drgondog
Major
I printed a letter in my book, from Galland dated March 1984, and have another that I received from him in September,1985 in reply to the question. "what reall effect did the introduction of the Mustang have on Luftwaffe operations?"
I will summarize his words (Some direct quotes, some combined) to the second letter because they largely compliment the first. BTW the letter in Angels, Bulldogs and Dragons was a very thoughtful collaboration between Toliver and Galland on my behalf (Letter written to Toliver to answer my question regarding effect of combining long range with high performance escort fighter and enabling them to break away from the bombers to aggressively attack the LW).
Summary
"They (Mustangs and Thunderbolts) cut the heart out of the experienced fighter pilot arm - not just single engine but also the twins that we pressed into service hurting our effectiveness against RAF. We lost far too many old hands in the winter and spring of 1944 to ever be able to achieve air superiority again".
"The American AF attacks on our petroleum industry were the fatal blow making it impossible to train fighter pilots sufficiently to prepare them for the onslaught - presuming we could train them unmolested by Mustangs far enough away from England and Italy bases.
"The unshackling of the 8th AF fighters, particularly the Mustang, from close support, effectively created nighmares for us in planning, assembling and climbing to sufficient altitude to at least enable diving attacks in sufficient force to overwhelm local escorts. The roaming fighters shot up our airfields, killed our pilots taking off and landing, killed our students and caused frequent shortages of aircraft for local units. The effect was decreasing morale. The time to Split S and dive down (Abschwung) was present.We increasingly moved our units further North and South - which made it difficult to form and attack in large numbers anywhere."
"The best answer and countermeasure would have been to have the Me262 flown by only our best fighters we had at the time"
I intend to publish both letters in the revision.
All of the above dialogues because I wanted to better understand from a well respected LW Officer, the contribution of P-51s roaming at will east of Berlin, south of Munich. A lot of 355th FG pilots died strafing German airfields - incented by duty but also by 'acedom' because 8th AF decided to accord a German aircraft destroyed on the ground the same as in the air.
One man's opinion, even Galland's is not enough to make the case about the effectiveness of the LW after April (or May or Pick One) but he did have a responsibility and ultimately fired from his job by Der Fuhrer for not solving the problem. Make your own judgement - I respect your point of view
Regards,
Bill
I will summarize his words (Some direct quotes, some combined) to the second letter because they largely compliment the first. BTW the letter in Angels, Bulldogs and Dragons was a very thoughtful collaboration between Toliver and Galland on my behalf (Letter written to Toliver to answer my question regarding effect of combining long range with high performance escort fighter and enabling them to break away from the bombers to aggressively attack the LW).
Summary
"They (Mustangs and Thunderbolts) cut the heart out of the experienced fighter pilot arm - not just single engine but also the twins that we pressed into service hurting our effectiveness against RAF. We lost far too many old hands in the winter and spring of 1944 to ever be able to achieve air superiority again".
"The American AF attacks on our petroleum industry were the fatal blow making it impossible to train fighter pilots sufficiently to prepare them for the onslaught - presuming we could train them unmolested by Mustangs far enough away from England and Italy bases.
"The unshackling of the 8th AF fighters, particularly the Mustang, from close support, effectively created nighmares for us in planning, assembling and climbing to sufficient altitude to at least enable diving attacks in sufficient force to overwhelm local escorts. The roaming fighters shot up our airfields, killed our pilots taking off and landing, killed our students and caused frequent shortages of aircraft for local units. The effect was decreasing morale. The time to Split S and dive down (Abschwung) was present.We increasingly moved our units further North and South - which made it difficult to form and attack in large numbers anywhere."
"The best answer and countermeasure would have been to have the Me262 flown by only our best fighters we had at the time"
I intend to publish both letters in the revision.
All of the above dialogues because I wanted to better understand from a well respected LW Officer, the contribution of P-51s roaming at will east of Berlin, south of Munich. A lot of 355th FG pilots died strafing German airfields - incented by duty but also by 'acedom' because 8th AF decided to accord a German aircraft destroyed on the ground the same as in the air.
One man's opinion, even Galland's is not enough to make the case about the effectiveness of the LW after April (or May or Pick One) but he did have a responsibility and ultimately fired from his job by Der Fuhrer for not solving the problem. Make your own judgement - I respect your point of view
Regards,
Bill