Dive bombers to Ceylon 1942 (1 Viewer)

[Shortround6]

I agree the heavier wing bombs on a P-40 (D onward) were a gradual development, but as soon as you could put a 50 gallon fuel tank on the centerline (earliest production version of P-40D) you can carry about a 300 lb bomb for sure, and it turned out pretty quickly that you can also carry about a 500 lb bomb. The fuel tank system has a release switch to ditch the external tank. Needless to say that also works for a bomb, so all you have left to do is rig something to arm the bomb which seems to have been done various ways.

The P-40Cs/Tomahawk IIBs were rigged for the 52 gal drop tank, in large part to make up for the smaller fuel capacity of the self-sealing tanks. The long nose P-40s were rigged with the underwing small bomb racks, although seldom used? This seems to have been very much a doctrine decision by the USAAC. Curtiss was advertising a bewildering array of bomb combinations (including a 500lb on center line) on the export Hawk 75s but only a few minor countries took them up on it.
Tomahawks may or may not have had the small under wing racks and/or releases/triggers/safeties installed.
I said it was confusing
British and American bombs (and French) were not standardized at this point (1940-41) in regards to bomb lugs and spacing. British 20lb bomb probably did not fit a rack built for US 20lb bombs? Yes, ground crew were inventive.

SBDs did plenty of harm with 500 lb bombs on Japanese ships, and Vals did even worse on US and British ships.

500lb seems to be a decent standard.................however...............British 250lb bombs are below standard as were British 500lb GP bombs.
early British 250lbs held about 68lbs of HE and the early 500lb GP bombs held about 140lb HE. US and Japanese (and German) GP bombs held closer to 50% HE instead of 27-29%.

But range would be limited with external bombs. That's the real limitation here.

That is the real problem with using single engine army planes for this mission. SBD-3 Jan 1941 manual (up-dated later) calls for 100 gal fuel with 1000lb bomb and 140 gals with 500lb bomb and 150-260 gal for scout missions. This was all internal and is the capacity for the protected tanks.

Two other types that came to mind are the Whirlwind (as a coastal defense fighter and strafer) and a Martin Maryland, which they did have available quite early. Doesn't carry a huge bomb load but it is fast and has a long range, and what bombs it does carry can go in the bomb bay I think. If you don't want the Whirlwind (I can hear complaints already) send some Beaufighters, they were already around. Beaufighters had enough speed down low that they could tangle with Zeros and sometimes came out on top, plus plenty firepower (and more ammunition than Whirlwind) to strafe ships.

Covered by others. Beaufighters got bombs but rather late.

The problem with all these light bomber types is that without fighter escort their losses were heavy. 11 squadron Blenheims got lucky when they attacked the IJN in 1942, remaining undetected until they dropped their bombs. But once the IJN fighters got their act together 5 of the 9 attacking Blenheimscwere shot down.

And that is the major problem with the single (or two?) squadrons of airplanes putting a major hurt on the Japanese off of Ceylon in early 1942. Granted there were only a few air forces (or more properly a few local commanders) in the world that thought that escort fighters were essential for strike success. Even the US at Midway was not allocating enough escorts.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Whirlwind - just 114 built incl prototypes. Equipped just 2 squadrons, the second only forming in Sept 1941. Only started using bombs in June 1942, after suitable modifications.

Beaufighter - in high demand in Britain as a nightfighter (Mosquito NF.II didn't begin to enter service until early 1942 with first ops in April). Coastal version in short supply. 3 squadrons at home (2 of which converted to type in last quarter of 1941. Next didn't convert until June 1942) and 2 squadrons in ME (third squadron didn't form until Aug 1942 having drawn aircraft and crews from home) Another squadron at home reverted to flying Blenheim IVf in mid-1941 until Sept 1942 due to lack of aircraft. First thoughts of turning it into a torpedo fighter only arose at very end of 1941. Accelerated development saw first dozen TF operational around Sept 1942.

Amongst the little referred to movements was the decision in Jan 1942 to send two Beaufort squadrons to Ceylon. 22 left in Feb becoming operational there at end of April, thereby just missing Operation C. 217 left in May but aircraft delayed in ME. Beaufort was another aircraft in short supply in late 1941/early 1942. Formation of 2 squadrons on the type in Britain in late 1941 had to be postponed. They received Hampdens for TB role in early 1942 along with 2 squadrons transferred from Bomber Command in April, as replacement for the 2 Beaufort squadrons being sent to the Far East.

Marylands formed the backbone of Desert Air Force light bomber squadrons in 1941/42 alongside Blenheims. At one point in mid-1941 the plan was for the Baltimore to go to the Far East, but priorities changed and they went to the ME instead.

But again this was a type that didn't begin to reach the front line squadrons until early 1942.

The problem with all these light bomber types is that without fighter escort their losses were heavy. 11 squadron Blenheims got lucky when they attacked the IJN in 1942, remaining undetected until they dropped their bombs. But once the IJN fighters got their act together 5 of the 9 attacking Blenheimscwere shot down.

Blenheims had much higher losses than Marylands in the Middle East, that's why the Blenheims were phased out. Fighters in the Middle East are also a good bit faster than the Japanese. Maryland makes around 300 mph.

But I do think it would need a fighter escort, which is why I mentioned the Whirlwind, Beaufighter, Kittyhawk etc.

I think a squadron of Beaufighters doesn't seem impossible. They did end up both in Australia and in India eventually.

Beauforts are the same speed as the Blenheim, more or less, but torpedo carrying brings another interesting possibility (and they could actually dive bomb too, sort of) but they didn't have too great of luck with them.

 

[EwenS]

I don't think you fully understand the logistics and timescale involved in moving a squadron from Britain.

Once you decide to send a squadron overseas you need to find the shipping space on a ship sailing in a convoy running to a schedule (not easy in 1941/42 due to shortages of suitable shipping). Then all the personnel require medical checks, and replacements found if required. Then embarkation leave, packing up all the equipment, transporting it to the relevant port and loading it on the ship.

To take 22 Beaufort squadron as an example, the first mention of movement in the ORB was 3 Jan 1942. Ground personnel sailed on 16 Feb on convoy WS16 via the Cape. It arrived at Bombay on 8th April. Meanwhile the aircrew began flying out via Gib, Malta and the ME on 18th March. The whole squadron then came together at Ratmalana, Ceylon at the end of April.

The previous convoy, WS15 sailed on 11 Jan 1942 with the Bombay section arriving in that port on 4th March.

Now back up to the point that a squadron has to begin to prepare to move. 6 weeks back and you get to the beginning of Dec 1941. Then figure in the orders for that move to be made. You now need the decision making process to begin BEFORE war breaks out in the Far East, and even then the squadron is only going to be in place just before the Japanese strike.

Then look at Beaufighter squadron availability. I noted 3 coastal squadrons in Britain at the end of 1941 with 2 converting in the last quarter. 235 only gave up its Blenheim IVf in Dec 1941 having received it first two Beaus in Oct for training, and flying its first operation on the type on Christmas Day 1941. 236 began to receive Beaufighters in Oct 1941, flying its first operation on the type on 12 Nov, but didn't give up the last of the Blenheim IVf until March 1942. Those two squadrons were robbed of Beaus and aircrews in early 1942 to keep the two ME squadrons operational.

In Nov 1941 252 & 272 in the ME had just 24 Beaus between them. Then figure in losses during Operation Crusader.

The Aussies had been trying to get Beaufighters for some time. The first two Beaufighters arrived in Australia from Britain in March 1942 with more following over coming months. Enough had been assembledAustralia (with some difficulty as none of the engineering personnel had experience of the type) to allow deliveries to 30 squadron RAAF to start in June to allow training to begin. The squadron moved to New Guinea in Aug and began operational flying at the start of Sept. 31 squadron RAAF was then able to form in Aug.

The first Beaufighter squadron in India, 27 RAF, reformed on 19 Sept 1942. Its first Beau and the first in India, was received on 5th Nov and by mid-Dec it had 13 on hand. It flew its first operation on Christmas Day 1942.

So while you might believe a squadron of Beaus could be spared to send to Ceylon before Operation C, the evidence suggests something different, unless the whole question of the priority given to the Far East in 1941 is somehow changed. And that is the same problem that all these "what ifs" founder on. Those on the scene at the time with the limited resources they had and the numerous competing interests that existed, made very difficult choices as to the priorities. Trying to say today that they should have done this or that involves a huge amount of hindsight.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I don't think you fully understand the logistics and timescale involved in moving a squadron from Britain.

Once you decide to send a squadron overseas you need to find the shipping space on a ship sailing in a convoy running to a schedule (not easy in 1941/42 due to shortages of suitable shipping). Then all the personnel require medical checks, and replacements found if required. Then embarkation leave, packing up all the equipment, transporting it to the relevant port and loading it on the ship.

To take 22 Beaufort squadron as an example, the first mention of movement in the ORB was 3 Jan 1942. Ground personnel sailed on 16 Feb on convoy WS16 via the Cape. It arrived at Bombay on 8th April. Meanwhile the aircrew began flying out via Gib, Malta and the ME on 18th March. The whole squadron then came together at Ratmalana, Ceylon at the end of April.

The previous convoy, WS15 sailed on 11 Jan 1942 with the Bombay section arriving in that port on 4th March.

Now back up to the point that a squadron has to begin to prepare to move. 6 weeks back and you get to the beginning of Dec 1941. Then figure in the orders for that move to be made. You now need the decision making process to begin BEFORE war breaks out in the Far East, and even then the squadron is only going to be in place just before the Japanese strike.

Then look at Beaufighter squadron availability. I noted 3 coastal squadrons in Britain at the end of 1941 with 2 converting in the last quarter. 235 only gave up its Blenheim IVf in Dec 1941 having received it first two Beaus in Oct for training, and flying its first operation on the type on Christmas Day 1941. 236 began to receive Beaufighters in Oct 1941, flying its first operation on the type on 12 Nov, but didn't give up the last of the Blenheim IVf until March 1942. Those two squadrons were robbed of Beaus and aircrews in early 1942 to keep the two ME squadrons operational.

In Nov 1941 252 & 272 in the ME had just 24 Beaus between them. Then figure in losses during Operation Crusader.

The Aussies had been trying to get Beaufighters for some time. The first two Beaufighters arrived in Australia from Britain in March 1942 with more following over coming months. Enough had been assembledAustralia (with some difficulty as none of the engineering personnel had experience of the type) to allow deliveries to 30 squadron RAAF to start in June to allow training to begin. The squadron moved to New Guinea in Aug and began operational flying at the start of Sept. 31 squadron RAAF was then able to form in Aug.

The first Beaufighter squadron in India, 27 RAF, reformed on 19 Sept 1942. Its first Beau and the first in India, was received on 5th Nov and by mid-Dec it had 13 on hand. It flew its first operation on Christmas Day 1942.

So while you might believe a squadron of Beaus could be spared to send to Ceylon before Operation C, the evidence suggests something different, unless the whole question of the priority given to the Far East in 1941 is somehow changed. And that is the same problem that all these "what ifs" founder on. Those on the scene at the time with the limited resources they had and the numerous competing interests that existed, made very difficult choices as to the priorities. Trying to say today that they should have done this or that involves a huge amount of hindsight.

If the priority of sending things East isn't changed in this "What If" scenario, (which almost by definition requires hindsight!) I don't think there is any way you are going to get any kind of defense in place for Ceylon in time.

Ceylon was not ready mainly because of the low priority for the Theater.

If they have a Beaufighter squadron in India a few months after the battle, I don't think it's too far fetched to nudge timelines a little bit, but that does hinge on priorities. What were they doing in India anyway?

As for the challenges of moving stuff to Theater, they managed to do it pretty quickly with the AVG. That may be a good benchmark.

 

[Shortround6]

As for the challenges of moving stuff to Theater, they managed to do it pretty quickly with the AVG. That may be a good benchmark.

Actually the example of the AVG just makes EwenS look even better.
Jan 6th 1941 is when the "sale" of 100 Tomahawks to China is usually listed. Actual sale or gift from Britain or British just allow China to jump the production list?
at any rate, June 1941 is when the 100 planes arrive in Rangoon, in crates. August 1941 sees the AVG assembling and testing their aircraft in Toungoo Burma. Dec 20th 1941 sees the first AVG combat in China. One squadron (?) is still in Burma and join RAF Buffaloes defending Rangoon on Dec 25th.
So about 6 months from order placed to ships making 1/2 around the world and then about 5-6 months to assemble and test fly around 80 planes and get around 60 to China.
Not all 100 were assembled, some were used as spares and some might have been been lost to Japanese bombing. The ones at Rangoon were supposed to go to China but stayed when the war broke out.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Six months seems reasonable to me. I think there were some Beaufighters, Whirlwinds, Kittyhawks, Marylands, Bostons and Vengeances available to order by November 1941. Probably Spitfires too, which might have helped a lot.

Lets see, Hawk 75 / Mohawk fighters for sure. Plenty of Buffaloes if you want them, but you probably should strip them down a bit first. Plenty of Hurricanes.

 

[Shortround6]

I would suggest really looking at the history of AVG. They didn't have enough spare parts, they didn't have enough spare engines and there were none to had in the CBI theater. Shipping in planes with non-standard engines is just asking for trouble if the planes last longer than even a few months. The AVG didn't have enough mechanics although a number of Chinese did very good work there was still a communications/skill set problem. The Ground crews, both westerners and Chinese did heroic work but better planning (supplies) could have had more aircraft operational on any given day.

There were NOT plenty of Buffaloes or Hawk 75s in the 2nd 1/2 of 1941.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I would suggest really looking at the history of AVG. They didn't have enough spare parts, they didn't have enough spare engines and there were none to had in the CBI theater. Shipping in planes with non-standard engines is just asking for trouble if the planes last longer than even a few months. The AVG didn't have enough mechanics although a number of Chinese did very good work there was still a communications/skill set problem. The Ground crews, both westerners and Chinese did heroic work but better planning (supplies) could have had more aircraft operational on any given day.

I have read 6 or 7 books on the AVG. I know what they dealt with - and yet did they manage to be a problem for the Japanese or not? I would say clearly they did. Those original 100 aircraft became three quite effective squadrons, which later evolved into the basis for the 23rd Fighter Group. What exactly are you expecting here, to uproot and ship RAF Biggin Hill, the entire Supermarine and De Havilland home factories, and say, Rolls Royce Cheshire, and maybe set up an entire oil refinery and a munitions plant?

Conditions in just about all Pacific and CBI and North African / Middle Eastern bases were bad, with specific conditions ranging from marginal to horrific. I would guess Ceylon would be better than many other bases.

There were NOT plenty of Buffaloes or Hawk 75s in the 2nd 1/2 of 1941.

Buffalos equipped at least three squadrons - RAF 243 Sqn, 453 Sqn RAAF, and RNZAF 453 Sqn in Singapore and Malaya, in late 1941.

67 Sqn RAF was equipped with Buffaloes in Burma from October 1941 until February 1942 when they are replaced with Hurricanes.

5 Sqn RAF received their Mohawk IV (slightly modified Hawk 75A3 and A4) in December 1941 where they were based in Calcutta, and flew these until June 1943 when they were replaced with Hurricane IIc (probably a step down but I think they were running out of Mohawk spares by then, which all went to the other Sqn).

To wit, they still had enough Mohawk IV remaining available to equip 155 Sqn RAF in August 1942, also in India, which went on to fly Mohawk IVs until January 1944 when they were at last replaced by Spitfire VIII (a big step up!). 74 more Mohawk IV (or possibly as yet unmodified Hawk 75A3 / A4) were shipped by England to India apparently some time in 1941.

This to me is an indication that there were in fact both of these types available in Theater. Most of the Buffaloes did end up getting wiped out pretty quickly in Malaya and Burma etc. in late 1941 and early 1942. But there still seems to have been a fair number of Mohawks available. What you call 'plenty' is subjective but I think even a single squadron could help in the Ceylon situation. I don't think the Mohawks IVs were actually needed in Calcutta in 1941-42.

In addition to this, 3 Sqn SAAF also had Mohawks which were used to fight the Italians in East Africa. So I guess they were needed there.

 

[Wildcat]

Throwing the Wirraway into the mix. The RAAF had 7 squadrons equipped at the outbreak of the Pacific war; however, I'm not certain of the date when the dive bomber variant was produced. Additionally, the RAAF received the first of 360 odd Battles in June 1940 so the possibility exists that these could have been sent to Ceylon in your scenario.

 

[EwenS]

Import / export history of Mohawks for the RAF posted on another site by Geoffrey Sinclair.

"As far as I know lots of work to convert from French to RAF standard. And as has been noted many were left in their crates for months while decisions were made about them.

Not quite all ex French, there were some ex Norwegian, ex Iran and reported ex China, plus captured/defected Vichy French. According to the USAAF order F-273 for HK-75A-4 was split 216 France, 204 Britain, with acceptances for Britain beginning in May 1940 and ending in August, those for France ending in June. Exports for France ended in June, exports for Britain were 57 in July, 118 in August and 29 in September 1940, total 204. Exports for Norway were 15 in March and 10 in April 1940.

The RAF Mohawk numbers are quite consistent in the eyes of those in London. According to the import report Mohawks arriving in UK, 32 in Jul-40, 37 in Aug-40, 117 in Sep-40 18 in Oct-40, total 204

According to Air Arsenal North America 5 of the Norwegian order of H-75A-6 made it to Britain, they appear to have been treated as Norwegian in the import report, they became AR630 to 34 and never left Britain, so 204 imports becomes 209 RAF serials. The following using British Military Aircraft Serials, by Robertson and dates from serial registers.

65 AR630 AR694, arrival dates start in August 1940
19 AX880 AX898, arrival dates around September 1940
20 BB918 BB937, ToC in 1940/early 1941
6 BB974 BB979, ToC in 1940/early 1941
20 BJ434 BJ453, ToC in 1940/early 1941
20 BJ531 BJ550, ToC in 1940/early 1941
20 BK569 BK588, ToC in 1940/early 1941
4 BK876 BK879, ToC in 1940/early 1941
4 BL220 BL223, entries ruled through in Serial Registers, "stet", ToC Nov/Dec 40, exported to Portugal, South Africa, South Africa, Middle East respectively.
9 BS730 BS738, ToC in 1940/early 1941
4 BS744 BS747, ToC in 1940/early 1941
15 BS784 BS798, ToC in 1940/early 1941
3 BT470 BT472, ToC in March 1941
Total 209

Exports from UK
8 in Nov-40 to Middle East Vessel damaged, 4 aircraft returned to UK, but re-exported, so assumed only 4 aircraft involved, exported twice
-4 in Nov-40 to Middle East Vessel damaged, aircraft returned to UK
13 in Jan-41 to Middle East
2 in Jan-41 to South Africa
14 in Feb-41 to South Africa
4 in Apr-41 to South Africa
12 in May-41 to South Africa
12 in Jun-41 to South Africa
8 in Jul-41 to South Africa
11 in Aug-41 to Portugal
5 in Sep-41 to India
6 in Sep-41 to South Africa
3 in Oct-41 to India
5 in Oct-41 to Portugal
6 in Nov-41 to India
10 in Dec-41 to India
4 in Jan-42 to India
4 in Jan-42 to South Africa
1 in Feb-42 to India
35 in Apr-42 to India
11 in May-42 to India
10 in Jun-42 to India
1 in Jun-43 to India.

Total 181, 86 India, 17 Middle East, 16 Portugal, 62 South Africa

RAF census of February 1943 says 5 Mohawks in Britain, 21 Middle East, 55 South Africa, 63 India, total 144 effectives. 2 instructional, 22 lost in UK, 25 lost overseas, 16 transferred to other powers, total lost 65, grand total 209.

As of June 1944 still a total of 209 Mohawks but only 6 still effective. I read this as of February 1943 5+22+2 = 29 in Britain, in June 1944 it is 2+25+1 = 28. 209 total - 28 Britain - 181 exports = 0 According to AIR 19/524 204 Mohawks were delivered to the RAF in Britain July 1940 to May 1941, 184 of these in 1940.

In addition to the above Air Arsenal North America has
1 AX799 AX799, in Robertson, HK-75A-9, Pattern aircraft for Chinese production
4 HK823 HK826, only HK823 in Robertson, Ex French in Middle East, 2 went to SAAF, nothing in Serial Registers.
9 LA157 LA165, in Robertson, reported to be from the 10 HK-75A-9 sent to Iran March and April 1941, nothing in Serial Registers,
1 DR761 DR761, reported to be assembled in India from kits meant for China, up to 5 flown, nothing in Serial Registers,

The China aircraft may have something to do with the import report having 8 Mohawk imports into India in January 1944 and 16 in February."

The export dates are the dates of leaving Britain. Add about 2 months for deliveries to ME & India via Cape, then add time for assembly & testing before delivery to a squadron.

The export to the ME at the end of 1940 was intended to provide the equipment for an RAF fighter squadron at Aden. Aden was a highly important British base for refuelling ships at the southern end of the Red Sea. It had been subject to air attack in 1940 from Italian aircraft based in East Africa, just the other side of the Red Sea.

Deliveries to Portugal were part of a political effort to persuade that country not to join the Axis. Had they done so, the Allied position in the Atlantic would potentially be much worse as U-boats would have gained the ability to refuel in the shelter of the Azores.

Air defence of India in 1941 before the arrival of the Mohawks was in the hands of nothing better than biplane Hawker Audax being flown as single seaters by 5 squadron. While it began to receive Mohawks in Dec 1941 it still had Audax on its books until Aug 1942. From the export dates above and my comments about delivery, you can begin to see why.

155 squadron was formed in April 1942 at Peshawar on the North West Frontier of India. It had no aircraft until it began to receive the Mohawks in mid-Aug after it had moved to southern India near Madras. It initially flew air defence and coastal patrols while working up before moving East to the Calcutta area in Oct to become fully operational. Again from the export dates you can see why it took so long to equip it with Mohawks and get them operational.

 

[EwenS]

Ignoring the 33 Buffalos from the Belgian order taken over by the RAF and used by various RAF & FAA units in Britain and the ME, it is the 170 Buffalo ordered for RAF that are relevant to this discussion. 3 delivered to Britain for trials with rest direct to Singapore with deliveries between arriving April & Aug 1941 IIRC. About 30 were later crated up and shipped to Burma for use by 67 squadron (see below) And there were also some losses before 7 Dec 1941 in accidents.

Those 167 sent to Singapore / Burma not only had to provide the front line strength of the squadrons formed to fly them, but a reserve against the usual peacetime attrition let alone that expected in wartime. So roughly 50% of surviving aircraft in Dec 1941 were in reserve.

Squadron formations to fly them:-

67 formed Singapore March 1941 to fly Buffalo and was fully equipped by May. Transferred to Rangoon, Burma (without aircraft) in Oct where it received new Buffalos previously shipped there for them. It was the only operational fighter squadron in Burma at the time of the outbreak of war in the Far East (the AVG based there were still in training prior to their intended move to China).

243 formed Singapore March 1941 on Buffalo.

21 RAAF moved to Singapore in Aug 1940 initially flying Wirraways until Nov 1941. Began to receive Buffalos in Aug, becoming fully equipped with them in Nov.

453 Australian having formed in Australia in May 1941 arrived in Singapore in Aug to receive its first aircraft, the Buffalo.

488 New Zealand formed in Sept 1941 in New Zealand reaching Singapore in Oct/Nov to receive its first aircraft. These were Buffalos given up by 67 squadron when it moved to Burma.

Note how late the last pair were formed and therefore their general lack of experience.

 

[EwenS]

Throwing the Wirraway into the mix. The RAAF had 7 squadrons equipped at the outbreak of the Pacific war; however, I'm not certain of the date when the dive bomber variant was produced. Additionally, the RAAF received the first of 360 odd Battles in June 1940 so the possibility exists that these could have been sent to Ceylon in your scenario.

Those 360 Battles were delivered between April 1940 and December 1943 specifically to train new aircrew under the Empire Air Training Scheme, despite the press reports of them having a secondary combat capability. And many, even from the earliest deliveries, were already modified as target tugs (with the rear cockpit converted to hold the wind driven target towing winch) or as dual control trainers.

ADF Serials - Fairey Battle

https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205443317

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Import / export history of Mohawks for the RAF posted on another site by Geoffrey Sinclair.

"As far as I know lots of work to convert from French to RAF standard. And as has been noted many were left in their crates for months while decisions were made about them.

Not quite all ex French, there were some ex Norwegian, ex Iran and reported ex China, plus captured/defected Vichy French. According to the USAAF order F-273 for HK-75A-4 was split 216 France, 204 Britain, with acceptances for Britain beginning in May 1940 and ending in August, those for France ending in June. Exports for France ended in June, exports for Britain were 57 in July, 118 in August and 29 in September 1940, total 204. Exports for Norway were 15 in March and 10 in April 1940.

The RAF Mohawk numbers are quite consistent in the eyes of those in London. According to the import report Mohawks arriving in UK, 32 in Jul-40, 37 in Aug-40, 117 in Sep-40 18 in Oct-40, total 204

According to Air Arsenal North America 5 of the Norwegian order of H-75A-6 made it to Britain, they appear to have been treated as Norwegian in the import report, they became AR630 to 34 and never left Britain, so 204 imports becomes 209 RAF serials. The following using British Military Aircraft Serials, by Robertson and dates from serial registers.

65 AR630 AR694, arrival dates start in August 1940
19 AX880 AX898, arrival dates around September 1940
20 BB918 BB937, ToC in 1940/early 1941
6 BB974 BB979, ToC in 1940/early 1941
20 BJ434 BJ453, ToC in 1940/early 1941
20 BJ531 BJ550, ToC in 1940/early 1941
20 BK569 BK588, ToC in 1940/early 1941
4 BK876 BK879, ToC in 1940/early 1941
4 BL220 BL223, entries ruled through in Serial Registers, "stet", ToC Nov/Dec 40, exported to Portugal, South Africa, South Africa, Middle East respectively.
9 BS730 BS738, ToC in 1940/early 1941
4 BS744 BS747, ToC in 1940/early 1941
15 BS784 BS798, ToC in 1940/early 1941
3 BT470 BT472, ToC in March 1941
Total 209

Exports from UK
8 in Nov-40 to Middle East Vessel damaged, 4 aircraft returned to UK, but re-exported, so assumed only 4 aircraft involved, exported twice
-4 in Nov-40 to Middle East Vessel damaged, aircraft returned to UK
13 in Jan-41 to Middle East
2 in Jan-41 to South Africa
14 in Feb-41 to South Africa
4 in Apr-41 to South Africa
12 in May-41 to South Africa
12 in Jun-41 to South Africa
8 in Jul-41 to South Africa
11 in Aug-41 to Portugal
5 in Sep-41 to India
6 in Sep-41 to South Africa
3 in Oct-41 to India
5 in Oct-41 to Portugal
6 in Nov-41 to India
10 in Dec-41 to India
4 in Jan-42 to India
4 in Jan-42 to South Africa
1 in Feb-42 to India
35 in Apr-42 to India
11 in May-42 to India
10 in Jun-42 to India
1 in Jun-43 to India.

Total 181, 86 India, 17 Middle East, 16 Portugal, 62 South Africa

RAF census of February 1943 says 5 Mohawks in Britain, 21 Middle East, 55 South Africa, 63 India, total 144 effectives. 2 instructional, 22 lost in UK, 25 lost overseas, 16 transferred to other powers, total lost 65, grand total 209.

As of June 1944 still a total of 209 Mohawks but only 6 still effective. I read this as of February 1943 5+22+2 = 29 in Britain, in June 1944 it is 2+25+1 = 28. 209 total - 28 Britain - 181 exports = 0 According to AIR 19/524 204 Mohawks were delivered to the RAF in Britain July 1940 to May 1941, 184 of these in 1940.

In addition to the above Air Arsenal North America has
1 AX799 AX799, in Robertson, HK-75A-9, Pattern aircraft for Chinese production
4 HK823 HK826, only HK823 in Robertson, Ex French in Middle East, 2 went to SAAF, nothing in Serial Registers.
9 LA157 LA165, in Robertson, reported to be from the 10 HK-75A-9 sent to Iran March and April 1941, nothing in Serial Registers,
1 DR761 DR761, reported to be assembled in India from kits meant for China, up to 5 flown, nothing in Serial Registers,

The China aircraft may have something to do with the import report having 8 Mohawk imports into India in January 1944 and 16 in February."

The export dates are the dates of leaving Britain. Add about 2 months for deliveries to ME & India via Cape, then add time for assembly & testing before delivery to a squadron.

The export to the ME at the end of 1940 was intended to provide the equipment for an RAF fighter squadron at Aden. Aden was a highly important British base for refuelling ships at the southern end of the Red Sea. It had been subject to air attack in 1940 from Italian aircraft based in East Africa, just the other side of the Red Sea.

Deliveries to Portugal were part of a political effort to persuade that country not to join the Axis. Had they done so, the Allied position in the Atlantic would potentially be much worse as U-boats would have gained the ability to refuel in the shelter of the Azores.

Air defence of India in 1941 before the arrival of the Mohawks was in the hands of nothing better than biplane Hawker Audax being flown as single seaters by 5 squadron. While it began to receive Mohawks in Dec 1941 it still had Audax on its books until Aug 1942. From the export dates above and my comments about delivery, you can begin to see why.

155 squadron was formed in April 1942 at Peshawar on the North West Frontier of India. It had no aircraft until it began to receive the Mohawks in mid-Aug after it had moved to southern India near Madras. It initially flew air defence and coastal patrols while working up before moving East to the Calcutta area in Oct to become fully operational. Again from the export dates you can see why it took so long to equip it with Mohawks and get them operational.

Seems like you do in fact obviously have enough Hawk 75 / Mohawks to equip a squadron in time for Ceylon. Which they in fact did have operational - in Calcutta.

One of the 'What-If' factors hinges on this bit from above: "And as has been noted many were left in their crates for months while decisions were made about them."

I think the 'What-If' requires at the very least, some swifter thinking on the part of some people. If you are relying on the precise dates and exact choices made in every decision as was and when it was made historically, as opposed to what aircraft were actually available and could be shipped in time if someone thought a bit differently and / or a bit more swiftly (and yes, hindsight does come into play), then I think you are just going to end up with the exact same situation as actually happened historically. If not, what else is supposed to change in a 'What If' scenario?

Clearly they did have a lot of Hawks around, if by 'a lot' we mean in the ballpark of the number of 100 Tomahawks they used for the AVG.

And where would a squadron of Hawks actually be more useful, in Calcutta or in Ceylon?

Same applies IMO to the Beaufighters. Sure only one or two squadrons were available, but one squadron could make a difference.

Beaufighters historically could and did tangle with Zeros, their low altitude speed allowed them to survive and even prevail in these encounters better than you might think. The Beaufighters in India and Burma actually seem to have made out better against Ki-43s than some of the single-engined types.

I also think Sunderlands in particular and / or more PBYs would be useful here for long range scouting.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Throwing the Wirraway into the mix. The RAAF had 7 squadrons equipped at the outbreak of the Pacific war; however, I'm not certain of the date when the dive bomber variant was produced. Additionally, the RAAF received the first of 360 odd Battles in June 1940 so the possibility exists that these could have been sent to Ceylon in your scenario. View attachment 854218

View attachment 854219

I was initially laughing at this but looking it up, Wirraway III / Ca-16 actually carried a good bomb load of two 500 lb bombs. When did that one come out?

I don't think Fairey Battle is going to do much more than just die unless they can convert them to Fulmars in the field...

 

[EwenS]

Six months seems reasonable to me. I think there were some Beaufighters, Whirlwinds, Kittyhawks, Marylands, Bostons and Vengeances available to order by November 1941. Probably Spitfires too, which might have helped a lot.

Lets see, Hawk 75 / Mohawk fighters for sure. Plenty of Buffaloes if you want them, but you probably should strip them down a bit first. Plenty of Hurricanes.

The story of the Vengeance was a long and sorry tail. I recommend Peter C Smith's book about all the twists and turns. Vultee design with a licence granted to Northrop as a second source supplier. First problem, Vultee HQ & main factory was in Downey, California and was fully engaged in knocking out trainers for the USAAF. So production was to be undertaken at a former Stinson plant in Nashville, Tennessee on the other side of the country. The Northrop plant was in Hawthorne California. Any design changes, which extended beyond the start of production, and there were many, took time to disseminate. Result two plants producing aircraft to a different standard. So Northrop aircraft became Vengeance I and Vultee aircraft Vengeance II in RAF service.

Vengeance first flight by prototype July 1941 (not March as claimed on Wiki). First production aircraft off the production line at Northrop flew on 30 Nov 1941.

By mid-1941 orders were:-
Vultee - 500 from Cash & Carry contracts and 400 Lend Lease (last 100 under designation Vengeance III)
Northrop - 200 under Cash & Carry and 200 hundred under Lend Lease.
Total 1,300.

The war with Japan broke out. Mid-Jan 1942 the USAAF arrange to sieze a significant part of the Vengeance aircraft under contract. They then diverted most to Australia as part of their commitment to build up the RAAF, but not necessarily immediately they rolled off the production line. As a result the RAAF were able to receive their first 5 Vengeance aircraft in Australia on 30 May 1942 followed by another 10 at the end of July. Further deliveries followed in 1943. 12 squadron began to convert to the type in late Sept 1942 but didn't deploy to New Guinea until mid-1943.

Deliveries to Britain started with 1 in March 1942 and 23 in April 1942. As of 21st May 1942 NONE had been shipped to India. I covered their arrival and early service in post #19 on this thread.

The first Spitfire squadrons to deploy overseas sailed from Britain on convoy WS16 in Feb 1942, with some assembled aircraft on Argus and others in the holds of merchantmen. The first of these began to be taken by carrier for Malta at the beginning of March. 92 & 145 squadrons were taken to Takoradi to fly their aircraft across Africa to Egypt. The prime reason for releasing Spitfires to the ME in early 1942 was that the Bf 109F began to turn up in Mediterranean skies in increasing numbers in late 1941 and they were outperfoming the Hurricane I & II then serving in the theatre. BUt there were even shortages of Spitfires for the squadrons in the ME in 1942. 92 had no aircraft until Aug despite having arrived in mid-April.

It was May before Churchill agreed to send a Spitfire Wing to Australia. They left in June. But due to a crisis in the ME with the fall of Tobruk all bar two of their initial equipment was diverted to Egypt when the ships carrying them reached Takoradi. India was even further down the pecking order

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The story of the Vengeance was a long and sorry tail. I recommend Peter C Smith's book about all the twists and turns. Vultee design with a licence granted to Northrop as a second source supplier. First problem, Vultee HQ & main factory was in Downey, California and was fully engaged in knocking out trainers for the USAAF. So production was to be undertaken at a former Stinson plant in Nashville, Tennessee on the other side of the country. The Northrop plant was in Hawthorne California. Any design changes, which extended beyond the start of production, and there were many, took time to disseminate. Result two plants producing aircraft to a different standard. So Northrop aircraft became Vengeance I and Vultee aircraft Vengeance II in RAF service.

Then there is the whole thing about the bizarre wing shape they ended up with, the original odd flying profile / attitude etc. But somehow the end result seemed to work reasonably well. Especially in Burma / India.

Vengeance first flight by prototype July 1941 (not March as claimed on Wiki). First production aircraft off the production line at Northrop flew on 30 Nov 1941.

By mid-1941 orders were:-
Vultee - 500 from Cash & Carry contracts and 400 Lend Lease (last 100 under designation Vengeance III)
Northrop - 200 under Cash & Carry and 200 hundred under Lend Lease.
Total 1,300.

The war with Japan broke out. Mid-Jan 1942 the USAAF arrange to sieze a significant part of the Vengeance aircraft under contract. They then diverted most to Australia as part of their commitment to build up the RAAF, but not necessarily immediately they rolled off the production line. As a result the RAAF were able to receive their first 5 Vengeance aircraft in Australia on 30 May 1942 followed by another 10 at the end of July. Further deliveries followed in 1943. 12 squadron began to convert to the type in late Sept 1942 but didn't deploy to New Guinea until mid-1943.

Deliveries to Britain started with 1 in March 1942 and 23 in April 1942. As of 21st May 1942 NONE had been shipped to India. I covered their arrival and early service in post #19 on this thread.

Someone would have had to move faster to get some to Ceylon in time, no doubt.

The first Spitfire squadrons to deploy overseas sailed from Britain on convoy WS16 in Feb 1942, with some assembled aircraft on Argus and others in the holds of merchantmen. The first of these began to be taken by carrier for Malta at the beginning of March. 92 & 145 squadrons were taken to Takoradi to fly their aircraft across Africa to Egypt. The prime reason for releasing Spitfires to the ME in early 1942 was that the Bf 109F began to turn up in Mediterranean skies in increasing numbers in late 1941 and they were outperfoming the Hurricane I & II then serving in the theatre. BUt there were even shortages of Spitfires for the squadrons in the ME in 1942. 92 had no aircraft until Aug despite having arrived in mid-April.

It's a bit more complex than that. There was a gradual ratcheting up from 'Tertiary Theater' status to almost 'Main Show' status by 2nd El Alamein.

• Spoiler: Very brief timeline of new fighters sent to Middle East by both sides.

  • First there was the initial phase - the biplane war - Gladiators vs. Fiat CR. 32s mainly, and in some numbers, with some Lysanders, Gauntlets, Harts, BR.20s, I think Wellesleys, maybe Wildebeasts? Swordfish. A host of weird planes all duking it out. There was a lot of losses on both sides, but the British had a slight upper hand, arguably.
  • Then Hurricanes came in gradually starting with 73 Sqn in late 1940 / early 41, and the Italians brought in some Fiat G.50s. Hurricanes were a game changer.
  • The Germans sent some Bf 110s in early 1941, but Hurricanes still dominating.
  • Then the Germans sent in Bf 109E7s with JG 27 in April 1941. Hurricane losses started to mount, Blenheims were dying like flies. The Italian sent in Macchi MC.200, which were better than the Fiats but still a bit inferior to the Hurricane.
  • Then the first Tomahawks were deployed with 112 Sqn starting in June 1941. These seemed to even the odds quite a bit, notably on one particularly harrowing battle for both sides which somewhat rattled JG 27. So the Germans diverted some 109F-4s that were meant for the Russian Front, going into action with JG 27 by Dec 1941.
  • The Italians got the first of their new MC.202 in action with 9° Gruppo, 4° Stormo in November 1941, followed swiftly by 1° Stormo. This tends to be downplayed in a lot of popular narratives about the war but these were very effective fighters.
  • Tomahawks were getting in a bit low supply, and the Hurricane units were suffering very badly from the F-4, but Kittyhawks, which on paper looked to be a big improvement, were coming online in Dec 1941 in significant numbers.

  [*]On paper the Kittyhawk Is looked like a vast improvement over the Tomahawk IIb, which were doing pretty well. Kitty was faster, much more heavily armed, capable of carrying bombs and external fuel tanks. But the Kittyhawk was a heavier plane and the power had not gone up accordingly. Using the engine settings from the manual, it was underpowered. Climb rate was roughly half of that of a Tomahawk. Maneuverability was reduced. Combat speeds were not as advertised. They had problems with the radios and not enough of the right types. The guns had major problems with weapon stoppages. There were a lot of other little problems normal when introducing a new aircraft type to the battlefield.
  
  So the Kittyhawks did not work out as hoped, at least initially, which I think is the actual reason why they finally decided to get the wheels turning on the Spitfires.
  
  British in this period were also not using the latest BoB tactics like finger four / wingmen. They were trying all sorts of weird formations, they were not doing any aerial gunnery training, and they were focusing heavily on ground attack and bombing and less so on the fighter war, which was not great for morale as the Germans and Italians were both racking up kills.
  
  The first Spits to the region as you noted went to Malta in March 1942. Badly needed there.
  
  By the time the Spitfire Vbs finally became operational in North Africa in May and June of 1942, local units had revised both tactics and flying doctrines with the Kittyhawk.
  [*]
  
  [*]Kittyhawk I and Ia were now operating at 50" Hg for takeoff and initial climb, 60" Hg or more for WEP, meaning horsepower jumped by about 35% at lower altitude. They had worked out a method for gunnery training ('shadow shooting'), secured more and better radios (and developed better radio procedure / doctrine) improved (though not eliminated) problems with the guns, and flying in pairs / finger four and using the "Big Wing" tactic they had developed to deal with attacks from above by the 109s and 202s. They also had some kind of radar in Theater which helped predict Axis attacks.
  
  Spitfire VB and VCs could defend home airfields and fight over the front line, but did not have the range to escort bombers to operational targets further back, so Kittyhawks still bore the brunt. Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronatica were still winning the air to air fight but their losses were starting to mount, and by this time the Kittyhawks were also being used to bomb tactical and operational targets (including Axis airfields) which was a way to force the Axis fighters into a disadvantageous fight.
  
  Then in July and August the first Kittyhawk II / P-40F started to trickle in, both with the US 57th FG and two Commonwealth units- 260 RAF and 3 RAAF. More Spitfires and the first P-38 Lightnings by Nov. 42. Kittyhawk IIs were doing at least even with the Luftwaffe and RA, which led to JG. 27 losing several 'experte' and being sufficiently fractured that they had to be rotated out, and replaced by JG 77 and elements of JG 53 and 51. The Germans also sent in FW 190s with JG 2, initially very successful but not enough.

It was May before Churchill agreed to send a Spitfire Wing to Australia. They left in June. But due to a crisis in the ME with the fall of Tobruk all bar two of their initial equipment was diverted to Egypt when the ships carrying them reached Takoradi. India was even further down the pecking order

From what I understand they could have sent Spitfires to the ME a few months earlier, but they seem to have been hoarding them for home island defense, for somewhat understandable reasons. But my understanding is that Spit Vs could have come. Early Mk V were in combat in Feb 1941 with 92 Sqn. But I'm not an expert on the type.

 

[EwenS]

Seems like you do in fact obviously have enough Hawk 75 / Mohawks to equip a squadron in time for Ceylon. Which they in fact did have operational - in Calcutta.

One of the 'What-If' factors hinges on this bit from above: "And as has been noted many were left in their crates for months while decisions were made about them."

I think the 'What-If' requires at the very least, some swifter thinking on the part of some people. If you are relying on the precise dates and exact choices made in every decision as was and when it was made historically, as opposed to what aircraft were actually available and could be shipped in time if someone thought a bit differently and / or a bit more swiftly (and yes, hindsight does come into play), then I think you are just going to end up with the exact same situation as actually happened historically. If not, what else is supposed to change in a 'What If' scenario?

Clearly they did have a lot of Hawks around, if by 'a lot' we mean in the ballpark of the number of 100 Tomahawks they used for the AVG.

And where would a squadron of Hawks actually be more useful, in Calcutta or in Ceylon?

Same applies IMO to the Beaufighters. Sure only one or two squadrons were available, but one squadron could make a difference.

Beaufighters historically could and did tangle with Zeros, their low altitude speed allowed them to survive and even prevail in these encounters better than you might think. The Beaufighters in India and Burma actually seem to have made out better against Ki-43s than some of the single-engined types.

I also think Sunderlands in particular and / or more PBYs would be useful here for long range scouting.

There were a lot of other things went wrong in Ceylon in April 1942 that even another squadron of Mohawks was not going to fix.

There is a whole series of articles here about various aspects of IJN operations in the IO in April 1942. Rob Stuart has been studying the extensively for many years.

Articles

Often forgotten about is the IJN operations in the Bay of Bengal at the same time as Ceylon was being attacked. During those operations a Japanese cruiser force, supported by a carrier struck at shipping along the Indian coast north of Madras sinking 20 merchnat ships and damaging another 3. So it is wrong to say that you could afford to leave the rest of the Indian coast undefended to reinforce Ceylon even further. You do not know where that force will turn up next.

https://i0.wp.com/thuppahis.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/indian-ocean-raid-april-1942.webp?ssl=1

 

[Admiral Beez]

IIRC the Chesapeake never operated as a DB due to faulty design of it's dive brakes and the alternative was to lower the LG to act as a dive brake,

I'd like to reintroduce discussion on the Chesapeake at Ceylon. It's available and unwanted on the home front. It can at worst add level bombing capability on that Blenheim strike, and at best can add a marginal dive bomber capability. I'm surprised they weren't sent to Malaya.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I was just reading this memoir by DH Clarke and this is probably already well known around here, but man, he loved the Henley. Didn't think much of the Hurricane or the Kittyhawk either. He described chasing a Bf 109 in a Henley without any guns.

How feasible was it to make a Henley a dive bomber or am I in the wrong thread for that question

 

[buffnut453]

How feasible was it to make a Henley a dive bomber or am I in the wrong thread for that question

View attachment 854362

Since the Henley was designed as a light bomber with dive bombing capabilities, I think the answer is yes.