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The P-40Cs/Tomahawk IIBs were rigged for the 52 gal drop tank, in large part to make up for the smaller fuel capacity of the self-sealing tanks. The long nose P-40s were rigged with the underwing small bomb racks, although seldom used? This seems to have been very much a doctrine decision by the USAAC. Curtiss was advertising a bewildering array of bomb combinations (including a 500lb on center line) on the export Hawk 75s but only a few minor countries took them up on it.I agree the heavier wing bombs on a P-40 (D onward) were a gradual development, but as soon as you could put a 50 gallon fuel tank on the centerline (earliest production version of P-40D) you can carry about a 300 lb bomb for sure, and it turned out pretty quickly that you can also carry about a 500 lb bomb. The fuel tank system has a release switch to ditch the external tank. Needless to say that also works for a bomb, so all you have left to do is rig something to arm the bomb which seems to have been done various ways.
500lb seems to be a decent standard.................however...............British 250lb bombs are below standard as were British 500lb GP bombs.SBDs did plenty of harm with 500 lb bombs on Japanese ships, and Vals did even worse on US and British ships.
That is the real problem with using single engine army planes for this mission. SBD-3 Jan 1941 manual (up-dated later) calls for 100 gal fuel with 1000lb bomb and 140 gals with 500lb bomb and 150-260 gal for scout missions. This was all internal and is the capacity for the protected tanks.But range would be limited with external bombs. That's the real limitation here.
Covered by others. Beaufighters got bombs but rather late.Two other types that came to mind are the Whirlwind (as a coastal defense fighter and strafer) and a Martin Maryland, which they did have available quite early. Doesn't carry a huge bomb load but it is fast and has a long range, and what bombs it does carry can go in the bomb bay I think. If you don't want the Whirlwind (I can hear complaints already) send some Beaufighters, they were already around. Beaufighters had enough speed down low that they could tangle with Zeros and sometimes came out on top, plus plenty firepower (and more ammunition than Whirlwind) to strafe ships.
And that is the major problem with the single (or two?) squadrons of airplanes putting a major hurt on the Japanese off of Ceylon in early 1942. Granted there were only a few air forces (or more properly a few local commanders) in the world that thought that escort fighters were essential for strike success. Even the US at Midway was not allocating enough escorts.The problem with all these light bomber types is that without fighter escort their losses were heavy. 11 squadron Blenheims got lucky when they attacked the IJN in 1942, remaining undetected until they dropped their bombs. But once the IJN fighters got their act together 5 of the 9 attacking Blenheimscwere shot down.
Whirlwind - just 114 built incl prototypes. Equipped just 2 squadrons, the second only forming in Sept 1941. Only started using bombs in June 1942, after suitable modifications.
Beaufighter - in high demand in Britain as a nightfighter (Mosquito NF.II didn't begin to enter service until early 1942 with first ops in April). Coastal version in short supply. 3 squadrons at home (2 of which converted to type in last quarter of 1941. Next didn't convert until June 1942) and 2 squadrons in ME (third squadron didn't form until Aug 1942 having drawn aircraft and crews from home) Another squadron at home reverted to flying Blenheim IVf in mid-1941 until Sept 1942 due to lack of aircraft. First thoughts of turning it into a torpedo fighter only arose at very end of 1941. Accelerated development saw first dozen TF operational around Sept 1942.
Amongst the little referred to movements was the decision in Jan 1942 to send two Beaufort squadrons to Ceylon. 22 left in Feb becoming operational there at end of April, thereby just missing Operation C. 217 left in May but aircraft delayed in ME. Beaufort was another aircraft in short supply in late 1941/early 1942. Formation of 2 squadrons on the type in Britain in late 1941 had to be postponed. They received Hampdens for TB role in early 1942 along with 2 squadrons transferred from Bomber Command in April, as replacement for the 2 Beaufort squadrons being sent to the Far East.
Marylands formed the backbone of Desert Air Force light bomber squadrons in 1941/42 alongside Blenheims. At one point in mid-1941 the plan was for the Baltimore to go to the Far East, but priorities changed and they went to the ME instead.
But again this was a type that didn't begin to reach the front line squadrons until early 1942.
The problem with all these light bomber types is that without fighter escort their losses were heavy. 11 squadron Blenheims got lucky when they attacked the IJN in 1942, remaining undetected until they dropped their bombs. But once the IJN fighters got their act together 5 of the 9 attacking Blenheimscwere shot down.
I don't think you fully understand the logistics and timescale involved in moving a squadron from Britain.
Once you decide to send a squadron overseas you need to find the shipping space on a ship sailing in a convoy running to a schedule (not easy in 1941/42 due to shortages of suitable shipping). Then all the personnel require medical checks, and replacements found if required. Then embarkation leave, packing up all the equipment, transporting it to the relevant port and loading it on the ship.
To take 22 Beaufort squadron as an example, the first mention of movement in the ORB was 3 Jan 1942. Ground personnel sailed on 16 Feb on convoy WS16 via the Cape. It arrived at Bombay on 8th April. Meanwhile the aircrew began flying out via Gib, Malta and the ME on 18th March. The whole squadron then came together at Ratmalana, Ceylon at the end of April.
The previous convoy, WS15 sailed on 11 Jan 1942 with the Bombay section arriving in that port on 4th March.
Now back up to the point that a squadron has to begin to prepare to move. 6 weeks back and you get to the beginning of Dec 1941. Then figure in the orders for that move to be made. You now need the decision making process to begin BEFORE war breaks out in the Far East, and even then the squadron is only going to be in place just before the Japanese strike.
Then look at Beaufighter squadron availability. I noted 3 coastal squadrons in Britain at the end of 1941 with 2 converting in the last quarter. 235 only gave up its Blenheim IVf in Dec 1941 having received it first two Beaus in Oct for training, and flying its first operation on the type on Christmas Day 1941. 236 began to receive Beaufighters in Oct 1941, flying its first operation on the type on 12 Nov, but didn't give up the last of the Blenheim IVf until March 1942. Those two squadrons were robbed of Beaus and aircrews in early 1942 to keep the two ME squadrons operational.
In Nov 1941 252 & 272 in the ME had just 24 Beaus between them. Then figure in losses during Operation Crusader.
The Aussies had been trying to get Beaufighters for some time. The first two Beaufighters arrived in Australia from Britain in March 1942 with more following over coming months. Enough had been assembledAustralia (with some difficulty as none of the engineering personnel had experience of the type) to allow deliveries to 30 squadron RAAF to start in June to allow training to begin. The squadron moved to New Guinea in Aug and began operational flying at the start of Sept. 31 squadron RAAF was then able to form in Aug.
The first Beaufighter squadron in India, 27 RAF, reformed on 19 Sept 1942. Its first Beau and the first in India, was received on 5th Nov and by mid-Dec it had 13 on hand. It flew its first operation on Christmas Day 1942.
So while you might believe a squadron of Beaus could be spared to send to Ceylon before Operation C, the evidence suggests something different, unless the whole question of the priority given to the Far East in 1941 is somehow changed. And that is the same problem that all these "what ifs" founder on. Those on the scene at the time with the limited resources they had and the numerous competing interests that existed, made very difficult choices as to the priorities. Trying to say today that they should have done this or that involves a huge amount of hindsight.
As for the challenges of moving stuff to Theater, they managed to do it pretty quickly with the AVG. That may be a good benchmark.
I would suggest really looking at the history of AVG. They didn't have enough spare parts, they didn't have enough spare engines and there were none to had in the CBI theater. Shipping in planes with non-standard engines is just asking for trouble if the planes last longer than even a few months. The AVG didn't have enough mechanics although a number of Chinese did very good work there was still a communications/skill set problem. The Ground crews, both westerners and Chinese did heroic work but better planning (supplies) could have had more aircraft operational on any given day.
There were NOT plenty of Buffaloes or Hawk 75s in the 2nd 1/2 of 1941.
Throwing the Wirraway into the mix. The RAAF had 7 squadrons equipped at the outbreak of the Pacific war; however, I'm not certain of the date when the dive bomber variant was produced. Additionally, the RAAF received the first of 360 odd Battles in June 1940 so the possibility exists that these could have been sent to Ceylon in your scenario.
Import / export history of Mohawks for the RAF posted on another site by Geoffrey Sinclair.
"As far as I know lots of work to convert from French to RAF standard. And as has been noted many were left in their crates for months while decisions were made about them.
Not quite all ex French, there were some ex Norwegian, ex Iran and reported ex China, plus captured/defected Vichy French. According to the USAAF order F-273 for HK-75A-4 was split 216 France, 204 Britain, with acceptances for Britain beginning in May 1940 and ending in August, those for France ending in June. Exports for France ended in June, exports for Britain were 57 in July, 118 in August and 29 in September 1940, total 204. Exports for Norway were 15 in March and 10 in April 1940.
The RAF Mohawk numbers are quite consistent in the eyes of those in London. According to the import report Mohawks arriving in UK, 32 in Jul-40, 37 in Aug-40, 117 in Sep-40 18 in Oct-40, total 204
According to Air Arsenal North America 5 of the Norwegian order of H-75A-6 made it to Britain, they appear to have been treated as Norwegian in the import report, they became AR630 to 34 and never left Britain, so 204 imports becomes 209 RAF serials. The following using British Military Aircraft Serials, by Robertson and dates from serial registers.
65 AR630 AR694, arrival dates start in August 1940
19 AX880 AX898, arrival dates around September 1940
20 BB918 BB937, ToC in 1940/early 1941
6 BB974 BB979, ToC in 1940/early 1941
20 BJ434 BJ453, ToC in 1940/early 1941
20 BJ531 BJ550, ToC in 1940/early 1941
20 BK569 BK588, ToC in 1940/early 1941
4 BK876 BK879, ToC in 1940/early 1941
4 BL220 BL223, entries ruled through in Serial Registers, "stet", ToC Nov/Dec 40, exported to Portugal, South Africa, South Africa, Middle East respectively.
9 BS730 BS738, ToC in 1940/early 1941
4 BS744 BS747, ToC in 1940/early 1941
15 BS784 BS798, ToC in 1940/early 1941
3 BT470 BT472, ToC in March 1941
Total 209
Exports from UK
8 in Nov-40 to Middle East Vessel damaged, 4 aircraft returned to UK, but re-exported, so assumed only 4 aircraft involved, exported twice
-4 in Nov-40 to Middle East Vessel damaged, aircraft returned to UK
13 in Jan-41 to Middle East
2 in Jan-41 to South Africa
14 in Feb-41 to South Africa
4 in Apr-41 to South Africa
12 in May-41 to South Africa
12 in Jun-41 to South Africa
8 in Jul-41 to South Africa
11 in Aug-41 to Portugal
5 in Sep-41 to India
6 in Sep-41 to South Africa
3 in Oct-41 to India
5 in Oct-41 to Portugal
6 in Nov-41 to India
10 in Dec-41 to India
4 in Jan-42 to India
4 in Jan-42 to South Africa
1 in Feb-42 to India
35 in Apr-42 to India
11 in May-42 to India
10 in Jun-42 to India
1 in Jun-43 to India.
Total 181, 86 India, 17 Middle East, 16 Portugal, 62 South Africa
RAF census of February 1943 says 5 Mohawks in Britain, 21 Middle East, 55 South Africa, 63 India, total 144 effectives. 2 instructional, 22 lost in UK, 25 lost overseas, 16 transferred to other powers, total lost 65, grand total 209.
As of June 1944 still a total of 209 Mohawks but only 6 still effective. I read this as of February 1943 5+22+2 = 29 in Britain, in June 1944 it is 2+25+1 = 28. 209 total - 28 Britain - 181 exports = 0 According to AIR 19/524 204 Mohawks were delivered to the RAF in Britain July 1940 to May 1941, 184 of these in 1940.
In addition to the above Air Arsenal North America has
1 AX799 AX799, in Robertson, HK-75A-9, Pattern aircraft for Chinese production
4 HK823 HK826, only HK823 in Robertson, Ex French in Middle East, 2 went to SAAF, nothing in Serial Registers.
9 LA157 LA165, in Robertson, reported to be from the 10 HK-75A-9 sent to Iran March and April 1941, nothing in Serial Registers,
1 DR761 DR761, reported to be assembled in India from kits meant for China, up to 5 flown, nothing in Serial Registers,
The China aircraft may have something to do with the import report having 8 Mohawk imports into India in January 1944 and 16 in February."
The export dates are the dates of leaving Britain. Add about 2 months for deliveries to ME & India via Cape, then add time for assembly & testing before delivery to a squadron.
The export to the ME at the end of 1940 was intended to provide the equipment for an RAF fighter squadron at Aden. Aden was a highly important British base for refuelling ships at the southern end of the Red Sea. It had been subject to air attack in 1940 from Italian aircraft based in East Africa, just the other side of the Red Sea.
Deliveries to Portugal were part of a political effort to persuade that country not to join the Axis. Had they done so, the Allied position in the Atlantic would potentially be much worse as U-boats would have gained the ability to refuel in the shelter of the Azores.
Air defence of India in 1941 before the arrival of the Mohawks was in the hands of nothing better than biplane Hawker Audax being flown as single seaters by 5 squadron. While it began to receive Mohawks in Dec 1941 it still had Audax on its books until Aug 1942. From the export dates above and my comments about delivery, you can begin to see why.
155 squadron was formed in April 1942 at Peshawar on the North West Frontier of India. It had no aircraft until it began to receive the Mohawks in mid-Aug after it had moved to southern India near Madras. It initially flew air defence and coastal patrols while working up before moving East to the Calcutta area in Oct to become fully operational. Again from the export dates you can see why it took so long to equip it with Mohawks and get them operational.
Throwing the Wirraway into the mix. The RAAF had 7 squadrons equipped at the outbreak of the Pacific war; however, I'm not certain of the date when the dive bomber variant was produced. Additionally, the RAAF received the first of 360 odd Battles in June 1940 so the possibility exists that these could have been sent to Ceylon in your scenario. View attachment 854218
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The story of the Vengeance was a long and sorry tail. I recommend Peter C Smith's book about all the twists and turns. Vultee design with a licence granted to Northrop as a second source supplier. First problem, Vultee HQ & main factory was in Downey, California and was fully engaged in knocking out trainers for the USAAF. So production was to be undertaken at a former Stinson plant in Nashville, Tennessee on the other side of the country. The Northrop plant was in Hawthorne California. Any design changes, which extended beyond the start of production, and there were many, took time to disseminate. Result two plants producing aircraft to a different standard. So Northrop aircraft became Vengeance I and Vultee aircraft Vengeance II in RAF service.Six months seems reasonable to me. I think there were some Beaufighters, Whirlwinds, Kittyhawks, Marylands, Bostons and Vengeances available to order by November 1941. Probably Spitfires too, which might have helped a lot.
Lets see, Hawk 75 / Mohawk fighters for sure. Plenty of Buffaloes if you want them, but you probably should strip them down a bit first. Plenty of Hurricanes.
The story of the Vengeance was a long and sorry tail. I recommend Peter C Smith's book about all the twists and turns. Vultee design with a licence granted to Northrop as a second source supplier. First problem, Vultee HQ & main factory was in Downey, California and was fully engaged in knocking out trainers for the USAAF. So production was to be undertaken at a former Stinson plant in Nashville, Tennessee on the other side of the country. The Northrop plant was in Hawthorne California. Any design changes, which extended beyond the start of production, and there were many, took time to disseminate. Result two plants producing aircraft to a different standard. So Northrop aircraft became Vengeance I and Vultee aircraft Vengeance II in RAF service.
Vengeance first flight by prototype July 1941 (not March as claimed on Wiki). First production aircraft off the production line at Northrop flew on 30 Nov 1941.
By mid-1941 orders were:-
Vultee - 500 from Cash & Carry contracts and 400 Lend Lease (last 100 under designation Vengeance III)
Northrop - 200 under Cash & Carry and 200 hundred under Lend Lease.
Total 1,300.
The war with Japan broke out. Mid-Jan 1942 the USAAF arrange to sieze a significant part of the Vengeance aircraft under contract. They then diverted most to Australia as part of their commitment to build up the RAAF, but not necessarily immediately they rolled off the production line. As a result the RAAF were able to receive their first 5 Vengeance aircraft in Australia on 30 May 1942 followed by another 10 at the end of July. Further deliveries followed in 1943. 12 squadron began to convert to the type in late Sept 1942 but didn't deploy to New Guinea until mid-1943.
Deliveries to Britain started with 1 in March 1942 and 23 in April 1942. As of 21st May 1942 NONE had been shipped to India. I covered their arrival and early service in post #19 on this thread.
The first Spitfire squadrons to deploy overseas sailed from Britain on convoy WS16 in Feb 1942, with some assembled aircraft on Argus and others in the holds of merchantmen. The first of these began to be taken by carrier for Malta at the beginning of March. 92 & 145 squadrons were taken to Takoradi to fly their aircraft across Africa to Egypt. The prime reason for releasing Spitfires to the ME in early 1942 was that the Bf 109F began to turn up in Mediterranean skies in increasing numbers in late 1941 and they were outperfoming the Hurricane I & II then serving in the theatre. BUt there were even shortages of Spitfires for the squadrons in the ME in 1942. 92 had no aircraft until Aug despite having arrived in mid-April.
It was May before Churchill agreed to send a Spitfire Wing to Australia. They left in June. But due to a crisis in the ME with the fall of Tobruk all bar two of their initial equipment was diverted to Egypt when the ships carrying them reached Takoradi. India was even further down the pecking order
There were a lot of other things went wrong in Ceylon in April 1942 that even another squadron of Mohawks was not going to fix.Seems like you do in fact obviously have enough Hawk 75 / Mohawks to equip a squadron in time for Ceylon. Which they in fact did have operational - in Calcutta.
One of the 'What-If' factors hinges on this bit from above: "And as has been noted many were left in their crates for months while decisions were made about them."
I think the 'What-If' requires at the very least, some swifter thinking on the part of some people. If you are relying on the precise dates and exact choices made in every decision as was and when it was made historically, as opposed to what aircraft were actually available and could be shipped in time if someone thought a bit differently and / or a bit more swiftly (and yes, hindsight does come into play), then I think you are just going to end up with the exact same situation as actually happened historically. If not, what else is supposed to change in a 'What If' scenario?
Clearly they did have a lot of Hawks around, if by 'a lot' we mean in the ballpark of the number of 100 Tomahawks they used for the AVG.
And where would a squadron of Hawks actually be more useful, in Calcutta or in Ceylon?
Same applies IMO to the Beaufighters. Sure only one or two squadrons were available, but one squadron could make a difference.
Beaufighters historically could and did tangle with Zeros, their low altitude speed allowed them to survive and even prevail in these encounters better than you might think. The Beaufighters in India and Burma actually seem to have made out better against Ki-43s than some of the single-engined types.
I also think Sunderlands in particular and / or more PBYs would be useful here for long range scouting.
IIRC the Chesapeake never operated as a DB due to faulty design of it's dive brakes and the alternative was to lower the LG to act as a dive brake,
How feasible was it to make a Henley a dive bomber or am I in the wrong thread for that question
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