Certainly Goering, with his boast to supply by air Paulus Sixth Army at Stalingrad, did one of the fatal errors of the war, but the main fault was his or of his Chief that ordered to resist at any cost?
I essentially agree with you. Goering's destructive influence was often as a result of political factors, but to separate Goering's politics from Hitler's would be a tricky project
The Stalingrad airlift is another example where Goering is often cited as having been entirely to blame whereas the historical record would not show that to be quite correct. The popular narrative is informed by other senior German officers with their own agendas, writing post war about men who for rather obvious reasons could not defend themselves. For example Manstein wrote:
"I am unsure whether Goering's frivolous assurances to Hitler were due to a false appreciation of existing capabilities, or to a desperate need for admiration. Whatever the cause, Goering was to blame."
We should establish a timeline.
On 19th November Hitler, who was relaxing at the Berghof, received a telephone call from Zeitzler who informed him (some say Zeitzler was shouting down the line) that the Soviets had smashed the Rumanian front and that the Rumanians were in full flight. The situation, whilst serious was not regarded as critical.
On 20th November the Axis flank south of Stalingrad was also breached. Hitler realised at once that the Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies were in danger of encirclement. It is now that he ordered Manstein to stop his planned offensive operations and take command of "Army Group Don" which didn't amount to much in reality.
Jeschonnek arrived at the Berghof on this day. Goering was chairing an oil conference at Karinhall and could not attend. Hitler explained that 6th Army would probably be cut off within days. He had organised a new army group under Manstein and this would launch a relief effort as soon as possible. He hoped not only to free the 6th Army but to regain lost territory and rebuild a defensive line.
Jeschonnek,
understanding the 6th Army's encirclement to be temporary assured Hitler that if adequate airfields were maintained both inside and outside the pocket and bomber and transport aircraft were used hen the Luftwaffe could air lift sufficient supplies to the army.
With this assurance Hitler, who only two weeks earlier had announced that his forces had taken "that vitally important city....with Stalin's name" more or less committed to hold Stalingrad.
On the afternoon of 21st November he signalled Paulus, ordering him to stand firm:
"..despite the threat of temporary encirclement" As for the air lift "orders will follow".
So far Goering is not involved in this decision making process.
On 21st November it became clear to Luftwaffe commanders ( Richthofen, Fiebig and Pickert) that the 6th Army did not plan an immediate break out but was expecting to be supplied by air. Fiebig had spoken to Generalmajor Schmidt, the 6th Army's Chief of Staff and realised that both he and Paulus had embraced Hitler's idea of aerial re-supply.
Richthofen wrote in his diary on this day.
"Sixth Army believes it will be supplied by the air fleet in its hedgehog positions.... I make every effort to convince it that this cannot be accomplished..."
He made phone calls to anyone who he thought would listen. Zeitzler, Weichs (at HQ Army Group B), Jeschonnek and now certainly Goering in Berlin. He convinced some.
On 22nd November Weichs sent a message to the OKW. The prompt withdrawal of the 6th Army was essential because.
"The supply by air of the twenty divisions that constitute the army is not possible. With the air transport available and in favourable weather conditions, it is possible to carry in only one tenth of their essential daily requirements."
Within the pocket several Corps commanders took the same view. At a meeting without Paulus' knowledge Seydlich (51st Army Corps), Jaenicke (4th AC), Heitz (8th AC), Strecker (11th AC) and Hube (14th Panzer Corps) all agreed that a rapid break out was their only chance and even started regrouping for the operation.
Paulus, like Schmidt, was not persuaded by Richthofen and Fiebig. He vacillated throughout 22nd and 23rd November as the chances of a successful break out faded with every hour.
On the evening of the 23rd, in response to an order from Hitler to maintain defensive positions, Paulus finally responded by teletype that "timely and adequate supply has been ruled out" and he requested "freedom of decision".
On 24th Hitler, now back in East Prussia, told Paulus to stay where he was. The die was cast.
Why did Hitler make such a decision? The idea that "Fortress Stalingrad" could be resupplied by air was quite different to that which Jeschonnek had rashly assured the Fuhrer was possible. Jeschonnek had foreseen only a temporary operation to keep the encircled forces going until they were relieved. On the 23rd as Hitler travelled
by train from Berchtesgarten to East Prussia he had been unable to speak to men like Richthofen, Fiebig or Pickert whose air forces were expected to carry out the operation. During this critical period he was unable to speak to Weichs who shared their view. He was informed by an "overanxious" Zeitzler, second hand.
Hitler accused Zeitzler of being too pessimistic and listening to "defeatist commanders".
The Army commanders who accompanied Hitler (Keitel and Jodl) were in no position to make informed assessments. Keitel was typically sycophantic and Jodl optimistic, if qualified.
Jeschonnek now notified Hitler that he might have been too hasty in his assurances. He must surely have spoken with Richthofen by now. His volte-face carried no weight because Hitler replied that now not only did Keitel and Jodl agree that the 6th Army should stay but that his own superior
Reichsmarschall Goering had given his personal assurance that the Luftwaffe could meet the army's needs.
When did Goering give this crucial assurance?
Irving (in Goring) believes that Hitler first spoke to Goering about this on 21st November, a full day
after Jeschonnek made his rash promise and shortly
after Hitler had mentioned the air lift to Paulus.
This is supported by a recollection of a conversation between Hitler and Richthofen at the Wolf's Lair, noted in the latters diary on 11th February 1943. Hitler told Richthofen that he himself had promised the 6th Army that it would be supplied by air....
"without the Reichsmarschall's knowledge."
Goering later told Richthofen that still believing the 6th Army's encirclement to be temporary "he had played the optimist and supported the Fuhrer in his decision to stand fast there."
The decision making process descended into Nazi farce on the 22nd. Hitler asked Goering if he still supported the air lift and Goering assured him that it could be done. He later explained to Paul Korner (under secretary of state for the four year plan) that.
"Hitler already had Jeschonnek's papers before I set eyes on them. I could only say 'Mein Fuhrer, you have all the figures. If they are correct, then I place myself at your disposal."
The figures were wrong. The standard 25oKg and 1000Kg air supply containers did not carry that weight. They carried about 60% of that amount. The names were derived from the size of bomb that they replaced on the racks. Jeschonnek had compounded his earlier mistake and when he asked Goering to inform Hitler that their calculations were based on the wrong data he was told that it was too late.
On the 27th (not the 23rd as some believe), after the start of the airlift, the farce continued. We only have Zeitzler's version. He claimed to have spent some time attempting to convince Hitler that the air lift was impossible. Hitler sent for Goering and asked him directly if the 6th Army could be supplied by air. Goering said that it could be. Zeitzler asked Goering if he even knew what tonnage had to be flown in each day. Goering replied that he did not but that his staff officers did. Zeitler then gave his figures. The army needed a minimum of 300 tons each day. This equated to a minimum of 500 tons on every flying day.
"I can do that" Goering said
"Mein Fuhrer, that is a lie" Zeitzler replied.
It was all too late.
Who was to blame for the debacle of the Stalingrad air lift? First and foremost Hitler. He was supported in the decision by many including Jeschonnek, Paulus, Schmidt, Keitel and Jodl. Of course Goering must shoulder a significant responsibility too, but the blame is not entirely or exclusively his.
Steve