Fw-187 could have been German P-51?

[stona]

Men like Von Seeckt may have kept a spark of "military" aviation alive in the interwar period and before the Nazis came to power but without Goering there would have been no Luftwaffe to sent to Spain in 1936 or Poland in 1939.

There may have been Nazis in senior positions in all three arms of the Wermacht, but the Luftwaffe was a Nazi service which is something different.

Like Parsifal I'm no apologist for Nazism or Goering, but an unbalanced view based on populist caricatures of the Nazi leadership is not helpful.

I actually agree with DonL that Goering exerted a baleful and destructive influence over the Luftwaffe but to lay the blame for all its failures and shortcomings at his feet is far to simplistic.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Elmas]

------------------
I actually agree with DonL that Goering exerted a baleful and destructive influence over the Luftwaffe but to lay the blame for all its failures and shortcomings at his feet is far to simplistic.

Cheers

Steve

I agree but the "baleful and destructive influence over the Luftwaffe" was from Goering or from the CinC, Adolf HItler?

Far from me any simpaty for Goering, of course.......

Goering, in six years!, did a good job to raise a Luftwaffe practically from scratch, to train air and ground crews to a level of efficency that in 1939 was the best in the world, to develop machines and a doctrine of cooperation Army-Air Force that destroyed Poland and France and nearly defeated Russia.
It was completely unbelievable, in 1939, even among the most optimistic filo-Nazis, that German Panzerdivisionen could open France like a hot knife in the butter so that Hitler could spot Dover from Calais. At this point war turned from tactic into strategic, a war that Third Reich was not prepared to fight, much less could afford....

I've always read that silly things like "Baedeker Blitz" were Hitler's, and not Goering's, ideas, not to speak of the delays of the use Me 262 as interceptor. Certainly Goering, with his boast to supply by air Paulus Sixth Army at Stalingrad, did one of the fatal errors of the war, but the main fault was his or of his Chief that ordered to resist at any cost?

 

[stona]

Certainly Goering, with his boast to supply by air Paulus Sixth Army at Stalingrad, did one of the fatal errors of the war, but the main fault was his or of his Chief that ordered to resist at any cost?

I essentially agree with you. Goering's destructive influence was often as a result of political factors, but to separate Goering's politics from Hitler's would be a tricky project

The Stalingrad airlift is another example where Goering is often cited as having been entirely to blame whereas the historical record would not show that to be quite correct. The popular narrative is informed by other senior German officers with their own agendas, writing post war about men who for rather obvious reasons could not defend themselves. For example Manstein wrote:

"I am unsure whether Goering's frivolous assurances to Hitler were due to a false appreciation of existing capabilities, or to a desperate need for admiration. Whatever the cause, Goering was to blame."

We should establish a timeline.

On 19th November Hitler, who was relaxing at the Berghof, received a telephone call from Zeitzler who informed him (some say Zeitzler was shouting down the line) that the Soviets had smashed the Rumanian front and that the Rumanians were in full flight. The situation, whilst serious was not regarded as critical.

On 20th November the Axis flank south of Stalingrad was also breached. Hitler realised at once that the Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies were in danger of encirclement. It is now that he ordered Manstein to stop his planned offensive operations and take command of "Army Group Don" which didn't amount to much in reality.

Jeschonnek arrived at the Berghof on this day. Goering was chairing an oil conference at Karinhall and could not attend. Hitler explained that 6th Army would probably be cut off within days. He had organised a new army group under Manstein and this would launch a relief effort as soon as possible. He hoped not only to free the 6th Army but to regain lost territory and rebuild a defensive line.
Jeschonnek, understanding the 6th Army's encirclement to be temporary assured Hitler that if adequate airfields were maintained both inside and outside the pocket and bomber and transport aircraft were used hen the Luftwaffe could air lift sufficient supplies to the army.

With this assurance Hitler, who only two weeks earlier had announced that his forces had taken "that vitally important city....with Stalin's name" more or less committed to hold Stalingrad.
On the afternoon of 21st November he signalled Paulus, ordering him to stand firm:

"..despite the threat of temporary encirclement" As for the air lift "orders will follow".

So far Goering is not involved in this decision making process.

On 21st November it became clear to Luftwaffe commanders ( Richthofen, Fiebig and Pickert) that the 6th Army did not plan an immediate break out but was expecting to be supplied by air. Fiebig had spoken to Generalmajor Schmidt, the 6th Army's Chief of Staff and realised that both he and Paulus had embraced Hitler's idea of aerial re-supply.
Richthofen wrote in his diary on this day.

"Sixth Army believes it will be supplied by the air fleet in its hedgehog positions.... I make every effort to convince it that this cannot be accomplished..."

He made phone calls to anyone who he thought would listen. Zeitzler, Weichs (at HQ Army Group B), Jeschonnek and now certainly Goering in Berlin. He convinced some.

On 22nd November Weichs sent a message to the OKW. The prompt withdrawal of the 6th Army was essential because.

"The supply by air of the twenty divisions that constitute the army is not possible. With the air transport available and in favourable weather conditions, it is possible to carry in only one tenth of their essential daily requirements."

Within the pocket several Corps commanders took the same view. At a meeting without Paulus' knowledge Seydlich (51st Army Corps), Jaenicke (4th AC), Heitz (8th AC), Strecker (11th AC) and Hube (14th Panzer Corps) all agreed that a rapid break out was their only chance and even started regrouping for the operation.

Paulus, like Schmidt, was not persuaded by Richthofen and Fiebig. He vacillated throughout 22nd and 23rd November as the chances of a successful break out faded with every hour.

On the evening of the 23rd, in response to an order from Hitler to maintain defensive positions, Paulus finally responded by teletype that "timely and adequate supply has been ruled out" and he requested "freedom of decision".

On 24th Hitler, now back in East Prussia, told Paulus to stay where he was. The die was cast.

Why did Hitler make such a decision? The idea that "Fortress Stalingrad" could be resupplied by air was quite different to that which Jeschonnek had rashly assured the Fuhrer was possible. Jeschonnek had foreseen only a temporary operation to keep the encircled forces going until they were relieved. On the 23rd as Hitler travelled by train from Berchtesgarten to East Prussia he had been unable to speak to men like Richthofen, Fiebig or Pickert whose air forces were expected to carry out the operation. During this critical period he was unable to speak to Weichs who shared their view. He was informed by an "overanxious" Zeitzler, second hand.
Hitler accused Zeitzler of being too pessimistic and listening to "defeatist commanders".
The Army commanders who accompanied Hitler (Keitel and Jodl) were in no position to make informed assessments. Keitel was typically sycophantic and Jodl optimistic, if qualified.

Jeschonnek now notified Hitler that he might have been too hasty in his assurances. He must surely have spoken with Richthofen by now. His volte-face carried no weight because Hitler replied that now not only did Keitel and Jodl agree that the 6th Army should stay but that his own superior Reichsmarschall Goering had given his personal assurance that the Luftwaffe could meet the army's needs.
When did Goering give this crucial assurance?

Irving (in Goring) believes that Hitler first spoke to Goering about this on 21st November, a full day after Jeschonnek made his rash promise and shortly after Hitler had mentioned the air lift to Paulus.
This is supported by a recollection of a conversation between Hitler and Richthofen at the Wolf's Lair, noted in the latters diary on 11th February 1943. Hitler told Richthofen that he himself had promised the 6th Army that it would be supplied by air....

"without the Reichsmarschall's knowledge."

Goering later told Richthofen that still believing the 6th Army's encirclement to be temporary "he had played the optimist and supported the Fuhrer in his decision to stand fast there."

The decision making process descended into Nazi farce on the 22nd. Hitler asked Goering if he still supported the air lift and Goering assured him that it could be done. He later explained to Paul Korner (under secretary of state for the four year plan) that.

"Hitler already had Jeschonnek's papers before I set eyes on them. I could only say 'Mein Fuhrer, you have all the figures. If they are correct, then I place myself at your disposal."

The figures were wrong. The standard 25oKg and 1000Kg air supply containers did not carry that weight. They carried about 60% of that amount. The names were derived from the size of bomb that they replaced on the racks. Jeschonnek had compounded his earlier mistake and when he asked Goering to inform Hitler that their calculations were based on the wrong data he was told that it was too late.

On the 27th (not the 23rd as some believe), after the start of the airlift, the farce continued. We only have Zeitzler's version. He claimed to have spent some time attempting to convince Hitler that the air lift was impossible. Hitler sent for Goering and asked him directly if the 6th Army could be supplied by air. Goering said that it could be. Zeitzler asked Goering if he even knew what tonnage had to be flown in each day. Goering replied that he did not but that his staff officers did. Zeitler then gave his figures. The army needed a minimum of 300 tons each day. This equated to a minimum of 500 tons on every flying day.

"I can do that" Goering said

"Mein Fuhrer, that is a lie" Zeitzler replied.

It was all too late.

Who was to blame for the debacle of the Stalingrad air lift? First and foremost Hitler. He was supported in the decision by many including Jeschonnek, Paulus, Schmidt, Keitel and Jodl. Of course Goering must shoulder a significant responsibility too, but the blame is not entirely or exclusively his.

Steve

 

[Juha]

Excellent Steve
I'd like to add that Paulus and Schmidt played also one other critical part in the Stalingrad fiasco, they did next to nothing to improve airfields and landing strips inside the cauldron which would have been very important for increasing the amount of stuff the LW could be able to fly in.

And generally, infights are part of life in very large organizations, look e.g. the FC in late 1940.

 

[GregP]

As one who digresses frequently, I can't throw stones, but this is related to the Fw 187 how? Sounds like good fodder for a dedicated thread.

 

[GrauGeist]

As one who digresses frequently, I can't throw stones, but this is related to the Fw 187 how? Sounds like good fodder for a dedicated thread.

It's actually connected to the Fw187 and a good many other promising aircraft that the leadership looked over for various reasons.

Animosity between manufacturers fueled by favoritism at the top doomed many projects to the back-burner or obscurity when they could have taken center stage and produced results that the Luftwaffe desperately needed.

 

[GregP]

I can see that. If they had proceeded with the Fw 187 and reduced Bf 110 production, then the result might have been beneficial to the Luftwaffe.

Never mind the post above!

 

[GrauGeist]

In retrospect, Greg, there were quite a few aircraft that the Luftwaffe would have benefitted by, had the leadershiptaken a pro-active hand in.

The long-range strategic bomber program would have certainly altered the timeline (Bomber A aka Ural Bomber program).

Not demanding that all medium bombers having dive-bombing capabilities would have been a real boost in potential aircraft types that were hindered otherwise by the dive-bombing requirement.

Recognizing the potential for jet engined aircraft (and appreciating that the He280 would use kerosene, not gasoline) and immediately funding the engine research and production for the Jumo, Hirth and BMW engine programs when first introduced.

Recognizing the potential in the Fw187, the Ar240, the He280, the He100, the Ta154 and He219 to name just a few.

These are some examples, there were many other situations like this throughout the other branches of their service, hindering their military's ability to operate efficiently.

 

[stona]

Recognizing the potential in the Fw187, the Ar240, the He280, the He100, the Ta154 and He219 to name just a few.

These are some examples, there were many other situations like this throughout the other branches of their service, hindering their military's ability to operate efficiently.

Some of those were recognised, certainly the He 219 and the Ar 240 keep appearing in RLM discussions. The problem was that the Germans had limited and ever diminishing resources, both skilled labour and materiel, in the latter half of the war. It would have been wonderful for them if they could have tried to develop several of the aircraft which they were unable to do. They would have liked to enjoy the luxury of some failures, without dire consequences. They simply did not have the wherewithal to do it. It's one of the reasons that they lost the war.
The US squandered billions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of man hours and tons of materiel on aircraft projects, some of which never flew. They could afford to do it. The Germans could not and that puts a lot more pressure on the decision makers. It tends to lead to conservative or seemingly safe options being taken. It's surprising that the Germans did develop such remarkable aircraft at all.
Cheers
Steve

 

[N4521U]

Sure................


if it had been built by North American!

 

[Shortround6]

The long-range strategic bomber program would have certainly altered the timeline (Bomber A aka Ural Bomber program).

Not really. 400 Ural bombers or 800 He 111s?

And Ural bombers without long range escorts and long range navigation systems ( the beam systems were limited in range) are going to do what the RAF did in the early part of the war. Swan about the country side and bomb the wrong cities, assuming they can find a city.

Not demanding that all medium bombers having dive-bombing capabilities would have been a real boost in potential aircraft types that were hindered otherwise by the dive-bombing requirement.

This one is spot on. A major blunder.

Recognizing the potential for jet engined aircraft (and appreciating that the He280 would use kerosene, not gasoline) and immediately funding the engine research and production for the Jumo, Hirth and BMW engine programs when first introduced.

This has possibilities but is not a sure thing.

Recognizing the potential in the Fw187, the Ar240, the He280, the He100, the Ta154 and He219 to name just a few.

The He 100 was a dead end. It had very little potential. It's potential would have to wait until mid 1941 because of the armament situation. And it's ability to mount more armament is limited. A single cannon + 2-4 mg fighter was NOT what the Luftwaffe needed in 1943 either.

 

[GregP]

I like the He 100, assuming a normal radiator and not an evaporative cooling system.

I'd mount 2 or 3 cannons and no machine guns. But, that doesn't mean it would have been a success.

It probably should have had the chance for at least a small production run, though, from the German viewpoint.

 

[DonL]

Apropos Wever himself canceld the Ural Bomber before his death and worked out the Bomber A program, but without dive bombing.
Imagine a He 177 production ready at 1940/1941 with four gondulas and four seperate engines.

I agree totaly to the issue dive-bombing.
Perhaps at the Ju 88 it would make sense to devide the production, for a fast medium bomber aka night fighter and the ability to dive bomb for a heavy destroyer and Navy support a/c (torpedo bomber and Stuka). THis was also happened in real live with the Ju 88 G1.
For the Do 217 no dive bombing ability.

I agree with SR6 to the He 100 and also the Arado 240 had difficult issues through her very tricky/bad flight characteristics. Also I didn't see the Arado as a long range escort fighter, she was a total other concept as the FW 187, which I see as the only LW long range escort fighter till the Ta 152H-10, which wasn't a paper design.

The He 219 and Ta 154 were both only night fighter developments, but with a fast Ju 88 level medium bomber (without dive bombing abilitys) at 1939/40, I think there would be a very good base for a nightfighter from the beginning.

 

[pattern14]

There were a number of Luft 4 engine bomber projects that could have been a successful alternative to the He 177, but for one reason or another, they didn't materialise. They simply didn't figure into the Nazi strategy of the late 1930's, and were given no priority, much like the the Jet fighter programme. An alternative fighter to the Bf 109 was not considered seriously either in 1939, as the Spanish civil war had proved their superiority to the opposition. The war in Europe was never intended to last as long as it did, and the Third Reich was convinced that no more advanced aircraft would be necessary to achieve their goals. Like most of Heinkels designs, the He 187 never progressed past the waste of resources stage. The FW190, in all its forms, was always the best piston engine aircraft the Germans had, and would have always been a superior all rounder compared to the He 187 ( or He 100 etc). As far as claiming the P51 was responsible for clearing the Luftwaffe from the skies in 1944, it was the lack of effectively trained pilots, resources, and bad management that killed the Luftwaffe. What ever superiority the P51 had came far behind its superiority in numbers, and pilots with many hundreds of training hours, under far more conducive conditions. They were also were not sabotaged by forced labour. The P47 and Tempest were considered a more deadly enemy than the P51 by a number of German pilots accounts.

 

[Juha]

... An alternative fighter to the Bf 109 was not considered seriously either in 1939, as the Spanish civil war had proved their superiority to the opposition. The war in Europe was never intended to last as long as it did, and the Third Reich was convinced that no more advanced aircraft would be necessary to achieve their goals...

Eh, the RLM asked designs for a new fighter in 1937 and the Fw 190 V1 flew its maiden flight during summer 1939. And Messerschmitt AG got a development contract for a jet fighter in late 1938.

 

[pattern14]

Eh, the RLM asked designs for a new fighter in 1937 and the Fw 190 V1 flew its maiden flight during summer 1939. And Messerschmitt AG got a development contract for a jet fighter in late 1938.

I'm happy to be wrong, but I thought it was for a supplementary fighter, and not a replacement for the Bf 109. The Fw 190 had its fair share of teething troubles, and was not made reliable enough to be operational until 1941. As for the Me 262, it was not given priority, and as far as I know only an order for 3 were to be built as experimentals. The disinterest in Jets shown by the powers that be in the Third Reich parallels that of the British. It was only as things dragged out and deteriorated that the Jet fighter programme got really underway

 

[OldSkeptic]

There were a number of Luft 4 engine bomber projects that could have been a successful alternative to the He 177, but for one reason or another, they didn't materialise. They simply didn't figure into the Nazi strategy of the late 1930's, and were given no priority, much like the the Jet fighter programme. An alternative fighter to the Bf 109 was not considered seriously either in 1939, as the Spanish civil war had proved their superiority to the opposition. The war in Europe was never intended to last as long as it did, and the Third Reich was convinced that no more advanced aircraft would be necessary to achieve their goals. Like most of Heinkels designs, the He 187 never progressed past the waste of resources stage. The FW190, in all its forms, was always the best piston engine aircraft the Germans had, and would have always been a superior all rounder compared to the He 187 ( or He 100 etc). As far as claiming the P51 was responsible for clearing the Luftwaffe from the skies in 1944, it was the lack of effectively trained pilots, resources, and bad management that killed the Luftwaffe. What ever superiority the P51 had came far behind its superiority in numbers, and pilots with many hundreds of training hours, under far more conducive conditions. They were also were not sabotaged by forced labour. The P47 and Tempest were considered a more deadly enemy than the P51 by a number of German pilots accounts.

Good points overall, but don't be too hard on the P-51. It delivered the coup de gras to the Luftwaffe. The hard worked and suffering P-38s, plus the ;ater longer ranged P-47s carried the 'heavy load' of the first part of the destruction of the Luftwaffe in late '43 through early 44. The Germans Twins (mostly 110s, though some 88s and 410s) were cleared form the skies by them, which were critical for the Luftwaffe's tactics in winning the 2 air wars over Germany in late 43 (against the USAAF and the RAF). Once they were gone they were left with the 109, insufficient guns against the US bombers (and if they were added terrible performance) and the 190As, which had the guns, but had insufficient high altitude performance. The Germans paid a terrible price for their poor high altitude engine development.

Where the Mustang was critical was that the Luftwaffe had pulled back, yes leaving areas like most of the Ruhr vulnerable, but many things, especially the oil refineries and coal to oil plants were still out of range of the escorts. and the Germans could inflict terrible losses on those bombers who tried.

The Mustang had that range and it's performance was superior, at those altitudes, to anything the Germans had at the time. Plus, it's range was so good that they could (and did) chase the Luftwaffe right back to their bases, giving no respite at all.There was no, up and hit the escorts/bombers, then disengage and get back refuel/reload and then do the same. It was up and hit the escorts/bombers, then get chased all the way back... Then, if you got back at all, you had to face getting through a gauntlet after that refuel/reload, even before you got close to the bombers (though German tactics in that mid-late 44 period were woeful which aided the escorts job immensely).

The Mustang was not an 'uber plane', just very, very good and had terrific range (aided by good planning and tactics of course thanks to Doolittle who, after Park, I put as the finest air tactician of the western air forces).

 

[stona]

coup de grace .........'gras' is something rather different, as in 'foie gras', which I quite like.

And yes, the P-51 was a very good aeroplane and it had exceptional range which certainly dealt a decisive blow to Luftwaffe morale, if not the Luftwaffe itself. The crucial points are that it could get to where it needed to be and compete.

Cheers

Steve

 

[DonL]

There were a number of Luft 4 engine bomber projects that could have been a successful alternative to the He 177, but for one reason or another, they didn't materialise. They simply didn't figure into the Nazi strategy of the late 1930's, and were given no priority, much like the the Jet fighter programme. An alternative fighter to the Bf 109 was not considered seriously either in 1939, as the Spanish civil war had proved their superiority to the opposition.

Please can you name other then the He 177, Do 19 and Ju 89 and both the Ju 89 and Do 19 were Ural Bomber requirements and compare to the layout of the He 177 old fashioned.
Also do you realy think, that a significant better single engine fighter was possible with the DB 601,605 and Jumo 211 engines as the Bf 109?
Does it make sense to develop an other single engine fighter a/c with the same engine?
I have written this several times in this forum, the major mistake was 1937/38 with the advertisement of the Bomber B and a 2000PS engine.
There was no natural development from 1938-1941 of the normal DB 601/Jumo 211 engines to the next upgrade DB 603/Jumo 213, instead the LW supported the Jumo 222 and DB 604X.
The Bomber B program and the engine requirements costs 3-4 years development time for the DB 603 and Jumo 213.

Like most of Heinkels designs, the He 187 never progressed past the waste of resources stage. The FW190, in all its forms, was always the best piston engine aircraft the Germans had, and would have always been a superior all rounder compared to the He 187 ( or He 100 etc). As far as claiming the P51 was responsible for clearing the Luftwaffe from the skies in 1944, it was the lack of effectively trained pilots, resources, and bad management that killed the Luftwaffe. What ever superiority the P51 had came far behind its superiority in numbers, and pilots with many hundreds of training hours, under far more conducive conditions. They were also were not sabotaged by forced labour. The P47 and Tempest were considered a more deadly enemy than the P51 by a number of German pilots accounts.

With He 187 and think you mean the FW 187 from Focker Wulf?

If so I disagree with your opinion. The FW 187 was a twin engine fighter/light destroyer which had a formidable aerodynamic and promised much more speed then the FW 190 and Bf 109 and much more agility then the FW 190, equal to the Bf 109.
From the data sheets the Fw 187 was to my opinion much more promising then the P 38.
To my opinion she would be lighter, much faster and would had much less wing loading, with ordinary DB 605 engines and the punch of 4 x 151 canons.

I agree about your analyse about the training of the LW pilots, but also here the Bf 109 was not a good a/c for rookies.
The Bf 109 was a bitch to fly, especially at high speeds and since 1943 lacked a lot of level speed against her enemys.
The Bf 109 was a pure energy fighter, but since 1943 with no advantage to escape through speed.
At the hands of experts, she was a deadly weapon, if the pilot had the advantage of the position and could dictate the fight through dive and climb, once the Bf 109 was sqeezed in a fast vertical fight she was dead mead!
Here I see the big advantage of the FW 187 for rookies, through the promised speed, if the position of the fight is bad, she would have had the advantage through a very high level speed to escape against a P 51 and P 47

 

[Juha]

I'm happy to be wrong, but I thought it was for a supplementary fighter, and not a replacement for the Bf 109. The Fw 190 had its fair share of teething troubles, and was not made reliable enough to be operational until 1941. As for the Me 262, it was not given priority, and as far as I know only an order for 3 were to be built as experimentals. The disinterest in Jets shown by the powers that be in the Third Reich parallels that of the British. It was only as things dragged out and deteriorated that the Jet fighter programme got really underway

Yes, 190 were to be used alongside 109, butwhat was wrong with that, and 1941 wasn't a problem, in 1941 109F was the best short range SE fighter in the world. The order for 20 future Me 262s was given on 31 Jan 40. The numbers fluctuated it was 20 protos and 15 pre-production in late 40, dropped to 5 protos and 20 pre-production in summer 41. Only after the fiasco of the first jet flight, when the both BMW jet-engines failed and the 262 V1 was only saved by the earlier decision to keep the Jumo 210G in the nose the order dropped to 5 protos until a successful jet flight was made. Then the orders went up again and the Me 262 got the highest priority in Dec 42.