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Perhaps. Or perhaps the maneuver might be noticed and the Battles torn up. I agree that a doctrinal objection to tactical air-support was not the RAF's shining moment here, though they did come around by 1944.
Do we have any instance of Battles launching such an attack profile, against any target be it land or sea, successfully against such a CAP?
I'm no fighter pilot, but I'd imagine that if flying off from carriers, I'd be more focused on the threat from torpedo-bombers and DBs rather than level bombers, and that if my hunch is true, the Blenheims slipped through precisely because the Japanese CAP were focused on what they thought of as the ship-killers. That's only a guess, but let's be fair, it has every bit as much evidence as your own idea.
I'd say they clearly came around in 1942, or they wouldn't have won 2nd Alamein
A fair correction, though my understanding is that this mindset was pretty local to North Africa and took time to percolate through RAF hierarchy, with the result culminating in 2TAF over NW ETO where it was perfected.
An 100% loss rate on a one way mission that cripples even one IJN carrier is worth the loss of all the Blenheims, Skuas and Chesapeakes and their crews we can muster. Nagumo is going to hightail it out of the area and never again venture into the Indian Ocean. He's got bigger fish to fry at Coral Sea and Midway, and now he's a carrier short.That is still 44% attrition, an entirely unsustainable rate. USN and IJN both had to spend time recuperating a month or so after each battle to overcome those sorts of losses. Fighting off a raid, okay, but remember, it wasn't clear that this was only a raid at that time.
I am not sure of the details of that, though it seems like some of these lessons were also applied in Burma, both by the British and the Americans.
I'm sure there was a degree of institutional lag though.
An 100% loss rate on a one way mission that cripples even one IJN carrier is worth the loss of all the Blenheims, Skuas and Chesapeakes and their crews we can muster. Nagumo is going to hightail it out of the area and never again venture into the Indian Ocean. He's got bigger fish to fry at Coral Sea and Midway, and now he's a carrier short.
The Battles were used in France and, to lesser extent in Africa for tactical strike/glide bombing missions. Anyways we have lots of examples of IJN CAP entirely failing to intercept SDBs prior to them beginning their attack dives.Perhaps. Or perhaps the maneuver might be noticed and the Battles torn up. I agree that a doctrinal objection to tactical air-support was not the RAF's shining moment here, though they did come around by 1944. Do we have any instance of Battles launching such an attack profile, against any target be it land or sea, successfully against such a CAP?
I'm no fighter pilot, but I'd imagine that if flying off from carriers, I'd be more focused on the threat from torpedo-bombers and DBs rather than level bombers, and that if my hunch is true, the Blenheims slipped through precisely because the Japanese CAP were focused on what they thought of as the ship-killers. That's only a guess, but let's be fair, it has every bit as much evidence as your own idea.
The Battles were used in France and, to lesser extent in Africa for tactical strike/glide bombing missions. Anyways we have lots of examples of IJN CAP entirely failing to intercept SDBs prior to them beginning their attack dives.
On 10 May 1940, 5 Battles attacked the Vroenhoeven bridge which measured 370 x 30ft, and they succeeded in knocking it down with 250lb bomb hits, although all 5 Battles were shot down by a combination of dense flak and Luftwaffe fighters.
The attrition rates are irrelevant because the Luftwaffe and German Army knew that the bridges would be targets and they reacted accordingly, especially as the Battles were sent in several days after the bridges had been captured. Any other available aircraft type making tactical strikes against those bridges would have suffered severely. The key point is that this bridge was 1/6 of the area of an IJN fleet carrier and 5 Battles took it out. The Battle doesn't have to be state of the art in 1942, it just has to be in the right place at the right time.I don't agree with "lots of examples" of IJN CAP "entirely failing". At Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz, SBDs suffered losses, sometimes in their dives, because IJN fighter pilots in that era were well-trained, very experienced, and just as dedicated to mission.
We all know Battles were used to attack land targets in ETO, but you didn't mention anything about their mission effectiveness. Care to lay out loss-rates versus results? Do we have an example where Battles attacked a defended target, got the job done, and skedaddled without getting shot to Hell and gone?
Okay, there's one example, albeit that all five were lost in the effort. How much CAP did that bridge have, and what's the breakdown on losses by cause?
Mind you, dear reader, I'm not belittling the valiance or skill of those crews. But I doubt that the Fairey is a good answer in 1942 against any opponent fielding decent fighters or flak crewed by trained personnel.
As an aside, I'd point out that any bridge that can be put down by 250-lb bombs can't be that strong. To be sure, even 250-lb bombs could damage the Japanese carriers in Op C, but first you've got to get those bombs on target, and second you'd better hope they hit something flammable or explosive.
The Japanese air officers had to coordinate their combat air patrol without the incalculable advantage of early warning by means of radar. Standard procedure was to retain most of the fighters on deck until the enemy had been spotted, then scramble the remaining Zeros for a close interception. Thus the Japanese CAP system required high visibility to operate at best efficiency....
...After a flight of only an hour and fifteen minutes, Burch was rewarded with the sight of MO Striking Force. At 1032, The Yorktown SBDs spotted what they thought were two carriers, a battleship, three heavy cruisers, and four light cruisers or destroyers crossing an open area on course 190 degrees, speed 20 knots. The Yorktown pilots had been aided by the enemy's mad dash at 30 knots and a brisk tailwind. Burch carefully led his twenty-four SBDs closer to the ships, using cloud cover to conceal his approach. Skirting the edge of a cloud mass, Burch moved to take position upwind of the Japanese force. By 1049, he had attained excellent position just southeast of the enemy carriers, where he waited impatiently for Torpedo Five to arrive so the two elements could coordinate their attacks for maximum shock value and mutual protection. As the lumbering Devastators were still some distance away, the SBDs had to wait, circling at the edge of the clouds. From their perch at 17,000 feet the crews could see to the north and below a number of Zeros circling lazily at perhaps 12,000 feet over the nearest flattop. MO Striking Force continued steaming southward at high speed, and the Zuikaku and her escorts began to disappear into the black squall line marking the southern terminus of the open area. Soon both Japanese carriers, the only targets worth attacking, would be lost to view inside rainstorms. Over the radio Burch fretted, pleading with Taylor to "Bear a hand because time's a wastin!"6 He could do nothing until Taylor replied that he had spotted the target.
While enemy dive bombers milled about nearly overhead, the Japanese were oblivious to their presence. The Shōkaku completed air operations by 1030 and warily waited for something to happen. The Zeros spotted by Burch over the Shōkaku were Okabe and wingman PO3c Tanaka Yoshizō; Iwamoto flew at much greater height over the Zuikaku. At lower level near the Shōkaku were the five Zeros led by PO1c Minami and PO1c Miyazawa. Ready to take off was Ensign (Special Service) Abe and PO1c Kawanishi Jinichirō. Likewise poised on board the Zuikaku for instant launch was the Zuikaku's fighter leader, Lieut. Okajima, with four Zeros of his large 11th Shōtai.
Midway:
When Massey swung north to chase the Hiryū, the flagship Akagi at 1020 gave the signal to launch planes. Ten minutes or so later the four flight decks would be cleared of strike planes. Almost simultaneously with her message, her lookouts spotted American dive bombers poised over the Kaga! The CAP was totally unprepared for a dive bombing attack. In contrast to the two previous torpedo attacks (VT-8 and VT-6), there were now no fighters held in reserve. All had swarmed eagerly after Torpedo Three or Thach's Wildcats.
McClusky at 1022 pushed over on the Kaga, the westernmost of the four carriers. The flattop heeled into a sharp evasive turn, but she could not evade the onslaught of twenty-five SBDs. Gallaher's Scouting Six followed McClusky down, and, by mistake, most of Bombing Six piled on as well. The Akagi commenced launching Zeros, holding course into the wind to launch aircraft. Best went after her with five SBDs from Bombing Six. Meanwhile, the first of four bombs slammed into the Kaga, preventing the launch of her strike group of three Zeros and twenty-seven carrier attack planes. Flaming aircraft and explosions soon turned the Kaga's flight deck into an inferno and doomed the vessel. The Akagi's time had also come. At 1025, the first Zero started down her flight deck, but Best's five SBDs already hurtled toward her. His pilots secured two 1,000-lb. bomb hits, one detonating in the midst of the eighteen carrier attack planes spotted aft on deck for launch. Like the Kaga, the fleet flagship had taken mortal damage.
At 1550 Kirn's squadron pushed over from 14,000 feet against the Ryūjō. No Zeros intervened...
The attrition rates are irrelevant because the Luftwaffe and German Army knew that the bridges would be targets and they reacted accordingly, especially as the Battles were sent in several days after the bridges had been captured.
Any other available aircraft type making tactical strikes against those bridges would have suffered severely. The key point is that this bridge was 1/6 of the area of an IJN fleet carrier and 5 Battles took it out. The Battle doesn't have to be state of the art in 1942, it just has to be in the right place at the right time.
At Coral Sea the first 3 SBDs attacked Shoho with no CAP opposition.
From Lundstrom:
Eastern Solomons:
And if it didn't go well the losses could be heavy. "Black Friday" 9th Feb 1945. 31/32 Beaus dispatched with an escort of 10/12 Mustang III (P-51B/C).Hi
This is just to point out the RAF was not picking off isolated ships that had poor defensive capabilities, it was a very dangerous occupation. It would have been nice to have a Beaufighter equipped Strike Wing plus lots more fighters out in Ceylon, but it was too early in the war to be able to do that and would still have been costly unless there were enough allied aircraft to overwhelm the Japanese carrier force air element, that would need a lot of aircraft not a few obsolete types.
Mike
I didn't suggest that Nagumo would run scared after losing a carrier at Ceylon, only that he'd not return due to commitments elsewhere. It would be interesting to see what key learnings about fleet air defence and reconnaissance Nagumo and his air bosses take away from their Indian Ocean experience as they head into the Coral Sea and Midway campaigns.Perhaps, but remember, after losing four carriers at Midway, Nagumo led forces of three carriers not once but twice into battle in the Solomons. The idea that one crippled carrier will scare the Japanese off is not really borne out. That only happened at Coral Sea because the other carrier had lost so many airframes ... and the Shoho had been sunk.
And further to the point, Nagumo had nothing to do with Coral Sea except for donating CarDiv5 to Adm Inouye. Strategery is above his pay-grade. The clusterfuck at Midway belongs to Yamamoto and his staff, in great proportion.
The KB had little opportunity to consider anything before Midway due to their operational tempo and were destined to repeat the mistakes from early operations at Midway.I didn't suggest that Nagumo would run scared after losing a carrier at Ceylon, only that he'd not return due to commitments elsewhere. It would be interesting to see what key learnings about fleet air defence and reconnaissance Nagumo and his air bosses take away from their Indian Ocean experience as they head into the Coral Sea and Midway campaigns.
I didn't suggest that Nagumo would run scared after losing a carrier at Ceylon, only that he'd not return due to commitments elsewhere.
In the context of this conversation, attrition rates matter greatly, because, as I've already pointed out, the British did not know this Japanese incursion was a temporary raid in force. If you want to put light bombers like the Battle into this, you'll need to consider survivability.
In any air battle -- indeed, in any battle at all -- attrition rate matters -- unless and until you are yourself willing to quit the field ... and even then, your decision is going to be driven in part by (wait for it) attrition.
Get those five Battles up over KdB and let us know how it goes.
A big point you're eliding is that bridges don't actually sail at 27 kts while doing evasive maneuvers. This makes your comparison, to use the British lexicon, chalk and cheese. We're talking about sending them out against carriers in the Indian Ocean with organic air defense sailing on unpredictable routes.
I never wrote that no SBDs ever got a clear shot. Go back and reread what I wrote, for context and content rather than argumentation. Thanks in advance.
And contrary to popular opinion carriers don't go haring about the oceans at anything like their maximum speeds. Usual operating speeds are 15 to 25 knots +/- a knot or two.
FWIW
The main failings of the Swordfish (as a design) relative to operations in the open ocean, were its speed and the lack of significant protection (no SSFT and little or no armour).
As is (as was?), the early-war Swordfish (so SSFT) only had about 25-50 miles less ROA with a torpedo or bombs than the early-war SBD (with SSFT) - albeit at a much slower cruise speed (about 55 mph less than the SBD). The problem with the non-SSFT arrangement is that fitting SSFT would have reduced the amount of fuel carried (minus 25%?) to such a degree that the range would no longer be acceptable. As mentioned up-thread, the FAA/RN figured the Swordfish (with a 1000-1500 lb load) had a 225-250 mile ROA. The USN figured the SBD (with a 1000 lb bomb) was good for about 250-300 miles ROA. The ranges I mention here are from the RN/FAA and USN planning charts.
Additionally, the potential effects of the all-weather operating capabilities of the Swordfish should not be underestimated - either in the ETO/MTO or the PTO - especially if you throw in ASV, although the time period of this thread might be too early for ASV. Dive bombing usually required daytime operations, but glide-bombing and torpedo attacks did not (at least not for the FAA).
The Albacore had SSFT and some armour protection, along with a ROA equal to the SBD - again at a much lower cruise speed (20-30 mph less) than the SBD.