33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,344
- Jan 31, 2021
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Frankly the reality is the Soviets were no match for the Germans and suffered as a result.
Not necessarily a function of Soviet problems as much as the Germans were vastly more experienced and had better equipment.
. . . so the Soviets weren't slouches, despite being surprised.
Napoleon would argue you never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake. Which applies to any military at any time.
The aim was end the war fast and eliminate the V-2 launch sites around The Hague, so probably the idea was that they would have got also Rotterdam with its huge harbour and so the importance of Antwerp would has been much smaller. Overly optimistic but maybe the risk was worth of taking. At least less than that taken by the WM in the Op. Barbarossa. When the december crises came shortage of ammo, fuel and winter cloathing had devastating effect. And a year later the same happened around Stalingrad, lack of fuel critically limited the operational possibilities for the 3 Panzer Divisions at Stalingrad and lack of supplies around Stalingrad made the lost of supply lines even more critical.Eisenhower's lack of a good strategic mind was well understood at the time. Any one could have seen that even had Market Garden worked, which was at best iffy, logistically the entire advance and indeed the NW European front was in a bad situation and needed a functional port. For someone obsessed with wide front advances he very oddly shifted into a very uncharacteristic 'war winning' move that was clearly vastly more likely to fail than succeed...
Funny about the Antwerp situation you layout, because instead of waiting to clear the flanks or improve the situation they instead launched an offensive even deeper without a secured supply line. Bad planning yet again, which goes back to my central point: the Wallies weren't as good with logistics as is claimed and in fact screwed up badly by September 1944.
Again why launch Market Garden instead of securing the ports? The thrust wouldn't have ended the war and if successful left them in an even worse position.
that was 78 vs 75 but 10 of the losses on 22.6.1941 were miscellaneus a/c meaning planes like Hs 126s and Fi 156s etc. used only when ground forces were actively participating, at least one was a Fw 58. Invasion related air operations were a bit different from aerial bombing campaigns. Even Invasion related air operations differed sometimes so much that loss comparations are rather useless, on 10 May 1940 the LW lost 353 a/c but many of them were transport planes or Fi 156s....Frankly the reality is the Soviets were no match for the Germans and suffered as a result. Not necessarily a function of Soviet problems as much as the Germans were vastly more experienced and had better equipment. Still on day one alone the Germans lost more than on the worst day of the Battle of Britain, so the Soviets weren't slouches, despite being surprised.
Weaker how? Less effective for sure. In terms of all numbers they were vastly superior. So what weakness do you mean?In other words, the Soviets were weaker, and the superior numbers you keep citing immaterial. Thus the German success is at least as attributable to the weakness of their opponents as it is to German strength. Which is exactly my point.
Starting to sound like the Cathy Newman interview.In other words, German success is at least as attributable to the weakness of their opponent as it is to German strength. You make my point again.
What are you even talking about? I said the Soviets weren't pushovers based on the casualties they inflicted, but they were outmatched and took many more.Which is it? Were the Soviets no match for the Germans as you initially said? Or are they better than you initially said? It can't be both.
Doesn't seem like it, the prospects of success were exceedingly low.The aim was end the war fast and eliminate the V-2 launch sites around The Hague, so probably the idea was that they would have got also Rotterdam with its huge harbour and so the importance of Antwerp would has been much smaller. Overly optimistic but maybe the risk was worth of taking.
But for Hitler's strategic mistakes Barbarossa would have worked.At least less than that taken by the WM in the Op. Barbarossa.
That's overblown, per official Soviet history records the Soviets took something like 10:1 losses during December-February. The devastating losses were suffered by the Soviets. Check out Krivosheev for the Soviet losses and David Stahel's winter campaign book for the details.When the december crises came shortage of ammo, fuel and winter cloathing had devastating effect.
Stalingrad was the product of so much more than just supply difficulties.And a year later the same happened around Stalingrad, lack of fuel critically limited the operational possibilities for the 3 Panzer Divisions at Stalingrad and lack of supplies around Stalingrad made the lost of supply lines even more critical.
A major mistake.Of course the failure to take at least the Woensdrecht allowed the withrawal of the 15. Armee from south of the Schelde Estuary.
Weaker how? Less effective for sure. In terms of all numbers they were vastly superior. So what weakness do you mean?
Frankly the reality is the Soviets were no match for the Germans and suffered as a result.
What are you even talking about? I said the Soviets weren't pushovers based on the casualties they inflicted, but they were outmatched and took many more.
Frankly the reality is the Soviets were no match for the Germans and suffered as a result.
Methanol was a component of the fuel used up in Grand Prix racing until 130 Avgas was mandated starting with the 1958 seasonThe following link gives the fuel used by Mercedes Benz as 45% Benzene, 25% methyl alcohol, 23% aviation fuel, 3% acetone, 2% nitrobenzene and 2% top secret.Hi,
Methanol has been widely used in racing in the UK. However, it is limited in how many classes allow it. Speedway bikes (short dirt oval) and Sprint/Drag racing are/were the main users.
Eng
Hi, I am guessing that the 2% might include more tetraethyl lead for P/N increase and Brominated compounds for preventing lead fowling of sparkplugs.Methanol was a component of the fuel used up in Grand Prix racing until 130 Avgas was mandated starting with the 1958 seasonThe following link gives the fuel used by Mercedes Benz as 45% Benzene, 25% methyl alcohol, 23% aviation fuel, 3% acetone, 2% nitrobenzene and 2% top secret.
The oil companies had wanted to mandate ordinary automotive gasoline but there was no international standard for that.
I agree that with hindsight the idea was hugely optimistic. But that was the general attitude amongst Allies after the Great Swan from Normandy to the Netherlands' border. They hugely underestimated Germans ability to improvise and recover.Doesn't seem like it, the prospects of success were exceedingly low.
IIRC according to David Stahel Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany's Winter Campaign, 1941-1942 it was more like 6:1 over the course of the Winter Offensive. Russian casualties amounted to over 1.5 million against around 260,000 Germans. But lack of proper cloathing caused unnecessary losses because of frostbites and extra sickness. In addition, freezing weakens the vigilance of of sentries and probably even reduced patrol activity as did the difficulties to move through deep snow. And the need to loot cloathings, food and shelter from locals increased the partisan activity.That's overblown, per official Soviet history records the Soviets took something like 10:1 losses during December-February. The devastating losses were suffered by the Soviets. Check out Krivosheev for the Soviet losses and David Stahel's winter campaign book for the details.
Of cource, but lack of fuel prohibited the use of German panzer formations inside the forming Stalingrad pocket (14., 16. and 24. Panzer Divs) against the armoured outer northern pincer.Stalingrad was the product of so much more than just supply difficulties.
AgreeA major mistake.
Apparently, but all the more unforgivable given ULTRA intel.I agree that with hindsight the idea was hugely optimistic. But that was the general attitude amongst Allies after the Great Swan from Normandy to the Netherlands' border. They hugely underestimated Germans ability to improvise and recover.
I misremembered what he said in the book. On balance the casualties rations hugely favored the Germans. Also the casualties of winter were actually lower than during summer and fall 1941, while inflicting just as heavy of losses, in fact Soviet dead were higher as a percentage than in the rest of 1941 due to the weather. For all the talk of the Germans being unprepared it seems if anything Soviet troops were really not prepared for winter.IIRC according to David Stahel Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany's Winter Campaign, 1941-1942 it was more like 6:1 over the course of the Winter Offensive. Russian casualties amounted to over 1.5 million against around 260,000 Germans. But lack of proper cloathing caused unnecessary losses because of frostbites and extra sickness. In addition, freezing weakens the vigilance of of sentries and probably even reduced patrol activity as did the difficulties to move through deep snow. And the need to loot cloathings, food and shelter from locals increased the partisan activity.
By then the damage was done. I was talking about supply difficulties before the encirclement.Of cource, but lack of fuel prohibited the use of German panzer formations inside the forming Stalingrad pocket (14., 16. and 24. Panzer Divs) against the armoured outer northern pincer.
Often claimed, but Hitler didn't trust landline security. Mostly the Allies fucked up interpreting the info coming in through ULTRA. Some intel officers did pick up on the offensive and warned Eisenhower, but were ignored.Ultra helped only if Germans used radio communications, nearer the Germans got to the Reich more they could relied on landlines. One of the main reasons why the Wacht am Rhein surprised the Allies
They didn't have to attack in a hurry, they chose to to try and take advantage of German overextension. It worked initially and they got carried away. If you read memoirs of German survivors of the fighting the Soviets had winter uniforms, but those didn't help and they found piles of Soviet troops frozen all over the place. At a certain point you need to be indoors with fire to survive certain levels of cold.When one chose to attack through wintery forests with much of snow during the WW2 the survival rate of wounded was bound to be poor. Soviet were not unprepared for the winter but they had to launch their attacks in a hurry so their logistics were badly lacking. At least in the northern part of the attacks some of the troops had only a limited supply of ammo even before they launched the attack and some were alredy hungry at that point. Soviet attack tactics were still poor, there were still around thoughts based on the old maxim "The Red Army does not count its losses".
You mentioned something that happened inside the encirclement, so I thought that was what you were referring to in toto. Wasn't the issue less of an issue of fuel and more of mice chewing through wires in tank engines when they used hay to keep it from freezing? The mice got in to avoid the cold and nibbled on stuff.We are both talking about supply difficulties before the encirclement. I was referring the fuels situation at the beginning of the Soviet counter attack ie. the fuel situation when the Germans began to react the Soviet break-through through the 3rd Rumanian Army.
Trees are a wind break and can keep you from freezing somewhat. Operating in the open the attack especially wading through deep snow is something else entirely. Especially without the sun up.Now a long ago during my military service I was trained for winter warfare even guerrila type ie. operating behind enemy lines in winter. In northern coniferous forest zone one has plenty of wood around him, so plenty of means to build up shelter and keep up campfire. With proper cloathing minus 30 deg C is not a problem, of course one must be careful with ones nose and cheeks. And check one's toes time to time. And of course one needs energy. Remember even snow is a good insulating material. And before IR cameras became commomplace one could make one's fire so that it was difficult to detect. So when one knows the tricks northern coniferous forests were not unduly difficult enviroment to survive even in harsh winter.
Ok. You still have yet to show us that they had a fuel problem. Not saying trying to be a dick about it, just pointing it out that you made the claim without showing that it was actually the case.I wrote "the use of German panzer formations inside the FORMING Stalingrad pocket". The mice were problem of the unlucky 22.PzD which formed the western flank of XXXXVIII PzAK with the 1. Rumanian Armoured Div. Its main battle tank was Pz 38(t). 14., 16. and 24. PzDivs were good divisions with German equipment. 22. PzD and 1. Rum AD ended up with the few panzern they still had outside the pocket on the western bank of the River Chir.
Alcohol (ethanol) has some serious down sides as motor fuel.Granted, some (or probably a lot) of this tech wasn't really viable during World War II or was in its infancy, but could it have been useful in general during World War II for all sides?