F4F's in Europe

[FLYBOYJ]

No offence, but the Betty's nickname was the "flying lighter" The Hurricane in question shot down 4 armoured Axis bombers, including 3 Ju-88s and, IIRC, 2 x ME-110s. The point is that the Hurricane was flying alongside the Martlet, and it seems that the Sea Hurricane performed better in combat, albeit with 4 x 20mm cannon, when the aircraft were in the air together.

Doesn't prove much - you also have to consider pilot skill...

and luck.

 

[pinsog]

RCAFson: Now come on. You've had way too many good points today to secumb to the "1 pilot did this" syndrome. David McCampbell shot down 9 Japenese planes in 1 flight in a Hellcat while some other Hellcat pilots didn't shoot down any that day. Does that prove the Hellcat is better than the Hellcat. Of course not.

Maybe the Hurricane pilot was good, lucky, stumbled into a bunch of Germans, who knows. But it doesn't prove the Hurricane was better than the Wildcat overall. By the way, 4 20mm would be devistating to the aircraft you mentioned. Whew, hate tobe on the receiving end of that!

 

[RCAFson]

RCAFson: Now come on. You've had way too many good points today to secumb to the "1 pilot did this" syndrome. David McCampbell shot down 9 Japenese planes in 1 flight in a Hellcat while some other Hellcat pilots didn't shoot down any that day. Does that prove the Hellcat is better than the Hellcat. Of course not.

Maybe the Hurricane pilot was good, lucky, stumbled into a bunch of Germans, who knows. But it doesn't prove the Hurricane was better than the Wildcat overall. By the way, 4 20mm would be devistating to the aircraft you mentioned. Whew, hate tobe on the receiving end of that!

My point is that the Martlet and Sea Hurricane were flying side by side during Operation Pedestal, and this might have been the only occasion when they did so, in actual combat. I wish I knew the actual kill ratio between the two types during that Operation as we then have a direct comparison under identical conditions.

BTW, I sometime like to play around with IL-2, and an interesting scenario is to try and knock down an FW-200; with 8 x .303 very difficult, 6 x .5" not so bad, but with 4 x 20mm Hispanos, its almost easy, but you have to be a good shot with the limited ammo supply!

 

[pinsog]

I personally think against single engine fighters in WW2, 6 50's was the perfect armament. I think 20's were overkill for use against single engine fighters, with the exception of the P47. Sort of like using buckshot to kill ducks, of course it kills them when you hit them but there are far fewer pellets in a shotgun loaded with buckshot. I would rather have 6 50's and a larger supply of ammo. 20's were great for heavy bombers, in fact they were absolutely necessary. If your aimwas perfect and every burst connected then 20's would be fine, but I think you would spend alot more time missing and trying to get on target against a turning fighter, and by the time you did "click" your out of ammo.

 

[fastmongrel]

I personally think against single engine fighters in WW2, 6 50's was the perfect armament. I think 20's were overkill for use against single engine fighters, with the exception of the P47. Sort of like using buckshot to kill ducks, of course it kills them when you hit them but there are far fewer pellets in a shotgun loaded with buckshot. I would rather have 6 50's and a larger supply of ammo. 20's were great for heavy bombers, in fact they were absolutely necessary. If your aimwas perfect and every burst connected then 20's would be fine, but I think you would spend alot more time missing and trying to get on target against a turning fighter, and by the time you did "click" your out of ammo.

I always understood that shooting down bombers was the primary purpose of a fighter.

If you shoot a bomber down in flames you have potentially killed up to 10 expensively trained men, destroyed 4 expensive engines and an expensive airframe.

Shoot down a fighter and you have only killed 1 expensive man, 1 relatively cheap airframe and only 1 expensive engine.

I read a quote somewhere from a pilot that "shooting down fighters wins medals but shooting down bombers wins wars".

 

[Shortround6]

In some cases you have to shoot down the fighters first

 

[drgondog]

I always understood that shooting down bombers was the primary purpose of a fighter.

If you shoot a bomber down in flames you have potentially killed up to 10 expensively trained men, destroyed 4 expensive engines and an expensive airframe.

Shoot down a fighter and you have only killed 1 expensive man, 1 relatively cheap airframe and only 1 expensive engine.

I read a quote somewhere from a pilot that "shooting down fighters wins medals but shooting down bombers wins wars".

Then there is the other side of the coin - 'shoot down enough LW fighters and only flak remains'..

 

[drgondog]

I always understood that shooting down bombers was the primary purpose of a fighter.

That was partially true only for the LW against the USAAF and RAF Bomber Command in 1943-1945 over Germany - and while they succeeded in killing a lot of bomber crews they failed to stop them. The primary purpose of Fighters was to gain air superiority and total control over the battlefield.

If you shoot a bomber down in flames you have potentially killed up to 10 expensively trained men, destroyed 4 expensive engines and an expensive airframe.

Shoot down a fighter and you have only killed 1 expensive man, 1 relatively cheap airframe and only 1 expensive engine.

True - but if you ignore the 'lower value' fighter you become extinct - at least your own particular gene pool

I read a quote somewhere from a pilot that "shooting down fighters wins medals but shooting down bombers wins wars".

And shooting down fighters was the mission of 8th FC - and one can either say "as a result, the LW lost the air battle - or the 8th FC won the air battle"

 

[drgondog]

My point is that the Martlet and Sea Hurricane were flying side by side during Operation Pedestal, and this might have been the only occasion when they did so, in actual combat. I wish I knew the actual kill ratio between the two types during that Operation as we then have a direct comparison under identical conditions.

BTW, I sometime like to play around with IL-2, and an interesting scenario is to try and knock down an FW-200; with 8 x .303 very difficult, 6 x .5" not so bad, but with 4 x 20mm Hispanos, its almost easy, but you have to be a good shot with the limited ammo supply!

You would have to then prove identical conditions - like tactical position entering (or leaving) combat, pilot skill and leadership, shooting skills and philosophy (close before firing, shoot at anything), combat against bombers only, or against escorts and bombers, at the extent of one fighter's range while the other had time to loiter, altitude of the combats (in the strike zone of one fighter/a disadvantage for the other)..

etc, etc.

As to "IL-2" as a determinant - well 50 cal not very effective in IL 2 but seemed most effective against real opponents... so perhaps 'designer bias' versus real life?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

As to "IL-2" as a determinant - well 50 cal not very effective in IL 2 but seemed most effective against real opponents... so perhaps 'designer bias' versus real life?

The few times I messed around with IL2 I tend to agree, but then again it's just a game!

 

[davparlr]

This has been an interesting spat on the F4F vs the Hurricane. It is interesting to note that these two aircraft certainly represent the evolution of the aircraft from biplane to monoplane. Both having their feet firmly mounted the biplane era. The Hurricane was based on the biplane Fury, and the unbuilt F4F-1 being a biplane. Both planes were limited in growth and were quickly surpassed by technology. In comparison, the next generation of fighters, the Spitfire, Bf-109, F4U, et.al., was adapted to be front line fighters throughout the war. However, both the Hurricane and F4F, crewed by brave and capable pilots, performed heroically when heroic deeds were needed.

My gut feeling is that you could have swapped the F4F-3 and the Hurricane Mk II at Malta and Guadalcanal and the outcome would have been approximately the same.


An interesting note, the first F4F kill was a Ju-88 by a Martlet.

 

[pinsog]

I always understood that shooting down bombers was the primary purpose of a fighter.

If you shoot a bomber down in flames you have potentially killed up to 10 expensively trained men, destroyed 4 expensive engines and an expensive airframe.

Shoot down a fighter and you have only killed 1 expensive man, 1 relatively cheap airframe and only 1 expensive engine.

I read a quote somewhere from a pilot that "shooting down fighters wins medals but shooting down bombers wins wars".

That is an interesting quote, but someone on the allied side would have had to have called and requested that either the Germans or Japanese build such a plane for the allies to shoot at. By 1944 there were virtually no bombers to shoot at in the Luftwaffe, and what few there were weren't 4 engine heavies. The only 4 engine planes the Japanese had that I'm aware of were a few flying boats, and those were dispatched rather quickly by Browning 50's.

 

[drgondog]

I have read a lot of encounter reports in my research. The Do 217 and He 177 were pretty tough birds for a P-51B to dispatch quickly with just the 4x50 cal. Historically, a lot of the .33 and .2 and .25 credits were shared scores on those two types.

 

[JoeB]

My point is that the Hurricanes over Malta faced overwhelming odds, and were greatly outnumbered by an opponent that was 70 miles away and could fly several sorties a day and even loiter in the Hurricanes landing circuit. In contrast, the Wildcats over Henderson had a cakewalk against a very weak opponent that was based 600 miles away and averaged a weak attack a couple of times a week. Quoting F4F stats from Guadalcanal to try and prove the supposed superiority of the f4F over the Hurricane is complete bull.

Actually in the period I quote, when Bf109E's faced Hurricanes at Malta, Feb-May 1941, with 0:35 kill ration, most of the Bf109 victories were scored by one staffel, with less than 10 operational a/c, only occasionally supplemented by a couple of other staffeln. The Hurricanes were by not outnumbered in that period by German fighters, not outnumbered unless counting all the Axis bombers, and theless capable Italian fighters. In most of the rest of 1941, the Germans weren't operating single engine fighters against Malta at all. At times from late 1941 through 42 the German fighter force outnumbered the British, but that was Bf109F opposition, and mainly Spitfires on British side after the opending months of the year, which is not the period I'm referring to.

And you characterization of numbers over Gudalcanal is similarly inaccurate. The fighter numbers on each side tended to be around equal, but more often in Japanese favor than US. And just as with Malta you're ignoring significant twists and turns in the campaign. Only early in the Guadalcanal campaign were enemy fighters operating from 600 miles away (but obviously, they were *much* longer ranged fighters than a Bf109, and the Zero crushed other Allied fighter opposition operating from similarly long ranges). By October the Japanese began operating from Buin which is only around 1/2 as far, short range for a Zero. And the climactic battles in November and denoument of G'canal campaign (proper) to early '43, often involved F4F's escorting conovy attackers well north of Guadalcanal, or to suppress the airfield at Munda less than 200 miles from Henderson. And, many other F4F/Zero battles of 1942 involved carrier planes on one side or the other or both, operating at relatively short range.

So in general your G'canal thumbnail is inaccurate, after posting a lot of general figures for Malta which aren't very relevant to the point I made about that campaign, either.

Re: Shortround:
1. I consider post 1940 mods to Hurricane relatively minor for the simple manifest reason they had little impact on its combat success. Hurricane success v Bf109E's generally deteriorated, didn't improve, after 1940, even before it met the 109F with which it just wasn't competitive at all. Also, the Hurricane's results v the Japanese Army Type 1 hardly changed from 1942 to 1943 (around 4-5:1 ratio in favor of the Japanese), with both the improved sub-models, and an apparently more favorable situation wrt security of bases, morale, etc which are often given as explanaion/excuse for the poor 1942 Hurricane results. If those had really been the reasons, rather than something more basic, the results would presumably have improved in 1943, but they actually got worse (though not a by a statistically significant amount).

2. F4F won both combats w/ H-75 over Morrocco, in which the F4F's were considerably outnumbered in the second; and the Mohawk/P-36 and F4F had similar results v the Japanese. In general I just don't see a plausible argument that H-75's superior record to Hurricane v Bf109E in Battle of France is invalidated as F4F proxy by claiming H-75 a superior a/c to the F4F, that's just seems more just seeking any possible counterpoint to throw up on the wall and see if it sticks. The Hawk and F4F were quite similar planes in general design philosophy and performance parameters especially compared to the Hurricane, powered by the same or similar engine (depending on model), the main difference being the F4F's considerably superior armament (again stuff like seat armor or fuel tank liners could be fitted to either a/c, or the Hurricane, none of the three were designed with them, and the benefits and drawbacks of fitting them to any of the three were not greatly different, and probably not as significant an impact to combat results as is sometimes made out).

Joe

 

[renrich]

In the "for what it is worth department" Eric Brown who I believe was a FAA pilot thought the Wildcat was superior to the Sea Hurricane.

 

[Glider]

Actually in the period I quote, when Bf109E's faced Hurricanes at Malta, Feb-May 1941, with 0:35 kill ration, most of the Bf109 victories were scored by one staffel, with less than 10 operational a/c, only occasionally supplemented by a couple of other staffeln. The Hurricanes were by not outnumbered in that period by German fighters, not outnumbered unless counting all the Axis bombers, and theless capable Italian fighters. In most of the rest of 1941, the Germans weren't operating single engine fighters against Malta at all. At times from late 1941 through 42 the German fighter force outnumbered the British, but that was Bf109F opposition, and mainly Spitfires on British side after the opending months of the year, which is not the period I'm referring to.

In the period Feb-May 1941 the Hurricanes were often outnumbered.
26/2/41 8 Hurricanes went up against 38 x Ju87, 10 x Do 215, 10 x He111 and apprix 25 fighters including 109E's from 7/JG26, MC 200's from 6 Gruppo and 12 x CR42.
Your observation about the less capable Italian fighters may well be true compared to an ME109 but to a Hurricane the MC200 was not to be taken lightly. Its also true to point out that the bombers were the main target for the Hurricanes and should be taken into account.
This also applies to the period from late 41 when the Germans did outnumber the Malta defences, the italians still took part and should not be discounted. The odds were heavily stacked against the RAF

 

[RCAFson]

The Hurricanes were by not outnumbered in that period by German fighters, not outnumbered unless counting all the Axis bombers, and theless capable Italian fighters. In most of the rest of 1941, the Germans weren't operating single engine fighters against Malta at all. At times from late 1941 through 42 the German fighter force outnumbered the British, but that was Bf109F opposition, and mainly Spitfires on British side after the opending months of the year, which is not the period I'm referring to.

Yeah, so 10 Hurricanes , for example, when faced with 10 Me109s. 10 Mc202s and 10Cr42s, escorting 30 bombers, are not outnumbered? What nonsense.

And you characterization of numbers over Gudalcanal is similarly inaccurate. The fighter numbers on each side tended to be around equal, but more often in Japanese favor than US. And just as with Malta you're ignoring significant twists and turns in the campaign. Only early in the Guadalcanal campaign were enemy fighters operating from 600 miles away (but obviously, they were *much* longer ranged fighters than a Bf109, and the Zero crushed other Allied fighter opposition operating from similarly long ranges). By October the Japanese began operating from Buin which is only around 1/2 as far, short range for a Zero. And the climactic battles in November and denoument of G'canal campaign (proper) to early '43, often involved F4F's escorting conovy attackers well north of Guadalcanal, or to suppress the airfield at Munda less than 200 miles from Henderson. And, many other F4F/Zero battles of 1942 involved carrier planes on one side or the other or both, operating at relatively short range.

So in general your G'canal thumbnail is inaccurate, after posting a lot of general figures for Malta which aren't very relevant to the point I made about that campaign, either.

I don't like using other people posts, but since I don't have the book referenced, I'll do it anyways:

Some quotes from First Team:


"The Imperial Navy faced immense problems prosecuting a successful air offensive against Guadalcanal, many of hs own making. The nearest fully operational airfields to the target remained the cluster of bases around Rabaul: Vunakanau Field ~Rabaul West) for the bombers and the fighter strip at Lakunai (Rabaul East) set beneath a massive volcano. All lay at least 560 miles from Guadalcanal, entailing strike missions of eight hours or more. The auxiliary field at Buka, 400 miles from Guadalcanal, was used only sporadically for lack of support facilities."

"The extremely long and fatiguing missions down the "Guadal Highway'' (Gadaru Gairo), as the Japanese nicknamed the Slot, adversely effected the Zero fighter escorts. To save fuel many pilots fought with their belly tanks attached, which reduced combat performance. Even so the fighter leaders set a maximum of 15 minutes over Guadalcanal. Most of the Rabaul Zeros, clipped-wing A6M3 Model 32s with 20 percent less range than the A6M2 Model Its, could not even reach Guadalcanal and return. Work had only begun on the vital airstrip at Buin on southern Bougainville opposite Shortland island and 300 miles from Guadalcanal. Until its completion set for late September, no Zero 32s could be used. and crippled aircraft enjoyed no refuge short of Buka."



"Thus the destruction of Allied air power at Guadaicanal and also attacks against enemy ships-fell to VAdm. Yasnagata Seigo's 6th Air Attack Force (26th
Flotilla) flying the long-range but highly vulnerable Mitsubishi G4M1 Type l"

P192:
"They had the Unenviable task of dealing with the hit-and-run attacks by the Grumman Wildcats. The absence of radios in the land-based Zeros forced relatively inflexible escort tactics. Citing its limited range (50 miles) and poor reliability, the fighter groups had ripped out all the radio equipment, including the mast and aerial, to save 18 kg of weight. The lack of radios prevented close coordination between escorts and bombers and proved most detrimental in the Solomon air battles."


p201
"The raid on the 12th, a typical Guadalcanal donnybrook, hammered home the tactical points Smith made the previous afternoon. The arthritic F4Fs did need at least 30 minutes to reach 28,000 feet and assure height advantage over the bombers. Simpler complained in his report, "The F4F4 is too slow in climb to altitude and has insufficient ceiling and speed to deal with the modern bombers and fighters." Climbing in tight, compact formations such as the one Smith used kept the F4Fs together for massed attacks and somewhat discouraged the fighter escorts from diving in. Usually fighting in trios or pairs, the Zeros rarely surrendered altitude advantage."

"VF-S had trained for carrier defense, where it was critical to break up an enemy strike before it reached the ships. Conditions at CACTUS did not permit that. The Marines learned from bitter experience that more than one pass at the bombers risked a thrashing by the escort. Later in the campaign this did not necessarily apply. The bombers, especially after releasing payloads, cruised so fast that follow-up attacks became increasingly shallow, of low deflection, and more dangerous. Certainly VF-5's experiences vindicated Smith's warnings. In his action report Richardson opined it was "impracticable to make more than one run on the bombers and employ the speed gained in the attack to avoid the Zero." This would take VF-5 time to learn."

p238
by Sept 21, 1942 of 86 F4Fs committed 43 were lost from all causes.

Aside from early warning the F4Fs fighting over CACTUS enjoyed additional advantages. Fuel limitations prevented the enemy fighters from prolonging any actions. The 1st MAW wrongly believed the Zeros operated from Buka, which at 400 miles was a great distance in its own right, but they later learned to their amazement that the enemy came the whole long way from Rabaul. The CACTUS fighters battled over their own turf, so to speak, to the great benefit of Dave Richardson and numerous others.

p270
Back at base Kofukuda's and Odors pilots were very pleased with the day outcome, which seemed to vindicate the fighter-sweep tactic and provided sweet revenge for 28 September. Kofukuda's dozen Zeros really did a number on the thirteen CACTUS F4Fs they ambushed, forcing all to dive away. The fight was another classic example of the value of altitude superiority and surprise.

P275
From the CAP only Carl's division fought that day. Their cunning, deadly ambush elicited claims of nine Zeros and one probable: Bauer (four plus one probable), Frazier two, and one each to Carl, Winter, and Lynch. They won a tremendous victory for the Ist MAW and took revenge for the previous day Bauer earned great admiration for his skill, leadership, and devotion to his team mates. Two days later Geiger presented "Coach" with a Japanese rising sun banner to mark his achievements. Bauer gave it to MAG-23. Even though the other F4Fs had not fought, they suffered numerous mechanical failures, illustrating the great strain on men and materiel at CACTUS. Of Armistead's seven VMF-224 F4Fs that reached 33,000 feet, five dropped out (two with blown super charger gaskets and.one from oxygen failure. Blair crashed with a burned-out engine, leaving VF-5 with sixteen Wildcats (eleven flyable).

I found out the composition of the Air groups aboard HMS Eagle, Indomitable and Victorious, during Operation Pedestal and it works out to: 10 Martlets, 16 Fulmars, and 46 Sea Hurricanes. However Eagle was sunk by a sub and 12 Sea Hurricanes were lost before the fight began, leaving 34 Sea Hurricanes in Operation. According to Wildcat Aces of WW2, the Martlets only made 4 kill claims, out of 30; so that gives us:
10 Martlets = 4 claims, = .4 kills/aircraft
50 Fulmars and Hurricanes = 26 claims = .52 kills/aircraft.

From what I can tell, even the Fulmars made more kill claims than the Martlets.

 

[gjs238]

Returning to my original query...

The British wanted/needed American planes - as many as possible.
It wasn't so much an issue of quality but quantity - they needed more planes and lots of them.
Of course, they wanted the best they could get, but would take almost whatever they could get.
I imagine they would have appreciated receiving planes equivalent to or superior than the Hurricane Spitfire, but lacking that, they took what they could and used them where they could.

I'm wondering why F4F's weren't received/used in greater quantity.

There was an earlier post about production limitations...
If the F4F was desired, and production was limited, I imagine the British could/would have solicited license manufacture as they did with the P-40 (genesis of P-51.)

There was an earlier post about high altitude performance of double stage supercharged F4F's not being necessary, as Spitfires fulfilled that role.
Perhaps, but then why all the negative comments about P-39, P-40 and P-38 (sans turbo) altitude performance?
It seems there was a desire for good high altitude performance which was lacking in the US planes received.

 

[Shortround6]

Returning to my original query...

I'm wondering why F4F's weren't received/used in greater quantity.

There was an earlier post about production limitations...
If the F4F was desired, and production was limited, I imagine the British could/would have solicited license manufacture as they did with the P-40 (genesis of P-51.)

It can take a year or more to tool up and start manufacture of an existing design, if the factory has to start from scratch. Ordering planes in the summer of 1940 would mean deliver in the summer of 1941 at best and into the spring of 1942 for first delivery if tooling up doesn't go well. Most American Manufacturers aside from Curtis and Boeing were rather small. For instance Lockheed had 7464 employees as of Jan 1 1940 and while that may sound large (mostly working on Hudson bombers) they had 40,307 employees by Nov 1941 at which time Lockheed had delivered about 100 P-38s (although many more were in progress)

There was an earlier post about high altitude performance of double stage supercharged F4F's not being necessary, as Spitfires fulfilled that role.
Perhaps, but then why all the negative comments about P-39, P-40 and P-38 (sans turbo) altitude performance?
It seems there was a desire for good high altitude performance which was lacking in the US planes received.

While the F4F did have better high altitude performance than the P-39 and P-40 that is damning with faint praise. The F4F was not as good as the Spitfire by a fair margin and at best was equal to a MK II Hurricane without tropical gear for use in Europe. The F4F's lower performance at low altitudes (sea level to 15,000) meant it would have trouble performing the missions the P-40 did perform in North Africa.

You are back to the F4F being too slow at low altitude to the low altitude role done by the P-40 and while better at high altitude it wasn't up to the performance thought to be needed against the Germans aircraft.

While it could have performed a useful role in the far east or med the British thought they had that covered with the Hurricanes.

 

[gjs238]

It can take a year or more to tool up and start manufacture of an existing design, if the factory has to start from scratch. Ordering planes in the summer of 1940 would mean deliver in the summer of 1941 at best and into the spring of 1942 for first delivery if tooling up doesn't go well. Most American Manufacturers aside from Curtis and Boeing were rather small. For instance Lockheed had 7464 employees as of Jan 1 1940 and while that may sound large (mostly working on Hudson bombers) they had 40,307 employees by Nov 1941 at which time Lockheed had delivered about 100 P-38s (although many more were in progress) .

All that being said, North American was still asked to produce P-40's under license.