Fixing the Italian Military, 1933~1945

[History Learner]

There's a tendency among armchair historians, thankfully in decline to posit that the Japanese can't come up with their own ideas. The notion that the A6M had to be a copy of a western design comes to mind. Postwar this thinking applied to Japanese made consumer products and vehicles. Anyway, the IJN's Kido Butai had the best naval strike and fighter aircraft afloat operating from a half dozen fast fleet carriers. If the US decided to move its Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor and maintain it at half readiness in full view of Japanese intel ops, I am rather sure that Yamamoto or someone else in the IJN will independently arrive at the notion that we could and should use our carriers to conduct a first strike (including sorting out low depth torpedoes), per history.

In terms of Taranto we know the first time the IJN practiced for a Strike South was in November of 1940 after the British attack. By the time Yamamoto's staff began drawing up the plans for Pearl Harbor in earnest in 1941, the Japanese had already dispatched one fact finding mission to Europe to study the strike and another would be dispatched shortly, with the final report submitted in October of 1941. Notably, this was before Hirohito officially signed off on the strike. While the idea certainly existed before 1940, the plan as enacted certainly didn't and a lot of evidence exists to say the Japanese applied best practices from it in formulating said plan.

More importantly than the above is the changed strategic context, IMHO. The IJA and most of the IJN opposed the Pearl Harbor operation, with one of the most common criticisms being that the Kido Butai being reserved for Pearl meant the invasion(s) of Southwest Asia had to be conducted with the minimally acceptable forces. Given here the Commonwealth has not had to denude Asia to fight in North Africa and the Royal Navy, not tied down in the Mediterranean, can and most likely will sortie in force once the Japanese launch their offensives. In that situation and without the precedent of Taranto to back up his arguments, I very much doubt Yamamoto will be able to force through his plan given the extreme risks it would entail.

 

[Shortround6]

Been watching some you-tube videos on Italian armor and while I have learned a little bit there is still a lot of nonsense being put out.
I am a gun guy so it really gets me when most of the videos claim the Italian (Austrian) 47mm was good gun or at least as good as anything else in late 1940.
It wasn't. And the problem was that the Germans, British, Soviets and Americans were already working on the replacements for their 1940 guns while it would take the Italians 1 1/2 to years to come up with their replacement.
gun...................................................MV.....................AP shell weight....................HE shell weight/mv
Italian 47/32...............................670ms.......................1.5kg...........................................2.37kg/250ms (?)
German short 50......................756ms.......................2.07kg...........................................--..--
British 2pdr.................................792ms.......................1.08kg...........................................NA
American 37mm......................884ms........................0.87kg...........................................0.73kg/792ms
Soviet 47mm.............................760ms.......................1.43kg..........................................unkown
French 47mm tank gun.........670ms.......................1.63kg..........................................1.41kg/-----

The Italian gun was almost 2 years behind, granted the British had screwed up 3 different ways but that does not move the Italians to near the top of the list. Installing a gun in the fall of 1940 that is inferior to the gun that they fought in 1937 in Spain in a very similar tank (smaller) is not a good look.
The Italian 47/40 is skimmed over as a slightly long gun. Now given that it showed up so late and in so few production tanks it wasn't of much importance historically. But it is the gun the Italians should have been using in in 1940 or early 1941. The increase in MV to 820/830ms put it about even with the German long 50mm although the lighter projectile did hurt it.
The heavy HE shell was nice advantage although I have some real doubts about the listed velocity, if true it was a real limit to effective range of the gun, especially in a tank. I am not sure if the HE shell is getting confused with the Effetto Pronto shell (HEAT) which, while effective in larger calibers, was not very effective in the 47mm. And a 250ms velocity makes hitting anything over 300meters very difficult.
The tanks were mostly bolted construction, some riveting but actual rivets are harder to see and most of visible lumps are bolt heads. Many tanks were using bolted construction in 1940/41.

The Italians seemed to have screwed themselves with the tank machineguns. This is sort of judgement call as the gun itself seems to have been well liked and reliable. However the 24 round box magazine means that the actual rate of fire was low compared to other tanks. A single co-ax gun with 24 round box magazines might not have been enough (commander was the gunner so there is no 3rd turret crewman to use the pintle mount on the top of the turret. The twin bow gun may have been more needed than in other other tanks???
British tanks with their BESA guns with 225 round belts may have been able to dispense with bow gun and gunner without affecting combat effectiveness much?

Radios and/or lack of radios is often not mentioned.

Excuses are often made about the small size needed for Italian operations in the Mountains against Austria(?) or France but then they sometimes claim that the British were already designing for the desert? Crusader was designed in the summer of 1939. The earlier Cruisers were designed in 1936/37. British were designing in general, not for the desert. British were also just as behind as anybody else when it comes to needing sand filters or wear caused in track systems.

 

[Elan Vital]

Been watching some you-tube videos on Italian armor and while I have learned a little bit there is still a lot of nonsense being put out.
I am a gun guy so it really gets me when most of the videos claim the Italian (Austrian) 47mm was good gun or at least as good as anything else in late 1940.
It wasn't. And the problem was that the Germans, British, Soviets and Americans were already working on the replacements for their 1940 guns while it would take the Italians 1 1/2 to years to come up with their replacement.
gun...................................................MV.....................AP shell weight....................HE shell weight/mv
Italian 47/32...............................670ms.......................1.5kg...........................................2.37kg/250ms (?)
German short 50......................756ms.......................2.07kg...........................................--..--
British 2pdr.................................792ms.......................1.08kg...........................................NA
American 37mm......................884ms........................0.87kg...........................................0.73kg/792ms
Soviet 47mm.............................760ms.......................1.43kg..........................................unkown
French 47mm tank gun.........670ms.......................1.63kg..........................................1.41kg/-----

The Italian gun was almost 2 years behind, granted the British had screwed up 3 different ways but that does not move the Italians to near the top of the list. Installing a gun in the fall of 1940 that is inferior to the gun that they fought in 1937 in Spain in a very similar tank (smaller) is not a good look.
The Italian 47/40 is skimmed over as a slightly long gun. Now given that it showed up so late and in so few production tanks it wasn't of much importance historically. But it is the gun the Italians should have been using in in 1940 or early 1941. The increase in MV to 820/830ms put it about even with the German long 50mm although the lighter projectile did hurt it.


Radios and/or lack of radios is often not mentioned.

Excuses are often made about the small size needed for Italian operations in the Mountains against Austria(?) or France but then they sometimes claim that the British were already designing for the desert? Crusader was designed in the summer of 1939. The earlier Cruisers were designed in 1936/37. British were designing in general, not for the desert. British were also just as behind as anybody else when it comes to needing sand filters or wear caused in track systems.

Worse, the 47/32 and 47/40 actually had 630 m/s and 755 m/s respectively (last line). This means the 47/32 was even weaker than the French SA35 and the 47/40 was in the ballpark of the Soviet 45mm, even though the 45 was used in turrets of similar size while the SA35 was specifically designed for use in small 1-man turrets (in fact, originally a turret that was even smaller than the ones the gun was actually used in), so had an excuse to be relatively low velocity. As we know, the 47/40 ended up fitting just fine in the M13 turrets.

The Italians would pretty much have had to use the 47/40 from 1935 onwards and the wartime 47/46 and 47/52 projects (815 and 840 m/s respectively) from 1939-41 onwards to have acceptable small caliber AT for the towed units or for the tanks, with the latter guns being close to the French SA37, German 5cm L60 and Soviet 45 M-42. Incidentally, Ansaldo did have higher performance 47mm guns like 47/46 or 47/48 before 1934, so the Italian industry already had options.

Ansaldo initially welded the CV33s, but returned to riveted/bolted construction as it was more commercially profitable. While thick armor welding is not the same as bullet-resistant/bulletproof armor welding, Ansaldo had plenty of time to permanently switch to welding before the war.

It must be said that a lot of the design concepts for Italian tanks were pushed by Ansaldo's lead engineer Rosini who had, it turns out, completely misjudged the direction tanks would take. Given the Italians set out to design heavier and larger tanks in 1940-41 and even before, the country's geography was not a good excuse.

 

[TM06]

-snip-

YouTube is a total crapshoot in regards to accuracy of information. Sometimes you'll get wonderfully accurate and new information, but many more times you'll get blatantly false or outright wrong information - on rare occasions you might even find those false sources being explicitly fabricated in order to push a narrative, prerogative or some other kind of agenda.

But in regards to Italy, AFAIK the EP and EPS shells were generally relegated to guns in the 65 mm range and up, anything lower was found to be inadequate. The zenith of which was the EP shell designed for the 90/42 (shortened 90/53, similar ballistics the KwK 36 88mm gun on the Tiger) on the P.43Bis - which IIRC clocked in at about 240 mm of penetration and ~750 m/s(?) Take the claims with a healthy grain of salt though.

 

[Shortround6]

YouTube is a total crapshoot in regards to accuracy of information. Sometimes you'll get wonderfully accurate and new information, but many more times you'll get blatantly false or outright wrong information - on rare occasions you might even find those false sources being explicitly fabricated in order to push a narrative, prerogative or some other kind of agenda.

But in regards to Italy, AFAIK the EP and EPS shells were generally relegated to guns in the 65 mm range and up, anything lower was found to be inadequate. The zenith of which was the EP shell designed for the 90/42 (shortened 90/53, similar ballistics the KwK 36 88mm gun on the Tiger) on the P.43Bis - which IIRC clocked in at about 240 mm of penetration and ~750 m/s(?) Take the claims with a healthy grain of salt though.

Something sure seems to be off here. Getting even 3 times the diameter of the shell for penetration during WW II was just about unheard of. Things got a lot better right after the war.
High speed projectiles that are spin stabilized was problem. The faster the shell spins the wider the jet it forms and the less penetration. Then there are fuse problems, Shaped charges work well with a certain amount of stand off. The less stand off the less penetration but fast projectiles crush the nose cone and reduce penetration as the fuse functions. Fuses also got better during the 50s. Americans went to fin stabilized HEAT rounds in the 90mm guns in the M47 tanks. I imagine they could be fired out of the older 90mm guns ? but the sights may not having aiming marks?
In any case one source says that the M348 HEAT round was developed (or standardized ?) in 1951 and and was good for about 280-290mm of penetration.

The later (1953 ?) M431 ammo was good for 340mm of penetration

Note that both of these are fin stabilized to get rid of the spin problem and nose probe on the later one to try to get good stand off.
I have no idea of what the Italians were doing in 1943/44 but something does not seem right.
Please note that a 'static' shot (round is placed next to target and detonated ) is going to give much better penetration than a live shot (projectile is spinning as it hits) if the projectile is spin stabilized.

 

[TM06]

Something sure seems to be off here. Getting even 3 times the diameter of the shell for penetration during WW II was just about unheard of. Things got a lot better right after the war.
High speed projectiles that are spin stabilized was problem. The faster the shell spins the wider the jet it forms and the less penetration. Then there are fuse problems, Shaped charges work well with a certain amount of stand off. The less stand off the less penetration but fast projectiles crush the nose cone and reduce penetration as the fuse functions. Fuses also got better during the 50s. Americans went to fin stabilized HEAT rounds in the 90mm guns in the M47 tanks. I imagine they could be fired out of the older 90mm guns ? but the sights may not having aiming marks?
In any case one source says that the M348 HEAT round was developed (or standardized ?) in 1951 and and was good for about 280-290mm of penetration.
View attachment 842247
The later (1953 ?) M431 ammo was good for 340mm of penetration
View attachment 842248
Note that both of these are fin stabilized to get rid of the spin problem and nose probe on the later one to try to get good stand off.
I have no idea of what the Italians were doing in 1943/44 but something does not seem right.
Please note that a 'static' shot (round is placed next to target and detonated ) is going to give much better penetration than a live shot (projectile is spinning as it hits) if the projectile is spin stabilized.

Again, take the measurements with a grain of salt. The muzzle velocity seemed off to me too - I was thinking more in the 400~500 range based off of the Swedish Sav m/43's 105 mm gun, which had a HEAT shell also capable of 240mm penetration but flew at the low ~400 m/s range.
One also has to wonder why they would need an EP shell on the 90 mm when it was already a very capable gun with its APCBC-HE shells. A little on the lower velocity side for a gun of its class (750~770 m/s), but they still packed a mean punch. Maybe since they chopped the barrel down for the 90/42, they thought they'd need the extra penetration it could offer?
Or maybe the Italian designers were hopped up on a bit too much of the German "crystal" - certainly wouldn't be the first time for an Axis designer.

 

[Shortround6]

Getting back to the Italian tanks and the Italian Army in general. It seems like the Italian army in the late 30s was still concentrating on fighting in the Mountains on the Italian northern borders. Which is somewhat understandable given Italy's WW I experience although they were very interested in tanks at the end of WW I with the French Renault FT 17s and the 1920s copy of it by Fiat. While the L3/33 were OK for policing (subjugating ) the African Tribesmen they were not up to much more. With Italy trying to expand it's influence something better was needed. Italian experience in Spain was somewhat ignored (running into BT-5s. T-26s and Soviet armored cars). While Austria was becoming much less of a threat France was not going away and the Italian need to secure the western Libyan border against the French needed better than the L3/33 and the Italian desire to take over/expand Albania should have also be taken into account. Not that Albania was itself was much of problem but expecting it's neighbors to do nothing was wishful thinking.
I do wonder about the Idea, often put forward, that Italian "tanks" were small and light for fighting in the mountains on narrow roads/tracks. It may be true but a quick look at what the French were building shows the Italians were in deep trouble. The French class of 1935/36 infantry tanks (Renault R35, FMC-36) while far from great tanks would be a problem for any late (1936 or later) Italian army. They were heavier and might have had trouble with mountain roads/bridges but they were actually smaller in width than the M11/39 and were about 40cm wider than the L3/33. The French 37mm gun sucked as an AT weapon but since the L3/33 only had 12-14mm at best that was well in the ability of the short 37mm to deal with it. The French had a co-ax machine gun so the commander/gunner/loader had his choice of AP cannon ammo, HE cannon ammo (hand grenade size?) or the MG with a 150 drum. Prior to the lend of 1939 the Italian tank commander had his choice of 8mm machine gun or..........................8mm machine gun..........................or trying to find (without radio) one of the few L3/38s with a 13mm machine gun or even rarer (maybe don't show up until 1938?) The 20mm version didn't show up until 1940? They had the flame thrower version but trying to deal with the trailer on the "mountain" roads would have been a problem.
The real problem shows up with the M11/39 which has the 37mm gun in the hull and while the Italian 37mm is lot better than the French one the French have smartened up somewhat in 1939/40 are busy trying fitting an improved 37mm gun to their tanks which is roughly equal to the Italian 37mm gun. French tanks still have better armor and the Italian 3 man tank layout is little better than the French two man layout. To rub salt into the would the French Somua 35 is actually a few centimeters narrower than the M11/19 .
The French Char D2

was 2.22 meters wide compared to the M11/39's width of 2.2 meters. Granted the Char D2s height and weight may have posed problems but the excuse of narrow roads is rather thin one. French tank had number of troubles but how much was known to Italians is speculation.
The Italians seem to have lost their way since they had built about 50 of these in 1929-30

Same gun as was used in the M-11/30 and in a rotating turret. Make the turret big enough to hold a 2nd man and co-ax machine gun and take 8 years to improve the engine and suspension. Not great but then the Italians took until 1940 to do any better and by that time the bar had been raised.

 

[Elan Vital]

Going back to 1925, the Italian military had already requested a FIAT 3000 replacement in the form of the Tipo II: FIAT 3000 Tipo II - Tank Encyclopedia

This was an elarged extrapolation at 9 tonnes with at least 20mm of armor in places, now the ability to carry both a gun and coaxial MG (the 37/40 did not exist yet), a more powerful 75 hp diesel engine and improved suspension. In many ways this was more capable than the Renault NC of the day and still more promising in some respects than the Char D1. Definitely not great but it shows that Italy could perfectly request light tank/turreted gun tank specifications that are competitive for the period.

Following on from the Tipo II with further improved specifications could have easily yielded a decent line of tanks in the 1930s. Worth also remembering that Ansaldo-FIAT had the better 37/44 gun, 47mm guns more powerful than the 47/32, and 2-man tank turrets (for armored cars and a heavy tank for the USSR) in 1932, so a lot of these elements could have been incorporated in a new spec.

 

[Shortround6]

Going back to the Italian doctrine of the summer of 1940.

The Italian Army developed a new and revolutionary doctrine of combined arms warfare in 1938 based on the lessons learned from their experiences of the 1930s. The success from the use of Italian combined arm teams in Spain and in Ethiopia proved the concept of motorized forces and the natural follow-on of mechanization for the Italian Army. This doctrine was called the War of Rapid Decision. With this doctrine the Italian Army had developed a new and dynamic operational art of war. The Italian military in Libya had all the necessary elements to be successful utilizing this new doctrine. In addition it had a commander that already successfully used and demonstrated an applied motorized doctrine in the Italo-Ethiopian war where it proved victorious to him. Marshal Graziani didn't utilize this new doctrine.

Combined with the available armor and motorized artillery forces, he would have had a potential mechanized force to invade Egypt with in August of 1940. The only realistic motorized formation that could have been formed is with the Comando Carri Armati della Libia, possibly three or four artillery Regiments, and one motorized infantry division.

As far as the Italian tanks needed to implement such a doctrine, the two battalions of M11/39s (72 tanks) were sent to Libya in July 1940 becoming part of the Comando Carri Armati della Libia on Aug 29th 1940. These tanks formed the backbone of the advance to Sidi Barrani starting Sept 13th. As mentioned earlier, most accounts say that these tanks had no radios.
There were a few radios in special command L.3/33-35s, maybe one per company. Italian training was rather sketchy. In the summer of 1940 there were only 1 or 2 tanks larger than the L3/33 or Fiat 3000 in the tank school/s and even at the short period of 25 days most trainees only got a limited amount of driver, gunner, and mechanic training.
The M13/40 was in production but the low rate of production meant that the third medium battalion (III/32) arrived in Libya in Oct with 37 tanks and the 4 battalion was sent to Albania in Dec while the 5 battalion was sent to Libya. Only 1 or two went to the tank schools so training was woefully lacking. While it was planned to have radios in the M13/40, just like the M11/39s. lack of radios meant that few, if any were installed as built. The 6th battalion was sent at the end of Dec, 1940. It was not until late spring or early summer of 1941 that the M-13/40s got radios fitted at the factory in large numbers. The L6/40 was ordered into production in March 1940 but no production examples were delivered until May of 1941 (?).
This is one leg of of the combined arms doctrine and as can be seen, it was a pretty shaky leg.

The infantry component was also very shaky for use in North Africa. Combined arms in the Italian Alps or in Albania don't need the amount of trucks that North Africa does and with the main tanks maxing out at about 32kph on a level, decent road, fast trucks are not needed either and perhaps the Bersaglieri could have been used for short movements (2-3 days) in poor terrain? But trying to move without trucks in the dessert over long distances in an area is scarce resources (water and food) is not going to work. Trucks do have stop further from the battleline and have the troops dismount but than can be taken into account in in 1940 (nobody had APCs). Having radio links between the tanks and the infantry was very important. Motorcycle messengers are not going to work.

And that brings us to the 3rd leg of the stool. You need artillery and for fast moving battle this means you can't use standard artillery tactics/movement or even strength (numbers).
In WW I it was hard enough for the artillery to try to keep up with the advancing infantry, granted trying to use horses to move even light artillery over shell torn ground was extremely difficult. With even slow tanks things got rather difficult quickly. Even a light battery (75mm guns) can take around a 1/2 hour to unhitch and get into position. They were no long riding into position at gallop, unlimbering and blazing away with open sights at a visible enemy like 1914. The guns had to placed into position to shield them from return fire (at least the reverse slope of a hill) but in place that could be located on a map, survey stakes had to set out and aiming markers put out. Calculations made as to likely targets on the map and the guns, especially those with limited travers, aligned accordingly. Radios and/or field phones set up. Now imagining doing that while trying to support a tank unit that was advancing even 3-4kph. They would be out of range in about 2 hours assuming that the guns started about 2km behind the start line. You have to leap frog the batteries so there are always one or two batteries ready to fire while the other battery/s are moving. When it is time to move the survey stake and aiming makers have to picked up and stowed. Ready use ammo made safe and stowed. Communications equipment stowed (field phone wire can be left, assuming there is a stock available, for clean up crews) so there is a lot of things to do besides hooking the guns up to tow vehicles. Trucks allow for the artillery to follow tanks down the road but the tanks can start and stop much faster than the artillery can. Going off road can leave the artillery bogged down in soft ground.
Longer range artillery can cut down a bit on the leap frogs (12km range guns vs 10km range guns?), guns with 60 degree traverse are much quicker to set up than guns with 6-8 degrees of travers.
Outrunning your HE and Smoke support can be deadly for both the tanks and the infantry.

It is easy to write about combined arms doctrine in the abstract and you do have to start somewhere. But there are dozens if not hundreds of details that have to worked out and in Aug, Sept, Oct 1940 Italy did not have many of pieces in place. British also did not have combined arms doctrine in place but they had more working radios, better trained troops, and more trucks to improvise with.

 

[Shortround6]

The Italians learned from the 1940/early 1941 battles and local commanders started having Libyan repair shops start as series of Autocannone (truck mounted artillery) to make up for the lack of operational mobility of the Italian artillery units in North Africa. Since these depended, for the most part, of guns that were already in North Africa and on trucks that were already there (either Italian or captured British) actual numbers were small. This is no refection on the commanders that ordered it done or the workshops and men that did the work.
It is reflection on Italian high command that there was little supply of even similar vehicles from Italy itself.
Best Italian field gun of the war (built in small numbers) was the Cannone da 75/32 modello 37 and in many ways it was a very good gun. However it took just a bit too long to get into production and the carriage dates it a bit.

The carriage itself was suitable for high speed tow but the speed of emplacement and re-embarking(?) leaves something to be desired. Having to hammer those stakes into ground is going to take a lot effort/time and getting them back out is also going to be slow hard work. A number of nations used this system in late WW I and though the 20s and early 30s.
Other nations went to 'spade'

It was possible to fire the spades folded on hard ground. but using the spades gave better results (gun moved less between shots) it often did take several shots with spades to dig in and stabilize. Getting back out often required moving the gun forward, lots of men, ropes around the wheels for leverage, tow vehicle and/or winch. But the stake system didn't allow for most of these "short cuts". The stakes have to pulled out vertically and while moving the gun forward a few centimeters may help there is still going to be some digging and hammering/pulling. Using 1/2 tracks as tow vehicles gets the gun battery to and from firing sites in poor conditions, it doesn't do anything for getting the guns into and out off action at the firing positions.
Italians may have been no position industrially to build tracked SP guns but given the times they tried in WW I to not try anything in the 1930s seems a little short sighted.
A lot of times the Italian Autocannone were used as mobile AT guns but that says an awful lot about the poor AT capabilities of the Cannone da 47/32 and a lot about the bravery of the Italian crews.
Italians needed work a lot harder to actually get the mobile battle doctrine to work during the 1930s.

 

[Shortround6]

It seems to me that one of the best things the Italian army could have done in 1938-39 was to abandon the Cannone da 47/32 as a towed AT gun and as a tank gun and build/buy a more powerful 47mm gun. The 47/32 was nice mountain gun and/or infantry support gun, it was a crap AT gun which forced the forward deployment of 65mm and 75mm infantry guns/howitzers as ersatz AT guns of dubious efficiency. They scored some kills but perhaps a better weapon would have done better at lower cost (fewer crewmen killed).
The adoption of truck mounted guns in 1938/39 as cheap SP guns would also have paid benefits. I am not sure if the Italians even built more than a 100 Autocannone even during 1941-43 (many of the total were SP 20mm AA guns) so this is not a huge ask.
Also more radios sooner

The problem with using infantry guns/howitzers as AT guns is simple ballistics. If you can increase the MV gun from 630m/s to 780m/s you can increase the effective range by about 150meters. Effective range being the distance you can expect a 1st round hit a good percentage of the time. This is governed by the time of flight and the fact that gravity is pulling the round/s downward at an increasing velocity with longer time. 9.8 meters per second squared so that in the first second of flight the shell drops 4.9 meters. In the second 2 second of flight the shell drops about 14.6 meters (in addition to first 4.9 meters) and in the 3rd second it drops 24.4 meters (in addition to the 19.5 meters of the first 2 seconds) for a total drop of 43.9 meters.
This is why using infantry/mountain guns at 1000 meters with MV of 350m/s shells doesn't work well. You have to aim over 40 meters over the top of the tank. You can kill the enemy tank with the 65-75mm howitzer but you have to let it get suicidality close (next tank is well within MG range of the defending gun/s) like 300 meters.
The increase penetration of the higher velocity gun is bonus over the 47/32.
Italians had run into the Soviet 45m guns in Spain. The Czechs were making a very nice 47mm gun. The Japanese started making a 47mm gun after their wars with the Soviets (a bit late for Italy) and the French were building a 47mm AT gun but they over did it a bit. Just under 1100kg for 47mm gun was not a good return on investment but the light Italian 47/32 was also not a good return on investment. It wouldn't do the job it needed to do.

The Italians needed to keep their scarce artillery further to the rear doing actual artillery jobs, not playing at being AT guns.

 

[TM06]

It seems to me that one of the best things the Italian army could have done in 1938-39 was to abandon the Cannone da 47/32 as a towed AT gun and as a tank gun and build/buy a more powerful 47mm gun. The 47/32 was nice mountain gun and/or infantry support gun, it was a crap AT gun which forced the forward deployment of 65mm and 75mm infantry guns/howitzers as ersatz AT guns of dubious efficiency. They scored some kills but perhaps a better weapon would have done better at lower cost (fewer crewmen killed).
The adoption of truck mounted guns in 1938/39 as cheap SP guns would also have paid benefits. I am not sure if the Italians even built more than a 100 Autocannone even during 1941-43 (many of the total were SP 20mm AA guns) so this is not a huge ask.
Also more radios sooner

The problem with using infantry guns/howitzers as AT guns is simple ballistics. If you can increase the MV gun from 630m/s to 780m/s you can increase the effective range by about 150meters. Effective range being the distance you can expect a 1st round hit a good percentage of the time. This is governed by the time of flight and the fact that gravity is pulling the round/s downward at an increasing velocity with longer time. 9.8 meters per second squared so that in the first second of flight the shell drops 4.9 meters. In the second 2 second of flight the shell drops about 14.6 meters (in addition to first 4.9 meters) and in the 3rd second it drops 24.4 meters (in addition to the 19.5 meters of the first 2 seconds) for a total drop of 43.9 meters.
This is why using infantry/mountain guns at 1000 meters with MV of 350m/s shells doesn't work well. You have to aim over 40 meters over the top of the tank. You can kill the enemy tank with the 65-75mm howitzer but you have to let it get suicidality close (next tank is well within MG range of the defending gun/s) like 300 meters.
The increase penetration of the higher velocity gun is bonus over the 47/32.
Italians had run into the Soviet 45m guns in Spain. The Czechs were making a very nice 47mm gun. The Japanese started making a 47mm gun after their wars with the Soviets (a bit late for Italy) and the French were building a 47mm AT gun but they over did it a bit. Just under 1100kg for 47mm gun was not a good return on investment but the light Italian 47/32 was also not a good return on investment. It wouldn't do the job it needed to do.

The Italians needed to keep their scarce artillery further to the rear doing actual artillery jobs, not playing at being AT guns.

Like E Elan Vital said earlier, Italy had more powerful 47 mm gun designs as early as 1934 in the 47/46 and 47/48 - ditching the 47/32 for those would have been the smarter play in the long run with the possibility of the 47/52 later on if they still need a low-to-medium calibre gun for light tanks and/or armoured cars.
As for the AT gun role I'm a bit stumped. The 50~57 mm range seems like the best choice for AT guns with the ZiS-2 being the zenith of that, but Italy never had anything in that calibre range. Perhaps they could have bored out a 47 mm gun to 57 mm?

 

[Airborne2001]

• Italy invests more heavily into welding technologies, supplanting the riveting used to make a majority of their tanks.

I learned recently that a big but relatively unknown reason behind the Ba.88s failure was actually because of the ineficiency of Bredas industrial capacity as an aircraft manufacturer (Perhaps the Italian Brewster?). The airframe was designed in a way that was waaaay to heavy. Had the design been more efficient, then the Ba.88 would've at least been a workable design. It still would've been a little underpowered, but moreso like an Italian Hs.129 and less like a late-1800s failed pioneer design.

 

[TM06]

I learned recently that a big but relatively unknown reason behind the Ba.88s failure was actually because of the ineficiency of Bredas industrial capacity as an aircraft manufacturer (Perhaps the Italian Brewster?). The airframe was designed in a way that was waaaay to heavy. Had the design been more efficient, then the Ba.88 would've at least been a workable design. It still would've been a little underpowered, but moreso like an Italian Hs.129 and less like a late-1800s failed pioneer design.

I think the Ba.88 would've been dead on arrival regardless for the simple fact that it was never going to work as a military aircraft. The design was fundamentally flawed from the start due to its concentric fuselage, and no amount of perceived efficiency gains could offset that.
If you want my opinion, the Ba.88 should've been tossed in the trash and the CR.25 should have been the one the RA should have focused on instead - that one actually had room to grow.

 

[Airborne2001]

I think the Ba.88 would've been dead on arrival regardless for the simple fact that it was never going to work as a military aircraft. The design was fundamentally flawed from the start due to its concentric fuselage, and no amount of perceived efficiency gains could offset that.
If you want my opinion, the Ba.88 should've been tossed in the trash and the CR.25 should have been the one the RA should have focused on instead - that one actually had room to grow.

This is part of what I mentioned with the airframe design. That being said, I do agree that a design like the CR.25 would've been way better.

Another idea would be to get the SM.88 to be a domestic aircraft instead of an export one:

It had two DB-601s, three 12.7mm machine guns (one was for a rear gunner), and could carry ~600kg of bombs. It first flew in 1939, and was also considered for Gnome-Rhone engines. The main issue, again, is that it was designed for export only. It would later evolve into the SM.91.

 

[tomo pauk]

Another idea would be to get the SM.88 to be a domestic aircraft instead of an export one:

A neat looking aircraft.
A bit of skepticism - is there a photo of a real aircraft anywhere? My google-fu is weak today.

 

[Airborne2001]

A neat looking aircraft.
A bit of skepticism - is there a photo of a real aircraft anywhere? My google-fu is weak today.

Not any more photos exist as I'm aware, and the only in person photos seem to be from this particular day:

If it helps, here is a thread from secretprojects.co.uk that features discussions of the aircraft:

Savoia-Marchetti SM 88

Is anyone got the photos or drawings of the SM88.I look in Google already but It doesn't have.

www.secretprojects.co.uk

While looking, I appear to have found a photo of another engine variation:

 

[Shortround6]

Not any more photos exist as I'm aware, and the only in person photos seem to be from this particular day:
View attachment 847453
If it helps, here is a thread from secretprojects.co.uk that features discussions of the aircraft:

Savoia-Marchetti SM 88

Is anyone got the photos or drawings of the SM88.I look in Google already but It doesn't have.

www.secretprojects.co.uk

While looking, I appear to have found a photo of another engine variation:
View attachment 847454

I believe this a version ( model?) of the SM.86 and not the SM.88. The SM.86 was a development of the SM.85.

Small wing and two 460hp 9 cylinder radials.
There were two SM.86 aircraft, one with a pointer nose and a pair of 600 hp Walter Sagitta inverted V-12 engines
and a second one with 540 hp Isotta Fraschini Gamma inverted V-12 engines.
The 2nd one may have had twin tails and more revisions to the cockpit/canopy.
These were all small aircraft with a single fuselage.

The SM.88 was somewhat larger and used two booms and a center fuselage (a bit bigger than a P-38).
A stepping stone to the SM.91

Problem with all of them is the lack of suitable engine produced in Italy and the lack of German supplied engines.

 

[SaparotRob]

I believe this a version ( model?) of the SM.86 and not the SM.88. The SM.86 was a development of the SM.85.

View attachment 848907
Small wing and two 460hp 9 cylinder radials.
There were two SM.86 aircraft, one with a pointer nose and a pair of 600 hp Walter Sagitta inverted V-12 engines
and a second one with 540 hp Isotta Fraschini Gamma inverted V-12 engines.
The 2nd one may have had twin tails and more revisions to the cockpit/canopy.
These were all small aircraft with a single fuselage.

The SM.88 was somewhat larger and used two booms and a center fuselage (a bit bigger than a P-38).
A stepping stone to the SM.91
View attachment 848908
Problem with all of them is the lack of suitable engine produced in Italy and the lack of German supplied engines.

A timely post. Rex's Hanger just release a video on the "Flying Banana".

 

[Shortround6]

The Fiat CR.25 may have had growth potential. What it did not have was engines.

The wing was a bit smaller than a Blenheim wing but the fuselage was a little bulkier.
total drag many have been close. With two Fiat engine of the type used the MC.200 single seat fighters it was supposed to hit 290mph.
With a pair of DB 601s it could have been a lot faster but it was still going to be slower than Bf 110 with the same engines so..................?