Erich Hartmann - how did his comrades regard him?

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in 43 and early 44 the LW did not have the problem they knew they could attack over a rather large area from Holland/France and then into the interior of Germany. After the Normandie fiasco the LW was then limited and radar control would vector the Lw gruppen to the largest area it could find of US bomber and not the escorts as that seemed menial to the hierarchy's minds through the war in the Reich defense factor. per Facto it was engage the US heavy bombers at any cost if at all possible we know through LW and US operations that more and more the LW S/E's could not even engage the bombers as they were pounced by P-51 groups and shot to pieces. 21 and 26 November 44 comes to mind though the latter too many B-24's were engaged and shot down by Fw's
 
So you did indeed have a better chance flying with bomber command after mid 1944.
I STILL don't fancy it!
Cheers
Steve
 
Cold facts are bit like statistics...lies, damn lies and statistics.

Here is an extract from "Aspects of the Combined British and American Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939 to 1945.", Including an assessment of RAF Bomber Command and the 8th 9th US Army Air Forces' Casualties and Losses in World War II;
Michael Varley 2005

In summary from July the loss to sortie ratio for BC was as follows. The figures are interpeted from the graphs in Varleys article, so ive had to do some rounding (eyesight not so good these days)
(sorties/losses, percentage)
Jul: 16000/260: 1.625
Aug:18000/260: 1.388
Sep: 20000/150: 0.750
Oct: 16000/150: 0.938
Nov: 17000/170: 1.000
Dec: 16000/160: 1.000
Jan: 16000/190: 1.188
Feb: 11000/220: 2.000
Mar 17000/300: 1.76
Apr 21000/110: 0.524

What erich refers to as March 1945, may be equivalent to what I have categorised as February. Certainly these two months, feb/Mar were not as good as the preceding months which had seen a drop to less than 1% for the first time, but wre still below the wartime average for BC. The command during the war had flown a total of either 364514 with 8325 lost, or 389809 with 8655 lost, which gives average loss rates of 2.203-2.284%

The material that this is based on is attached
 

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Your welcome Juha.

parisfal, the link in post #220 gives specific numbers so need to strain your eyesight. ;)
 
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are your stats the bi-product of both T/E and S/E fighters plus Flak ? for NF's one can hardly disagree with the performance of the Boiten McKenzie duo-both volumes on the Nachtjagd against BC giving the standard claims to real victories issue obviously still a further work as both are being re-written right now before the move to the Eastern Front Nachtjäger.
 
parsifal, 16000 LW fighters brought down when? 1944? I don't think so... 1/2 that is more realistic. but your entitled to your opinion.. which is usualy spot on.

compare here: http://www.don-caldwell.we.bs/claims/tonywood.htm

The site you have directed to me are combat losses and claims. Caldwell is an excellent reference, no argument thre. however, like so many sources, he fails to take into account all Luftwaffe losses, because of the LW methods of damage assessment, reporting. Also does not include what might be termed non-combat losses.

Between January and May, the Reich Air Defences lost 2300 pilots, and a further 3000 odd aircraft to non-combat causes. That means that at minimum the LW lost Jan-May 1944 a minimum of 5300 aircraft.

For cross referencing you might want to have a look at Murray. An oldie, but a goodie, it provides some sobering figures on LW losses

Attrition and the Luetwaffe
 
operating in the dark means in a lot of cases you're never going to know what happened to the bombers, other than they never returned. They wouldn't know if it was flak, nightfighters, or if they just got lost and flew into the North Sea.
 
Hi Erich

In response to your query, which i assume was for me to answer.....

I think they represent all combat losses

According to Varleys preamble

"In respect of RAF operations the main source of statistical data
has been that contained in the Appendices to Vol. IV of "The
Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany" 1939-1945 by Webster
Frankland, HMSO, London 1961 ( referred to in this paper as
the Official History). Supplemented by information contained in
ACM Sir Arthur Harris' "Despatch on War Operations", written
1945 but not published until 50 years later by Frank Cass,
London
"

But he says he also refers to Chorleys nine volume work on BC, which as a generalization gives a further 10% losses over and above the figures given. I have not looked at Chorley all that closely (its nine volumes remember, plus i dont have a copy with me right now), but my guess is these represent post action write offs and/or non-combat losses. Obviously if you prefer Chorleys losses to the official history's, you need to add 10% to those loss rates

What makes me suspect Chorleys loses are including post action write offs is that his losses for personnel are very close to those given in the official history. you dont lose personnel fopr birds that make it back home and are then scrapped.
 
Thats certainly an option, but even then there are complications. Many German aircraft were dmaged, taken out of group control, and then scrapped some time later. Some aircraft were lost to causes unknown. Ther is also the issue of comparability. BC losses for rxample, include aircraft lost in accidents and aircraft lost to Non-combat causes, but I am less sure if the BC stats include airframes subsequently scrapped, or simply not repaired.

To me the most comparable losses are in fact the total losses....what each side lost as a result of a given operation, from all causes, including non-combat losses. That way we know we are not being selective in the losses we include.

Thats the best way to compare, but for some reason, authors seem to delight in hiding some losses, not reporting others....all sorts of games and tricks...applies to all sides incidentally
 
If a aircraft goes on a combat mission and doesn't return, it's a combat loss, even if it just ran out of fuel, am I correct ?

What is the difference between a combat loss, and a operational loss ?

Is a aircraft preparing for a mission the day before that crashes on a check flight a operational loss ?

Is a aircraft that crashes on takeoff for a combat mission a combat loss ?
 
If a aircraft goes on a combat mission and doesn't return, it's a combat loss, even if it just ran out of fuel, am I correct ?

What is the difference between a combat loss, and a operational loss ?

Is a aircraft preparing for a mission the day before that crashes on a check flight a operational loss ?

Is a aircraft that crashes on takeoff for a combat mission a combat loss ?

Some very good questions here. if you take the German nightfighter forces, their biggest single sources for loss were crash landings, either from being lost, flying low to avoid marauding Mosquitoes, or simply misjudging where they were. Im sure Erich can give a far better answer than me in this regard.

What to classify these losses as. If not for the BC activities, most of these losses would never occur, but then again, the losses are not the result of direct action by BC. Are they combat losses or, as you describe them, operational losses. If we exclude those sorts of losses we tend to get a very skewed result for the Night Fighter losses. They come away looking as if they were more or less impervious, but in reality they were far from that.

Like I said, my opinion is that you do your best to ferret out every last loss that might be associated with that operation, even if the airframes final fate is not determined for some months after the operation. In my book, a loss is a loss, and ought to be counted that way
 
Is their not a heirarchy of RAF losses? I've always understood combat losses to come under operational losses. i.e. all combat losses are operational losses.Other losses incurred whilst on operations also come under this umbrella.
Non operational losses would be just that. A loss whilst not on operations,say a ferry flight for example.
If I've been labouring under an allusion,which is distinctly possible,I hope someone will correct me.
Steve
 
Now
what Chorley says in his introduction in Vol 1. "...In later volumes a/c lost on operational sorties from bomber OTUs and HCUs will be included...The casualties reported are confined to those airmen whose a/c was lost or deemed to have been damaged beyond economical repair and, therefore, I have not mentioned those airmen who were killed in the air but whose a/c made a safe return to base. Neither have I included casualties unconcerned with air operations..."

Juha
 
Which on the face of it is inconsistent with Varley, who says Chorley gives figures for all aircraft lost, with totals for operational losses, non-operational losses and losses on the ground. There is an inconsistency here somewhere.

The figures given in the officieal History are for all losses from all causes, as are the figures given in Harris's final report. oddly enough, however, the loss figures given in these two other sources are both lower than those given by Chorley
 
I dont think its that simple. There was a tendency as the war wound down, for LWs otherwise thorough and logical confirmation system to be disreqgarded. However all through the war the LW has instances of confirmation procedures not being followed.

There are statistical certainties to overclaiming, but i cant see any clear patter in the LW of things getting better or worse as the war progressed. Perhaps as a rule of thumb, shoot downs over friendly territory were inherently more accurate. But conversely, losses over enemy territory that is then overrun and becomes friendly territory wouldnt have much "home town advantage".

Sorry for not being much help on that one ratsel
 
Ratsel,I can't find a specific date but several references to the autumn of 1944 or late 1944 as the date when the claims system was abandoned or collapsed. I'm guessing it just petered out.

I was just checking night fighter claims and came across the story of Major Walther Ehle of II./NJG 1. He attacked a 77 Squadron Halifax flown by a Sergeant Lewis on the night of 25/26 May 1943. The Halifax blew up and destroyed two other aircraft,both Stirlings,one of 7Squadron and one of 218 Squadron. Ehle was officially credited with both these aircraft but refused to count them in his personal score as he had never even seen them,let alone fired on them. There's an honest man.

Cheers
Steve
 

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