German logistics, purchase programs and war booty, reality and alternatives 1935-43 (2 Viewers)

[tomo pauk]

Perhaps this might be a more appropriate thread.

If telling Dornier to license produce another aircraft, why not jump straight to the Ju 88 instead of the He 111? Ju 88 had it's first flight in late 1936, and by mid-late 1937 they knew they were onto a winner. Now it took a few more years before it entered service, so setting up another Dornier-ran shadow factory in 1937 might have been a bit too early. Then again, if Udet had not insisted on redesigning the plane for the dive bomber role, maybe it could have been ready somewhat earlier?

Ju-88 - why not? It was able to carry a bigger bomb load, and we're just saved a lots of Ju 211s with the radial attacker/light bomber switcheroo.

Sticking the G-R 14N's on the Ju 88 could have been interesting as well. Probably mostly a wash performance-wise compared to the Jumo 211, but at least it would have been a second source of engines. But if (pretty big if!) they could have produced the G-R 14 radials in sufficient numbers, could this have largely replaced the need for the Jumo 211, allowing Jumo engineering to focus more on next generation projects like the 213 and 004?

Without the need for making the 14M, G&R can make a good number of 14Ns, to what the number of these engines captured can be added (1000 complete engines + 400 engines worth of spares were 'found' per German counting in 1942).

BTW - Jumo were showing off the Jumo 213 graphs with the swirl throttle already by late 1941. That might've been a boon on the Jumo 211, giving it perhaps another 100 HP down low without tanking anything in the higher altitudes - not too shabby with 1600 HP for take-off for the 211N?
The Jumo 211 might've been improved a lot with a 2-stage S/C, too. But then again, the 14R was also there for the German to ponder come 1941...

 

[mack8]

A question about the MG FF and a hypothetical belt feed mehanism. If the germans somehow managed to do that early enough, just like the japanese eventually did, how many rpg could be fitted in the Bf-109E wing? Same for the Bf-109F-1 axial MG FF. When the MG-151/20 was fitted iirc 150 rpg was the ammo supply. Could a close figure be viable for a belt fed MG FF as well? Also does that mean there is no need for underwing bulges for the drums on the Bf-109E and Fw-190 models if the guns were belt fed?

 

[tomo pauk]

A question about the MG FF and a hypothetical belt feed mehanism. If the germans somehow managed to do that early enough, just like the japanese eventually did, how many rpg could be fitted in the Bf-109E wing? Same for the Bf-109F-1 axial MG FF.

While the belt-fed MG FF was indeed hypothetical on the 1-engined fighters, it was a reality on some Do 217 night fighters.
The motor cannon on the 109 was with 150-200 rds (?) IIRC. MG FF(M) used the more slender ammo than the MG 151, so the numbers carried could've been greater.

When the MG-151/20 was fitted iirc 150 rpg was the ammo supply. Could a close figure be viable for a belt fed MG FF as well? Also does that mean there is no need for underwing bulges for the drums on the Bf-109E and Fw-190 models if the guns were belt fed?

The more slender ammo might allow still for 150 dr/gun to be carried in the wings. Yes, the ammo belts will need to be set as it was the case with British fighters, ie. parallel to the datum line, and not in 'spiral' like the MG 151s had above the gondolas.
Drums were a reason for the bulges under the wings on the fighter with the MG FFs there, so without the drum, the need to have the bulges is probably not there anymore.

 

[mack8]

While the belt-fed MG FF was indeed hypothetical on the 1-engined fighters, it was a reality on some Do 217 night fighters.
The motor cannon on the 109 was with 150-200 rds (?) IIRC. MG FF(M) used the more slender ammo than the MG 151, so the numbers carried could've been greater.


The more slender ammo might allow still for 150 dr/gun to be carried in the wings. Yes, the ammo belts will need to be set as it was the case with British fighters, ie. parallel to the datum line, and not in 'spiral' like the MG 151s had above the gondolas.
Drums were a reason for the bulges under the wings on the fighter with the MG FFs there, so without the drum, the need to have the bulges is probably not there anymore.

Thanks for the insight. From memory the Zero for instance went from 100 rpg drums to 125 rpg belts. I've read that in Hurricanes and Spitfires the count increased from 60 rpg in drums to 120 in belts, though that is for a different cannon. And there is the IAR-81C with 175 rpg for the Mausers vs. 60 for the drum fed Ikarias, though presumably some of the increase was from removing two 7,92mm MGs. Are there figures for FW-190 outer Mauser cannons rpg that replaced the MG FF, as strangely i couldn't find anything quickly online?

I'm trying to guesstimate how many MG FF rounds could the Bf-109E carry with belts instead of the 60 rpg drums. What would you say is a realistic figure, is 90-100 feasible, too little, too much? Based on what you say, a belt fed axial MG FF should carry at least same number of rounds like the MG 151 right, so 150 rpg for a Bf-109F-1 is doable (hence at least rectifying one of the complaints regarding firepower)?

 

[tomo pauk]

Are there figures for FW-190 outer Mauser cannons rpg that replaced the MG FF, as strangely i couldn't find anything quickly online?

140 rd/gun for the outer MG 151s on the A6.

I'm trying to guesstimate how many MG FF rounds could the Bf-109E carry with belts instead of the 60 rpg drums. What would you say is a realistic figure, is 90-100 feasible, too little, too much? Based on what you say, a belt fed axial MG FF should carry at least same number of rounds like the MG 151 right, so 150 rpg for a Bf-109F-1 is doable (hence at least rectifying one of the complaints regarding firepower)?

My idea is to remove the cowl LMGs (and later not to install the HMGs) and their ammo, obviously.
Ideally, 200 rd for the central gun, and 150 rd for each of the wing guns. Minimum will probably be 150 rd for the central gun and 100 rd for each of the wing guns, IMO.

 

[tomo pauk]

A bit more about the Czech guns Germans obtained between 1939-41.
They all but abandoned plans to make any of these guns - eg. the sFh 37(t) was planned to be phased out in production by April 1940, per the plans from January of the same year. Not that a good idea, since that gun was longer-ranged than the sFh 18 by some 2 km.
(in the same time, production plans for the sFh 18 were also meh, calling for under 60 pcs monthly to be produced, while the 8.8cm Flak was to be produced at triple that amount, with aim for 1942 and beyond staying at 300 pcs per month - a thing that people arguing against the bombing offensive might find interesting)
The 4.7cm ATG was kept with just a few hundred in the German service by 1941. To the best of my knowledge, there was no such gun produced in Jun 1940, and only 6 were made in August (the same month saw 40 of 3.7cm Czech guns for tanks produced, as well as 28 of 47mm Bohler - a far more sedate gun than the Czech weapon; also 228 of the 3.7cm Pak were made).

tl;dr - a more concerted effort with the production of some Czech guns would've been a net gain to the Axis war effort

 

[Shortround6]

If you are not aware of this site it may be somewhat useful. More than a few typo's/misprints but how many are due to the translation I don't know.

https://en.topwar.ru/214183-cheshskie-protivotankovye-gornye-i-polevye-orudija-v-vooruzhennyh-silah-nacistskoj-germanii.html

Something I saw was that while the 37mm AT gun could be towed by 1 horse, they claimed to need 2 horses for the 47mm AT gun and 4 horses for use by cavalry .
There were carriages for motor towing for both.

The 47mm Bohler gun was very close to the 37mm AT guns for penetrating armor, but significantly better as an HE thrower/infantry gun.
The 4.7 cm PaK (t) was very good gun in 1940, it might have been good in the desert in 1941, it was useful in Russia in 1941 against everything except KVs and T-34s but as the KVs and T-34s became more common it was not much use.
It wasn't the difference of 50ms in velocity (standard AP) so much but the .45kg difference (1.6 to 2.05) in projectile weight. Granted it came at a large increase in weight for the gun.
Germans had over done it on the AP shot, there wasn't enough to go around once they were is Russia. The Germans were depending on it too much to keep the small guns in service.
The 5cm Pak 38 was a better use of tungsten carbide.

The 15cm sFh 37(t) would have been useful for as many as they could make.

 

[tomo pauk]

The 5cm Pak 38 was a better use of tungsten carbide.

The better 47mm better AT guns were probably better users of the tungsten carbide than the 37mm guns
Interestingly enough, the French 47mm ATG with the cored shot was almost as good as the 5cm Pak, at least going on by the tables posted here. And the Czech 47mm was in the ballpark with the short 5cm gun.

Over-boring the French ATG and Czech 47mm guns to take the German 5cm ammo might've also been a good idea.

 

[History Learner]

Yes, it matches the accepted thinking (and their own assessments) that Germany did not have the breath for a long, exhausting war. Germany's war in the west was just that - short and devastating campaigns. Poland, respite, Denmark/Norway almost complete before Battle of France, rest,

Adam Tooze, who's probably most responsible for popularizing this idea, has had to retreat on it in recent years as the weight of the last 20 years of scholarship has been firmly against it. Jonas Scherner's 2022 article in particular was crucial in this change:

This article refutes a fundamental assumption behind the Western powers' 'long-war strategy' in 1939, and casts doubt on the conventional wisdom regarding the alleged unpreparedness of Nazi Germany for a longer war. It does so by re-examining Germany's war-preparedness through the lens of those raw materials that were of vital importance for the production of all armaments: non-ferrous metals. Contemporaries believed that these metals were the Achilles heel of the Nazi war economy because Germany had to cover its consumption predominantly with imports from overseas, which meant that it was extremely vulnerable to a sea blockade. But this article challenges these assumptions and shows that the Nazi war-planners were prepared for a longer war because of the lessons learned from the Great War, which they had carefully and covertly studied. The statistics compiled in this article demonstrate that it was the preparations based on these lessons rather than contingencies and non-predictable events, such as the access to occupied Europe due to unexpected victories, that were primarily responsible for the fact that Germany did not run out of metals during the Second World War. Germany lost the war not because of a lack of economic preparation, at least not in the field of metals, but because of the strategic decision to start a war which was bound to draw in an ever more superior coalition of enemies the longer it lasted.​

Paul Schmelzig's 2017 article is another example of this trend:

Despite a well-established literature on the economics of World War Two, to this day reliable statistics on overall raw material supplies for Nazi Germany are lacking. The operations of shell companies, the special de jure status of occupied areas, and the Wehrmacht practice to "live off the land" have led to a significant underestimation of de facto resource endowments of the Third Reich. For the example of rubber—one of the prime "scarce war commodities"—this article demonstrates the extent and sources of deficiencies, and offers new data. On this basis, and in contrast to recent arguments that view raw materials as a "basic constraint" of the German economy, it is shown that surprisingly comfortable supplies existed between December 1941 and May 1944, during which Nazi-controlled Europe seemed ready to allow a realization of Hitler's 'Lebensraum' designs. The failure to realize those designs originated in military setbacks—which subsequently impacted economic performance as a secondary effect.​

Whether better logistics (and let's say a better plan of Barbarossa than Halder's) would lead to the collapse of the USSR is a slightly bigger question. But it is not entirely impossible that the fall of Leningrad, Moscow and Ukraine in 1941/2 would reduce the Soviets (at least for a while) to negligible danger and thus provide (them) time to fortify the coasts of Europe and set up air defenses and/or clear North Africa and/or neutralize the UK. That is, to prepare for the arrival in the USA.

The loss of Moscow, Leningrad and the Donets Basin would be fatal for the Soviet cause, per Stalin himself (And Western Allied assessments of the situation). From The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II by Martin Kahn:

The Soviets were very interested in receiving material aid from the Western Powers. According to a telegram sent by Stalin to Churchill on 3 September, the Soviets would be defeated, or so seriously weakened, that they would be unable to undertake any active operations against Germany if it did not receive material help from Britain, and without the opening of a second front in France or the Balkans.67 The next day Ambassador Cripps sent a telegram, distributed to Churchill, the War Cabinet and the FO. Cripps urged British action in order to create a diversion from the hard-pressured Soviets, otherwise a collapse would commence.68 Three days later he sent another telegram to the FO and the War Cabinet, describing a meeting with Stalin. On a direct question Stalin was uncertain as to whether or not the Soviets could hold out until the spring. But by this Stalin did not mean a separate peace, but outright defeat, even though he did not see this happening and rather implied prolonged retreat, possibly to the Volga.69

Further:

When he spoke to Stalin they also touched upon the loss of economic assets due to the German advance. If he received this information specifically from Stalin or not is unclear, but Cripps nevertheless stated that the loss of (and up to) the Donets Basin, Moscow and Leningrad would mean a loss of two-thirds of the capacity to supply the front.70 Without these areas the USSR would be forced to abstain from active participation, and withdraw to a defensive position. If the Donets were lost Stalin believed that they would need steel and coal, otherwise the railways would not function. In addition there would be a greatly enhanced need for aircraft and tanks, but most of all for aluminium. Stalin saw no need for food imports during the winter, except for some wheat to the Far East.71 The need for aluminium was also stressed in Stalin's telegram to Churchill from 3 September.72 In a despatch from Cripps dated 15 September he stated that he had heard rumours concerning the serious food situation in some outlying districts, due to the worsening of the civilian transport situation as a result of the war.73 In late October Cripps informed the FO that several sources reported about a "serious food shortage". 74

In such an eventuality, the U.S. planning was to sign an armistice with the Soviets. From Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II:

Marshall's reasoning was based not only on Eisenhower's February–March presentations but also on military and political events since then which had heavily reinforced the OPD's original conclusions. Once again the focal point was the Soviet Union. ''The retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to Allied victory,'' now acting chief of staff McNarney had emphasized on April 12; if German armies were allowed to turn west, ''any opportunity for a successful offensive against the European Axis would be virtually eliminated.'' 56 In mid June the staff again warned that Russian collapse would necessitate a strategic reassessment, ''possibly with the result of directing our main effort to the Pacific rather than the Atlantic.'' 57​

 

[History Learner]

The idea the Germans did not mobilise until 1942 or later is largely wrong, what they did do was squeeze the civilian side of the economy harder and stepped up efficiency.

Most of the indexes show constraints on the civilian economy didn't begin until roughly 1942. Hitler and the NSDAP were deeply concerned about a replay of 1918, and thus resisted reductions in living standards as long as possible:

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

In these debates what is defined as a long war and at what intensity? The 4+ years of WWI, the 5.66 years of WWII, the hundred years war? Germany alone against the world? Average western front (1915 to 1918) consumption and casualties from the start? Go and stop, only a few months of heavy ground and air combat in 21 months September 1939 to May 1941? Are we talking Germany as in 1936 or mid 1939? Italy as an active ally requiring resources? Choose one or the other and shortages grow and shrink.

Originally, thanks to Speer and things like statistics on the number of people classified as servants in 1942 the idea was little German economic mobilisation until 1942. In reality the Nazis were using things like off the books loans to push the economy hard in the 1930's trying to build autarky in planned key areas, like chemicals, explosives, rubber and oil while creating a powerful military, the war prevented a financial crisis, the pre war expansions into Austria and Czechoslovakia having fiscal reasons as well. The plan had its draw backs, synthetic oil costs more than natural which inhibited the take up of motor vehicles and so the civil demand. With guaranteed orders and profits local industry did not push hard on exports which were needed to generate the foreign exchange needed resulting in problems obtaining foreign credit. With women told to go make babies and plenty of government jobs available "full employment" was achieved, which certainly improved people's outlook on life, while purchasing ability and choice was improved versus the depression it was curtailed by the military allocations. Compare 1939 with 1933/34 and things look much better, use 1928/29 and they are worse.

The multi volume set Germany and the second world war has an article on economic preparations for war, Germany's trade in value terms bottomed out in 1934 at a third that of 1928 and 1929, it recovered to about 40% by 1939, which was a good thing for war planning as 60% of trade was expected to be cut or severely curtailed in a war with Britain and France, including metals, ores and liquid fuels. Nazi ideology downgraded the USSR from a top 3 trading partner to around 30th. If mobilisation had actually used the expected fuel levels Germany would have problems after between 2 (Diesel) and 7 (avgas) months of war. Coal miner work days went from 8 to 8.75 hours in 1939, electricity and gas had to be rationed pre war, the withdrawal of 3 million men from the economy had the inevitable effects, including coal shortages in the 1939/40 winter.

By incorporating Austria and Czechoslovakia Germany's steel production in 1939 finally exceeded the 1929 figure, being gifted over 1,000 aircraft and 500 or so tanks etc. from the Czech military was useful, similar for Austria. France supplied important raw materials and by allowing Vichy to rule kept the sea lanes to North Africa open, as well as links to Portugal and Türkiye.

Germany's expansion to June 1941 and into say Q3/41 was economically quite profitable, solving many raw material problems without using large amounts of raw materials to do so, with low casualties while providing plenty of war booty for at least training and second line formations. Was all that use of Red Army 76.2mm guns a sign of shortages or intelligent use of resources? Germany charged occupied countries fees paid in kind with raw materials with rigged currency exchange rates, while the army in the USSR used local resources where possible.

The ideal economy is balanced, no over or under production and not even the US could have everything it thought it needed. So you need to make judgement calls on where raw materials became the key shortage, and there are plenty of statements about could have, if only. Nazi ideology meant the killing or under employed millions of potential workers. The Germans worked around shortages, so did everyone else, they tailored their production to their resources, so did everyone else, they made decisions about stuff now versus production capacity now, stuff later, so did everyone else. Lots of local material crisis, so did everyone else. The western allies increased mechanisation of their farm sectors, the Germans employed more foreigners, a second best solution based on available resources. Germany's economy as managed did not suffer badly from raw material shortages like everyone else's because of production decisions, but at the same time specific programs like the jet engines certainly did, assemble enough specific programs or items and you can prove a material shortage, note the overall economy running reasonably smoothly and prove no real material shortages. How about introducing widespread refrigeration and watch food spoilage go down and reduce the need to buy fresh produce every day or two, cutting raw material use and increasing available worker hours. Another resource issue?

It looks like around May 1944 was the time German raw material shortages became widespread, that is usual requirements could not be met, reducing things like steel output, but the time lag between raw material and finished product meant peak war production was later. There is also an issue about the types and quality of steel being made given the alloy metal availability. A lack of steel was cited as an important reason in curtailing the synthetic oil program after war began as an example, cancelling warships another. Having the ability to retire military horses in favour of motorisation would have made the Heer more effective, so does the lack of truck and fuel production count as raw material constraint? How about the steel to make the truck and fuel plants? Or does having more tanks etc. now instead of more per month later provide enough benefits that it is an allocation decision, not a shortage decision? How about agricultural machinery instead of tanks?

Romania had plenty of oil for a European nation, built an oil based economy as a result and so only a minority of production was available for export, throw a gigantic wrecking ball into an economy of 20 million people and make a couple of million tons a year of oil available for others?

No one and everyone suffered shortages in WWII, in terms of economy wide production the wheels generally kept turning despite local problems, output was adjusted as required, with lots of shortages blamed. Measured against the western allies in things like trucks and artillery pieces per soldier the Germans had shortages in percentage terms as well as absolute terms. Is percentage a better way of measuring shortages?

The Nazi expansion of war making and sustaining ability pre war was near the limits of peace time abilities, the mid 1940 to mid 1941 period was the last real chance to lay down long term capacity increases but that ran into the need for more air and sea power to fight Britain and an increase in land power to fight the USSR, plus provide occupation troops in the newly controlled territories before talking hubris.

The Red Army counter attack around Moscow in 1941 recovered the Mosbas coal mines, an important resource.

To reiterate, if you want just about anybody's 1939 economy to look good, compare it to the 1932 to 1934 one, want it to look bad compare it to the 1928/29 one and what really is a definition of a shortage for an economy, not just an individual program. Remember Britain and Canada combined were short of resources compared with the US, just like Germany.

 

[Zmauky]

I would just add that statements (especially by politicians) are just that - just a statements.

A small illustration note - the Convair B-36 was born from the request to build an intercontinental bomber - during 1940 when the Americans expected that the UK might lose the war (after the fall of France and during BoB) and that they would not have friendly bases in Europe.

And Stalin ... well, between the end of the SCW and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, only 4 months passed. I am not sure when the Soviets withdrew from Spain, but it is certain that they looked at each other through the sights.

And not to mention the UK - French idea of an expeditionary corps in Finland during winter war.

I think it is quite ungrateful to claim what would happen in case of this or that event, especially based on statements (and also no plan are set in stone).

The course of history as we know it is sometimes much stranger than one would expect.

I mean that my experience of history is that we are wandering and wandering and that many events (and thus the course of history) are mostly coincidentally exactly as they were (and under the influence of Murphy).

Like for example ... what are the six coldest winters in the 20th century?
Or what If certain courier plane had not crashed, would the German campaign to the west in '40 have been a copy of WW1 (as planned) ..

Actually, maybe we need a thread "random events that changed the course of history"

 

[bf109xxl]

The Red Army counter attack around Moscow in 1941 recovered the Mosbas coal mines, an important resource.

The importance of the Mosbass should not be overestimated. In 1940 it provided about 6% of the total coal production in the USSR and mainly brown coal for power plants . After the evacuation of factories in the Tula region in 1941 (for example, the Kosogorsk metallurgical plant was evacuated to Lys'va in Ural region), the importance of the Mosbass further decreased. In 1942 the Mosbass produced less coal than in 1941, only in 1943 production increased by 70%.
The USSR suffered from a severe shortage of coking coal for the steel production, thus the most important supplier of coal during the war was the Kuzbass.

 

[History Learner]

I would just add that statements (especially by politicians) are just that - just a statements.

I definitely get where you're coming from on this, so we can analyze it further on an objective basis. As far as the rhetorical level, Stalin was relaying it in private to the British Government for purposes of war coordination which would reduce the propensity to lie given if London thinks the Soviets are a lost cause they might cut aid which was essential to the USSR at that point. We can further test that by looking at the industrial data of the USSR at the time, which shows the Moscow region alone represented 25% of Soviet manufacturing output and 50% of vehicle output (Most of the Soviet aviation industry was based there or around relatively nearby Gorky):

In 1941 the main industrial sites (see next map) were, not surprisingly, around the two largest cities: Moscow and Leningrad. Moscow assembled 50% of all the vehicles and machine tools in the country and 40% of all electrical equipment. It also had several aircraft factories. There were 475 major plants in the capital city. Leningrad had 520 factories and 780.000 workers and produced 20% of the machine tools, 91% of the hydro turbines, 82% of the turbine generators, and had among other firms, the Kirov works, the largest manufacturing plant in the country that produced the heavy KV-1 tanks. Leningrad by itself contributed 10% of the total Soviet industrial production. Together, both cities were responsible for more than one-fifth of the industrial production of the Soviet Union.​

A small illustration note - the Convair B-36 was born from the request to build an intercontinental bomber - during 1940 when the Americans expected that the UK might lose the war (after the fall of France and during BoB) and that they would not have friendly bases in Europe.

The B-36, when fully developed and produced in sufficient numbers in the late 1940s, would indeed be a powerful weapon but up until 1944, nuclear development was seen as a deterrent, not an offensive weapon system:

Up until early 1944, the bomb was still talked about as if it were going to be a deterrent against Germany. By August 1943, for example, Vannevar Bush was still reporting to Roosevelt that the Germans might be ahead, or at least neck-and-neck in the "race" for the bomb: "This may result in a situation where it will be necessary for us to stand the first punishing blows before we are in a position to destroy the enemy." By early 1944, Groves had decided that the Germans having a bomb was "unlikely," but that it still needed to be held out as a possibility. By late 1944, it was clear, from the Alsos mission, that Germany was nowhere near an atomic bomb — and indeed, they soon learned that the German program was in 1945 not even as far as where the Americans had gotten by the end of 1942. I put this out just as context for their thinking. Over the course of late 1943 through 1944, the bomb shifted from being a deterrent to a first-strike weapon — a weapon that was meant to be used, not held in reserve.

The reason for this is because until the Alsos Mission, it was thought Germany was either ahead or tied with the American project in nuclear developments. Allied planners were thus operating under a Proto-MAD logic; their atomic program was meant to prevent the Germans from using their own offensively against them. To this end, the one targeting committee held while the ETO was still raging in 1943 solely focused on the Japanese:

The point of use of the first bomb was discussed and the general view appeared to be that its best point of use would be on a Japanese fleet concentration in the Harbor of Truk. General Styer suggested Tokio but it was pointed out that the bomb should be used where, if it failed to go off, it would land in water of sufficient depth to prevent easy salvage. The Japanese were selected as they would not be so apt to secure knowledge from it as would the Germans.1

Post-War, General Groves stated FDR only asked once about using the atomic bomb against Germany (During the Battle of the Bulge), and he gave a host of reasons as to why this was unlikely to be practical:

REPORTER: General Groves, could we go back for a minute. You mentioned in your book [Now it Can Be Told] that just before the Yalta Conference that President Roosevelt said if we had bombs before the European war was over he would like to drop them on Germany.3 Would you discuss this?

GROVES: At the conference that Secretary Stimson and myself had with President Roosevelt shortly before his departure, I believe it was December 30th or 31st of 1944, President Roosevelt was quite disturbed over the Battle of the Bulge and he asked me at that time whether I could bomb Germany as well as Japan. The plan had always been to bomb Japan because we thought the war in Germany was pretty apt to be over in the first place and in the second place the Japanese building construction was much more easily damaged by a bomb of this character than that in Germany. I urged President Roosevelt that it would be very difficult for various reasons.

The main one was that the Germans had quite strong aerial defense. They made a practice, as every nation does, that when a new plane came into the combat area, that they would run any risk that they could to bring such a plane down so that they could examine it and see what new ideas had come in so that they could make improvements and also would know the characteristics of the plane so that they could prepare a better defense against it. We had no B-29's in Europe. If we had sent over a small squadron or group as we did against Japan of this type, everyone of them would have been brought down on the first trip to Germany. If they hadn't been, it would have been through no lack of effort on the part of the Germans.

The alternative would be to bring a large number of B-29's over to to England and that would have been a major logistical task and the other possibility would have been to have used a British plane which would not have been a bit pleasing to General Arnold and also would have created a great many difficulties for our general operation because then it would be an Allied operation with the United States furnishing the bombs and everything connected with it but using a British plane and a British crew to actually drop the bomb and it would have raised a tremendous number of difficulties.

And difficulties like that — while you say you should be able to handle that — you can but in a project of this character there are so many little things, each one of them key, that you can't afford to throw any more sand into the wheels that you can help.

The bombing of Germany with atomic bombs was, I would say, never seriously considered to the extent of making definite plans but on this occasion I told the President, Mr. Roosevelt, why it would be very unfortunate from my standpoint, I added that of course if the President — if the war demanded it and the President so desired, we would bomb Germany and I was so certain personally that the war in Europe would be over before we would be ready that you might say I didn't give it too much consideration.

Given that, I sincerely doubt the U.S. would fight on until 1947 or 1948 to use a pair of untried weapon systems to break the stalemate.

I think it is quite ungrateful to claim what would happen in case of this or that event, especially based on statements (and also no plan are set in stone).

At least on the American end, they are being drawn from official reports rather than off hand statements. The Victory Plan of 1941, which was the official U.S. war plan created in expectation of Soviet collapse, directly came to the conclusion a straight conventional conflict could not be won by the Anglo-American alliance:

This conviction was reinforced over the course of 1941 and 1942, as it became clear the conquest of the USSR would render the "Blockade and Bomb" strategy unfeasible since the Axis would control sufficient resources that the former would be removed as impediment and the latter could be counter-acted and mitigated. From Stoler:

Eisenhower and his subordinates were far from alone or original in perceiving the overriding importance of continued Soviet participation in the war. As previously noted, in the summer and fall of 1941 Roosevelt and army planners had begun to recognize that victory over Germany might not be possible unless the Red Army continued to tie down the bulk of the Wehrmacht, and they consequently had made assistance to Russia a focal point of their global strategy. The JB had forcefully reiterated this conclusion by informing Roosevelt on December 21 that ''Russia alone possesses the manpower potentially able to defeat Germany in Europe.'' 26 The Soviets' late 1941 success in stopping the German advance on Moscow and launching a counteroffensive, occurring at a time when Axis forces were everywhere else successful, further reinforced this belief. As a result virtually all Allied planning papers in late 1941– early 1942 stressed the critical importance of aiding the Russians so that they could survive a renewed German onslaught. Roosevelt agreed. ''Nothing would be worse than to have the Russians collapse,'' he told Treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau on March 11. ''I would rather lose New Zealand, Australia, or anything else than have the Russians collapse.'' Five days earlier the JUSSC had bluntly stated that ''Russia must be supported now by every possible means'' because the absence of a Russian front would postpone ''indefinitely'' the end of the war.27 And as army planners realized, such postponement would only increase public and naval pressure to turn away completely from the indecisive European theater in favor of the Pacific.​

 

[History Learner]

In these debates what is defined as a long war and at what intensity? The 4+ years of WWI, the 5.66 years of WWII, the hundred years war? Germany alone against the world? Average western front (1915 to 1918) consumption and casualties from the start? Go and stop, only a few months of heavy ground and air combat in 21 months September 1939 to May 1941? Are we talking Germany as in 1936 or mid 1939? Italy as an active ally requiring resources? Choose one or the other and shortages grow and shrink.

Basically, the war as fought. Going into 1940, the Germans weren't expecting a quick victory but a prolonged struggled for France. The GSWW series notes their build out plans were meant for this, with munitions output set to peak in the second half of 1941 and thus presumably striking the fatal blow around that point. With the conquests they did rack up in 1940-1942, the systems the Germans did build before the war were able to carry them through until their collapse in 1944-1945 as Schmelzig notes.

Originally, thanks to Speer and things like statistics on the number of people classified as servants in 1942 the idea was little German economic mobilisation until 1942. In reality the Nazis were using things like off the books loans to push the economy hard in the 1930's trying to build autarky in planned key areas, like chemicals, explosives, rubber and oil while creating a powerful military, the war prevented a financial crisis, the pre war expansions into Austria and Czechoslovakia having fiscal reasons as well. The plan had its draw backs, synthetic oil costs more than natural which inhibited the take up of motor vehicles and so the civil demand. With guaranteed orders and profits local industry did not push hard on exports which were needed to generate the foreign exchange needed resulting in problems obtaining foreign credit. With women told to go make babies and plenty of government jobs available "full employment" was achieved, which certainly improved people's outlook on life, while purchasing ability and choice was improved versus the depression it was curtailed by the military allocations. Compare 1939 with 1933/34 and things look much better, use 1928/29 and they are worse.

The multi volume set Germany and the second world war has an article on economic preparations for war, Germany's trade in value terms bottomed out in 1934 at a third that of 1928 and 1929, it recovered to about 40% by 1939, which was a good thing for war planning as 60% of trade was expected to be cut or severely curtailed in a war with Britain and France, including metals, ores and liquid fuels. Nazi ideology downgraded the USSR from a top 3 trading partner to around 30th. If mobilisation had actually used the expected fuel levels Germany would have problems after between 2 (Diesel) and 7 (avgas) months of war. Coal miner work days went from 8 to 8.75 hours in 1939, electricity and gas had to be rationed pre war, the withdrawal of 3 million men from the economy had the inevitable effects, including coal shortages in the 1939/40 winter.

By incorporating Austria and Czechoslovakia Germany's steel production in 1939 finally exceeded the 1929 figure, being gifted over 1,000 aircraft and 500 or so tanks etc. from the Czech military was useful, similar for Austria. France supplied important raw materials and by allowing Vichy to rule kept the sea lanes to North Africa open, as well as links to Portugal and Türkiye.

Germany's expansion to June 1941 and into say Q3/41 was economically quite profitable, solving many raw material problems without using large amounts of raw materials to do so, with low casualties while providing plenty of war booty for at least training and second line formations. Was all that use of Red Army 76.2mm guns a sign of shortages or intelligent use of resources? Germany charged occupied countries fees paid in kind with raw materials with rigged currency exchange rates, while the army in the USSR used local resources where possible.

The ideal economy is balanced, no over or under production and not even the US could have everything it thought it needed. So you need to make judgement calls on where raw materials became the key shortage, and there are plenty of statements about could have, if only. Nazi ideology meant the killing or under employed millions of potential workers. The Germans worked around shortages, so did everyone else, they tailored their production to their resources, so did everyone else, they made decisions about stuff now versus production capacity now, stuff later, so did everyone else. Lots of local material crisis, so did everyone else. The western allies increased mechanisation of their farm sectors, the Germans employed more foreigners, a second best solution based on available resources. Germany's economy as managed did not suffer badly from raw material shortages like everyone else's because of production decisions, but at the same time specific programs like the jet engines certainly did, assemble enough specific programs or items and you can prove a material shortage, note the overall economy running reasonably smoothly and prove no real material shortages. How about introducing widespread refrigeration and watch food spoilage go down and reduce the need to buy fresh produce every day or two, cutting raw material use and increasing available worker hours. Another resource issue?

It looks like around May 1944 was the time German raw material shortages became widespread, that is usual requirements could not be met, reducing things like steel output, but the time lag between raw material and finished product meant peak war production was later. There is also an issue about the types and quality of steel being made given the alloy metal availability. A lack of steel was cited as an important reason in curtailing the synthetic oil program after war began as an example, cancelling warships another. Having the ability to retire military horses in favour of motorisation would have made the Heer more effective, so does the lack of truck and fuel production count as raw material constraint? How about the steel to make the truck and fuel plants? Or does having more tanks etc. now instead of more per month later provide enough benefits that it is an allocation decision, not a shortage decision? How about agricultural machinery instead of tanks?

Romania had plenty of oil for a European nation, built an oil based economy as a result and so only a minority of production was available for export, throw a gigantic wrecking ball into an economy of 20 million people and make a couple of million tons a year of oil available for others?

No one and everyone suffered shortages in WWII, in terms of economy wide production the wheels generally kept turning despite local problems, output was adjusted as required, with lots of shortages blamed. Measured against the western allies in things like trucks and artillery pieces per soldier the Germans had shortages in percentage terms as well as absolute terms. Is percentage a better way of measuring shortages?

The Nazi expansion of war making and sustaining ability pre war was near the limits of peace time abilities, the mid 1940 to mid 1941 period was the last real chance to lay down long term capacity increases but that ran into the need for more air and sea power to fight Britain and an increase in land power to fight the USSR, plus provide occupation troops in the newly controlled territories before talking hubris.

The Red Army counter attack around Moscow in 1941 recovered the Mosbas coal mines, an important resource.

To reiterate, if you want just about anybody's 1939 economy to look good, compare it to the 1932 to 1934 one, want it to look bad compare it to the 1928/29 one and what really is a definition of a shortage for an economy, not just an individual program. Remember Britain and Canada combined were short of resources compared with the US, just like Germany.

I agree with some of this and some I don't. The UN trading statistics for example show Germany had recovered to 80% of the level of 1928 by 1938:

Without question, the loss of trade with the Soviets was a blow initially, but the Germans made up for it by intensified trade with Southern and Eastern Europe, as Germany had effectively established economic hegemony in the region and this was a major reason for the Anglo-French taking a hardline on Poland:

Spoiler: Trade with Northeastern Europe compared to Soviet Trade

Spoiler: Trade with the Balkans

As for the MEFO situation, what had happened was they had run out of foreign exchange to fund the purchases necessary for continued rearmament at the pace they were on. This had happened before in 1937 and had been resolved without an economic collapse by slowing down the pace of rearmament. What was different in 1939 was that the Anglo-French had begun to rearm following Munich, which made taking another pause more dicey. The alternative, as Tooze notes, was to go to a proper war economy and exceed the "20% GNP threshold" but the Nazis were reluctant to begin suppressing living standards given the memory of 1918:

Spoiler: Tooze on the MEFO Situation

Spoiler: Richard Overy on the MEFO situation

Basically, the Germans weren't at risk of an economic collapse but they did face the situation of having to take another pause or repress living standards. Ultimately, Hitler created a third option of war with Poland in the expectation it wouldn't lead to the onset of a general war while granting the resources needed to continue arming; obviously he was wrong. With the benefit of hindsight, the best option was to cancel or delay Plan Z which began in 1939 and would've freed up sufficient resources that the Army and Luftwaffe could continue to arm without triggering the onset of a general war yet.

 

[Zmauky]

My problem is that I am a bit lazy, so it is difficult and also time-consuming ( the free time I don't have to much) to extract exact numbers and quotes. This does not mean that I do not like to read them and learn something new.
On the other hand, I assume that we all know the topics we are discussing quite well. And that perhaps I should substantiate my statements more extensively.

Bottom line, when I wrote that the loss of Leningrad, Moscow and Ukraine would put the Soviets in a very difficult situation, I am not wrong. After that, would a new Brest-Litovsk, surrender, or something else follow...

It's another thing when we can talk about things that did happen... like for example Roosevelt's conversation with (I think it was) the bishop of New York (there are records) in which Roosevelt says that he doesn't care about Eastern Europe and that he is ready to sell it to Soviets for their key contribution in the war with Germany.

In any case, an interesting question (even if we drifted far from the topic) is whether, in the event that Germany has A-bombs and an active war with USA and UK, the USA would be ready to sacrifice the UK and leave the islands to nuclear bombing ?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

British report of German metal stocks as of September 1939, at 1939 consumption rate, months of stocks, copper 7.2, lead 9.7, zinc 11.5, antimony 13.6, cobalt 30, nickel, molybdenum, chrome and vanadium all about 13 months, tungsten 15, manganese ore 18 months, iron ore stocks 9 months at 1938 (not 9) consumption rate. I suggest dropping the spoiler label of included data.

Basically, the war as fought. Going into 1940, the Germans weren't expecting a quick victory but a prolonged struggled for France.

The original statement talked about things before the war, the strengthening of key war making industries in the 1930's, reduction of key imports, now we are in 1940, at war, with many uncertainties resolved, and like others entering the war pruning of long term projects had happened, those that could produce useful items over the next couple of years continued. So yes, the Germans in early 1940 assumed a war in France would be at least a two year campaign. What was the pre war planning assumptions on war opponents and duration? The ones that formed the basis of pre war capacity planning?

The GSWW series notes their build out plans were meant for this, with munitions output set to peak in the second half of 1941 and thus presumably striking the fatal blow around that point. With the conquests they did rack up in 1940-1942, the systems the Germans did build before the war were able to carry them through until their collapse in 1944-1945 as Schmelzig notes.

The systems built before and early in the war were capacity, which is separate to the sources of inputs, September 1939 to May 1944 is 56 or so months, no one could afford that level of vital war stocks. The conquests gave the raw materials and extra industrial capacity, including niche items like steel mills able to use different ore grades. During the war German capacity was overall quite well matched to raw materials once adjustments were made, like everyone else, shortages were worked around. The old assumption the Germans did not do long term capacity planning and expansion is as wrong as they did a really good job at it so the conquests are not really that relevant. Essentially the Germans idled large numbers of non German factories etc. to ensure the German ones had enough raw materials, that had its usual downside, for example making new, or just spare parts for, non German agricultural machinery.

I agree with some of this and some I don't. The UN trading statistics for example show Germany had recovered to 80% of the level of 1928 by 1938:

Germany and the Second world War yearly figures have a different take which needs to be resolved, the UN figures have a footnote regarding Germany, in 1938 Germany expanded to absorb Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia, what does the UN report for those countries? Things like goods or goods and services and loan repayments come into play.

The north eastern Europe trade table provided does not include Sweden, which had a quite stable requirement for coal from Germany and in turn a reasonably stable export of high quality iron ore. It would be good to see what that trade did in the period, similar for Denmark which exported food. The Balkans table provided is running at roughly twice the value of the NE Europe one, in 1939 the Balkans is reported as having 9.9% of German trade, Scandinavia 11.4%, the Baltics 1.8%. We know Germany made a strong effort in these areas as they were safe from blockade, good prices were offered to the Balkans but only in return for purchasing German goods, a problem that military equipment sales ultimately helped fix. Another 9.1% of trade was Belgium, Holland and Switzerland, Italy 4.5%.

If you put the Balkans and NE Europe tables together the two way trade goes up by 60% 1935 to 1938 for around 15% of German trade, Germany and the Second World war reports a 27% increase in total trade. The 1938 Balkans trade was worth about 8% more than 1929 trade.

By the time the Nazis came to power gold and foreign exchange were down to under a fifth the 1930 peak, by 1937 about 2.5%, Austria restored things to about the 1933 levels.

Without question, the loss of trade with the Soviets was a blow initially, but the Germans made up for it by intensified trade with Southern and Eastern Europe, as Germany had effectively established economic hegemony in the region and this was a major reason for the Anglo-French taking a hardline on Poland:

How exactly does an April 1939 decision be affected by a long standing trade situation? Which is different to hegemony, that came in 1940/41. Also how does Poland fit in the hegemony concept, given its trade in 1938 in value terms is around those of the Balkan countries, though Poland had 1.75 to 5.7 times more people than the Balkan countries listed. The Balkan states noted they were at a disadvantage with Germany, being a minority of German trade but a big slice of theirs, unfortunately the British table of Balkan trade in 1938 only lists the major powers, there had to be intra Balkan trade for a start, so these percentage will need adjustment down, but 54.5% Germany, 7.1% Austria, 10.3% Czechoslovakia, 9.2% Italy, 4.7% France, 14.2% Britain

As for the MEFO situation, what had happened was they had run out of foreign exchange to fund the purchases necessary for continued rearmament at the pace they were on.

MEFO were internal currency, not foreign exchange, which required selling things to other people.

This had happened before in 1937 and had been resolved without an economic collapse by slowing down the pace of rearmament. What was different in 1939 was that the Anglo-French had begun to rearm following Munich, which made taking another pause more dicey.

The British and French had begun rearmament in 1935/36 and as they noted the increasing German expenditure they in turn increased theirs, and began to involve other countries, like the US. The British and French economies combined were superior to Germany's and that was beginning to tell.

Basically, the Germans weren't at risk of an economic collapse but they did face the situation of having to take another pause or repress living standards.

No one ever said they faced a collapse, only a combination of internal finance plus foreign exchange problems. The Nazis more than quadrupled the military budget between 1934/35 and 1938/39, plus about a sixth of total military spend in the time period came from the loans, with no new loans written in 1939. In 1938 42.7% of German Government expenditure was on the military, representing 18.1% of the GDP. In the first year of WWII the Government was using 35.7% of it's budget to repay loans, from around September 1940 onwards the German government spent more money on loan repayments than new weapons. In the period 1 September 1943 to 31 August 1944, the percentage split was Wehrmacht 23.1%, civil departments 11.6%, debt repayments 65.3%. In 1933 the German government had debts as 1 short and 11 long term, in 1939 it was 15 short and 27 long term (not sure about units).

Ultimately, Hitler created a third option of war with Poland in the expectation it wouldn't lead to the onset of a general war while granting the resources needed to continue arming;

What exactly were the resources in Poland and how long would they last?

With the benefit of hindsight, the best option was to cancel or delay Plan Z which began in 1939 and would've freed up sufficient resources that the Army and Luftwaffe could continue to arm without triggering the onset of a general war yet.

In simple terms no, the German navy was too small. When the RN went around selling total cost of ownership as a yearly sum over the lifetime of the ship, a battleship cost 58.5 naval aircraft, a large cruiser 26.1, a small cruiser 17.6 and a destroyer or submarine around 5.7. As a quick guide double the aircraft cost for twin engine bombers. Apart from changes in manufacturing capacity there were economic reasons why there was no 1930's dreadnought race. During the war a medium tank cost around the same as a single seat single engine fighter, in 1939 the Germans built 732 tanks including 246 panzer II and 8,295 aircraft of all types. The army had a much bigger wages, accommodation, transport etc cost than the air force or navy but a much lower per capita equipment cost. On 2 September 1939 the Luftwaffe quartermaster reported operational combat units held 3,609 aircraft, plus another 552 transports, on 11 May 1940 the figures were 4,782 and 471.

Like everyone the Germans learnt to make things more efficiently, so add a time to any cost figure. Projected costs for the 1,000th a/c of each series, excluding engine(s) and propeller(s) based on a GL Ltd.Chef-Ing. report of 24 April 1941.

Bf109E = 15,000 RM (the Bf 109F would be the same)
Do17Z = 41,000 RM
He111H = 71,000 RM
Ju88A = 73,000 RM

In 1939 the Germans published a price list for various aircraft available for export. The prices dropped according to how many were ordered. The aircraft were fully equipped. So an order for less than 50 Bf109E would have an individual cost of 162,000 RM. An order for 201 or more would have an individual cost of 130,000 RM. The engine alone seems to have been a fixed cost at 47,000 RM. Assuming the 201+ order price was closest to the real cost (plus profit) then

Bf110C 290,000 RM
He111P 328,000 RM
He111H 330,000 RM
Hs126 128,000 RM
Ju52 200,000 RM
Ju87B 140,000 RM
Ju88A 305,000 RM

www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp905.pdf Might be worth digging out the audit reports the article uses.

Table 6 you will note the costs are maximum and minimum for the year and the Ju88 for 1939/1940 it is maximum 523,385, minimum 210,648 marks. So if you ignore the obvious high cost in 1939 you are much more able to see the real lowering of costs. In 1941/42 the Ju88A-4 came it at between 170,605 and 167,129 marks, the tropical version between 173,143 and 159,143 marks. In 1942/43 the Ju88A-4 trop came in at between 141,246 and 139,274 marks.

Be careful about what is actually being paid for here, whether Junkers is charging for just the airframe and not all components. Also the later war use of forced and slave labour

 

[History Learner]

British report of German metal stocks as of September 1939, at 1939 consumption rate, months of stocks, copper 7.2, lead 9.7, zinc 11.5, antimony 13.6, cobalt 30, nickel, molybdenum, chrome and vanadium all about 13 months, tungsten 15, manganese ore 18 months, iron ore stocks 9 months at 1938 (not 9) consumption rate. I suggest dropping the spoiler label of included data. The original statement talked about things before the war, the strengthening of key war making industries in the 1930's, reduction of key imports, now we are in 1940, at war, with many uncertainties resolved, and like others entering the war pruning of long term projects had happened, those that could produce useful items over the next couple of years continued. So yes, the Germans in early 1940 assumed a war in France would be at least a two year campaign. What was the pre war planning assumptions on war opponents and duration? The ones that formed the basis of pre war capacity planning?

The systems built before and early in the war were capacity, which is separate to the sources of inputs, September 1939 to May 1944 is 56 or so months, no one could afford that level of vital war stocks. The conquests gave the raw materials and extra industrial capacity, including niche items like steel mills able to use different ore grades. During the war German capacity was overall quite well matched to raw materials once adjustments were made, like everyone else, shortages were worked around. The old assumption the Germans did not do long term capacity planning and expansion is as wrong as they did a really good job at it so the conquests are not really that relevant. Essentially the Germans idled large numbers of non German factories etc. to ensure the German ones had enough raw materials, that had its usual downside, for example making new, or just spare parts for, non German agricultural machinery.

Volume 5 of the GSWW series covers it in excellent detail and I also can't recommend Scherner's article enough either. He specifically jumps on that exact point about the 1930s autarkic measures as having laid the resource foundations for the war as fought:

How did blockade-induced measures affect German consumption of essential raw materials during the Second World War? To answer this question, it is important to distinguish between measures aimed at the domestic economy (such as autarky policies and stockpiling) and those resulting from the exploitation of occupied territories and imports more broadly. This distinction is helpful because, prior to the war, the Nazi authorities did not have a clear understanding of which territories would be occupied and therefore could not determine the extent of inflows from them. By differentiating between the effects from domestic measures and those from abroad, we can better assess the extent to which the improved supply was the result of conscious preparation for a future blockade or simply favoured by the course of the war. This is particularly important because the improved supply during the Second World War is often attributed primarily to the greater exploitation of occupied territories through imports and foreign labour inflows.90

However, the contribution of occupied territories to Nazi Germany's wartime supply of raw materials for the armaments industry and the Wehrmacht during World War II was mainly rather small, especially if we consider that German consumption exceeded that of the First World War by far.91 German supply (including that of substitutes) was often primarily or almost exclusively the result of domestic measures implemented in the 1930s to reduce consumption and/or increase of domestic production. This was particularly true for the supply of fuels, rubber, and non-ferrous metals.92 However, the situation differed for iron ore: significantly larger domestic supply could have been achieved, but cost considerations prevented the mining of German ores, which had a low iron content, to the maximum extent.93​

Obviously, I can't cite the article in full here but I highly recommend reading it in full to you and everyone else as its great scholarship.

Germany and the Second world War yearly figures have a different take which needs to be resolved, the UN figures have a footnote regarding Germany, in 1938 Germany expanded to absorb Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia, what does the UN report for those countries? Things like goods or goods and services and loan repayments come into play.

Included within the German category for that year is my understanding.

How exactly does an April 1939 decision be affected by a long standing trade situation? Which is different to hegemony, that came in 1940/41. Also how does Poland fit in the hegemony concept, given its trade in 1938 in value terms is around those of the Balkan countries, though Poland had 1.75 to 5.7 times more people than the Balkan countries listed. The Balkan states noted they were at a disadvantage with Germany, being a minority of German trade but a big slice of theirs, unfortunately the British table of Balkan trade in 1938 only lists the major powers, there had to be intra Balkan trade for a start, so these percentage will need adjustment down, but 54.5% Germany, 7.1% Austria, 10.3% Czechoslovakia, 9.2% Italy, 4.7% France, 14.2% Britain

Because naval buildups are insanely expensive, and Plan Z was no exception. Starting in January of 1939, the Navy was given predominance in the steel rations and this had a drastic impact for both the Heer and Luftwaffe:

1939-1940 Production Plans (reduced plans)

MG 34 - 61,000 (13,000)
105mm Artillery - 840 (460)
Pz III/IV tanks - 1,200 (600)
Aircraft - 10,000 in 1939 (~6,000)

Ammunition production likewise collapsed per WoD:

As far as the matter of Poland, in what context are you asking?

MEFO were internal currency, not foreign exchange, which required selling things to other people.

Yes, which is the point both Overy and Tooze make; there wasn't a risk of a financial crisis in 1939. The issue was the matter of having enough foreign exchange to continue bankrolling rearmament at then current rates.

The British and French had begun rearmament in 1935/36 and as they noted the increasing German expenditure they in turn increased theirs, and began to involve other countries, like the US. The British and French economies combined were superior to Germany's and that was beginning to tell.

Germany had already reached parity the with the Anglo-French by 1937-before the first wave of annexations-per Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. Adam Tooze notes that by 1940, Germany had come to rival the industrial base of the United States:

For 1930, we find a remarkable similarity in machine to worker ratios between Germany and the United States. There are differences in certain key areas. However, the US stock of metal-working tools is not yet distinguished by a clear commitment to mass production technology. For the period after 1935, until the early 1940s, our data suggest a remarkable degree of convergence. The American stock stagnated. In some areas, there was disinvestment. And the average age of machinery rose dramatically. By contrast, Germany entered a period of rapid catch-up, which appears to have continued into the early years of the war. By 1940, German metal-working came close to matching its American counterpart in terms of the number of workers employed and the quantity and types of machines installed. German machines were, on average, far younger. This process of catching-up, however, was dramatically reversed during World War II. Over a period of no more than four years the American stock expanded by over eighty percent and growth was markedly concentrated in key categories of mass production equipment. It appears that it was only in this period that mass production machinery came to truly dominate US metal-working. German investment, albeit moving in the same direction, failed to match the new intensity of American commitment to mass production in some key machinery classes​

No one ever said they faced a collapse, only a combination of internal finance plus foreign exchange problems. The Nazis more than quadrupled the military budget between 1934/35 and 1938/39, plus about a sixth of total military spend in the time period came from the loans, with no new loans written in 1939. In 1938 42.7% of German Government expenditure was on the military, representing 18.1% of the GDP. In the first year of WWII the Government was using 35.7% of it's budget to repay loans, from around September 1940 onwards the German government spent more money on loan repayments than new weapons. In the period 1 September 1943 to 31 August 1944, the percentage split was Wehrmacht 23.1%, civil departments 11.6%, debt repayments 65.3%. In 1933 the German government had debts as 1 short and 11 long term, in 1939 it was 15 short and 27 long term (not sure about units).

Overy doesn't really seem to see the internal finance as an issue and both him and Tooze seem agreed the chief issue was foreign exchange. The Germans had been there before, in 1937, and had to dramatically slow rearmament which was the central issue at play. As Overy notes, neither Hitler nor even Schnacht (Removed early 1939) thought the economy was the issue, but rather the wider strategic picture; with Anglo-French rearmament gathering steam and the U.S. signalling more support, Germany's position would suffer relative decline.

With the benefit of hindsight we know this wasn't a realistic worry; Britain was already struggling to keep apace by 1938-1939 and was already at it's maximum effort.

What exactly were the resources in Poland and how long would they last?

For one, the coal and steel of Polish Silesia as well as extensive farmland (Thus expanding the internal food supply, reducing import needs) and other material benefits. I'll try to double check WoD when I get a chance to confirm it fully.

 

[muskeg13]

AI assisted responses and their too detailed fact checks may lead to the demise of this forum.

 

[SpicyJuan11]

AI assisted responses and their too detailed fact checks may lead to the demise of this forum.

Are you accusing HistoryLearner of using AI? Nothing in his post indicates that. If he did use AI, it would be easy to check if the sources cited don't even exist…