Since they couldn't compute exact strength, they usually erred on the side of caution. That's why a modern plane rated to a given amount seems flimsy to an older design. It actually is, in a way, since people can better compute what the exact limit is, they can build right onto that limit.
If you really wanted to evaluate strength, you'd want to evaluate an old plane's strength with modern technology; then use the figures you got out of that as a baseline figure, and you'd be building as tough as the past.
That had to also do with older-fashioned ideas about how a design should last as long as the customer wants it to. If you want to keep it a long time, we'll keep repairing it. Boeing, from what it appeared, seemed to subscribe less to the idea: The 707 for example was expected to last 40,000 hours. While the plane could probably be repaired and maintained past that point, there was the presumption that people would probably just buy the newer model.
This idea, when carried to conclusion, results in what's called planned obsolescence: You design a product to fail after a certain amount of time, so people would have to buy a newer model. I'm not a big fan of this practice.
An interesting thing was MacD / Boeing had gone to the USAF asking for money plus an old Eagle so they could test it to destruction to determine its actual failure point in hours. The USAF said nope, so the engineers did some calculations to determine best guess when the average jet would fail. They had a formula that included hours, over Gs plus who knows what else. They came up with 12000 hours. The MOGUARD Eagle that broke up in mid air was put thru the formula and was determined to have about 11700 hours ish on it when it failed with a defective structural part.
Not bad hypothesizing on the engineers part, that includes the guys who designed and built as well as their protégés who figured out the failure formula.
Cheers,
Biff