parsifal
Colonel
I should explain where I intend to go with all this detail. firstly, finding a reasonably detailed account of what was happening in that last part of may 1940 is not all that easy, and is crucial in understanding a large part of the remainder of the war. Secondly I wanted to set up the conditions that led to the evacuation, and just how operations dictated how the evacuation came about. Thirdly I wanted to look at the allied actions that may have contributed to the famous halt order....why did the german High command (Rundstedt and kluge mostly) reach the conclusion that they had to halt for a few days. I believe it was the result of the various allied counterattacks and threatened counterattacks that at least influenced the Germans to draw a halt to their advance and consolidate. I believe that the germans also underestimated the ability of the Allies to carry out a successful evacuation. With their essntially continental view of the battle, they saw the Channel as a barrier that could not be crossed, and therefore the allies were trapped against the sea unable to escape. I dont think that they quite got it that the allies in fact saw the channel as an escape hatch from which they could at least get their people out of the maelstrom engulfing them.
There were a number of counterattacks in addition to the most famous one at Arras. There was the attack previously reported by the 121 Rgt, There were also covering counterattacks on the 23rd by 3rd DL<M covering the retreat of frankforce after the collaps of the Arras battle. There were numerous unnamed counteraattacks on both sides of the panzer corridor. In the south in particular, the French mounted attacks to anchor their defences behind the Somme, pushing back some of the bridgeheads the germans had established there. A few attacks in smaller scales in the next few days were mounted, but they were mostly uncoordinated and all failed to achieve significant results. Nevertheless, what these counterattacks did for the Allies was to buy time. In Berlin, Adolf Hitler feared that these counterattacks, though uncoordinated, could amount to a serious threat if planned better, therefore the German forces must take a brief pause to regroup and plan how to deal with this potential threat. On the front lines, the German field commanders were encountered with flood plains unsuitable for vehicles, therefore some welcomed the order to slow the advance from Berlin. As a result, the Allies were given an opportunity to organize for a retreat to Dunkirk, where they made a miraculous evacuation.
There were a number of counterattacks in addition to the most famous one at Arras. There was the attack previously reported by the 121 Rgt, There were also covering counterattacks on the 23rd by 3rd DL<M covering the retreat of frankforce after the collaps of the Arras battle. There were numerous unnamed counteraattacks on both sides of the panzer corridor. In the south in particular, the French mounted attacks to anchor their defences behind the Somme, pushing back some of the bridgeheads the germans had established there. A few attacks in smaller scales in the next few days were mounted, but they were mostly uncoordinated and all failed to achieve significant results. Nevertheless, what these counterattacks did for the Allies was to buy time. In Berlin, Adolf Hitler feared that these counterattacks, though uncoordinated, could amount to a serious threat if planned better, therefore the German forces must take a brief pause to regroup and plan how to deal with this potential threat. On the front lines, the German field commanders were encountered with flood plains unsuitable for vehicles, therefore some welcomed the order to slow the advance from Berlin. As a result, the Allies were given an opportunity to organize for a retreat to Dunkirk, where they made a miraculous evacuation.
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