FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Which one? Niagara or Hoover? In either case one could of probably covered for another if a grid could be quickly built.
German commando attack on the US, Canada Alaska
- Thread starter Soren
- Start date
Which one? Niagara or Hoover? In either case one could of probably covered for another if a grid could be quickly built.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Canada and the US was blessed with multiple centers of manufacturing and basic industrial production.
There was no single point of vulnerability.
There was no single point of vulnerability.
Freebird
Master Sergeant
Good thread Soren! Interesting topic, there is alot more I will get to later.
Hey Njaco, I have a question for you - The Philly Camden are Navy yards correct? Is there any hill or high point that you can observe the yards at a distance? Could a recce team posing as sightseers or whatever in Nov 1941 get a good look into the yards?
And a question for you Soren, looking at the pics of the Italian "manned torpedoes" could a U-boat transport 2- 4 of these things? I would assume that they are about 2,000 - 2,500 pounds, and that the shields for the riders can be removed
From Wikipedia The United States mainland was first Bombardment shelled by the Axis on February 23, 1942 when the Japanese submarine I-17 attacked the Ellwood oil production facilities at Goleta, near Santa Barbara, California. Although only the pumphouse and catwalk were damaged, ''I-17'' captain Nishino Kozo radioed Tokyo that he had left Santa Barbara in flames. No casualties were reported and the total cost of the damage was officially estimated at approximately $500-1000. However news of the shelling triggered an invasion scare along the West Coast.
In WWII a Japanese sub surfaced off Vancouver Island and fired some rounds at the lighthouse there, but missed. This marked the first enemy shelling of Canadian soil since the War of 1812. Though no casualties were reported, the subsequent decision to turn off the lights of outer stations was disastrous for shipping activity.
In what became the only attack on a mainland American military installation during World War II, the Japanese submarine I-25, under the command of Tagami Meiji, surfaced near the mouth of the Columbia River, Oregon on the night of June 21 and June 22, 1942 and fired shells toward Fort Stevens (Oregon). The only damage officially recorded was to a baseball field's backstop. Probably the most significant damage was a shell that damaged some large phone cables. The Fort Stevens gunners were refused permission to return fire, since it would have helped the Japanese locate their target more accurately. American aircraft on training flights spotted the submarine, which was subsequently attacked by a US b.omber, but it escaped.
Tim I would think that the subs would lurk farther out in the mouth of the Chesapeake and sink ships there. I was thinking of a mini-sub commando attack against Norfolk Va. there were three carriers stationed there + a couple of battleships. The Italians holed two British battleships by this method in Alexandria, Egypt in Dec 1941. One BB took about 8 months to repair, the other took about 15 IIRC.
Pic of a Italian mini-sub below
Has anyone considered how vulnerable the US refineries were? Most of them are on the coast, and in Dec. 1941 were unprotected and also were lit up at night. Attacks by subs in the first few nights after Pearl Harbour would be almost impossible for the US to defend against. Destruction or significant damage to several oil facilities would be more than a passing "blip" to the war effort. At this point in the war the UK was increasingly more reliant on US oil, because many British Allied facilities were in the Persian Gulf in the Far East, and ships had to be detoured around Africa
Hey Njaco, I have a question for you - The Philly Camden are Navy yards correct? Is there any hill or high point that you can observe the yards at a distance? Could a recce team posing as sightseers or whatever in Nov 1941 get a good look into the yards?
And a question for you Soren, looking at the pics of the Italian "manned torpedoes" could a U-boat transport 2- 4 of these things? I would assume that they are about 2,000 - 2,500 pounds, and that the shields for the riders can be removed
From Wikipedia The United States mainland was first Bombardment shelled by the Axis on February 23, 1942 when the Japanese submarine I-17 attacked the Ellwood oil production facilities at Goleta, near Santa Barbara, California. Although only the pumphouse and catwalk were damaged, ''I-17'' captain Nishino Kozo radioed Tokyo that he had left Santa Barbara in flames. No casualties were reported and the total cost of the damage was officially estimated at approximately $500-1000. However news of the shelling triggered an invasion scare along the West Coast.
In WWII a Japanese sub surfaced off Vancouver Island and fired some rounds at the lighthouse there, but missed. This marked the first enemy shelling of Canadian soil since the War of 1812. Though no casualties were reported, the subsequent decision to turn off the lights of outer stations was disastrous for shipping activity.
In what became the only attack on a mainland American military installation during World War II, the Japanese submarine I-25, under the command of Tagami Meiji, surfaced near the mouth of the Columbia River, Oregon on the night of June 21 and June 22, 1942 and fired shells toward Fort Stevens (Oregon). The only damage officially recorded was to a baseball field's backstop. Probably the most significant damage was a shell that damaged some large phone cables. The Fort Stevens gunners were refused permission to return fire, since it would have helped the Japanese locate their target more accurately. American aircraft on training flights spotted the submarine, which was subsequently attacked by a US b.omber, but it escaped.
Tim I would think that the subs would lurk farther out in the mouth of the Chesapeake and sink ships there. I was thinking of a mini-sub commando attack against Norfolk Va. there were three carriers stationed there + a couple of battleships. The Italians holed two British battleships by this method in Alexandria, Egypt in Dec 1941. One BB took about 8 months to repair, the other took about 15 IIRC.
Pic of a Italian mini-sub below
Has anyone considered how vulnerable the US refineries were? Most of them are on the coast, and in Dec. 1941 were unprotected and also were lit up at night. Attacks by subs in the first few nights after Pearl Harbour would be almost impossible for the US to defend against. Destruction or significant damage to several oil facilities would be more than a passing "blip" to the war effort. At this point in the war the UK was increasingly more reliant on US oil, because many British Allied facilities were in the Persian Gulf in the Far East, and ships had to be detoured around Africa
Attachments
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Freebird, definately can look on the Philly yard from the Jersey side either through the Rveolutionary battlefirld at National Park or anywhere along the shoreline. In fact there are several large islands that are unihabited that everyone uses for parties. Great cover.
Not sure from the Philly side onto Camden. Maybe Tim would have a better view.
The Navy yard is surrounded by refineries.
How about sinking a few block ships at the entrance to the Delaware? Maybe ships can be built but not sail?
Not sure from the Philly side onto Camden. Maybe Tim would have a better view.
The Navy yard is surrounded by refineries.
How about sinking a few block ships at the entrance to the Delaware? Maybe ships can be built but not sail?
Freebird
Master Sergeant
I was thinking more along the lines of commando attacks on the major ships
Glider
Major
If you are going to use a human chariot which is a good idea then I would blow one of the gates in the Panama Canal.
Haztoys
Senior Airman
PD...You are a God of info..As always... I never new that so much went on in the Lawrence..The German U-boaters had nuts to do what they need...
We are lucky the Japanese did not use there subs right ..Or America and the Allies would of had a much harder fight in the PTO...And Germany would of had more subs
- Thread starter
- #68
Freebird, as Njaco says, you can see into the Philly yards from Jersey and from the river. But back in 1940, they were building ships as far north as Bristol (about 25 miles north) and as far south as Wilminton, DE (about 30 miles south) as well as all over the Jersey side. So, to get a look into it, you'd probably have to be in the middle of the shipyard.
There were two bridges up at that time that would give you a bird's eye view of the Rivers but neither was directly alongside the Phila Navy Yard.
There are no hills within LOS of the Phila Navy Yard. Jersey is dead flat at that point and so is most of Pa around there.
Getting a midget sub into Norfolk is a possibility. Back then, there were also other shipyards in the area as well as Portsmouth, VA and Baltimore further up the Chesapeake Bay. Combined, it was a huge navy base and the Ches an inland lake. Going in an putting holes in a CV or BB would make news but not really affect the Navy materially. They were just pumping so many of the things out. Plus, you'd be holing it right in the middle of the repair yards. Float 'em, run them over to a dry dock and fix 'em. Not simply, but not as hard to deal with as putting a couple of torpedoes in them in the middle of an ocean. Similar to what happened to the BBs at Pearl Harbor but without a trip to the repair yards.
There were a ton of refineries in the area of Phila. Plus, the long pipeline from Texas to Phoenixville was terminalled only 40 miles from Phila. Back in the 40s, Phila was a big time refiniery area (as was and is North Jersey). But destroying a refinery is actually pretty hard. You've got to actually wreck the equipment in a lot of different places to make a real affect. Hitting one or two valves and blowing up some tanks looks like big stuff but it can be fixed fairly fast. And it takes time to put all the explosives in. You can look at the Ploesti raids to see how long it took to really knock the thing out.
I guess, what I am saying is the US had capacity to spare in fixing stuff as well as making stuff. While it might take the Brits 8 months to fix a BB, holing one in it's home port would probably not take more than 3-4 to fix at the outside. And given the way refineries are constructed and how they were being expanded, blowing up a section of it wouldn't do more than passing damage that would be fixed in less than a month.
There were two bridges up at that time that would give you a bird's eye view of the Rivers but neither was directly alongside the Phila Navy Yard.
There are no hills within LOS of the Phila Navy Yard. Jersey is dead flat at that point and so is most of Pa around there.
Getting a midget sub into Norfolk is a possibility. Back then, there were also other shipyards in the area as well as Portsmouth, VA and Baltimore further up the Chesapeake Bay. Combined, it was a huge navy base and the Ches an inland lake. Going in an putting holes in a CV or BB would make news but not really affect the Navy materially. They were just pumping so many of the things out. Plus, you'd be holing it right in the middle of the repair yards. Float 'em, run them over to a dry dock and fix 'em. Not simply, but not as hard to deal with as putting a couple of torpedoes in them in the middle of an ocean. Similar to what happened to the BBs at Pearl Harbor but without a trip to the repair yards.
There were a ton of refineries in the area of Phila. Plus, the long pipeline from Texas to Phoenixville was terminalled only 40 miles from Phila. Back in the 40s, Phila was a big time refiniery area (as was and is North Jersey). But destroying a refinery is actually pretty hard. You've got to actually wreck the equipment in a lot of different places to make a real affect. Hitting one or two valves and blowing up some tanks looks like big stuff but it can be fixed fairly fast. And it takes time to put all the explosives in. You can look at the Ploesti raids to see how long it took to really knock the thing out.
I guess, what I am saying is the US had capacity to spare in fixing stuff as well as making stuff. While it might take the Brits 8 months to fix a BB, holing one in it's home port would probably not take more than 3-4 to fix at the outside. And given the way refineries are constructed and how they were being expanded, blowing up a section of it wouldn't do more than passing damage that would be fixed in less than a month.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Tim, arent the currents around there quite tricky?
And navigating a midget sub in water thats usually murky isnt exactly easy to do.
And navigating a midget sub in water thats usually murky isnt exactly easy to do.
Yeah, in both the Delaware and the Ches, the currents are hairy. Both are tidal runs which means the variation can be pretty wierd. Probably not much of a problem if you are on a boat and navigating the flow above the surface. You can always up your speed and adjust for drift and stay in the dredged channel. But if you are trying to run a midget sub in, underwater, with only occasional periscope sightings for bearings (very close to the water), it would be very easy to run aground.
One thing about the Delaware, it has a dredged channel that is 40Ft deep all the way to about North Philadelphia. About a good, I'm going on memory here, about 70-80 miles. 6 hours as a sea and anchor detail. But the dredged channel is only about 300 yds wide. It is very easy to get out of the lane and then you're screwed. Mud or rocks all over the place.
Think the Ches is the same. Every so often ('bout every 10 -15 years) a Navy ship runs aground in the Ches and in the blink of an eye the Captian and Navigator are history. Tricky channels down in the mouth of the Ches with all that water coming down the bay.
parsifal
Colonel
someone has raised the possibility of using Italian Chariots from a German submarine. There are a number of problems with that idea.
Technically, it would be possible to do that, but this is not the problem. Italian Chariots were TOP SECRET to the Italian Navy, and were never going to be easily or willingly shared with the germans. After the attacks in November against the british Battleships in Alexandria, everybody (except the US) wanted to get hold of them. The British had the most luck, they managed to capture several of the Mailie from failed Italian operations. Despite being allied to the Italians, the germans never got their hands on one of these devices, even after the Italian surrender. It was more than two years before the german had anything comparable to the Mailie, and then only in a very crude form (the Neger, and later the Marder types).
There just was not the level of co-operation between the axis partners, that existed between the allies. This was particualrly true of the Italians, who despised the Germans because of the way the germans treated them. Mussolini was particulalry incensed by the fact that germany failed to inform the Italians of the invasion of Russia in June. Many italians working in Russia (mostly bringing in food and oil supplies) were left stranded because of this german oversight.
So, providing the specialist equipment to a country whom many in Italy considered to be the true enemy was the first proble. The second problem was training. At this stage, frogmen were a raraity,, highly trained, and requiring a lot of time to prepare. 10th MAS, the specialist Italian outfit that operated these craft had been training and preparing its personnel since the beginning of 1938, and even by the middle of 1941 the italians were still perfecting the techniques required to use this specialist equipment. How on earth are the Germans, who had shown zero interest in this kind of warfare until after November 1941, going to all of a sudden going to acquire the highly specialized skills needed to operate these craft. They were at least two years of having the personnel needed, ready for action, assuming the italians are going to show them in the first place.
This of course also raises the problem of anticipation. Since the entry of the US was not something that the germans had planned for, in a proper sense (admittedly Doenitz had anticipated it, but the German Admiralty as a whole had not expected it). The Germans would have needed veritable eyes in the back of their heads to start preparing for this kind of operation. Assuming all manner of co-operation with their allies (for which NO evidence exists) one can reasonably suggest that they would have needed at least a year to prepare for the operation. A year in which signal traffic would need to go nuts about how and where and with what they were going to attack. Given that the German Naval codes, including the U-Boat codes were broken in June 1941 (although they were subsequently restored for a time) it is almost certain that the plan would have been discovered.
Someone also made the flippant remark that it would be "easy" to convert a type IX to be the carrier of these subs. Well, thats intersting. Considering that it took 8 months for the italaians to complete the conversions to enable the launching of the Mailie from just two Coastal Subs 9the Scire and the Da vinci), ther again is a proble. I dont doubt that it would be possible to convert a Type IX to the purpose, but how do you think Doenitz, and Hitler are going to react to the loss of a U-Boat from operations for 8 month?. Tey are going to go bonkas, and refuse to give up the Boat for such a scheme. moreover, the maximum number of craft that the italian boats could carry was just two....lets be generaous and surmise that the German Boat which is about twice as big, can carry four such craft.....for the loss of eight months of operation by a major unit of the KM, you are going to be able to launch just four craft....and for what?????
Technically, it would be possible to do that, but this is not the problem. Italian Chariots were TOP SECRET to the Italian Navy, and were never going to be easily or willingly shared with the germans. After the attacks in November against the british Battleships in Alexandria, everybody (except the US) wanted to get hold of them. The British had the most luck, they managed to capture several of the Mailie from failed Italian operations. Despite being allied to the Italians, the germans never got their hands on one of these devices, even after the Italian surrender. It was more than two years before the german had anything comparable to the Mailie, and then only in a very crude form (the Neger, and later the Marder types).
There just was not the level of co-operation between the axis partners, that existed between the allies. This was particualrly true of the Italians, who despised the Germans because of the way the germans treated them. Mussolini was particulalry incensed by the fact that germany failed to inform the Italians of the invasion of Russia in June. Many italians working in Russia (mostly bringing in food and oil supplies) were left stranded because of this german oversight.
So, providing the specialist equipment to a country whom many in Italy considered to be the true enemy was the first proble. The second problem was training. At this stage, frogmen were a raraity,, highly trained, and requiring a lot of time to prepare. 10th MAS, the specialist Italian outfit that operated these craft had been training and preparing its personnel since the beginning of 1938, and even by the middle of 1941 the italians were still perfecting the techniques required to use this specialist equipment. How on earth are the Germans, who had shown zero interest in this kind of warfare until after November 1941, going to all of a sudden going to acquire the highly specialized skills needed to operate these craft. They were at least two years of having the personnel needed, ready for action, assuming the italians are going to show them in the first place.
This of course also raises the problem of anticipation. Since the entry of the US was not something that the germans had planned for, in a proper sense (admittedly Doenitz had anticipated it, but the German Admiralty as a whole had not expected it). The Germans would have needed veritable eyes in the back of their heads to start preparing for this kind of operation. Assuming all manner of co-operation with their allies (for which NO evidence exists) one can reasonably suggest that they would have needed at least a year to prepare for the operation. A year in which signal traffic would need to go nuts about how and where and with what they were going to attack. Given that the German Naval codes, including the U-Boat codes were broken in June 1941 (although they were subsequently restored for a time) it is almost certain that the plan would have been discovered.
Someone also made the flippant remark that it would be "easy" to convert a type IX to be the carrier of these subs. Well, thats intersting. Considering that it took 8 months for the italaians to complete the conversions to enable the launching of the Mailie from just two Coastal Subs 9the Scire and the Da vinci), ther again is a proble. I dont doubt that it would be possible to convert a Type IX to the purpose, but how do you think Doenitz, and Hitler are going to react to the loss of a U-Boat from operations for 8 month?. Tey are going to go bonkas, and refuse to give up the Boat for such a scheme. moreover, the maximum number of craft that the italian boats could carry was just two....lets be generaous and surmise that the German Boat which is about twice as big, can carry four such craft.....for the loss of eight months of operation by a major unit of the KM, you are going to be able to launch just four craft....and for what?????
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Thats why our nickname is "flatlanders".
Parsifal, good points but I could throw in the following.
As far as US being in the war and not a target, I think lend-lease would have appealled to Hitler in the respect that convoys of Liberty ships and such were coming from US regardless whether they were in the war or not. It may have been a taget objective for Germany.
That being said, Doenitz may have supported a raid on these ships or supplies to stem the convoys. Just a thought. I doesn't seem that far gone. Thats was why I brought up the Philly Navy yards.
Now as to how, I leave that up to far better experts. Subs and minis and all.
- Thread starter
- #74
Parsifal,
I'm sure that if the Germans had wanted the Mailie they would've gotten it right away. And as for the co-operation between Italy and Germany, don't forget that Daimler Benz was delivering new engines to the Italians for use in their fighter designs. Furthermore the Italians were given new Bf-109G's as-well by the Germans, and in return the Germans were given Macchi, Reggiane Fiat fighters by the Italians.
I'm sure that if the Germans had wanted the Mailie they would've gotten it right away. And as for the co-operation between Italy and Germany, don't forget that Daimler Benz was delivering new engines to the Italians for use in their fighter designs. Furthermore the Italians were given new Bf-109G's as-well by the Germans, and in return the Germans were given Macchi, Reggiane Fiat fighters by the Italians.
parsifal
Colonel
The Italian Navy would most definately have not shared their "secret weapon with the Germans unless absolutely forced to. The italians were really dirty about not receiving what they regarded as their proper share of fuel oil. Moreover, after the November attacks on Alexandria, despite repeated requests, the Italians refused to provide the Germans with ANY help in this specialised form of warfare. The British got more from the Italians than the Germans when it came to the Chariot technology and training. Even so, it would be 1944 before the British could undertake any missions with these submersibles, and then only with help from the members of the 10th MAS.
The Italian navy would only be more incensed by the help you described. That was help to the air force, which the Navy hated almost as much as the Germans...dont forget, these are super senitive latins we are talking about here, and the germans never quite got that
The Italian navy would only be more incensed by the help you described. That was help to the air force, which the Navy hated almost as much as the Germans...dont forget, these are super senitive latins we are talking about here, and the germans never quite got that
- Thread starter
- #76
Parsifal,
Had the Germans wanted the Mailie they would've gotten it, infact they almost certainly already knew most of the things worth knowing about it, the Abwehr being all over the Italian armed forces. However the Germans had no use for it in late 43, and so a procurement of one wasn't even considered.
But again, had the Germans wanted it they would've gotten it, either the easy or the hard way. I'm sure the KM could persuade the Italian Navy to hand over a few examples of the Mailie in exchange for some KM hardware. If not the Abwehr could simply steal all the plans.
Now moving onwards, how would you guys equip the 25 man teams set off on US, Canadian Alaskan soil ?
Had the Germans wanted the Mailie they would've gotten it, infact they almost certainly already knew most of the things worth knowing about it, the Abwehr being all over the Italian armed forces. However the Germans had no use for it in late 43, and so a procurement of one wasn't even considered.
But again, had the Germans wanted it they would've gotten it, either the easy or the hard way. I'm sure the KM could persuade the Italian Navy to hand over a few examples of the Mailie in exchange for some KM hardware. If not the Abwehr could simply steal all the plans.
Now moving onwards, how would you guys equip the 25 man teams set off on US, Canadian Alaskan soil ?
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Soren, and just what were the 25 man teams going to accomplish?
What targets? How are they going to carry enough explosives to destroy their targets?
Especially when it came to Alaska. Nothing was there, save what was on the Pacific Coast.
What targets? How are they going to carry enough explosives to destroy their targets?
Especially when it came to Alaska. Nothing was there, save what was on the Pacific Coast.
- Thread starter
- #78
parsifal
Colonel
Had the Germans wanted the Mailie they would've gotten it, infact they almost certainly already knew most of the things worth knowing about it, the Abwehr being all over the Italian armed forces. However the Germans had no use for it in late 43, and so a procurement of one wasn't even considered.
The chief Abwehr operative in the Italian Admiralty was the KM naval Attache. I think his name was Raus, from memory.
I am not going to assert that the abwehr didn't know about Chariots, but neither is ther any evidence that I know of to say that they did know of it. If you have evidence to the contrary, I would like to see it.
In fact the circumstantial evidence very strongly suggests otherwise. The reports that I have seen (but I cannot now find) suggest that the OKM was very surprised by the equipment, and the success of Chariot attacks in November. Moreover, what is not so well known is that the 10 MAS had been operating for some months out of a disused merchant hulk, anchored across the bay to Gibraltar, in the Spanish port of Algerciras. The British had been unable to locate the source of these attacks. This small group of saboteurs managed to sink over 100000 tons of ships in Gibraltar, and were never caught. The british did eventually get a good clue as to what was happening, but this was never the result of covert intelligence. Now, if the germans had known about this they would have talked about it, and if they had talked about it the british would have found out about it, because the german security services were basically a swiss cheese with holes all over it, when it came to the SOE. There has seldom been a more compromised security organization as the abwehr. Moreover there is also the weakness of Enigma, which throughout 1941, the Allies were reading
The Italians had a weak security service as well, but it did not suffer from enigma style breaches like the germans, because they didn't use it (until 1942), and their own security services were actually superior to the Abwehr 9there wwere other security organizations, namely the B-Dienst service, the SD and Gehlens team attached directly to OKW. But none of these services had operatives working in Italy in 1941.
y
But again, had the Germans wanted it they would've gotten it, either the easy or the hard way. I'm sure the KM could persuade the Italian Navy to hand over a few examples of the Mailie in exchange for some KM hardware. If not the Abwehr could simply steal all the plans.
The german intelligence services were not on a par with its armed forces. The abwehr was basically the laughing stock of Europe, because all the intelligence agencies knew that they could sell any story to the organizations and it would accept it, hook, line and sinker. The german intelligence system suffered from being over rigid, and too centralized in terms of its control. This prevented many of its spy networks from employing the sort of quick thinking tactics that were needed in order to work successfully as a spy. Moreover, the over rigid approach taken by the abwehr meant that their operatives were generally very easily identified and compromised. In England for example, there was not one German spy that had not either been captured or compromised from early 1941 on .
Whilst I cant prove which spy service (Italian or German) had the upper hand, my suspicions are that it was the Italian. The italain spy service was nothing like the Italian military, it was actually quite efficient. For example, the Italians predicted, with a great deal of accuracy, the Torch and Sicilian landings, whereas the Germans were basically floundering.
Certainly, if the germans did know about the Italian chariots, they did not act on it, until after the November attacks. After that, they, in common with nearly everybody else, wanted to get their hands on the technology. AFAIK, they never did, and the proff of this is in the rather p[oor efforts they made in the form of the Neger and the Marder minisubs, which were based on the same general idea.
Lastly, the 10MAS outfit was the crème de la crème of the Italian military, It was a thoroughly professional outfit, full the equal to anything in any other army, and not an easy organization to penetrate when it came to its most jealously guarded secrets.
An overt "raid" would have had disastrous impacts on Italo-German relations. Are you suggesting that you would jeapodize the whole southern front, for the sake of delivering 4 Chariot attacks against the Americans. This really is getting a bit silly.
Now moving onwards, how would you guys equip the 25 man teams set off on US, Canadian Alaskan soil ?
Err equipping 25 man teams from U-Boats. Considering that each type IX is able to carry no more than fourteen men , exactly how many teams are we talking about. Given that you will want to so lavishly equip these teams, I estimate that you will need at least 4 boats per team. I don't know how many type IXs there were at this time, but it wasn't many. Each boat was basically sinking about 100000 tons of shipping per patrol, so, if youo are pulling these boats out of the subs available for tonnage warfare, as you must, in order to train the crews, and modify the boats for the operation, then you have foregone the loss of about 800000 tons of British shipping per team, and for what??????/
The chief Abwehr operative in the Italian Admiralty was the KM naval Attache. I think his name was Raus, from memory.
I am not going to assert that the abwehr didn't know about Chariots, but neither is ther any evidence that I know of to say that they did know of it. If you have evidence to the contrary, I would like to see it.
In fact the circumstantial evidence very strongly suggests otherwise. The reports that I have seen (but I cannot now find) suggest that the OKM was very surprised by the equipment, and the success of Chariot attacks in November. Moreover, what is not so well known is that the 10 MAS had been operating for some months out of a disused merchant hulk, anchored across the bay to Gibraltar, in the Spanish port of Algerciras. The British had been unable to locate the source of these attacks. This small group of saboteurs managed to sink over 100000 tons of ships in Gibraltar, and were never caught. The british did eventually get a good clue as to what was happening, but this was never the result of covert intelligence. Now, if the germans had known about this they would have talked about it, and if they had talked about it the british would have found out about it, because the german security services were basically a swiss cheese with holes all over it, when it came to the SOE. There has seldom been a more compromised security organization as the abwehr. Moreover there is also the weakness of Enigma, which throughout 1941, the Allies were reading
The Italians had a weak security service as well, but it did not suffer from enigma style breaches like the germans, because they didn't use it (until 1942), and their own security services were actually superior to the Abwehr 9there wwere other security organizations, namely the B-Dienst service, the SD and Gehlens team attached directly to OKW. But none of these services had operatives working in Italy in 1941.
y
But again, had the Germans wanted it they would've gotten it, either the easy or the hard way. I'm sure the KM could persuade the Italian Navy to hand over a few examples of the Mailie in exchange for some KM hardware. If not the Abwehr could simply steal all the plans.
The german intelligence services were not on a par with its armed forces. The abwehr was basically the laughing stock of Europe, because all the intelligence agencies knew that they could sell any story to the organizations and it would accept it, hook, line and sinker. The german intelligence system suffered from being over rigid, and too centralized in terms of its control. This prevented many of its spy networks from employing the sort of quick thinking tactics that were needed in order to work successfully as a spy. Moreover, the over rigid approach taken by the abwehr meant that their operatives were generally very easily identified and compromised. In England for example, there was not one German spy that had not either been captured or compromised from early 1941 on .
Whilst I cant prove which spy service (Italian or German) had the upper hand, my suspicions are that it was the Italian. The italain spy service was nothing like the Italian military, it was actually quite efficient. For example, the Italians predicted, with a great deal of accuracy, the Torch and Sicilian landings, whereas the Germans were basically floundering.
Certainly, if the germans did know about the Italian chariots, they did not act on it, until after the November attacks. After that, they, in common with nearly everybody else, wanted to get their hands on the technology. AFAIK, they never did, and the proff of this is in the rather p[oor efforts they made in the form of the Neger and the Marder minisubs, which were based on the same general idea.
Lastly, the 10MAS outfit was the crème de la crème of the Italian military, It was a thoroughly professional outfit, full the equal to anything in any other army, and not an easy organization to penetrate when it came to its most jealously guarded secrets.
An overt "raid" would have had disastrous impacts on Italo-German relations. Are you suggesting that you would jeapodize the whole southern front, for the sake of delivering 4 Chariot attacks against the Americans. This really is getting a bit silly.
Now moving onwards, how would you guys equip the 25 man teams set off on US, Canadian Alaskan soil ?
Err equipping 25 man teams from U-Boats. Considering that each type IX is able to carry no more than fourteen men , exactly how many teams are we talking about. Given that you will want to so lavishly equip these teams, I estimate that you will need at least 4 boats per team. I don't know how many type IXs there were at this time, but it wasn't many. Each boat was basically sinking about 100000 tons of shipping per patrol, so, if youo are pulling these boats out of the subs available for tonnage warfare, as you must, in order to train the crews, and modify the boats for the operation, then you have foregone the loss of about 800000 tons of British shipping per team, and for what??????/
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Soren doesnt know anything about the size or terrain for Alaska and Northern Canada.
Therefore we should concentrate on these potential spy teams for deployment on the eastern seaboard, maybe even Gulf Coast.
Therefore we should concentrate on these potential spy teams for deployment on the eastern seaboard, maybe even Gulf Coast.
Users who are viewing this thread
Similar threads
