German aces-post 1944

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I printed a letter in my book, from Galland dated March 1984, and have another that I received from him in September,1985 in reply to the question. "what reall effect did the introduction of the Mustang have on Luftwaffe operations?"

I will summarize his words (Some direct quotes, some combined) to the second letter because they largely compliment the first. BTW the letter in Angels, Bulldogs and Dragons was a very thoughtful collaboration between Toliver and Galland on my behalf (Letter written to Toliver to answer my question regarding effect of combining long range with high performance escort fighter and enabling them to break away from the bombers to aggressively attack the LW).

Summary
"They (Mustangs and Thunderbolts) cut the heart out of the experienced fighter pilot arm - not just single engine but also the twins that we pressed into service hurting our effectiveness against RAF. We lost far too many old hands in the winter and spring of 1944 to ever be able to achieve air superiority again".

"The American AF attacks on our petroleum industry were the fatal blow making it impossible to train fighter pilots sufficiently to prepare them for the onslaught - presuming we could train them unmolested by Mustangs far enough away from England and Italy bases.

"The unshackling of the 8th AF fighters, particularly the Mustang, from close support, effectively created nighmares for us in planning, assembling and climbing to sufficient altitude to at least enable diving attacks in sufficient force to overwhelm local escorts. The roaming fighters shot up our airfields, killed our pilots taking off and landing, killed our students and caused frequent shortages of aircraft for local units. The effect was decreasing morale. The time to Split S and dive down (Abschwung) was present.We increasingly moved our units further North and South - which made it difficult to form and attack in large numbers anywhere."

"The best answer and countermeasure would have been to have the Me262 flown by only our best fighters we had at the time"

I intend to publish both letters in the revision.

All of the above dialogues because I wanted to better understand from a well respected LW Officer, the contribution of P-51s roaming at will east of Berlin, south of Munich. A lot of 355th FG pilots died strafing German airfields - incented by duty but also by 'acedom' because 8th AF decided to accord a German aircraft destroyed on the ground the same as in the air.

One man's opinion, even Galland's is not enough to make the case about the effectiveness of the LW after April (or May or Pick One) but he did have a responsibility and ultimately fired from his job by Der Fuhrer for not solving the problem. Make your own judgement - I respect your point of view

Regards,

Bill
 
My judgement was decided many many years ago... Those same words that Galland spoke of to Bill are facts that have been around for decades.... Nice to have it in his handwriting of course...

No matter how good a pilot was, when being attacked by 4 Mustangs, if u dont have ur wingman on ur @ss, ur done, and even sometimes that wasnt enough...

The other thing to keep in mind when talking about under-trained replacement pilots are the former bomber pilots and twinners that were re-trained as single engine fighter pilots....

"OK Heinz, this is ur first mission in a Focke Wulf... Stay with ur element leader and attack the bombers when he does..."

"What happens if the Mustangs bounce us??"

"Ever use ur parachute before???"

Many many formerally trained pilots were blotted from the sky in those waning months of 44, including some RK winners from their bomber days......
 
hmmmmmmmmm bomber boys to fighter boys, sounds like JG 301 to me and the jet units KG(J) 51 and 54 with the 262 which were slaughtered with ease
 
Dan - you are right of course... I went into a long winded discussion about this very topic just now in the Mustang vs 109/190 thread. It lays out all the reasons I think Jan1 1944 through April, 1944 was the most crucial in the air battles and changing Luftwaffe from the hunter to the hunted..

My premise (and not novel but also not universally agreed either) is that few Mustangs defeated many 109/190/110/410's over the targets that were being attacked by 8th BC but not protected over target until 51s.

the 354(9th) started it with cantakerous 51's on 11 Jan, the the 357 in mid Feb and the 4th in late Feb and then the 355th in early March and finally the 352Fg in early April. They, plus the 20th, 55th and 364th in 38's were all the 8th had for Target support to three bomb divisions. Very few to support very many - against many over the target area.

The 47s could only play when the LW was bold about attacking on the Dutch/German border through the Munster and Dummer Lake area - after that they had to turn back while those nasty 51 jocks had all the fun

So, until so many were shot down in the Target area, heretofore a protected but dangerous hunting preserve (think of B-17s as a Cape), there were plenty of experienced Hans and Fritz' that were great hunters and lions among Buffs.

But faster stronger lions came forth and slew many of the weaker lions even though the weaker lions were many, soon to be few... I know I am going overboard on this subject - but the Mustang over Target would have been an endangered species if it was the 'weaker' lion.

Erich could be right that maybe June/July is a better barometer - but Galland was sure he lost way too many experienced guys in the West before May and forced to pull from Ost Front, South, Bomber pilots, and transport pilot pools to put butts in the seat - and reduce hours in training.

The graveyard spiral got deeper because the 51s weren't just meeting the LW at 26,000 feet - they were everywhere and busy eating all the women and children so that weaker lions were the future product even though Hans Jr and son of Fritz got better 109s and 190s.

By the time this happened the nasty, ugly hybrid Cape Buffalo (ugly and fat and mean but fast - kind of like you) called the P-47 could now also hunt on the preserve and eating their fair share of the women and kids and cousins and grandpas - and it was truly over - when ever you want to say it was over

Thus the fable of the wily Mustang as told by the winners.. magnanimous in historical perspective but cocky to the end -

Regards as Always

Bill
 
the nasty, ugly hybrid Cape Buffalo (ugly and fat and mean but fast - kind of like you) called the P-47 could now also hunt on the preserve
Hey now, fat I am not... Im 6'6" tall and weigh in at a ripped 225 lbs... I can rip a mans throat out in one grasp, paralyze ur entire left side with 2 fingers and run 10 miles with 75 pounds on my back...

And I have it on good accord that I am one handsome sexy bastardo....
 
Excellent post drgondog, but could it be possible that there might be something to what both you and Erich are discussing?

As Galland stated from your post..."The unshackling of the 8th AF fighters, particularly the Mustang, from close support, effectively created nighmares for us in planning, assembling and climbing to sufficient altitude to at least enable diving attacks in sufficient force to overwhelm local escorts. The roaming fighters shot up our airfields, killed our pilots taking off and landing, killed our students and caused frequent shortages of aircraft for local units. The effect was decreasing morale. The time to Split S and dive down (Abschwung) was present.We increasingly moved our units further North and South - which made it difficult to form and attack in large numbers anywhere"

Ok, so now you've got a fairly decent fighter force to go against the heavies, but with the 51s, free from escort and working over the continent like a pack of bees, you're losing the new men and machines and resources.

But once up and able to form, you become that terrible force that can do some damage, as Erich outlined in some attacks in Sept. to Dec. 1944.

I don't think the LW was done in by the summer of 44 but it sure as hell was being slashed at and by the time of the new year 45, you could kindof say, it gave up from exhaustion.

Which may be the point of your opinion. I think the LW was still aforce to be dealt with at least into early 1945 before it became totally spent and wasted.
 
I have on good authority that SEALs were considered inadequate wrt lovers and that PIR tpes were preferred. Are you telling me thsi is Untrune?Oh heart be still

I just csnt't believe this. BTW` my jumpmaster in 64 wa the Bragg NCO that that intercepted the collect call from that pitiful SEAL team at Granada when the poor miserable squid called to Bragg (collect) and asked for a fire control mission.

That miserable POS could do 600 squat jumps

Regards,

Bill
 
To use the word pitiful is not appropriate....

This mission, part of Operation Urgent Fury, is often given a bad rap for the lack of communication and the SEALs using the telephone to call air support from Bragg.... What it was, though, was a poorly conceived operation (senior, non-special operations types planned most of these goat-ropes) conducted during daylight with inadequate intelligence on the enemy forces..... The communications by land-line showed the ingenuity and flexibility of the SEALs, and their ingrained training to do whatever the heck it takes to get the job done - even if it means unusual or unconventional tactics or actions..... SEALs are not designed to fight sustained battles.... Get in, get out quickly without alerting anyone and get out of Dodge....

They held that mansion for over 24 hours....

Also, their close air support Cobras were shot down by AA fire.... What would u do Bill, call ur Mommy and say goodbye I love u??? 3 Marines died in those Cobras....

And Dont forget about the 4 SEALs who died during the Salinas beacon placement mission, MM1 Kenny Butcher, QM1 Kevin Lundbergh, HT1 Stephen Morris and ENCS Robert Schamberger....
 
Whoa Dan.. I meant no disrespect to the team. Period.

And apologies to you for my (not well thought out) use of the phrase 'pitiful' which was ONLY in refernce to fouled up communications - not the ability or the courage of anybody there.

This was teasing in a no tease zone!
 
personally concerning Galland the man was totally out of tune in mid to late 1944. He really had no clues about the Sturmgruppen in fact one letter I have seen in the German he thought the rear attacks and get in close with the bombers as suicidal...............well Addi it was of things to come, both the bombers and the heavy Fw's were going to feel the pain in a "new" type of aerial warfare.

he was over the hill in my opinion even when he flew the Me 262 in JV 44 that he wanted to create, on a personal level after seeing what JG 7 was accomplishing and with his state in such a high ranking in the Luftwaffe but thought of a bad sore by "Fatty", the guy wanted to fly the fast Schwalbe before wars end which he knew full well was coming

just my 2 cento's..........still think that Normandie was the final back-breaker the Luftwaffe in all it's silliness trying to protect the French regions when they should of really bolstered up their Reich defense measures around their vaunted industrial and city complexes instead of purely wasting precious metal and human life
 
Erich - your two cento's are worth as much as mine.

On Normandie there are two things to consider

First, the LW inflicted the worst punishment ever to the 4th FG (twice - June 6 and August 18) and the 353rd (June 12) during that period and the 355th (lost 4 air to air for a tie on June7) . 'Course they had their eyes on the ground in front and weren't looking for those sneaky devils high and behind.

Second factor of interest - they were meeting EVERYBODY over France. Nobody was out of range including the Tempests, the Typhoons, the Spits, the Poles, the French, Jugs, Lightnings (in best element) and Mustangs.

Proportionately they fought against the worst odds of the war during that campaign.

I don't know this answer - did the LW lose more fighter pilots June-August as they did March through May? And did they lose more experienced pilots than the March-May cycle?

Jes Curious

Bill
 
Bill I was looking over just one units Bf 109G-6 losses and that of III./JG 3. what an absolute slaughter..........the Gruppenkommandeur and I am going from memory as I closed the book a bit ago, but I think he and one other pilot were the only ones left to form up the new III. gruppe in late summer/fall of 44, all others severely wounded in action and or killed over Normandie.

III./JG 54 although nearly blown off the planet put in the top scores for all of the Luftw. day fighter units with 100 claims over Normandie country, and I even think during the June-August time frame several of the aces in the gruppe scored 4 kills on single days. Will have to do a double check on that

Flying Fw 190A-8's III./JG 54 ace Emil Lang shot down 4 P-51's on June 20, 1944 over Dreux and L'Aigle
 
Alls good Bill, thanks for the PM.... Gotta agree with u on point 2 of ur post... There were enemy aircraft everywhere, and many experienced pilots were gang slaughtered by those roving packs...

Erich, I have to concur with what u put in up above.... III./JG 54 was nearly obliterated over Normanie, and their total claims shows just how heavy they were in it...
 
Erich - as I recall, several 109's from III./JG3 went down on 28 July. Is there confirmation of all the locations for those ships? I've often wondered if one Staffeln went east a couple of days earlier as the Gruppe started to leave France.

It was JG11 that shot down Yellow Flight of 357FS on July 7, thinkin' it may have been JG 5 that got 353rd, and JG26 and JG3 that got 4th on 18 August but not at all certain, and unclear which outfit which hurt 4th on D-Day

Off topic but JG3 may have been the 355th's 'Bitch' as that Gruppen took serious losses from 355 on 24 April and 16 August to name a couple of days, then 300 and 301 after them. I have no clue who put the hurt on them in the Normandie unpleasantness.

The 355 did NOT have a winning record against JG26 but as near as I can tell did against everyone else.
 
8 Bf 109G-6's lost from III./JG 3, one of them 25km west of Argentan the others there is no info given as places are unknown. In the area of Argentan two other Bf 109G-6's were lost from attached 7./JG 52

From the 29th of July through August 12 there were 50 losses in the Gruppe and an additional 15 Bf 109G-6's lost in ground attack on August 7, 44 at the airfield at Chartres. the Gruppe stayed within France till first week of September 44 losing another 50 a/c from the 12 August till September 5th

crazy
 
The reason I asked is still trying to match a face and place to 28 July Mulhausen award for the old man. Of the 6 109s that bounced the B-24s near Mulhausen they got one of them according the history (seen to blow up) and dad chased the leader into the ground

But can't find a LW 'loss' that matches that location for either of the 109's.

Also McElroy certainly shot down Hirshfeld (only Mustang/Fw190 claim/award/loss match on that date and time) plus another unidentified 109 from an unidentified unit in the same point.

III./JG3 is the only outfit that reported 109s that seem to make sense as a possibility.

Oh well

Did you get my note about Caldwell?
 
uh oh more flys in the ointment my friend...........for July 28,44, there were 32 Bf 109G-6's flying from JG 302 and JG 27. they were soon vectored south while the SturmFw's of JG 300 stayed on course protected by 15 109G-6's of I./JG 300 flying a 1000 ft higher. In fact the only recognized kill for JG 300 this date was from a Bf 109G-6 pilot who shot down a B-17 north of Naumburg at 10.12hrs.
As you said ace Hirschfeld was shot down and bailed out but his chute did not open and also ace Gerhard Bärsdorf who had 10 kills to his credit.

I./JG 3 lost 6 Bf 109G-6/AS in aerial combat but places are unknown and no times. I./JG 302 shot down B-17's and B-24's plus a P-51 between Hof and Neustadt in Bavaria. It appears that 2 Bf 109G-6's from 1st and 2./JG 302 were lost to P-51's.

and yes thanks for the note about Don, etc......... :D
 
What of the Kassel raid of Sept 27, 1944? Read the month: SEPTEMBER, the ninth month of the year.

A 38 strong heavy bomber formation (USAAF) got nearly annihilated when the Sturmböck kids torched 34 of them in a matter of few minutes (38 heavies, 34 destroyed: 380 men in the formation, 340 which did not return, most of them killed).

Could a "band of kids hardly capable of making it airborne" have ever achieved such a masterful level of destruction?

That is just an isolated case of course; still it helps contradicting the allied fairy tale.

Hi,
A few inaccuracies in the allied losses in this post. 39 heavies were sent out, 1 blew a tire on take-off, 3 aborted. 35 made it over Germany when they got hit by the Luftwaffe. 29 crashed--25 of them over the Eisenach area. 29 German fighters crashed also, plus one American P-51. 336 men from the 445th Bomb Group participated in this battle. 117 were killed. 99 were POW's. My father was one of the B-24 pilots to make it back to England. We miss you, Eric. You have not been on our membership roll for several years.

I must say that the Americans had resources for replacements, where the Germans did not. One more battle like that in November and this type of attack was over for the Luftwaffe. The losses were just too heavy.

Of course, Eric is the expert on the Luftwaffe side of things.
 
29 german fighters are american claims or luftwaffe date for battle? if they are claims surely the actually lost are less
 

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