Dive bombers to Ceylon 1942

[Steamed_Banana]

On April 9 1942 9 Blenheims bombed the KB, and four were shot down by CAP, near the carriers, for the loss of one Zero, but unluckily the Blenheims were intercepted a 2nd time by Zeros and Vals returning from the Hermes strike, and another Blenheim and a Zero were shot down. So the KB, with 5 carriers and ~20 Zeros aloft only managed to shoot down 4 Blenheims. If we add ~30 Fairey Battles to the Blenheim formation, it seems unlikely that RAF losses would increase much since the Battle has the same (IIRC) defensive armament as a Blenheim and similar top speed. Ditto for a squadron or two of Skuas, albeit slower than Blenheims.

I am very well aware of that (in certain circles) very famous Blenheim mission, during which I think the Blenheim crews got very very lucky to get as far as they did, which in terms of actual damage to the Japanese fleet, was not very far at all. I know this mission has assumed nigh heroic stature among some folks, I just do not perceive it the same way.

In fact I do not even come close to your rosy estimate for the survival rate of Battles, Blenheims, Skuas, Vindicators or any other such obsolete aircraft against the Japanese fleet. In fact next to Battles Blenheims look like F-16s, but they were still nowhere near up to the task. But the truth is we will never know.

I base this opinion on two things:

1) The ratio of losses to the rest of the British forces during that very same battle, of which the dismal performance by the Blenheims was the stand out success, and
2) The catastrophic loss rates and even more dismal results by Blenheims during various operations in the Burma and in Malaya.

I'd say the overall outlook is pretty grim unless you get better fighters and / or a lot more of them, and better bombers too.

Or maybe attack with Wellingtons at night

 

[Admiral Beez]

So the KB, with 5 carriers and ~20 Zeros aloft only managed to shoot down 4 Blenheims.

Yes, but after they dropped their bombs over the targets. Their mission was complete.

 

[RCAFson]

To clarify, I looked back into my bookshelves and found that I misremembered this. The Type 99s that struck the 'Canal sortied from Buin and not Rabaul -- a much shorter flight.

The Aug 7 strike flew from Rabaul and ditched near Shortland Island.

 

[RCAFson]

I am very well aware of that (in certain circles) very famous Blenheim mission, during which I think the Blenheim crews got very very lucky to get as far as they did, which in terms of actual damage to the Japanese fleet, was not very far at all. I know this mission has assumed nigh heroic stature among some folks, I just do not perceive it the same way.

In fact I do not even come close to your rosy estimate for the survival rate of Battles, Blenheims, Skuas, Vindicators or any other such obsolete aircraft against the Japanese fleet. In fact next to Battles Blenheims look like F-16s, but they were still nowhere near up to the task. But the truth is we will never know.

I base this opinion on two things:

1) The ratio of losses to the rest of the British forces during that very same battle, of which the dismal performance by the Blenheims was the stand out success, and
2) The catastrophic loss rates and even more dismal results by Blenheims during various operations in the Burma and in Malaya.

I'd say the overall outlook is pretty grim unless you get better fighters and / or a lot more of them, and better bombers too.

Or maybe attack with Wellingtons at night

Or SBDs?

The losses against Zero escorts were not as severe as it seems, as many Hurricanes were caught during TO on April 5.

There's quite a difference in the tactical situation for Zero's flying carrier CAP and land based fighters. The CAP fighters are constrained in their ability to chase targets too far away from the carriers that they are tasked to protect, and historically, if the IJNAF didn't intercept prior to the Allied strike their effectiveness was greatly reduced.

It's unfortunate that the Blenheims used a level bombing attack, rather than low level glide bombing.

 

[EwenS]

A couple of points.

The last time the SBD participated in a carrier battle was at Philippine Sea in June 1944. And even then it was only aboard three CV and they were replaced by the SB2C between July & Sept. The SB2C was first used operationally against Rabaul in Nov 1943. After June 1944 the SBD was only being used operationally by the USMC from land bases.

The range of the Swordfish when it was designed, and for how and where the RN expected to be fighting was perfectly adequate. For example the distance from Libya to Crete at its narrowest is about 200 miles. Malta to Sicily just 60 miles. At Taranto, with the extra fuel tank in the Observer's cockpit or slung under the belly and without the TAG, were launched 170 miles from the target.

When it comes to the Pacific, I think many have an exaggerated idea of the operating ranges. As a generality the IJN sought to outrange the USN by 25-50 miles.


There is a need to distinguish between search missions with aircraft being sent out with no, or at least reduced, bomb loads and filled with as much fuel as possible, and strike missions. Generally the USN was looking at strike ranges of about 200 miles against an enemy fleet. But distances would generally be shorter in support of amphibious operations. But all sorts of things could be changed to suit operational conditions. Philippine Sea is an oddity because of a variety of factors.

For both sides, much depended on how good the search was to locate and report the other side first.

At Philippine Sea on 19th June 1944 the IJN launched from 280-400 miles because their forces were so spread out and because their aircraft were planning to land on Saipan after the strike rather than return to their carriers.

On the 20th the USN sent a search group out to over 325 miles in the afternoon which was considered an extreme range. When the strike was planned there were a number of reports with positions that contained a variety of positions and distances. They started at 275 miles before pushing out to 300 and on to 330 miles. Then figure in the relative speeds of the two fleets and the fact that the wind was blowing in exactly the opposite direction to that which TF58 needed for launch & recovery. The return journey was estimated at 250 miles due to the carriers closing the distance at about 22 knots during the 4 hours between the completion of launch and the start of recovery. The whole recovery cycle took about 2 hours in the dark with many pilots having very little night flying experience.

But there were sacrifices to achieve that long range. The air groups formed up en route instead of overhead each carrier group, as was the normal practice, in order to save fuel. Just make matters worse on arrival over the targets time was tight as the sun was going down. So there was not time for attacks to be co-ordinated. The result? About 80 aircraft lost from fuel shortages compared to 20 over the targets out of 226 that departed.

So basically the pilots had range anxiety throughout the mission.

On 16th Feb 1945 TF58 launched against the Tokyo area from just 60 miles off the coast of Japan. On 19th March, Franklin was hit when about 50 miles offshore when the target was Kure & Kobe (OK they had to fly over Shikoku to reach those targets on the Inland Sea so the distance to the target was greater). In July / Aug British and USN carrier aircraft were able to roam over most of both Japanese coasts as the carriers repositioned up and down the coast between strike periods.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Or SBDs?

The losses against Zero escorts were not as severe as it seems, as many Hurricanes were caught during TO on April 5.

Hmmm... and how do we interpret the Hurricanes outstanding results over Singapore? or later on against Ki-43 in Burma and India?

There's quite a difference in the tactical situation for Zero's flying carrier CAP and land based fighters. The CAP fighters are constrained in their ability to chase targets too far away from the carriers that they are tasked to protect, and historically, if the IJNAF didn't intercept prior to the Allied strike their effectiveness was greatly reduced.

It's unfortunate that the Blenheims used a level bombing attack, rather than low level glide bombing.

I guess we will never know. Off-hand I can't think of any major success with Blenheims against Axis warships. Care to remind me of any?

I can think of a few cases of Blenheims sinking some merchant ships prior to being savaged by Ki-43s in Burma. For example on 9 Sept 1942, a total of 9 Blenheims from RAF 60 and 113 sqns attacked Akyab at low level, dropping a total of 36 x 250 lb bombs and apparently sinking a 1500 ton transport ship tied up at the dock. Unfortunately they were attacked by Ki-43-I and lost 3 shot down and 2 force landed which were apparently written off.

Shortly afterword a total of 6 Hudsons from 62 and 353 Sqn also attacked, one being shot down and another force-landed back at base.

Maybe Lockheed Hudsons might be be another option. Good range, decent bomb load, they did sink some Axis warships and submarines. I think British ones had Boulton-Paul turrets installed with two guns plus fixed guns in the nose. They seemed to be able to fight off IJN and IJA fighters at least some of the time.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

A couple of points.

The last time the SBD participated in a carrier battle was at Philippine Sea in June 1944. And even then it was only aboard three CV and they were replaced by the SB2C between July & Sept. The SB2C was first used operationally against Rabaul in Nov 1943. After June 1944 the SBD was only being used operationally by the USMC from land bases.

The range of the Swordfish when it was designed, and for how and where the RN expected to be fighting was perfectly adequate. For example the distance from Libya to Crete at its narrowest is about 200 miles. Malta to Sicily just 60 miles. At Taranto, with the extra fuel tank in the Observer's cockpit or slung under the belly and without the TAG, were launched 170 miles from the target.

When it was designed? Sure, you could argue that, but that was what, 1933? The truth is the Swordfish had barely more than half the range of a D3A or SBD.

When it comes to the Pacific, I think many have an exaggerated idea of the operating ranges. As a generality the IJN sought to outrange the USN by 25-50 miles.

SBDs and F4Fs had a much closer max range to IJN equivalents than Swordfish and Hurricanes though, let's be real. I don't think that is a really valid comparison.

IJN could outrange the Swordfish by at least 100 miles, with plenty of margin for error.

There is a need to distinguish between search missions with aircraft being sent out with no, or at least reduced, bomb loads and filled with as much fuel as possible, and strike missions. Generally the USN was looking at strike ranges of about 200 miles against an enemy fleet. But distances would generally be shorter in support of amphibious operations. But all sorts of things could be changed to suit operational conditions. Philippine Sea is an oddity because of a variety of factors.

For both sides, much depended on how good the search was to locate and report the other side first.

At Philippine Sea on 19th June 1944 the IJN launched from 280-400 miles because their forces were so spread out and because their aircraft were planning to land on Saipan after the strike rather than return to their carriers.

On the 20th the USN sent a search group out to over 325 miles in the afternoon which was considered an extreme range. When the strike was planned there were a number of reports with positions that contained a variety of positions and distances. They started at 275 miles before pushing out to 300 and on to 330 miles. Then figure in the relative speeds of the two fleets and the fact that the wind was blowing in exactly the opposite direction to that which TF58 needed for launch & recovery. The return journey was estimated at 250 miles due to the carriers closing the distance at about 22 knots during the 4 hours between the completion of launch and the start of recovery. The whole recovery cycle took about 2 hours in the dark with many pilots having very little night flying experience.

But there were sacrifices to achieve that long range. The air groups formed up en route instead of overhead each carrier group, as was the normal practice, in order to save fuel. Just make matters worse on arrival over the targets time was tight as the sun was going down. So there was not time for attacks to be co-ordinated. The result? About 80 aircraft lost from fuel shortages compared to 20 over the targets out of 226 that departed.

So basically the pilots had range anxiety throughout the mission.

Swordfish pilots would have a hell of a lot of anxiety trying to fly a 250 mile mission...

On 16th Feb 1945 TF58 launched against the Tokyo area from just 60 miles off the coast of Japan. On 19th March, Franklin was hit when about 50 miles offshore when the target was Kure & Kobe (OK they had to fly over Shikoku to reach those targets on the Inland Sea so the distance to the target was greater). In July / Aug British and USN carrier aircraft were able to roam over most of both Japanese coasts as the carriers repositioned up and down the coast between strike periods.

No matter how you fold, re-analyze, or spin it, Swordfish had by far the least effective range of any Axis or Allied naval strike aircraft active in 1945, or 1944 or 1943 for that matter.

The only one it surpasses is the miserable Douglas Devastator, which was of similar vintage.

 

[MikeMeech]

I actually hadn't seen that post yet, as it appeared while I was writing the one above yours, which you apparently read but ignored?

But as I noted, while mast-head bombing was feasible against merchant shipping (with little or no AAA and usually no fighter defense), it was a lot riskier against warships. Especially larger warships and groups of warships with larger ones in the mix.

I haven't read all the stuff Mike posted yet (looks very interesting!) but a quick look suggests this is indeed about attacking merchant shipping. The photo shows a small cargo ship under attack. Planes like FW 200 Condors and Vickers Wellingtons could and did sink little isolated cargo steamers that way, but that's not what we are talking about here, is it?

Hi
Why do you think the mast-head attacks illustrated were against targets "with little or no AAA and usually no fighter defense". These attacks were made against German coastal convoys off the Norwegian, France and the low countries coasts, very near to Luftwaffe airfields, which is why 'surprise' was considered important, they wanted to start hitting the ships before the Luftwaffe turned up. Below are a couple of maps (from 'A Forgotten Offensive' by Christina Goulter):

From the same source mention of the increasing protection for these convoys:

Some images of attacks (later in the war when the RAF had some better aircraf

t to use) to add some 'colour':

Lots of Flak to contend with. From 1941 there were increasing amount of escorts used, indeed outnumbering the cargo ships at times. Example below showing attack on German convoy off the Dutch close on 20 November 1942 (from 'The Strike Wings' by Roy Conyers Nesbit):

This is just to point out the RAF was not picking off isolated ships that had poor defensive capabilities, it was a very dangerous occupation. It would have been nice to have a Beaufighter equipped Strike Wing plus lots more fighters out in Ceylon, but it was too early in the war to be able to do that and would still have been costly unless there were enough allied aircraft to overwhelm the Japanese carrier force air element, that would need a lot of aircraft not a few obsolete types.

Mike

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

To clarify, I looked back into my bookshelves and found that I misremembered this. The Type 99s that struck the 'Canal sortied from Buin and not Rabaul -- a much shorter flight.

Those Vals weren't destined to RTB due insufficent range. The were to ditch, as R RCAFson said

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Hi
Why do you think the mast-head attacks illustrated were against targets "with little or no AAA and usually no fighter defense". These attacks were made against German coastal convoys off the Norwegian, France and the low countries coasts, very near to Luftwaffe airfields, which is why 'surprise' was considered important, they wanted to start hitting the ships before the Luftwaffe turned up. Below are a couple of maps (from 'A Forgotten Offensive' by Christina Goulter):
View attachment 854650
View attachment 854651
From the same source mention of the increasing protection for these convoys:
View attachment 854652
View attachment 854653
View attachment 854655
Some images of attacks (later in the war when the RAF had some better aircrafView attachment 854657t to use) to add some 'colour':
View attachment 854656
Lots of Flak to contend with. From 1941 there were increasing amount of escorts used, indeed outnumbering the cargo ships at times. Example below showing attack on German convoy off the Dutch close on 20 November 1942 (from 'The Strike Wings' by Roy Conyers Nesbit):
View attachment 854659
This is just to point out the RAF was not picking off isolated ships that had poor defensive capabilities, it was a very dangerous occupation. It would have been nice to have a Beaufighter equipped Strike Wing plus lots more fighters out in Ceylon, but it was too early in the war to be able to do that and would still have been costly unless there were enough allied aircraft to overwhelm the Japanese carrier force air element, that would need a lot of aircraft not a few obsolete types.

Mike

First, I was referring specifically to successful daylight mast-head height attacks in the Pacific and Mediterranean, which were indeed as I said usually conducted against either unarmed or lightly armed merchant ships and / or some smaller and usually isolated warships.

US 5th Air Force A-20s and B-25s and Aussie Beaufighters in the Pacific, and RAF Wellingtons, Swordfish and other aircraft were very successful at this in the Med. FW 200s and He 115s and the like were also successful in this role in the North Sea for a while.

Against larger warships and convoys of such, such attacks could still sometimes be effective but at a much higher cost.

Armed merchant ships are kind of at a midpoint between actual warships and lightly armed merchant ships.

but here too in your example I think as the armament of the target ships goes up, the risks also increase, and the use of much faster and more heavily armed planes - later model Beaufighters and Mosquitoes diving in at well over 300 mph, various fighter bombers etc., improves the odds but still doesn't eliminate the risks. And I don't think even those kinds of planes had great odds in this kind of attack against say, a pocket battleship, or anyway I can't remember such a case.


Five squadrons of Beaufighters, (and / or a bunch of Mosquitos and Beaufighters) savaging a cargo convoy with some armed merchantmen with rockets, bombs, torpedoes and cannon just outside of some Norweigian Fjord is not quite the same thing as a cluster of Fairey Battles, Blenheims, and Swordfish trying daylight attacks against Kido Butai in the Pacific.

I do think in this scenario, they could have brought in some early Beaufighters and I think they would have been helpful in whatever mix of aircraft it was possible to put together.

 

[SaparotRob]

And Gabby Gabreski on bass guitar!

Hell yeah! I never met him but I worked with his daughter while on the railroad. She was one smart CPO (RET).

 

[RCAFson]

Swordfish pilots would have a hell of a lot of anxiety trying to fly a 250 mile mission...

There was only a dozen or so Swordfish available at Ceylon, but Indomitable and Formidable had 45 Albacores (24+21) between them. The range of a SWordfish II was 450nm at 90knots, with allowances for warmup and TO and full internal fuel (143IG). The range could be extended via an internal 60IG aux tank and then strike radius would be about 225-250nm. The Albacore had somewhat more range than the Swordfish and could also carry a 100IG internal tank for a torpedo strike radius of ~300nm and a range of 800nm, with allowances for warmup and TO.

 

[EwenS]

Indeed. If there was on thing the Japanese should have acquired from their German allies it's radar tech. Imagine at Coral Sea and Midway (first tested and then perfected after this Ceylon raid) if Nagumo's carriers had air-intercept (air-warning) radar. By 1939, the Germans had installed surface-search and gunnery radars, not air-intercept onto the Scharnhorst class battleships, which could have been installed as an air-warning set in at least one IJN carrier (along with a CIC or FDO and working radios) by 1942. If Nagumo has radar, my Skuas and Chesapeakes, along with the Blenheims will not find those essential undefended skies that day.

There was nothing wrong with Japanese scientists. They were after all the first to develop the magnetron which was the key to centimetric radar. Neither service did anything much with radar tech until they started getting hold of allied sets in places like Malaya & Singapore. But those were early metric wavelength radars.

Their biggest failure was that they completely failed to develop a fighter direction system to exploit the information coming from their radar sets when they finally got them to sea.

On 9th April the skies over the KB were not undefended. There was a CAP of 11 Zeroes overhead when the attack by the Blenheims began. Another 6 were launched immediately, 8 more 10 mins later, and 4 more 5 mins after that (+ 3 whose launch times are not identified). The problem was that the Mk.I eyeball of both the CAP pilots and the lookouts on the ships which didn't spot the attackers until too late.

To their credit however, they did not allow themselves to be drawn away from their primary task of defending the fleet as the Blenheims withdrew after losing 4 of their number.

 

[EwenS]

When it was designed? Sure, you could argue that, but that was what, 1933? The truth is the Swordfish had barely more than half the range of a D3A or SBD.



SBDs and F4Fs had a much closer max range to IJN equivalents than Swordfish and Hurricanes though, let's be real. I don't think that is a really valid comparison.

IJN could outrange the Swordfish by at least 100 miles, with plenty of margin for error.



Swordfish pilots would have a hell of a lot of anxiety trying to fly a 250 mile mission...

But as I noted given the intended operating areas, the Swordfish had enough range. This seems to something those from the USA have trouble getting their heads around. The RN never intended to go to the Pacific. Any fighting in the Far East was expected to be in the South China Sea.

No matter how you fold, re-analyze, or spin it, Swordfish had by far the least effective range of any Axis or Allied naval strike aircraft active in 1945, or 1944 or 1943 for that matter.

The only one it surpasses is the miserable Douglas Devastator, which was of similar vintage.

But the RN trained from pre-war to use its TB to attack at night or in bad weather, something they did successfully from the earliest days of the war. They recognised the limitations of the aircraft they had worked to minimise the risks. Only in extreme circumstances were they forced into attacking in daylight against modern fighters (Channel Dash or Kirkenes)

When was the first USN night attack? Oh yes Feb 1944 at Truk using 12 Avengers.

 

[kah]

Indeed. If there was on thing the Japanese should have acquired from their German allies it's radar tech. Imagine at Coral Sea and Midway (first tested and then perfected after this Ceylon raid) if Nagumo's carriers had air-intercept (air-warning) radar. By 1939, the Germans had installed surface-search and gunnery radars, not air-intercept onto the Scharnhorst class battleships, which could have been installed as an air-warning set in at least one IJN carrier (along with a CIC or FDO and working radios) by 1942. If Nagumo has radar, my Skuas and Chesapeakes, along with the Blenheims will not find those essential undefended skies that day.

Yes, but...

Japanese wireless was so poor--for a variety of technological reasons--that fighter aircraft routinely landed the set for the 300-odd lbs. of weight savings--this is why A6M missions over Malaya and the NEI had to have a Navy Type 98 fly along with them to navigate; this is why navy task forces were repeatedly surprised by air attacks.

Just as at Coral Sea and Midway, Japanese Fleet Air Defence doctrine relied on lookouts on ships belonging to the screen to spot incoming enemy a/c, and then direct one of the screening cruisers to steam towards the contact whilst firing its main battery; then the "CAP"--a quasi-coordinated gaggle of a/c supposedly protecting the naval force below--would fly towards the general area and rely on aircrew to spot and attack the incoming strike, with help from wing-waggling and hand signals.

I don't see how Lease/Lend DB, or Skuas, get to Ceylon--I am going to have to accept the contrarian rôle on thay count--but I will agree that if it is a half dozen true Dive Bombers with competent crews and armed with 1,000 lbs. bombs, then the Japanese carriers of the First and Second Squadrons (Akagi, Soryu, & Hiryu) are extremely vulnerable, the two of the Fifth Squadron (Shokaku & Zuikaku) less so, but still liable to serious damage.

There was a better chance of Sommerville launching his Swordfish night torpedo attack--far fewer "ifs" have to swing the British way. What might have happened the next morning is another tale, of course. It seemes unlikely the Swordfish could have knocked out all the Japanese carriers, and it is always possible they wouldn't have even hit one.

KAH

 

[RCAFson]

Gee, didn't we used to have a forum member who also found everyone else's post to be funny?

 

[Steamed_Banana]

But as I noted given the intended operating areas, the Swordfish had enough range. This seems to something those from the USA have trouble getting their heads around. The RN never intended to go to the Pacific. Any fighting in the Far East was expected to be in the South China Sea.

Ah, but let me help you a bit, this is for the geographically challenged, whether they be from your country, my country, or one of the many others represented in this forum. Most of whom already grasp this, like I assume the British planners in 1933 actually knew this fairly well, but from the context of the discussion it is not clear whether you are aware.

1 - The South China Sea
2- The Pacific Ocean, that vast body of water of which the South China Sea is a subset, technically a 'marginal sea of the Western pacific Ocean', according to Wikipedia.
3- The Aleutian islands, Alaska, US, for scale
4 - The Indian Ocean

The goal of an aircraft carrier is in fact to move around the seas and oceans. If one's goal is to sink enemy ships in range of land air bases, as was often possible in the Med and may in some cases be possible in the South China Sea, then you can use land based aircraft (most of which have vastly longer range than a Swordfish). But in naval combat, one presumes that the airbase, i.e. the aircraft carrier, is moving. That being key.

And in a combat between moving warships, even within the confines of the South China Sea (which covers 3,500,000 square kilometers) one will still need to outrange enemy aircraft, or at least come close to their range, otherwise your strike aircraft is dangerously obsolete really by definition, and your fleet sailing into treacherous waters in mortal peril. Like just a teensy bit further out into the vast Pacific or Indian Oceans which are contiguous bodies of water, the latter of which borders arguably the most important colonial holdings of the British Empire.

So once again, yes, a Swordfish was indeed probably adequate for 1933. Seven years later it's looking a little old. Nine years later it's looking positively creaky.

But the RN trained from pre-war to use its TB to attack at night or in bad weather, something they did successfully from the earliest days of the war. They recognised the limitations of the aircraft they had worked to minimise the risks. Only in extreme circumstances were they forced into attacking in daylight against modern fighters (Channel Dash or Kirkenes)

I did myself emphasize the ability to use the Swordish, in fact I think I introduced the concept to this very thread.

The ability to use radar on board aircraft, even painfully obsolete aircraft like the Swordfish, was a major achievement by the British, for which they should be (and by all appearances are) extremely proud.

However, the idea that one could rely on the enemy being unable to approach within range of their daylight bombers when they out-range your strike aircraft by hundreds of miles, and when their ships are even a fair bit faster over the water, is shall we say, an extremely optimistic way of looking at things.

No matter how much you want it to be the case, this

was not in the same league as this

When was the first USN night attack? Oh yes Feb 1944 at Truk using 12 Avengers.

Those Americans were clearly fools not to re-equip all of their navy squadrons with Swordfish and Sea-Hurricanes! I suspect this may have been only the latest by that time in a long series of dreadful mistakes they kept making, and might have been talked out of had they only been willing to listen.

 

[RCAFson]

I don't see how Lease/Lend DB, or Skuas, get to Ceylon--I am going to have to accept the contrarian rôle on thay count--but I will agree that if it is a half dozen true Dive Bombers with competent crews and armed with 1,000 lbs. bombs, then the Japanese carriers of the First and Second Squadrons (Akagi, Soryu, & Hiryu) are extremely vulnerable, the two of the Fifth Squadron (Shokaku & Zuikaku) less so, but still liable to serious damage.

There was a better chance of Sommerville launching his Swordfish night torpedo attack--far fewer "ifs" have to swing the British way. What might have happened the next morning is another tale, of course. It seemes unlikely the Swordfish could have knocked out all the Japanese carriers, and it is always possible they wouldn't have even hit one.

KAH

I agree that in the OTL rapid reinforcement of Ceylon is unlikely but I also think that it wouldn't have taken a very large departure from the OTL to have built more airbases on Ceylon and established OTU squadrons there with a couple of Battle and/or Skua squadrons.

Somerville had 45 Albacores (and one Swordfish IIRC) and could have had 12 more Swordfish if Hermes has been available. Of course the Swordfish and especially the Albacore was a very capable DB and could carry 2 x 500lb, 2 x 250lb bombs and an internal aux fuel tank or an external centreline DT.

 

[RCAFson]

Those Americans were clearly fools not to re-equip all of their navy squadrons with Swordfish and Sea-Hurricanes! I suspect this may have been only the latest by that time in a long series of dreadful mistakes they kept making, and might have been talked out of had they only been willing to listen.

Yet the USN used the TBD until Midway... at least with Swordfish they could have used a night TB strike. In mid 1942 Nimitz was calling for Merlin engined fighters to be placed on USN carriers...:

Here is the text of a despatch from Admiral Nimitz to
Admiral King sent on 20 June 1942:

ALL AIR COMBAT REPORTS BATTLE OF MIDWAY EMPHASIZE EXTREME
AND APPARENTLY INCREASED SUPERIORITY PERFORMANCE OF 0 FIGHTERS
X ALTHOUGH THESE PLANES ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN OURS THE
PRIMARY SOURCE OF ANY COMBAT SUCCESSES TO DATE BY NAVY FIGHTING
PLANES HAS BEEN OWN EXPERT TACTICS OPPOSED TO FAULTY ENEMY
TACTICS X OVERALL RESULTS HAVE BEEN BAD AND WILL BE SERIOUS
AND POTENTIALLY DECISIVE WITH IMPROVEMENT THAT MUST BE EXPECTED
IN ENEMY TACTICS X

CONSIDER ACTION ALL OF FOLLOWING LINES TO BE OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE
X PROVIDE P-40F PLANES OR COMPARABLE TYPE FOR ALL MARINE FIGHTING
SQUADRONS ASSIGNED TO OUTLYING BASES X IF P-40F OR COMPARABLE TYPE
CAN BE MODIFIED FOR AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATIONS PROVIDE THESE
PLANES FOR CARRIER FIGHTING SQUADRONS X TAKE ANY POSSIBLE STEPS
TO LIGHTEN F4F4 AND INCREASE AMMUNITION CAPACITY EVEN AT COST OF
REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF GUNS X GIVE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY TO
PRODUCTION AND DELIVERY NEW F4U FIGHTERS

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Yet the USN used the TBD until Midway... at least with Swordfish they could have used a night TB strike. In mid 1942 Nimitz was calling for Merlin engined fighters to be placed on USN carriers...:

As I already noted in this thread, (which you somehow missed?) the Swordfish was clearly superior to the TBD, an obsolete aircraft almost as old. I would note, however, that is a very low bar.

Luckily for the US, they had the far more successful TBF / TBM available, which the British made heavy use of for some odd reason. Almost incomprehensible given the Sterling capabilities of the Swordfish and the Ablacore, not to mention the extraordinary Barracuda!

As for the "Merlin engined fighters" requested here... devil's in the details I guess? How unfortunate all they could find were a few P-40Fs and those new F4Us.

I wonder why they didn't call for Seafires? Isn't that the best naval fighter of the war? Or was it the Sea Hurricane? Sea Gladiator? Fulmars!

How much more quickly would the Pacific War have been won if they had re-equipped the entire US fleet with Fulmars and Swordfish?