Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send?

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There have been mentions that the Brits should have preemptively occupied French Indo-China
This part needn't ignite war with Japan, provided the Brits get to FIC before the Japanese. Ideally, when the BEF is sent to France in 1939/40 a British Indian division or two plus a RAF squadron are entrusted to FIC command as a mini-BEF. When France falls in June 1940, the FIC CnC can either demand the British leave or welcome them as a counter or even, albeit a short deterrent to the coming Japanese.
Roosevelt pushed American involvement in the war as far as he politically could before pearl Harbor. The AVG is as much help as can be gotten and not any sooner.
Did the AVG ever consider moving to Malaya?
 
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The problem is that there wasn't a "division or two" available to be sent to FIC. In November 1940, the British Army force in all of Malaya Command comprised 17 battalions....it's little more than a single division. There's no way the British Army was in a position to find more divisions in the summer of 1940 after leaving most of its heavy equipment in France.

The Indian units that were sent to reinforce Malaya in 1941 were, in general terms, poorly trained and equipped. Even then, the divisions were under-strength and totally inadequate for the task that was asked of them.
 
Did the AVG ever consider moving to Malaya?

I doubt if anyone in the leadership of the AVG even considered service anywhere other than China. The US, at least significant elements in the US, had proprietary feelings towards China, but not towards members of the British Commonwealth.
 

Hi

Why in 1939/40 would Britain be sending troops to defend a French Colony when they already had a much smaller army than the French? There was a shortage of troops and equipment to defend the British Empire let alone defend the French Empire as well, especially when at the start of the war no one was expecting France to fall. Britain was not stupid and they were not going to start a third front unless they needed too, so any attack on the Japanese in Thailand can be ruled out as well before the Japanese make a move. Any deterrence of the Japanese during 1939-41 would have to have been undertaken by the USA as the British (French and Dutch as well) were too committed elsewhere, this appears not to be possible because of the US political situation, despite the rhetoric against Japan from the USA, therefore all that is left is to wait for the Japanese to act.

Mike
 
I would note that the original BEF sent to France in the fall of 1940 was 7 divisions or the equivalent of 7 divisions, it took a while to bring the BEF up to the 10 division strength it had in April of 1940. So, scraping up troops and equipment for another couple of divisions would be a bit difficult. The BEF was not particularly well equipped or perhaps I should say it was not equipped as well as some of the generals wanted. AA equipment was pretty much a joke (so was a lot of other peoples) Heavy artillery was in short supply and even the division's field artillery was a somewhat spotty collection.
 
To set up to make a difference whatever might be sent has to be sent in the summer of 1941. It goes by ship so has to be prepared and loaded weeks before it arrives and then be unloaded, assembled and moved to it's bases which need to have all the 'stuff' to operate it and arm it, also from ships loaded in the summer of 1941.

Given what was done during the preceding 12 months or so in defending the UK, taking East Africa from the Italians, dealing with assorted troubles in the Middle East, defeating the French in Syria, defeated the French in Madagascar, sending vital material to the Soviet Union, fighting a war in Greece as well as the major action in the Western Desert, whilst being heavily bombed and maintaining shipping across the globe and having fought and lost major actions in Norway and France just before it was not all that unreasonable to gamble on simply deterring Japan before 1942. The miracle was that they actually did what they did in the time and circumstances. We see it with perfect hindsight but what you gave Malaya (and Burma) you took away from an active front during a period when there was a perception that an invasion attempt on the UK was a real possibility and that sea communication with the UK in danger of being degraded severely.

There was much more to it than airborne Top Trumps and video game play. Middle East Command of the RAF pitched it realistically when they offered obsolete spare Gladiators etc.It was what was on hand to spare in the overall WW2 'game' at that time 12 months after France etc. had fallen.

Analysis later of the Japanese view of the actions in Malaya show that they were having troubles and running near empty at times and the OTL opposing forces with 1945 level training and experience with 1941 kit could have given them a stiff time.

Veering somewhat from the strict OP. I would send them in early 1941 force multipliers in early warning (human, air and radar) hardware and organisation together with a staff structure to kick the OTL forces into rapid action and realistic and appropriate training. There was nothing wrong with the troops etc. on hand. Only a management failure of leadership and a political failure to force Malaya into a war economy. Sending new toys would not be a substitute, although making defending Malaya and Burma easier of course (you have to see them as one entity strategically).

If you do send new toys they have to be troop ship killers even if they take great losses in doing so. IOTL they sent Vildebeests against the Japanese navy so there is little worse that an ATL could send. So what can carry a torpedo that you can load onto a ship in the summer of 1941 that is going spare? That is my refinement of the OP question.
 
Yes, I'm a little too ambitious in the earlier post. My goal was to have something, anything flying the British flag in FIC to counter the demands Japan was putting on the Vichy government to allow Japanese forces to enter FIC.

Japan was not ready in Sept 1940 to go to war with Britain, and may have held back if there was a flight of Vilderbeests and a battalion of Indian troops in FIC. Perhaps not, but Japan's first move may have been to demand that Britain withdraw from FIC now that Vichy has acquiesced to Japanese entry. How would Churchill respond?
 
I doubt if anyone in the leadership of the AVG even considered service anywhere other than China. The US, at least significant elements in the US, had proprietary feelings towards China, but not towards members of the British Commonwealth.

Chennault kept a third of the AVG in Burma, near the Brits at Mingaladon, until Burma fell. They had several satellite airstrips they could operate from, and did.
 
Chennault kept a third of the AVG in Burma, near the Brits at Mingaladon, until Burma fell. They had several satellite airstrips they could operate from, and did.

Yes, but the primary function of that detachment was defence of the Burma Road. The AVG didn't operate "near the Brits" in Burma, it operated from RAF facilities, indeed without RAF support the AVG probably couldn't have existed.
 
Actually, it wouldn't have put the onus on "the Allies". It would have put the onus entirely on the UK.
But not for long. The Japanese reaction would almost certainly have forced Roosevelt to take offensive action before Pearl Harbor could happen, committing the US to an unpopular war without a unifying event to sway public opinion. Given the state of US armed forces at the time, it would have likely gone badly for us for longer than it historically did.
Cheers,
Wes
 

Wes,

Not sure I agree. Roosevelt was steadfast in maintaining the line that US forces would not be used to defend or deter attacks against British Imperial outposts. Churchill tried numerous times to persuade Roosevelt to base a cruiser squadron or destroyer flotilla in Singapore, all to no avail. Yes, the ABDA conferences were proceeding but Roosevelt was very attuned to US public opinion which was broadly opposed to joining "another European war" or helping prop up imperial powers.

It's an interesting question of whether the US would have entered the war against Japan without a trigger like the attack on Pearl Harbor. The presence of US forces in the Philippines was clearly the catalyst but I wonder what might have happened had Tokyo accepted the risk and not directly attacked the US? My suspicion is that the US would have been forced into the war eventually, but probably not for some time in 1942 or, perhaps, even into 1943. Under those circumstances, we'd be living in a very different world today.

Cheers,
Mark
 

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