in dual mounts), the 40 mm AA gun and the galleries of 20mm cannon, not to mention the general increase in the number of AAA mounts, generally, per ship; and such developments as the VT fuse, made approaching a task group, or even an individual ship, that was expecting trouble just a bit dicey. Not to say there were not instances where individual CAP aircraft pursued their targets into the AAA envelope, but such a practice was by then greatly discouraged as shipboard gunners, having precious little time to distinguish identities of aircraft approaching at 300 plus mph, were already weapons free and more than willing to engage anything with wings.
Late war USN doctrine was for returning strike aircraft to return to the task group by a roundabout course, i.e., not a direct return course; with IFF on approach a picket destroyer; perform a prescribe approach maneuver; and be visually inspected (this was referred to as "de-lousing") to ensure there were no enemy aircraft tagging along. Failure to engage the IFF and perform the maneuver of the day meant approaching aircraft would be brought under fire and CAP vectored to dispose of those leaking from the picket's AAA envelope. Every now and then somebody would forget and every now and then they would pay the price.
With regard launching, or recovering, planes into the AAA envelope by a carrier, generally, a carrier maneuvering to avoid incoming attacks does not have time to steady up into the wind and launch or recover aircraft; it did not pay to run along in a predictable straight line while enemy aircraft are queuing for their runs, so it was not done. CAP aircraft were already aloft, not launched as the enemy came in, non CAP were ordered elsewhere as above. Plus, of course, everyone knew any aircraft an active AAA envelope was just a target.
Really, all of this was thought of by the folks involved. Early on there was little integration of AAA and CAP and in spite of enthusiasm to pursue incoming raider up to the very last second the CAP folks and the FDOs really knew that the fighters needed to get clear as incoming attacks approached the envelope. FDOs would warn off their CAPs and sent them off to more profitable targets, by the same token, non CAP aircraft would be sent somewhere out of the line of fire. As time went on and radar control improved and coordination improved, the break off of the CAP and hand off to the task group AAA batteries became more controlled, allowing the attackers little breathing space between the end of fighter interceptions and a lot of lead coming their way from the water's surface.
So, in a nutshell, carrier operations amidst AAA fire were no mystery. Everyone understood the danger and, for the most part, adhered to practices which tended to reduce the danger to friendly aircraft.
Rich
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Thanks Leonard.
HealzDevo
Staff Sergeant
Interesting, so AAA at the Battle of Coral Sea was thought to be almost useless by the fighter pilots? At least that is my interpretation of the above once the enemy pilot got beyond a certain point...
stug3
Staff Sergeant
HMS VICTORIOUS
Steam can be seen venting from the catapult towards the front of the flight deck.
Steam can be seen venting from the catapult towards the front of the flight deck.
stug3
Staff Sergeant
Operation PICKET I: Supermarine Spitfire Mark VB(T), BP844, the first of a further nine Spitfires to reinforce the RAF on Malta, taking off from the flight deck of HMS EAGLE with Squadron Leader E J "Jumbo" Gracie at the controls. These Spitfires, equipped with 90-gallon ferry drop tanks, flew to Ta Kali to re-equip No. 126 Squadron RAF, which Gracie was to command. BP844 was shot down over Malta, with the loss of its pilot, on 2 April 1942.
Operation PICKET I: RAF pilots walk towards their aircraft on the flight deck of HMS EAGLE after receiving their final instructions, before flying a reinforcement of nine Supermarine Spitfires to Ta Kali, Malta.
Operation PICKET I: RAF pilots walk towards their aircraft on the flight deck of HMS EAGLE after receiving their final instructions, before flying a reinforcement of nine Supermarine Spitfires to Ta Kali, Malta.
vinnye
Senior Airman
It is interesting to see how few aircraft are on the deck in the photos of HMS Eagle, if that were a shot of a USN carrier there would be lots of aircraft parked on deck. This is one reason why USN carriers had a greater striking capability compared to RN carriers. I would rather not have all that fuel etc on deck during a Kamikaze attack!
stug3
Staff Sergeant
Douglas TBD-1 Devastators of Torpedo Squadron 6 (VT-6) unfolding their wings on the deck of USS Enterprise (CV-6) prior to launching for attack against four Japanese carriers on the first day of the Battle of Midway. Established as VT-8S in 1937, the squadron was redesignated VT-6 that same year. Accepting delivery of its first TBD-1 aircraft in 1938, the squadron operated from USS Enterprise (CV-6). Following the entry of the United States into World War II, VT-6 participated in hit and run raids against the Marshalls and Wake Island. Launched on the morning of 4 June 1942, against the Japanese carrier fleet during the Battle of Midway, the squadron lost ten of fourteen aircraft during their attack.
The USS Yorktown on fire after being hit by Japanese bombers on the morning of 4th June 1942. Damage control parties were able to bring matters under control within an hour. When the second wave of Japanese planes arrived they believed she had already been sunk and that they were attacking another US carrier.
USS Yorktown (CV-5) is hit on the port side, amidships, by a Japanese Type 91 aerial torpedo during the mid-afternoon attack by planes from the carrier Hiryu, in the Battle of Midway, on 4 June 1942. Yorktown is heeling to port and is seen at a different aspect than in other views taken by USS Pensacola (CA-24), indicating that this is the second of the two torpedo hits she received. Note very heavy anti-aircraft fire.
The burning Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu, photographed by a plane from the carrier Hosho shortly after sunrise on 5 June 1942. Hiryu sank a few hours later. Note collapsed flight deck over the forward hangar.
Contemporary film of the battle directed by John Ford:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7OBw0r28qC0
The USS Yorktown on fire after being hit by Japanese bombers on the morning of 4th June 1942. Damage control parties were able to bring matters under control within an hour. When the second wave of Japanese planes arrived they believed she had already been sunk and that they were attacking another US carrier.
USS Yorktown (CV-5) is hit on the port side, amidships, by a Japanese Type 91 aerial torpedo during the mid-afternoon attack by planes from the carrier Hiryu, in the Battle of Midway, on 4 June 1942. Yorktown is heeling to port and is seen at a different aspect than in other views taken by USS Pensacola (CA-24), indicating that this is the second of the two torpedo hits she received. Note very heavy anti-aircraft fire.
The burning Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu, photographed by a plane from the carrier Hosho shortly after sunrise on 5 June 1942. Hiryu sank a few hours later. Note collapsed flight deck over the forward hangar.
Contemporary film of the battle directed by John Ford:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7OBw0r28qC0
Last edited:
