Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
I agree with that. I would argue that the DotR started with the non victory in the BoB and BoA.
Regards
John
Defence of the Reich
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I agree with that. I would argue that the DotR started with the non victory in the BoB and BoA.
Regards
John
parsifal
Colonel
Hpstorically, there were several occasions when the East front protagonists did make thye vaguest tilts at peace. At there was one occasion when Hitler did actually come come to realizing that he had bitten off more than he could chew in the east....at a point early enough (1942) for things to make a difference.
Ive seen report of Hitler, in either late Summer or early Autumn 1942 becoming very concerned about the lack of progress particualalry in the drive into the Caucasus. Its not well known, but the after the seizure of Maikop, the Germans instituted a report about how long it would take to restore some measurable oil production from these fields. The Germans (that is... Hitler) were very dismayed that no decent amount of production was possible for at least two years, and then only if trains devoted to military re-supply could be reduced. In a chapter of "Stopped At Stalingrad" Chris Hayward writes "The Fuhrer's initial joy at Maikops seizuree soom turned to bitter disapoointment. Hitlers delight soon turned to bitter dispoointment when it was learned that the Soviet rearguards had so comprehensively detroyed hundreds of the wells, that it would take years to restore production".
In September List reported that he was no longer abale to move forward. Hitler initially sent both Halader and Jodl to the front, to find out what the problem was. Both Halder and jodl agreed with Lists assment. These acts cost List and Halder thgeir jobs, with Hitler taking direct control of the Caucasus Army Group. however, Psychologically his reactions at learning that Lists pessimism was supported was very significant. The contemp0orary report clearly suggest Hitler was realizing that the battle at least at that pointwas lost. I am convinced that if the right pressure had been applied at that point, Hitler would not have taken direct persomnal command and may well have accepted the appopinment of a supreme east front military copmmander. This is what OKH wanted to do, but Hitlers solution was partial, and completely unsatisfacxtory....he appopinted himself as head of AG "A".
If a supreme commander had somehow been appointed, it is virtually assured that much of the disasters of the next three months would have been avoided, providing far greeater reserves for the 1943 fighting. Moreover , if the East front Commander had been Manstein, the Germ,ans would have managed a very heavy attritional toll on the Russians. That in itseld opens up huge possibilities.
Moreover, denying the effect the East Front has on German reserves is just silly. about 80% and casualties of combat for the German Army were on the Easternb Front. Around 60% at least of aircraft losses occurred in the East . The front placed massive demands on German roling stock and fuel. A truce, even if temporary will provide huge capabilities for the Germans.
Ive seen report of Hitler, in either late Summer or early Autumn 1942 becoming very concerned about the lack of progress particualalry in the drive into the Caucasus. Its not well known, but the after the seizure of Maikop, the Germans instituted a report about how long it would take to restore some measurable oil production from these fields. The Germans (that is... Hitler) were very dismayed that no decent amount of production was possible for at least two years, and then only if trains devoted to military re-supply could be reduced. In a chapter of "Stopped At Stalingrad" Chris Hayward writes "The Fuhrer's initial joy at Maikops seizuree soom turned to bitter disapoointment. Hitlers delight soon turned to bitter dispoointment when it was learned that the Soviet rearguards had so comprehensively detroyed hundreds of the wells, that it would take years to restore production".
In September List reported that he was no longer abale to move forward. Hitler initially sent both Halader and Jodl to the front, to find out what the problem was. Both Halder and jodl agreed with Lists assment. These acts cost List and Halder thgeir jobs, with Hitler taking direct control of the Caucasus Army Group. however, Psychologically his reactions at learning that Lists pessimism was supported was very significant. The contemp0orary report clearly suggest Hitler was realizing that the battle at least at that pointwas lost. I am convinced that if the right pressure had been applied at that point, Hitler would not have taken direct persomnal command and may well have accepted the appopinment of a supreme east front military copmmander. This is what OKH wanted to do, but Hitlers solution was partial, and completely unsatisfacxtory....he appopinted himself as head of AG "A".
If a supreme commander had somehow been appointed, it is virtually assured that much of the disasters of the next three months would have been avoided, providing far greeater reserves for the 1943 fighting. Moreover , if the East front Commander had been Manstein, the Germ,ans would have managed a very heavy attritional toll on the Russians. That in itseld opens up huge possibilities.
Moreover, denying the effect the East Front has on German reserves is just silly. about 80% and casualties of combat for the German Army were on the Easternb Front. Around 60% at least of aircraft losses occurred in the East . The front placed massive demands on German roling stock and fuel. A truce, even if temporary will provide huge capabilities for the Germans.
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Good point,
If Hitler had studied history he would have seen that even one of greatest armies of its age came somewhat unstuck in Russia...
The French Invasion of Russia in 1812, also known as the Russian Campaign in France (French: Campagne de Russie) and the Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia (Russian: Отечественная война 1812 года), was a turning point during the Napoleonic Wars. It reduced the French and allied invasion forces (the Grande Armée) to a tiny fraction of their initial strength and triggered a major shift in European politics as it dramatically weakened French hegemony in Europe. The reputation of Napoleon as an undefeated military genius was severely shaken, while the French Empire's former allies, at first Prussia and then the Austrian Empire, broke their alliance with France and switched camps, which triggered the War of the Sixth Coalition.
The campaign began on 24 June 1812, when Napoleon's forces crossed the Neman River. Napoleon aimed to compel Emperor of Russia Alexander I to remain in the Continental Blockade of the United Kingdom; an official aim was to remove the threat of a Russian invasion of Poland. Napoleon named the campaign a Second Polish War (in reference to the "First Polish War"); the Russian government proclaimed a Patriotic War.
At nearly half a million strong, the Grande Armée marched through Western Russia, winning a number of relatively minor engagements and a major battle at Smolensk on August 16–18. However, on that same day, the right wing of the Russian Army, under the command of General Peter Wittgenstein, stopped part of the French Army, led by Marshal Nicolas Oudinot, in the Battle of Polotsk. This prevented the French marching on the Russian capital at Saint Petersburg; the fate of the war had to be decided on the Moscow front, where Napoleon himself led his forces.
While the Russians used scorched-earth tactics, and often raided the enemy with light Cossack cavalry, their main army retreated for almost three months. This constant retreat undermined confidence in Field Marshal Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly, leading Alexander I to appoint an old veteran, Prince Mikhail Kutuzov, the new Commander-in-Chief. Finally, on 7 September, the two armies met near Moscow in the Battle of Borodino. The battle was the largest and bloodiest single-day action of the Napoleonic Wars; it involved more than 250,000 soldiers and resulted in at least 70,000 casualties. The French captured the battlefield, but failed to destroy the Russian army. Moreover, the French could not replace their losses whereas the Russians could replace theirs.
I think we all know that it was the Russian campaign that destroyed the Third Reich.
This what happens with a lunatic in charge and its always the foot soldiers that suffer ...what ever side they are on.
Cheers
John
If Hitler had studied history he would have seen that even one of greatest armies of its age came somewhat unstuck in Russia...
The French Invasion of Russia in 1812, also known as the Russian Campaign in France (French: Campagne de Russie) and the Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia (Russian: Отечественная война 1812 года), was a turning point during the Napoleonic Wars. It reduced the French and allied invasion forces (the Grande Armée) to a tiny fraction of their initial strength and triggered a major shift in European politics as it dramatically weakened French hegemony in Europe. The reputation of Napoleon as an undefeated military genius was severely shaken, while the French Empire's former allies, at first Prussia and then the Austrian Empire, broke their alliance with France and switched camps, which triggered the War of the Sixth Coalition.
The campaign began on 24 June 1812, when Napoleon's forces crossed the Neman River. Napoleon aimed to compel Emperor of Russia Alexander I to remain in the Continental Blockade of the United Kingdom; an official aim was to remove the threat of a Russian invasion of Poland. Napoleon named the campaign a Second Polish War (in reference to the "First Polish War"); the Russian government proclaimed a Patriotic War.
At nearly half a million strong, the Grande Armée marched through Western Russia, winning a number of relatively minor engagements and a major battle at Smolensk on August 16–18. However, on that same day, the right wing of the Russian Army, under the command of General Peter Wittgenstein, stopped part of the French Army, led by Marshal Nicolas Oudinot, in the Battle of Polotsk. This prevented the French marching on the Russian capital at Saint Petersburg; the fate of the war had to be decided on the Moscow front, where Napoleon himself led his forces.
While the Russians used scorched-earth tactics, and often raided the enemy with light Cossack cavalry, their main army retreated for almost three months. This constant retreat undermined confidence in Field Marshal Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly, leading Alexander I to appoint an old veteran, Prince Mikhail Kutuzov, the new Commander-in-Chief. Finally, on 7 September, the two armies met near Moscow in the Battle of Borodino. The battle was the largest and bloodiest single-day action of the Napoleonic Wars; it involved more than 250,000 soldiers and resulted in at least 70,000 casualties. The French captured the battlefield, but failed to destroy the Russian army. Moreover, the French could not replace their losses whereas the Russians could replace theirs.
I think we all know that it was the Russian campaign that destroyed the Third Reich.
This what happens with a lunatic in charge and its always the foot soldiers that suffer ...what ever side they are on.
Cheers
John
CobberKane
Banned
- 706
- Apr 4, 2012
Indeed there were many close squeaks, which is why I would no concur with the idea that combined allied force was "alway going to win". History could quite possibly have delivered an occupied UK and Western Europe with the US and USSR sitting on the sidelines. However, I agree that once the US entered the war it was as good as over.
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
I agree about the USA CK.
I would also raise the point that the nazi's armies were never big or strong enough to hold all of western Europe including GB.
The Gestapo's reign of terror and the concentration camps would have terrorised populations and there would be collaborators of course.
They may have invaded but,at the end of the day, holding onto the land and controlling the people is another matter entirely.
Cheers
John
Perhaps this explains why FDR Churchill sometimes appeared so, um, accommodating to the Soviets.
drgondog
Major
Parsifal - I can't find a period where more than 25% of LW Losses were suffered in the East. What are the sources you refer to?
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Ah, the wily and cynical Churchill.
I do not mean this to criticize, far from it Churchill in particular was the man of the moment. He literally held the freedom of Europe, Africa and the Far East in his hands.
John
parsifal
Colonel
Caldwell, which is a really good online source. These are not soley losses in combat.....they are overwhelmingly losses due to write offs, cannibilsation, overruns and the like. Caldwell establishes that only about 16% of combat losses were suffered by the LW in combat against the VVS. It was a far more dangerous environment in the air in the west. However, Ive always maintained that the lions share of the Me109s produced (just using them as an example) were not lost in air combat. Most were lost in the mud and blood of the eastern front.
Prof. Olaf Groehler disagrees with you, and Caldwell, at least for the period from Sept 43-Oct 44.
http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm
http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm
parsifal
Colonel
Oops. Looks like I got the ratios wrong. Should have checked. However, some of the criteria are a bit strange. Why include the Balkans as part of the west?
During this period, a total of 8600 operational aircraft were "lost" in the East, while 27,060 were "lost" in the West; according to Groehler. However this does not fully account for production in that period. the ratio of western "losses" to eastern "losses" was thus 27,060/8600 = 3.41 to one.
Also does not alter the fact that losses had not that much to do with enemy action....the majority of losses were due to non-combat related incidents. Groehler agrees with that.
During this period, a total of 8600 operational aircraft were "lost" in the East, while 27,060 were "lost" in the West; according to Groehler. However this does not fully account for production in that period. the ratio of western "losses" to eastern "losses" was thus 27,060/8600 = 3.41 to one.
Also does not alter the fact that losses had not that much to do with enemy action....the majority of losses were due to non-combat related incidents. Groehler agrees with that.
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How much fighting was done by the VVS in the Balkans in the time period Sept 43-Oct 44?
drgondog
Major
Prof. Olaf Groehler is the reource I have settled on for LW fighter losses.
Reality of all AF's.
The Wehrmacht was not envisioned to fight a prolongued war in Russia. You know the wishful thinking of the Nazis, Parsifal
parsifal
Colonel
I'll check this time before trying to answer definitively. However, fighting began December 1944, and more or less continued through to the end of 1944. There were at least three major offensives by the Red Army in the region. VVS average strength in that period varied, but saying it was 16000 would not be far from the truth. At least trwo major air army sized units were committed, so a figure of 5-6000 aircraft more or less continuously engaged is not an exaggeration.
If around 40% of Soviet front line strength was committed to the Balkan campaignsand 8900 that is statyed in Groehlers work is 60% of the VVS achievement, then it is likley the LW lost 3500-4000 a/c in the balakans, and 3500-4000 less ac in the west.
I woiuld therefore gusstimate that German losses in the East, including the Balkans campaign in that 43-45 period was 12500 to 13000 a/c, whilst German losses in the west (less the Balkans) was perhaps 23-25000. of course there was some allied activity in the Balkans, such as the Ploesti raids, but nowhere near the level of Soviet activity.
Soviet operations into the Balkans (Romania) did not start til Aug 19 1944. By Sept 1944, the Soviets had reached the Danube.
http://ww2db.com/images/battle_secondjassykishinevoffensive2.jpg
http://ww2db.com/images/battle_secondjassykishinevoffensive2.jpg
parsifal
Colonel
I dont agree. The Balkans includes Rumania, and Rumania at that time extended to include the bogus province of Tranistria. Operations to clear the Axis forces began immedialtely after the fall of Kiev.
Western sources sometimes euphamistically refer to the battles fought January to May 1944, as the clearing of the ukraine. Soviet histories do not refer to those campaign by that name. For them the clearing of the ukraine began with the offensives that followed behind Kursk, and more or less completed with the capture of the Ukrainian capital. Soviet sources consider the battles fought January to May as the first phases in the clearing of the Balkans. Certainly there were deep inroads into Rumania and somewhat into Hungray (their pre-1941 boundaries that is) by May. These are part and parcel of the Balkans proper.
Since Groehler relies in part on Soviet sources, his references to Balkan campaign losses should be assumed to be more akin to the Soviet version of the "Balkan campaign". even if you would prefer the western idea of what the Balkan campaign was, fighting in Rumania proper had started by the beginning of May.
So depending on how you want to interpret the names given and the geography, the "Balkan campaign" had begun either in January, or May 1944.
The relative weight the Soviets gave to these campaigns can be gauged by the forces they committed.....7 Army Group sized "Fronts" (out of either 16 or 18 front line "Fronts" available at that time), with the formations commited including the very best the Soviets could field at that time....(including the following army sized formations) 1st Tank, 2nd Tank, 3 Gds Armoured 4th Gds Armoured, 4th Gds Rifle, 8th gds Rifle, 37th Army, 7 Gds Rifle. They undertook massive interdiction operations in the Black Sea, virtually ignored in Western Sources.
In January 1944, the Soviets deployed 8500 frontline aircraft on the eastern Front. By may this number had increased to about 12000. If the Soviets committed their air strength more or less proportionally to the ground committment made, we can expect about 40-50% of their airforce to be deployed in these campaigns in the South. Against this, virtually all the LW strength in the East was used at some time or another, as the LW tended to be moved around the front fire brigade style wherever the fighting was heaviest, or the crisis the greatest (and the lionsd share of fighting at this time was in the South). To the German strength we must also consider the strengths and losses of the Hungarian and Rumanian air Forces which, according to Axworthy, amounted to around 30% of total (and whose losses are not included in Groehlers analysis) 11800 .
Not everyone agreees with Groehler incidentally Ellis for example puts LW losses at 116000 for the entire war, Italian losses at 5272, Hungarian and Rumanian losses are unstated, but are several thousand and all on the "Eastern Front" (of course there were the Ploesti Raids) . Soviet losses 1941-5 are 106000 a/c
The 1st Jassy-Kishinev battle was fought from April 1944, in today's Moldova.
Anything, in the Eastern front prior April of 1944, should still be regarded as a fighting within Soviet union. Red Army was, on 1st Dec 1943, at Dnepr river, IOW they were holding roughly half of Ukraine on that date. It took them until late April to gain a foothold in Carpathians.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/96/Eastern_Front_1943-08_to_1944-12.png
Romania is/was Balkans; Hungary and Moldova are/were not.
Anything, in the Eastern front prior April of 1944, should still be regarded as a fighting within Soviet union. Red Army was, on 1st Dec 1943, at Dnepr river, IOW they were holding roughly half of Ukraine on that date. It took them until late April to gain a foothold in Carpathians.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/96/Eastern_Front_1943-08_to_1944-12.png
Romania is/was Balkans; Hungary and Moldova are/were not.
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