Could the IJN have launched a "Third wave" at Pearl Harbour?

[renrich]

Found one of my books on PH. From Mitsuo Fuchida. He believed another attack should be mounted. His was almost the last AC to land after the second wave attack and he states that AC were already being rearmed, refueled and being made ready for another attack. The only document he knows of outlining Nagumo's reasons for withdrawing states: first attack inflicted all damage hoped for; enemy response had been unexpectedly prompt and losses would be disproportionate to damage inflicted; intercepted enemy messages indicated at least 50 large AC still operational and we did not know location of enemy carriers, subs and cruisers; did not want to remain in range of enemy landbased planes. Admiral Richardson was CINCUS and Kimmel replaced him prematurely because Roosevelt got upset at Richardson. Richardson was a blunt Texan(hooray for him) and told Roosevelt that the major units of the Pacific Fleet should be withdrawn to the mainland because PH could not be defended against an enemy attack because they had not enough planes to mount a 360 degree fulltime parol schedule. Of course that was exactly Kimmel's problem and one reason we were surprised.

 

[Freebird]

Found one of my books on PH. From Mitsuo Fuchida. He believed another attack should be mounted. His was almost the last AC to land after the second wave attack and he states that AC were already being rearmed, refueled and being made ready for another attack. The only document he knows of outlining Nagumo's reasons for withdrawing states: first attack inflicted all damage hoped for; enemy response had been unexpectedly prompt and losses would be disproportionate to damage inflicted; intercepted enemy messages indicated at least 50 large AC still operational and we did not know location of enemy carriers, subs and cruisers; did not want to remain in range of enemy landbased planes.

Thanks Renrich, I think the carriers were the main reason, the Japanese waited for some time for the scouts to find the carriers, as they didn't want to send out another attack wave until they found them. Also they didn't want to be surprised. I would think that if they had found destroyed 2 or 3 carriers in Pearl, there is a good chance that they wouldn't have finished the job on the battleships. (some of the TB's DB's that hit the BB's would have been busy with the carriers instead.

Also I was thinking, with 6 carriers it's easier to manage things. Suppose that the 200 aircraft from the first wave land back on 4 carriers, and quickly prepare for the 3rd wave attack {along with about 60 aircraft held back from second wave} Then as the 4 carriers are launching the 3rd wave at about 11:30 or 12:00 there are still 2 carriers available to land those aircraft from 2nd wave that are low on fuel. When the 3rd wave departs, the remaining 40-50 or so aircraft can land on the other carriers.

 

[Wayne Little]

How long would it take to turn around 35 aircraft? (from each carrier). I would indeed depend on this, that's why I ask the question. If they could do this in about an hour, could they not launch them at about 11 and hold the second wave in the air until 11:30 or so?

Ok after checking, the first wave aircraft in fact began arriving back at the carriers just after 10.00am, as they were recovered they would have been moved to the forward end of the flight deck. Now the aircraft would not have been left there as by the time all aircraft were recovered it was around 11.00. (Sea conditions slowed the recovery process). The decks needed to be cleared for the second wave's arrival. The carriers actually headed toward Oahu to reduce the distance the returning second wave had to cover.

During this time some aircraft would have been stowed below decks on the forward elevators,mainly Zeroes (forward hangar area)and Vals (Middle area)as these were their assigned positions below decks, the Kates however had to be moved to the rear elevators, once all recovery was complete, under normal circumstances. Now the majority of the attack aircraft in the first wave were Kates, so it is possible or probable that they were moved down the middle elevator and pushed to the rear below decks as other aircraft landed above them. (Zeroes and Kates)

Recovery of the second wave commenced at around. 11.15 and took approx. an hour to complete.

This whole scenario of recovery, stowing below decks, checking aircraft, repairing, refueling, rearming and doing it twice in difficult sea conditions certainly would have slowed the entire process of co-ordinating a new strike.

The first wave took for the most part an hour just to land all aircraft, without doing anything else but move and stow the planes. So even if you were thinking quick turn around you couldn't do anything because the second wave was just minutes away and it was necessary to get them down asap, tired crews, damaged aircraft, fuel? Remember all crews would have been awake since about 04.00 or thereabouts.

Then you need information from all carriers, back to Akagi (flagship) as to how many serviceable aircraft and type are available what target(s)? ordnance requirement and especially how many crews are fit to go. and then you need a plan, when you don't know just what you will be up against? Then you need to distribute the plan for a co-ordinated attack.

One source says Genda did not want a third strike to include the kates (slower and more vulnerable?), now thats a problem because the majority of the Vals were used in the second wave from Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. Only Shokaku and Zuikaku's Vals would initially be available from the first wave and they were in fact the least experienced Bomber crews.

So unfortunately the turnaround time was always going to be the problem, at this time the Japanese were in fact the best at carrier operations and there is not much chance that they could have created a sufficiently equipped third attack force from the first returning wave to mount a successful attack, be it against PH shore installations or Carriers. Time was simply against them.

Hope this helps the discussion.

 

[renrich]

Remember also that in those days land based heavy bombers were considered a very real threat to warships by bothe the US and Japan.

 

[syscom3]

In the book "Shattered Sword", the author takes pains to emphasize the slow nature of IJN carrier ops because of two things:

1) The hanger decks were not ventilated and aircraft could not be warmed up below decks.

2) The elevators were slow and there's lots of wasted time for them to be going up and down spotting aircraft.

 

[davparlr]

Freebird, I think you are exactly right that the army should have been responsible for defense of PH. Your point about who defends if the fleet is out is excellent. If a scapegoat was needed General Short should have had more culpability but it was disgraceful the way Kimmel and also Short were treated. There was blame to be allocated for many people but the plain truth was that the US was unprepared for a surprise attack at every level.

You are right on saying that the US was unprepared at every level. As far as Kimmel is concerned my biggest questions concern these two messages, quoted from "At Dawn We Slept", by George Prange. On November 27th, Marshall sent this message to Gen. Short:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes …. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense... You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary…

. This is condensed and it does not include wishy washy words about not giving the Japanese reason to attack. Also, on the same day, Kimmel received this message from the Navy Department:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning…..an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

. Again the missing words of this missive identify places other than Pearl Harbor as likely attack points. Now my concern is, why after months of unrest in the theater, and with the specific warnings known to have been sent, did Kimmel pursue the normal training procedures of the fleet being at sea during of the week and in port on the weekend. Why didn't he rotate his fleet so half were out while half or in, or at least not have a pattern of training that enemy could predict. To me this is a failure of basic defensive thought, "don't be predictable" and is similar in a basic tactical failure as Admiral Halsey's bite on the Japanese feint gambit at Leyte Gulf, only more disastrous. Also, why didn't he review Gen. Short's long range reconnaissance procedures? He had assets to aid in that effort if Gen. Short's measures were short. He had submarines, PBYs and destroyers, all of which could have made a decent screen. Instead, even with all the tornado warnings going off in the area, he decided to watch tv, thinking, "well, none have been seen around here." It was Kimmel's fleet and no matter what, he was responsible for its safety if he had resources to prevent a threat, and he did.

I have been heavy on Kimmel, but as you have said, similar comments could be made for Short, especially in regards to the first missive. In addition, all levels of command made poor decisions and very poor directions.

Of course they were scapegoats. That is what the military does, find the lowest to crucify, and let the upper guys go. If they could have gotten away with it, they would have laid the blame on the poor enlisted man looking at the radar scope or the junior officer that dismissed his report.

 

[renrich]

Dav, the problem I have with the treatment of Kimmel is exactly as you said. The guys in Washington were playing CYA and Stark had been a lifelong friend of Kimmel. A nightmare scenario for the US might have been that not only would Nagumo launch a second strike but move in close with his BBs and CAs to give all the military installations a thorough bombardment and then hunt down Enterprise and Lexington and destroy them. He probably could have done it but it would have been uncharacteristic for a Japanese commander to display that much initiative and would have delayed or made impossible his future activities. That scenario would have probably lengthened the war by a year or more.

 

[syscom3]

That scenario would have probably lengthened the war by a year or more.

Why a year or more?

The atomic bomb was going to be delivered on time in July 1945

The B29's were going to be delivered on time in 1944

The aircraft carriers were due in spring 1943, blah, blah, blah.

Nothing would change except for maybe when and where the battles for the south pacific would be fought.

The central pacific battles for the Gilberts, Marshalls and Mariana's would be fought right on schedule.

 

[B-17engineer]

WEll I would think that the U.S. Would be on there toes after the 1st 2 waves and it would've been more costly then the first 2 waves

 

[renrich]

Maybe a year is stretching it but I don't think we could have stopped the New Guinea invasion as Coral Sea may have done and I don't believe Midway would have happened in June. In 1941, the Navy only had 3 fleet oilers on the west coast so it would have taken a long time to replenish the tank farms. The key to the bombing of Japan was the base on Saipan although the A bomb could probably have been delivered from China. That scenario would have impacted the war in the ETO, probably Torch.

 

[syscom3]

Maybe a year is stretching it but I don't think we could have stopped the New Guinea invasion as Coral Sea may have done and I don't believe Midway would have happened in June. In 1941, the Navy only had 3 fleet oilers on the west coast so it would have taken a long time to replenish the tank farms. The key to the bombing of Japan was the base on Saipan although the A bomb could probably have been delivered from China. That scenario would have impacted the war in the ETO, probably Torch.

In 1942, the USN had dozens of fleet oilers available, as well as dozens of commercial tankers to replenish the oil farms.

Dont you think that with the vast array of ships and men available in the fall of 1943, the US could begin its Central Pcific invasions regardless of what the Japanese had in the SW Pacific?

 

[renrich]

Remember, this nightmare includes that Enterprise and Lex were sunk off PH. If there is no Midway or Coral Sea the IJN has 4 more big carriers plus 1 light and their air groups. We would not have been able to mount the Marshalls raids and get the operational experience. The Japanese probably would be able to occupy and get the air field operational on Guadalcanal. Wouldn't you think we would have to devote more forces to the defense of Australia to the detriment of offensive activities? During late 41 and 42, weren't we losing a lot of tankers in the Gulf and off the East Coast to U-boats? If I remember correctly in late 42,( after Santa Cruz?) we had only one carrier operational in the Pacific which was the damaged Enterprise. If she were sunk at PH, seems like we would be really short of CVs and probably CAs and CLs. In fact, both my uncles would have been MIA since they were in Salt lake City and Chicago.

 

[syscom3]

Remember, this nightmare includes that Enterprise and Lex were sunk off PH. If there is no Midway or Coral Sea the IJN has 4 more big carriers plus 1 light and their air groups. We would not have been able to mount the Marshalls raids and get the operational experience.

A disaster of that magnitude would mean the Hornet, Yorktown and Wasp would be transfered all the sooner to the Pacific. With the Saratoga still afloat, that would mean we would have four carriers.

If the Coral Sea and Midway battles never took place, that still means they IJN has 6 carriers (although they each had an air group more like the US medium carriers).

In the early Fall of 1943, the USN was going to sail into the central Pacific with at least a dozen carriers all equipped with Hellcats, Dauntlesses and Avengers, which would deal some pretty nasty blows in the IJN.

The Japanese probably would be able to occupy and get the air field operational on Guadalcanal. Wouldn't you think we would have to devote more forces to the defense of Australia to the detriment of offensive activities?

That wasn't untill July 1942. A full 8 months after Pearl. Even had they begun air operation from there, the war of attrition had begun, and they would not have been able to sustain any meaningfull operations.

If I remember correctly in late 42,( after Santa Cruz?) we had only one carrier operational in the Pacific which was the damaged Enterprise. If she were sunk at PH, seems like we would be really short of CVs and probably CAs and CLs. In fact, both my uncles would have been MIA since they were in Salt lake City and Chicago.

Yes, we ran out of carriers in Dec 1942. But that just means the operational tempo changes untill the new carriers begin to get delivered to the fleet in 1943.

 

[syscom3]

Although its mostly not related to the subject of this thread, here are some numbers on the fleet carriers available to the USN and IJN at the end of 1943 (number in brackets is the stated AC capacity):

USN: Saratoga (88 ), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington II (91), Intrepid (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Cabot (33)
For 14 carriers (7 CV and 7 CVL) for 850 aircraft.

IJN: Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku ( 84 ), Ryujo ( 38 ), Zuiho (30)
For 6 CV and 2 CVL for 581 aircraft. Note that the actual AC capacity for the IJN CV's is in fact, less than that. The numbers show the capcity of pre 1941 AC and AC in disassembled state (and stowed). Actuall totals were more like 70.


What does this mean? It shows that the IJN was a doomed force at anytime after summer 1943. Whatever happened at Pearl or Midway was irrelevant.

 

[Freebird]

Although its mostly not related to the subject of this thread, here are some numbers on the fleet carriers available to the USN and IJN at the end of 1943 (number in brackets is the stated AC capacity):

USN: Saratoga (88 ), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington II (91), Intrepid (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Cabot (33)
For 14 carriers (7 CV and 7 CVL) for 850 aircraft.

IJN: Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku ( 84 ), Ryujo ( 38 ), Zuiho (30) Junyo {53} Hiyo {53} Shoho {30} Ryuho {31}
For 6 CV and 2 CVL for 581 aircraft. 6 CV, 2 CVA, 4 CVL 748 aircraft.

What does this mean? It shows that the IJN was a doomed force at anytime after summer 1943. Whatever happened at Pearl or Midway was irrelevant.

And it also assumes that the US does not lose any more carriers in late '42 or early '43 when they are still outnumbered by the Japanese.

 

[syscom3]

It still doesnt matter because the USN would still have qualitative as well as quantitative superiority.

In Summer of 1944, its even worse for the IJN.

 

[renrich]

Just read an interesting story related by Thomas Moorer who was a young pilot of a PBY at PH. Later he became CNO. He said that in order to conduct a 360 degree search out of PH would require 36 to 40 AC. He said on a given day they would only would have six AC operational. This was before the attack. During they attack he was trying to get to the patrol plane base. After the attack all the PBYs were too damaged to fly except for two, one of which was his. Kimmel and his staff thought the IJN attack had been launched from the south west so his AC and the other were directed to search in that direction. During the takeoff there was so much oil on the water his windshield was covered up and he had to make an instrument takeoff. After they were airborne, one of the crew got out in front of the cockpit and cleaned the plexiglass with gasoline so they could see. I think there was a hatch in the nose of the AC but can you image cleaning the windshield while the plane was airborne?

 

[ToughOmbre]

Just read an interesting story related by Thomas Moorer who was a young pilot of a PBY at PH. Later he became CNO. He said that in order to conduct a 360 degree search out of PH would require 36 to 40 AC. He said on a given day they would only would have six AC operational. This was before the attack. During they attack he was trying to get to the patrol plane base. After the attack all the PBYs were too damaged to fly except for two, one of which was his. Kimmel and his staff thought the IJN attack had been launched from the south west so his AC and the other were directed to search in that direction. During the takeoff there was so much oil on the water his windshield was covered up and he had to make an instrument takeoff. After they were airborne, one of the crew got out in front of the cockpit and cleaned the plexiglass with gasoline so they could see. I think there was a hatch in the nose of the AC but can you image cleaning the windshield while the plane was airborne?

That's a great story ren. I've been studying and researching the attack on PH for most of my life and I've never heard about that PBY. Very cool.

TO

 

[syscom3]

And if Admiral Kimmel had paid attention to his defenses during November, he would have had far more PBY's operational.

And he could still put small ships offshore to patrol. No doubt a few would have been rapidly deposed of by the IJN, but they would have been able to send out an alarm.

 

[Freebird]

. Admiral Richardson was CINCUS and Kimmel replaced him prematurely because Roosevelt got upset at Richardson. Richardson was a blunt Texan(hooray for him) and told Roosevelt that the major units of the Pacific Fleet should be withdrawn to the mainland because PH could not be defended against an enemy attack because they had not enough planes to mount a 360 degree fulltime parol schedule. Of course that was exactly Kimmel's problem and one reason we were surprised.

Interesting, the CinC Singapore before the war Gen Dobbie had argued that preparations should be made for a defence line in Johore, {100 miles N of singpore} because the Island was not prepared for an attack was not really suited for defence. {the water barrier was too shallow the shoreline had dense vegitation which prevented good LoF}

He was retired before the attack, and his replacement was not as vocal about demanding that preparations be made.