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Adler I prefaced the question with "if they had located the carriers", (either in Pearl or known to be in San Diego). I agree with you that the fact they didn't find them historically was a huge part of Nagumo's decision. They made a big mistake by not having a way for their spies to get the message to Nagumo, and time the strike accordingly.
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Would the japanese have been successful launching a "Third wave"?
If the Japanese had found the US Carriers at Pearl Harbour, should they have risked a third wave?
If I have the data correct, the first wave landed back on the carriers at 10 am, the second wave at 12 noon. The Japanese spent another hour or two searching for the US Carriers, at which point it was decided by Nagumo that the risks of a third wave were too great.
If the US Pacific carriers were all accounted for (either sunk at Pearl or seen at anchor in San Diego), the Japanese could have re-armed the first wave aircraft for another attack and launched right away without losing time searching for the Carriers.
The third wave as advocated by Genda would have targeted the fuel tanks, repair shops, sub base and the cruisers destroyers at Pearl {5 out of 8 cruisers 26 of 29 destryers were undamaged following the second wave}
What would have been the result?
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As for fighters..... who knows. remember that the Enterprise airgroup arrived at Pearl in the waning moments of the battle. Imagine what a couple dozen Wildcats could do for defense!
Attacking PH was to knock US out the war. The timing was part of the big Jap push against the Dutch and British in se asia. So they were already commited and so they were going to attack carriers or no carriers.
I agree that they could have totally destroyed everything at PH but it wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war. Just timing.
They were right to quit while winning. If the carriers had been there then that would have been the prize.
The IJN knew the carriers were not in PH as the Japanese embassy sent that message in diplomatic code a day or so before the attack. Since we had broken that code, Washington deciphered that message. They did not notify Admiral Kimmel or Gen Short. They also told Tokyo that the BBs were not deploying torpedo nets. One would think that that information would be useful to Kimmel.
From what I've read, PH was either a knockout blow to keep US out of the war or to keep the US fleet from interfering from the SE Asian invasions.
The Japs would have to march into the White House to win the war...which is why PH was just a plain dumb idea.
But then again the Japs would have gone to war with the US over the Philipines so yeah...the Japs got in the first shot.
The war in the pacific would have ended exactly on time due to the US receiving the atomic bomb in 1945.
Would the japanese have been successful launching a "Third wave"?
If the Japanese had found the US Carriers at Pearl Harbour, should they have risked a third wave?
If I have the data correct, the first wave landed back on the carriers at 10 am, the second wave at 12 noon. The Japanese spent another hour or two searching for the US Carriers, at which point it was decided by Nagumo that the risks of a third wave were too great.
If the US Pacific carriers were all accounted for (either sunk at Pearl or seen at anchor in San Diego), the Japanese could have re-armed the first wave aircraft for another attack and launched right away without losing time searching for the Carriers.
The third wave as advocated by Genda would have targeted the fuel tanks, repair shops, sub base and the cruisers destroyers at Pearl {5 out of 8 cruisers 26 of 29 destryers were undamaged following the second wave}
What would have been the result?
If the Carriers were at Pearl at the time of the attack they would have been heavily targeted in the first place, and most likely sunk, they would have been sitting ducks! A third wave would not have been necessary figuring that they had eliminated the primary objectives, Carriers and other Capital ships.
Now, all scenarios need to be based on the IJN turn around time to launch another strike. The last of the first wave departed around 8.30 and an approx flight time back to the carriers puts it at 10.00am. So from approx 9.30 to say 10.15 or longer the recovery process would have been in full swing. The aircraft would need to be transferred below decks to clear for other incoming aircraft AND the second wave. Debriefing, checking aircraft for damage, csualties etc. would have taken time. Launch and recovery of CAP fighters..