Erich Hartmann - how did his comrades regard him?

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Parsifal is right. They repeated the same mistake with the Stalingrad "air bridge" and in every other crisis right until the end.Take a look at some of the pilots who flew on "Bodenplatte".
I know which airforce I'd rather be flying for too! It's one of those in which I could do my front line hours,hopefully with several hundred hours of training behind me, and move on to something safer. You wouldn't get me into a British or American bomber though.
Cheers
Steve
 
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The following is an article from another site. It is very similar to an article from a magazine i used to contribute years ago.

The period of training given to new pilots of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) was steadily shortened during the course of World War 2; the description below may be considered representative of the situation during the latter half of 1941.

For the prospective pilot joining the Luftwaffe from civilian life, the first step was a spell of six months at a Fliegerersatzabteilung or recruit training depot; this was the equivalent to the 'square-bashing' or 'boot camps' in other air forces. There the main emphasis was on drill and physical training, and the air aspect was introduced only in elementary lectures on the principles of wireless and map reading.

Having completed this initial training, the student pilot moved to a Fluganwarterkompanie, where he spent up to two months studying general aeronautical subjects. Thus prepared, he moved to an A/B Schule (elementary flying school) where he flew light aircraft such as the Klemm 35, the Focke Wulf 44 and the Buecker 131.

For his A2 licence the pupil received instruction in aerodynamics, aeronautical engineering, elementary navigation, meteorology, flying procedures and training in the reception of morse. For his B licence he flew higher-performance aircraft like the Arado 66, the Gotha 145 and the Arado 76, heavier aircraft like the Junkers W33 and W44 and the twin-engined Focke Wulf 58, and obsolescent combat types such as the He51, the Ar65 and the Hs123. On successful completion of his B2 training the candidate had between 100 and 150 hours flying time, and received his Luftwaffenflugzeugfuehrerschein (pilot's licence) and his Flugzeugfuehrerabzeichen (pilot's wings).

Those pilots selected for single-engined fighters or dive-bombers now went straight to the respective specialist schools for training in these roles.

Prospective twin-engined fighter, bomber and reconnaissance pilots went on to the C Flying Schools, where they received a further 50 to 60 hours flying during a course of some six months duration. These pilots were given ground training in advanced aeronautical subjects, and flew obsolescent operational types such as (in the case of bomber pilots) early versions of the He111, the Ju52, the Ju86 and the Do17. When he qualified at the C School the pilot received his ELF* or advanced pilot's licence. He was now able to fly his aircraft by day or by night with reasonable proficiency, had limited training in instrument flying, and could perform simple cross-country navigational flights under fair weather conditions.

On leaving the C School, the twin-engined fighter pilots went to their specialist school; the bomber and reconnaissance pilots were sent for 50 to 60 hours extra training in blind-flying, before moving to their specialist schools.

At the various specialist training establishments (Fighter, Bomber, Twin-engined Fighter, Dive-bomber and Reconnaissance) the pilots to fly multi-seat aircraft joined up with their crews. Combined crew training began, flying in operational types of the latest design. In general the exercises engaged in at the specialist schools were similar to those flown by bomber and reconnaissance pilots at the C Schools, but the night and cross-country flights were of longer duration and were undertaken in less favourable weather. On completion of their training at the specialist school, the crew usually remained together and was sent to an operational unit.

An important point to note is that during the initial part of the war the role of the observer (German: Beobachter) in a multi-seat aircraft was not so close to that of navigator as the literal English translation of the term might suggest. In fact the observer was trained as an aircraft captain, having flown as a pilot up to C standard before moving to the observers' school for a nine-month course (where he received further training in blind flying as well as navigation). Soon after the outbreak of the war the rule of the observer being the aircraft captain was gradually relaxed; from the beginning of 1942 observer training steadily deteriorated, until by 1944 it was down to five months, with little pilot training.

Having passed through their respective specialist training schools, the crews were sent to Ergaenzungseinheiten (operational training units) attached to the various operational Geschwader or Gruppen (groups). Here the crews learnt the tactical methods peculiar to the operational units they were later to join. As well as providing operational training, the Ergaenzungseinheiten served as holding posts for trained crews until they were required by the front-line units.

From the time he joined the Luftwaffe until he arrived at his Ergaenzungseinheit, a fighter or dive-bomber pilot had received about 13 months training with 150 to 200 flying hours; a bomber or reconnaissance pilot had received respectively 20 months and 220 to 270 hours.

It must be stressed, however, that these figures refer only to men who had passed through the system prior to the beginning of 1942. For in that year the Luftwaffe training organisation, efficient and smooth-running at the beginning of the war, began to crack under the strain exerted upon it.
 
parsifal said:
The following is an article from another site. It is very similar to an article from a magazine i used to contribute years ago.

The period of training given to new pilots of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) was steadily shortened during the course of World War 2; the description below may be considered representative of the situation during the latter half of 1941.

For the prospective pilot joining the Luftwaffe from civilian life, the first step was a spell of six months at a Fliegerersatzabteilung or recruit training depot; this was the equivalent to the 'square-bashing' or 'boot camps' in other air forces. There the main emphasis was on drill and physical training, and the air aspect was introduced only in elementary lectures on the principles of wireless and map reading.

Having completed this initial training, the student pilot moved to a Fluganwarterkompanie, where he spent up to two months studying general aeronautical subjects. Thus prepared, he moved to an A/B Schule (elementary flying school) where he flew light aircraft such as the Klemm 35, the Focke Wulf 44 and the Buecker 131.

For his A2 licence the pupil received instruction in aerodynamics, aeronautical engineering, elementary navigation, meteorology, flying procedures and training in the reception of morse. For his B licence he flew higher-performance aircraft like the Arado 66, the Gotha 145 and the Arado 76, heavier aircraft like the Junkers W33 and W44 and the twin-engined Focke Wulf 58, and obsolescent combat types such as the He51, the Ar65 and the Hs123. On successful completion of his B2 training the candidate had between 100 and 150 hours flying time, and received his Luftwaffenflugzeugfuehrerschein (pilot's licence) and his Flugzeugfuehrerabzeichen (pilot's wings).

Those pilots selected for single-engined fighters or dive-bombers now went straight to the respective specialist schools for training in these roles.

Prospective twin-engined fighter, bomber and reconnaissance pilots went on to the C Flying Schools, where they received a further 50 to 60 hours flying during a course of some six months duration. These pilots were given ground training in advanced aeronautical subjects, and flew obsolescent operational types such as (in the case of bomber pilots) early versions of the He111, the Ju52, the Ju86 and the Do17. When he qualified at the C School the pilot received his ELF* or advanced pilot's licence. He was now able to fly his aircraft by day or by night with reasonable proficiency, had limited training in instrument flying, and could perform simple cross-country navigational flights under fair weather conditions.

On leaving the C School, the twin-engined fighter pilots went to their specialist school; the bomber and reconnaissance pilots were sent for 50 to 60 hours extra training in blind-flying, before moving to their specialist schools.

At the various specialist training establishments (Fighter, Bomber, Twin-engined Fighter, Dive-bomber and Reconnaissance) the pilots to fly multi-seat aircraft joined up with their crews. Combined crew training began, flying in operational types of the latest design. In general the exercises engaged in at the specialist schools were similar to those flown by bomber and reconnaissance pilots at the C Schools, but the night and cross-country flights were of longer duration and were undertaken in less favourable weather. On completion of their training at the specialist school, the crew usually remained together and was sent to an operational unit.

An important point to note is that during the initial part of the war the role of the observer (German: Beobachter) in a multi-seat aircraft was not so close to that of navigator as the literal English translation of the term might suggest. In fact the observer was trained as an aircraft captain, having flown as a pilot up to C standard before moving to the observers' school for a nine-month course (where he received further training in blind flying as well as navigation). Soon after the outbreak of the war the rule of the observer being the aircraft captain was gradually relaxed; from the beginning of 1942 observer training steadily deteriorated, until by 1944 it was down to five months, with little pilot training.

Having passed through their respective specialist training schools, the crews were sent to Ergaenzungseinheiten (operational training units) attached to the various operational Geschwader or Gruppen (groups). Here the crews learnt the tactical methods peculiar to the operational units they were later to join. As well as providing operational training, the Ergaenzungseinheiten served as holding posts for trained crews until they were required by the front-line units.

From the time he joined the Luftwaffe until he arrived at his Ergaenzungseinheit, a fighter or dive-bomber pilot had received about 13 months training with 150 to 200 flying hours; a bomber or reconnaissance pilot had received respectively 20 months and 220 to 270 hours.

It must be stressed, however, that these figures refer only to men who had passed through the system prior to the beginning of 1942. For in that year the Luftwaffe training organisation, efficient and smooth-running at the beginning of the war, began to crack under the strain exerted upon it.
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Michael,
You have an excellent and concise grasp on this thorny subject.
I have learnt a lot from you.
Thanks
John
 
This is the second part of the article I previously posted, and provides some insight as to why the LW training standards absolutley nosedived after 1942.

Decline of the Pilot Training

The Battle of Britain had been the first major setback for the Luftwaffe, but in the main the losses in trained crews were made good by drawing upon the reserves already available within the service. Moreover, the comparatively low casualty rate during the first half of 1941 enabled the remaining gaps in the ranks to be filled without placing undue strain on the training organisation.

The relentless rate of losses from the beginning of the Russian campaign, however, made demands which the flying training organisation found almost impossible to meet: during the first six months of the offensive Luftwaffe casualties in aircrew, of all categories from all causes in all theatres, amounted to some 2,200 men; during the second six months an almost exactly equal number of men was lost.

The campaign in Russia also brought more direct forms of pressure on the flying training organisation. Early in 1942 many Ju52 aircraft, together with their instructor pilots, were removed from the C, blind-flying and bomber schools and sent to Russia to supplement the fleet of air transports engaged in flying supplies to the German troops cut off at Demjansk and Cholm. Owing to actual losses and shortages at the front line units, the instructors and aircraft were never returned to the training organisation. Later in the year the pace of air operations in the east led to a shortage of aviation fuel throughout the Luftwaffe; again it was the flying training schools that suffered.

The shortages of instructors, suitable aircraft and fuel threw out of gear the training programme for bomber and reconnaissance crews; in the short term there was a surplus of partially-trained pilots from the A/B Schools, but at the same time a lack of trained crews available at the Ergaenzungseinheiten.

In July 1942 General Kuehl, the Director of Training, brought to Goering's notice the fact that the shortages were leading to an impossible situation at the C Schools. As was so often the case, the Reichsmarschall had a glib answer: he ordered that the C Schools should be disbanded, and their functions taken over by the Ergaenzungseinheiten.

This proved to be beyond the capacity of the latter, however, for they had insufficient aircraft or instructors to cope with this sudden influx of pupils; so, in their turn, the Ergaenzungseinheiten farmed out many of them to the operational Gruppen (groups) for training. The net result of this confused situation was that the general standard of training of new crews for the bomber and long-range reconnaissance units fell so low that operational efficiency began to suffer significantly.

During 1943 the new Director of Training, Generalleutnant Kreipe, was able to slow the rate of deterioration of his organisation. But simple expedients, like the introduction of short glider courses to provide initial flying experience for pilots, could not make up for the perennial shortages of good instructors, modern aircraft and, above all, fuel.

By the beginning of 1944 German fighter pilots were joining their operational units with only about 160 hours flying training; this compared with more than 350 hours their counterparts in the RAF and the USAAF. The average flying experience in the USAAC at this time was in excess of 500 hours for their fighter elements.

During the first half of 1944 the Luftwaffe day fighter units suffered debilitating losses at the hands of the better-trained American escort fighter pilots, whose P-51 Mustangs could in any case out-perform the best fighters the Germans then had in service at this time; during this period the home-defence units lost some 2,000 pilots killed, missing or wounded.

When the Luftwaffe training organisation tried to make good these heavy casualties with similar numbers of new pilots, the result was a vicious circle: the ill-trained replacement fighter pilots were no match for their opponents and suffered heavy losses, and their places in the front line were taken by new pilots who had had a more hurried training and were even less of a match for their opponents.

During the late spring standards fell yet further, when the B flying schools were disbanded. Fighter pilots were now sent into action with only about 112 hours flying, made up as follows: A School, two hours glider flying and 50 hours powered flying on elementary types; Fighter School, 40 hours; Replacement Fighter Groupe, 20 hours.

Moreover, the so-called Windhund programme, which provided for the hasty conversion of ex-bomber pilots by giving them 20 hours flying in fighters resulted in a stream of pilots little able to stand up to the enemy.

In September 1944 the Luftwaffe flying training organisation received its death blow. With the systematic wrecking of the German synthetic fuel industry by Allied strategic bombers, aviation fuel production fell so far beneath Luftwaffe requirements that operations had to be curtailed. In such a climate the training schools, always the poor relation, could not survive long. First the elementary and many of the specialist schools were closed then, as the last of the trainees passed through, the specialist fighter schools were also disbanded and their instructors sent to the front. By February 1945 the Luftwaffe aircrew training organisation had, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist.
 
stona said:
. You wouldn't get me into a British or American bomber though.
Cheers
Steve
Click to expand...

Steve. From the latter half of 1944 on you were relatively safe. BC loss rates for example sank to about 0.5% per sortie from June 1944 (roughly)....well down on the 4% earlier in the year, and a lot less than the 7% casualty rates experienced in the latter half of 1941. Similar situation for US daylight bombers.

Whereas German fighters had done a lot of damage to the bombers in the early part of 1944, from about May 1944 on, they simply had great difficulty in successfully engaging them from that time on.

During 1944, the US lost about 3500 bombers in combat, I dont know the exact numbers of US fighters lost in air combat. Perhaps some of the US enthusiasts could assist here? Roughly speaking, however, the US fighter groups were shooting down about 6 LW fighters for every one they lost....so my guesstimate is about 2000 fighters lost. Thats a total of about 5500 US aircraft lost in ecahange for around 16000 LW fighters brought down. Thats an exchange rate heavily in favour of the US IMO
 
Put simply.....the Germans treated their pilot training program the same way they did their production and failed to create a much larger and comprehensive program in place until it was too late and well before Spaatz's Oil campaign even got well off the ground.

According to Mr. Cutler (Who's book I am suprisingly enjoying despite the somewhat controversial choice of Book Title), Germany's leadership failed to institute any kind of Long Term Expanded training program to churn out the numbers needed to the attrition war the Luftwaffe eventually faced....even after it became obvious what was coming/happening. (Cutler states that no such action was taken either in 42 or 43 to match pilot numbers with the increased aircraft production numbers that churned out by 44)

As has been related...instead, Germany started employing quick fix ad hoc solutions, like pulling instructors from flying schools and tapping bomber and transport pilots for Fighter plane conversion. As would be expected, training programs were shortened causing an increasing decline in quality as pilots reported to front line units.

In a thread already bloating with "Stats", I will hopefully be forgiven for introducing one or two more (but will try to keep it to a minimum :) ) Per Cutler's research, Germany produced a mere 15,000 fighter pilots between 1940 and 44. The USAAF in this same period produced 200,000.

In April of 1944 alone, LuftFlotte Reich lost nearly 40% of his frontline fighter pilots....LuftFlotte 3 lost nearly 25%. The replacements were weaker and weaker while US pilots were decently trained. US training was geared for mass production so baring the exceptionally talented pilot they were not anything special, but they were prepared and decently trained....averaging 300 hours before seeing combat. In 43 USAAF fighter pilots had about a 2:1 edge in flight hours over new Ger pilots (300/170) which declined further to 300/135 in 44.

When you combine the above with the numbers game.....its Lights Out for the Luftwaffe....oil or no oil. (Luftwaffe Disadvantage in pure numbers deteriorated from 1:2 to 1:4 by the end of 43 in favor of the USAAF.)
 
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Excellent posts above,you've both saved me a lot of typing! Well done. I was leafing through a couple of books wondering how I was going to condense so much information. Statistics may vary slightly but the gist is the same.

Parsifal,I was unaware how much one's chance of surviving in a bomber had increased towards the end of the war,but you still wouldn't have got me up in one,at least not willingly.

I think Ratsel that you must be an optimist too,but there's nothing wrong with that.

Cheers
Steve
 
not sure if I agree with all the statements spoken. Blind flying schule at least for NF's continued right into 1945 in the weapons/radar NJG 101 and 102. 262 unit Kommando welter the same as newer pilots/R/O's came into the oversized squadron and ont the goofy twin seater with Neptun FuG 217.

also though fewer losses of bombers from summer onward the tactic now was to devastate US bomber formations from the rear, Individual Us bomb groups faced and were hit pretty hard right up into January 1945 some of the worst air battles over the Reich were in July/August of 1944 right into November and December. the LW flying in much smaller denominations but bringing more firepower to bear.

Before my cousin was KIA in November 44 his JG 301 practiced and exercised the arrowhead rear attack and then from up high down on an angle. very effective and lethal, problem for this JG as well as others there just was not enough S/E fighters to make any real difference as the Reich was pounded daily.
 
things got more hairy for BC as the war wound down too.....since NF's couldn't be overwhelmed like the day fighters and the tech improvements made their attacks devestating to the targeted bombers. I recall Miller and Neillands commenting on it.
 
March 45 was nasty for BC, have to admit that the LW NF's crew seemed to be pretty lucky if they could get in the stream of things and take out 1-2 heavy bombers with Schräg-waffen and being diligent enough during that mode to watch for 100th grp Mossies. Don't want to stray too OT but the German LW night fighter crews due to jamming would just shut down their radar and go where the window being dropped was the heaviest and the old way of using their "eyes" for trailing exhausts.
 
parsifal said:
Steve. From the latter half of 1944 on you were relatively safe. BC loss rates for example sank to about 0.5% per sortie from June 1944 (roughly)....well down on the 4% earlier in the year, and a lot less than the 7% casualty rates experienced in the latter half of 1941. Similar situation for US daylight bombers.

Whereas German fighters had done a lot of damage to the bombers in the early part of 1944, from about May 1944 on, they simply had great difficulty in successfully engaging them from that time on.

During 1944, the US lost about 3500 bombers in combat, I dont know the exact numbers of US fighters lost in air combat. Perhaps some of the US enthusiasts could assist here? Roughly speaking, however, the US fighter groups were shooting down about 6 LW fighters for every one they lost....so my guesstimate is about 2000 fighters lost. Thats a total of about 5500 US aircraft lost in ecahange for around 16000 LW fighters brought down. Thats an exchange rate heavily in favour of the US IMO
Click to expand...

Wouldn't Goring's policy to ignore the fighters and go after the bombers have something to do with the moderate losses of US fighters?
It would make sense to me to hit the US Fighter Groups early on. This would make the escorts drop the long range tanks and or disrupt escort arrival / link-up timetable to make deep strike missions less well escorted. FWIW, I'd really not covet the "attack the escorting horde" assignment. This would have to be a large hit on one part of the escort plan.
 
George that was deemed as a written order to defend Reich airspace that in essence was to take out all US heavy bombers as to whatever means in spring of 1943 with all the silly proliferation of weapons systems that the German could put on their aircraft, most were failures. heavy cannon and the limited and not effective range of the Br 21 rocket launcher.
 
kettbo said:
Wouldn't Goring's policy to ignore the fighters and go after the bombers have something to do with the moderate losses of US fighters?

It surelay had some effect - on the other hand after Jan 1944 I believ that tactic would have a.) increased loss rates for LW, increased 8th FC losses - with advantage USAAF, and b.) decreased 8th BC losses overall because of a.)

It would make sense to me to hit the US Fighter Groups early on. This would make the escorts drop the long range tanks and or disrupt escort arrival / link-up timetable to make deep strike missions less well escorted. FWIW, I'd really not covet the "attack the escorting horde" assignment. This would have to be a large hit on one part of the escort plan.
Click to expand...

Recall that escort was largely a 'Relay' - so the LW would have to be very careful where and when they isolated and pinpointed the attacks, and would have to have sufficient force to attack in the numbers required to engage ALL the local escorts - which tended to dribble out flights and sections to repel. To disrupt Target escort they would have to find and concentrate on the long range fighters early in the R/V leg or mid range tot the target.

If they attacked over Holland or France they likely would engage P-47s on inbound Penertation Ramrod.. if they bounced over western germany they would affect only the local group working a series of bomb wings - and yes they would have to turn back before reaching a deep target.. if they bounced deep - then the escorts still had fuel to go to the target and back to Withdrawal Support R/V.
 
Erich said:
March 45 was nasty for BC, have to admit that the LW NF's crew seemed to be pretty lucky if they could get in the stream of things and take out 1-2 heavy bombers with Schräg-waffen and being diligent enough during that mode to watch for 100th grp Mossies. Don't want to stray too OT but the German LW night fighter crews due to jamming would just shut down their radar and go where the window being dropped was the heaviest and the old way of using their "eyes" for trailing exhausts.
Click to expand...


Gives data on RAF BC sorties and losses.
BC Operational Stats

At night: sorties - missing - crashed - percent
Jan 1945 - 9603 - 121 - 57 1.9%
Feb 1945 - 13715 - 164 - 60 - 1.6%
Mar 1945 - 11585 - 168 - 76 - 2.1%
Apr 1945 - 8822 - 51 - 25 - 0.9%

August 1944 - 10013 - 186 - 22 - 2.1%
 
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