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No offence, but the Betty's nickname was the "flying lighter" The Hurricane in question shot down 4 armoured Axis bombers, including 3 Ju-88s and, IIRC, 2 x ME-110s. The point is that the Hurricane was flying alongside the Martlet, and it seems that the Sea Hurricane performed better in combat, albeit with 4 x 20mm cannon, when the aircraft were in the air together.
RCAFson: Now come on. You've had way too many good points today to secumb to the "1 pilot did this" syndrome. David McCampbell shot down 9 Japenese planes in 1 flight in a Hellcat while some other Hellcat pilots didn't shoot down any that day. Does that prove the Hellcat is better than the Hellcat. Of course not.
Maybe the Hurricane pilot was good, lucky, stumbled into a bunch of Germans, who knows. But it doesn't prove the Hurricane was better than the Wildcat overall. By the way, 4 20mm would be devistating to the aircraft you mentioned. Whew, hate tobe on the receiving end of that!
I personally think against single engine fighters in WW2, 6 50's was the perfect armament. I think 20's were overkill for use against single engine fighters, with the exception of the P47. Sort of like using buckshot to kill ducks, of course it kills them when you hit them but there are far fewer pellets in a shotgun loaded with buckshot. I would rather have 6 50's and a larger supply of ammo. 20's were great for heavy bombers, in fact they were absolutely necessary. If your aimwas perfect and every burst connected then 20's would be fine, but I think you would spend alot more time missing and trying to get on target against a turning fighter, and by the time you did "click" your out of ammo.
I always understood that shooting down bombers was the primary purpose of a fighter.
If you shoot a bomber down in flames you have potentially killed up to 10 expensively trained men, destroyed 4 expensive engines and an expensive airframe.
Shoot down a fighter and you have only killed 1 expensive man, 1 relatively cheap airframe and only 1 expensive engine.
I read a quote somewhere from a pilot that "shooting down fighters wins medals but shooting down bombers wins wars".
I always understood that shooting down bombers was the primary purpose of a fighter.
That was partially true only for the LW against the USAAF and RAF Bomber Command in 1943-1945 over Germany - and while they succeeded in killing a lot of bomber crews they failed to stop them. The primary purpose of Fighters was to gain air superiority and total control over the battlefield.
If you shoot a bomber down in flames you have potentially killed up to 10 expensively trained men, destroyed 4 expensive engines and an expensive airframe.
Shoot down a fighter and you have only killed 1 expensive man, 1 relatively cheap airframe and only 1 expensive engine.
True - but if you ignore the 'lower value' fighter you become extinct - at least your own particular gene pool
I read a quote somewhere from a pilot that "shooting down fighters wins medals but shooting down bombers wins wars".
My point is that the Martlet and Sea Hurricane were flying side by side during Operation Pedestal, and this might have been the only occasion when they did so, in actual combat. I wish I knew the actual kill ratio between the two types during that Operation as we then have a direct comparison under identical conditions.
BTW, I sometime like to play around with IL-2, and an interesting scenario is to try and knock down an FW-200; with 8 x .303 very difficult, 6 x .5" not so bad, but with 4 x 20mm Hispanos, its almost easy, but you have to be a good shot with the limited ammo supply!
The few times I messed around with IL2 I tend to agree, but then again it's just a game!As to "IL-2" as a determinant - well 50 cal not very effective in IL 2 but seemed most effective against real opponents... so perhaps 'designer bias' versus real life?
I always understood that shooting down bombers was the primary purpose of a fighter.
If you shoot a bomber down in flames you have potentially killed up to 10 expensively trained men, destroyed 4 expensive engines and an expensive airframe.
Shoot down a fighter and you have only killed 1 expensive man, 1 relatively cheap airframe and only 1 expensive engine.
I read a quote somewhere from a pilot that "shooting down fighters wins medals but shooting down bombers wins wars".
Actually in the period I quote, when Bf109E's faced Hurricanes at Malta, Feb-May 1941, with 0:35 kill ration, most of the Bf109 victories were scored by one staffel, with less than 10 operational a/c, only occasionally supplemented by a couple of other staffeln. The Hurricanes were by not outnumbered in that period by German fighters, not outnumbered unless counting all the Axis bombers, and theless capable Italian fighters. In most of the rest of 1941, the Germans weren't operating single engine fighters against Malta at all. At times from late 1941 through 42 the German fighter force outnumbered the British, but that was Bf109F opposition, and mainly Spitfires on British side after the opending months of the year, which is not the period I'm referring to.My point is that the Hurricanes over Malta faced overwhelming odds, and were greatly outnumbered by an opponent that was 70 miles away and could fly several sorties a day and even loiter in the Hurricanes landing circuit. In contrast, the Wildcats over Henderson had a cakewalk against a very weak opponent that was based 600 miles away and averaged a weak attack a couple of times a week. Quoting F4F stats from Guadalcanal to try and prove the supposed superiority of the f4F over the Hurricane is complete bull.
In the period Feb-May 1941 the Hurricanes were often outnumbered.Actually in the period I quote, when Bf109E's faced Hurricanes at Malta, Feb-May 1941, with 0:35 kill ration, most of the Bf109 victories were scored by one staffel, with less than 10 operational a/c, only occasionally supplemented by a couple of other staffeln. The Hurricanes were by not outnumbered in that period by German fighters, not outnumbered unless counting all the Axis bombers, and theless capable Italian fighters. In most of the rest of 1941, the Germans weren't operating single engine fighters against Malta at all. At times from late 1941 through 42 the German fighter force outnumbered the British, but that was Bf109F opposition, and mainly Spitfires on British side after the opending months of the year, which is not the period I'm referring to.
The Hurricanes were by not outnumbered in that period by German fighters, not outnumbered unless counting all the Axis bombers, and theless capable Italian fighters. In most of the rest of 1941, the Germans weren't operating single engine fighters against Malta at all. At times from late 1941 through 42 the German fighter force outnumbered the British, but that was Bf109F opposition, and mainly Spitfires on British side after the opending months of the year, which is not the period I'm referring to.
And you characterization of numbers over Gudalcanal is similarly inaccurate. The fighter numbers on each side tended to be around equal, but more often in Japanese favor than US. And just as with Malta you're ignoring significant twists and turns in the campaign. Only early in the Guadalcanal campaign were enemy fighters operating from 600 miles away (but obviously, they were *much* longer ranged fighters than a Bf109, and the Zero crushed other Allied fighter opposition operating from similarly long ranges). By October the Japanese began operating from Buin which is only around 1/2 as far, short range for a Zero. And the climactic battles in November and denoument of G'canal campaign (proper) to early '43, often involved F4F's escorting conovy attackers well north of Guadalcanal, or to suppress the airfield at Munda less than 200 miles from Henderson. And, many other F4F/Zero battles of 1942 involved carrier planes on one side or the other or both, operating at relatively short range.
So in general your G'canal thumbnail is inaccurate, after posting a lot of general figures for Malta which aren't very relevant to the point I made about that campaign, either.
Some quotes from First Team:
"The Imperial Navy faced immense problems prosecuting a successful air offensive against Guadalcanal, many of hs own making. The nearest fully operational airfields to the target remained the cluster of bases around Rabaul: Vunakanau Field ~Rabaul West) for the bombers and the fighter strip at Lakunai (Rabaul East) set beneath a massive volcano. All lay at least 560 miles from Guadalcanal, entailing strike missions of eight hours or more. The auxiliary field at Buka, 400 miles from Guadalcanal, was used only sporadically for lack of support facilities."
"The extremely long and fatiguing missions down the "Guadal Highway'' (Gadaru Gairo), as the Japanese nicknamed the Slot, adversely effected the Zero fighter escorts. To save fuel many pilots fought with their belly tanks attached, which reduced combat performance. Even so the fighter leaders set a maximum of 15 minutes over Guadalcanal. Most of the Rabaul Zeros, clipped-wing A6M3 Model 32s with 20 percent less range than the A6M2 Model Its, could not even reach Guadalcanal and return. Work had only begun on the vital airstrip at Buin on southern Bougainville opposite Shortland island and 300 miles from Guadalcanal. Until its completion set for late September, no Zero 32s could be used. and crippled aircraft enjoyed no refuge short of Buka."
"Thus the destruction of Allied air power at Guadaicanal and also attacks against enemy ships-fell to VAdm. Yasnagata Seigo's 6th Air Attack Force (26th
Flotilla) flying the long-range but highly vulnerable Mitsubishi G4M1 Type l"
P192:
"They had the Unenviable task of dealing with the hit-and-run attacks by the Grumman Wildcats. The absence of radios in the land-based Zeros forced relatively inflexible escort tactics. Citing its limited range (50 miles) and poor reliability, the fighter groups had ripped out all the radio equipment, including the mast and aerial, to save 18 kg of weight. The lack of radios prevented close coordination between escorts and bombers and proved most detrimental in the Solomon air battles."
p201
"The raid on the 12th, a typical Guadalcanal donnybrook, hammered home the tactical points Smith made the previous afternoon. The arthritic F4Fs did need at least 30 minutes to reach 28,000 feet and assure height advantage over the bombers. Simpler complained in his report, "The F4F4 is too slow in climb to altitude and has insufficient ceiling and speed to deal with the modern bombers and fighters." Climbing in tight, compact formations such as the one Smith used kept the F4Fs together for massed attacks and somewhat discouraged the fighter escorts from diving in. Usually fighting in trios or pairs, the Zeros rarely surrendered altitude advantage."
"VF-S had trained for carrier defense, where it was critical to break up an enemy strike before it reached the ships. Conditions at CACTUS did not permit that. The Marines learned from bitter experience that more than one pass at the bombers risked a thrashing by the escort. Later in the campaign this did not necessarily apply. The bombers, especially after releasing payloads, cruised so fast that follow-up attacks became increasingly shallow, of low deflection, and more dangerous. Certainly VF-5's experiences vindicated Smith's warnings. In his action report Richardson opined it was "impracticable to make more than one run on the bombers and employ the speed gained in the attack to avoid the Zero." This would take VF-5 time to learn."
p238
by Sept 21, 1942 of 86 F4Fs committed 43 were lost from all causes.
Aside from early warning the F4Fs fighting over CACTUS enjoyed additional advantages. Fuel limitations prevented the enemy fighters from prolonging any actions. The 1st MAW wrongly believed the Zeros operated from Buka, which at 400 miles was a great distance in its own right, but they later learned to their amazement that the enemy came the whole long way from Rabaul. The CACTUS fighters battled over their own turf, so to speak, to the great benefit of Dave Richardson and numerous others.
p270
Back at base Kofukuda's and Odors pilots were very pleased with the day outcome, which seemed to vindicate the fighter-sweep tactic and provided sweet revenge for 28 September. Kofukuda's dozen Zeros really did a number on the thirteen CACTUS F4Fs they ambushed, forcing all to dive away. The fight was another classic example of the value of altitude superiority and surprise.
P275
From the CAP only Carl's division fought that day. Their cunning, deadly ambush elicited claims of nine Zeros and one probable: Bauer (four plus one probable), Frazier two, and one each to Carl, Winter, and Lynch. They won a tremendous victory for the Ist MAW and took revenge for the previous day Bauer earned great admiration for his skill, leadership, and devotion to his team mates. Two days later Geiger presented "Coach" with a Japanese rising sun banner to mark his achievements. Bauer gave it to MAG-23. Even though the other F4Fs had not fought, they suffered numerous mechanical failures, illustrating the great strain on men and materiel at CACTUS. Of Armistead's seven VMF-224 F4Fs that reached 33,000 feet, five dropped out (two with blown super charger gaskets and.one from oxygen failure. Blair crashed with a burned-out engine, leaving VF-5 with sixteen Wildcats (eleven flyable).
Returning to my original query...
I'm wondering why F4F's weren't received/used in greater quantity.
There was an earlier post about production limitations...
If the F4F was desired, and production was limited, I imagine the British could/would have solicited license manufacture as they did with the P-40 (genesis of P-51.)
There was an earlier post about high altitude performance of double stage supercharged F4F's not being necessary, as Spitfires fulfilled that role.
Perhaps, but then why all the negative comments about P-39, P-40 and P-38 (sans turbo) altitude performance?
It seems there was a desire for good high altitude performance which was lacking in the US planes received.
It can take a year or more to tool up and start manufacture of an existing design, if the factory has to start from scratch. Ordering planes in the summer of 1940 would mean deliver in the summer of 1941 at best and into the spring of 1942 for first delivery if tooling up doesn't go well. Most American Manufacturers aside from Curtis and Boeing were rather small. For instance Lockheed had 7464 employees as of Jan 1 1940 and while that may sound large (mostly working on Hudson bombers) they had 40,307 employees by Nov 1941 at which time Lockheed had delivered about 100 P-38s (although many more were in progress) .