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There really is no sense in any of these statements about Guernica and 'terror bombing' 70 years after the even.
I wasn't suggesting an alternate way to defeat the UK, I was suggesting creating strategies potent enough to be able to force them into a cold war style armistice in the long run while making them impotent enough to weather any counter-attacks in the short run. (this would, of course, be very different than the sort of thinking Hitler had in general ... more the sort of scenario one of those early-war Military Coup alternate histories might include, depending just who ended up in charge) Re-organizing Germany into a practical, efficient military and economic logistics machine with planning and goals that could actually be met in the real-world is rather another topic entirely though.Most historians would disagree, Hitler needed to force a surrender or capitulation of the UK. The UKs only means of attack was by air and air raids were in the most part repulsed in day time, the RAF went into the night before the LW. The Channel was closed to shipping early in the BoB and the first happy time of the U Boat war is generally said to start in June 1940. The high point of surface raider activity Graf Spee Admiral Scheer Gneisenau Bismark was about this time. The thread is about escort of German bombers and Goerings orders for it.
The comments were regarding pre-war R&D and tactics, not specific to the BoB beyond citing the limits in available weapons/resources and reasons for their absence.Again the thread is about Goering's orders for the BoB, you may think that it is sensible to put bombs onto 109s while the 109 escorts of bombers attacking London had to leave them defenceless due to lack of fuel, I disagree. The distance between France and London is well known and London was so obvious a target that Hitler demanded that he had the "say so" on when it was attacked. When London was attacked the escorts couldnt make the mission.
What is this about the HS123 in the BoB? If it was used it would have been decimated. The Ju 87 like many planes was great until it was opposed.
Exactly, it was an entirely different situation than what had previously complied with German Military doctrine and particularly demanded tactical strike aircraft better able to defend themselves as well as strategic bombing operations outside of existing LW practice in the preceding battles. (also ones they lacked the logistics planning to cope with)You cannot operate "close support" over the English Channel.
The terror tactics also worked rather well in as far as inducing short-term disarray and panic making it easier for ground forces to advance and and establish occupation. Those tactics break down when you take way the immediate invasion on the ground. Germany simply lacked the proper naval resources to mount any sort of real invasion (and trying to mount an invasion from the air alone would have been well beyond their existing resources as far as heavy military transports and gliders went), and anything leading up to invasion plans was effectively a waste of resources.There is a lot of sense. Historians can dissect the statements reports and records but in the late 1930s everyone in Europe knew what happened when German bombers bombed a city. Any comments on Rotterdam and Warsaw? in fact any city where the Germans had an army on the outskirts and the LW in range. The tactics used were the same as in medieval times, position a large army outside the city and bombard it.
My suggestion was only partially relevant to the BoB scenario specifically (and mostly for coastal strikes within practical range of bombed-up 109s) but was more centered on the missed opportunities to investigate fighter-bomber equipment and tactics pre-war. Particularly experimenting with bombloads on fighters and comparing the capabilities with those of dedicated bombers. (in general practice, dedicated dive bombers tended to have better accuracy, better maximum bombload and usually better range with a given bombload as well -comparing twin engine fighters to single engine dive bombers could skew things though, among other variables)The problem was that when other units of the Jagdwaffe started to equip a staffel as fighter bombers they flew in as high as they could, though lower and slower than their bomb less escorts, and dropped their bombs and scarpered at the first sign of the RAF. Scattering a few small bombs over London and south east England was indeed a waste of resources.
It wasn't so much the concept as the implementation that was flawed.
They potentially could have been fitted with small wing racks akin to the Ar 68 and some pre-war American fighters holding 10 kg (or 20 lb) bombs. 3 under each wing seemed to be common practice with both the USAAC and LW in the mid 1930s.Obviously a Bf 109 was an either/or as far as bombs and drop tanks went. It couldn't carry both.
In war terms it is difficult to calculate present day costs. On an inflation calculation a 1939 spitfire costs about £1,500,000 today which may be about right when a hand built one goes at auction for £3,100,000. I presume a Bf109 would be slightly cheaper but not by much. In the BoB and in most conflicts the pilots were much more valuable than the planes they flew. Using Bf109s to randomly scatter 500 Lb explosives over the UK was a foolhardy and political venture no military thinking behind it at all. The chances of them costing the UK more than they cost themselves was very low. EPB 210 had some training in low level bombing attacks the first pilots to drop bombs from a Bf109 had none.Scattering a few small bombs over London and south east England was indeed a waste of resources.
It wasn't so much the concept as the implementation that was flawed.
Obviously a Bf 109 was an either/or as far as bombs and drop tanks went. It couldn't carry both.
EPB 210 had some training in low level bombing attacks the first pilots to drop bombs from a Bf109 had none.
The terror tactics also worked rather well in as far as inducing short-term disarray and panic making it easier for ground forces to advance and and establish occupation. Those tactics break down when you take way the immediate invasion on the ground. Germany simply lacked the proper naval resources to mount any sort of real invasion (and trying to mount an invasion from the air alone would have been well beyond their existing resources as far as heavy military transports and gliders went), and anything leading up to invasion plans was effectively a waste of resources.
They could wage a tactical war against coastal operations and they could wage a strategic war against industry and shipping, but planning an invasion of the UK (beyond the Channel Islands) was a waste. Even for propaganda purposes I'm not sure ... if threat of invasion more useful than threat of being starved out or isolated from mainland Europe? (not more useful for inducing fear, but more useful for reducing overall will to fight one way or another -including fostering apathy among isolationists)
I understand that you are referring to the Bf 109 pilots of the designated 'jabo' Staffeln of the various Gruppen and you would be correct about them. Not only did they have no proper training, they very much resented being forced into this role.
To be strictly accurate I would mention that Erprobungskommando 210 also flew Bf 109s and that those pilots did have rudimentary training in low level bombing using a gun sight.
Cheers
Steve
I'm aware of the significance of the Battle of the Atlantic, though I will admit to not being intimately familiar with the sheer numbers involved, thanks for those details.The sea battle known as the battle of the Atlantic was part of the sea war between the allies and Germany, it was the longest battle fought in the whole war and among the hardest in terms of losses, technical endeavour and resources used.
Now, rather than going further off into possible points on investing in strategic bombers and maritime patrol aircraft or such, there is still a relevant overarching point about bomber escort as well as my tangent on fighter-bombers:
In as far as supporting the anti-shipping efforts, harassing/disrupting RAF coastal fighter groups and preventing them from effectively intercepting anti-shipping operations would be significant. Any heavy tactical bomber efforts aimed at destroying coastal fighter bases (aircraft and infrastructure -and personnel- alike) would still need escort, and that would certainly include any Ju 87 strike forces. (which would be vulnerable during attacks as well as much more vulnerable than level bombers on their return flights after dropping bombs) So you've got tactical bombers with escorts and some of those escorting fighters also making strafing runs, or you potentially have a larger force of fighter-bombers sooner with the ability to run or fight effectively once bombs are dropped. (Bf 110s could at least run in most cases -hypothetical production Fw 187A-1s should also be able to outrun and outclimb Spitfires at lower altitudes)
Ju 87s obviously have the advantage in bombing accuracy and bombload (at least compared to Jabo 109Es) so plenty of potential advantages to escorting them over using fighter-bombers alone.
What is this about KM or LW carrier borne aircraft? Germany didnt build any carriers? The Graf Spee, Bismark Admiral Scheer and other well armed surface raiders were either sunk or confined to port, an aircraft carrier would be in an even worse position than a pocket battleship, Germany didnt have a fleet of ships to sacrifice to protect them. Germany quickly learned that no matter how well designed or used their ships were, any engagement resulted in a need for repairs and there was no where to have the repairs done apart from in home ports where they were trapped and liable to suffer more damage.I'd also forgotten one factor on Naval fighters over their land based counterparts: with the strictly limited capacity for aircraft (and maintenance resources) on carriers, having fewer, more general-purpose/versatile types is more important than with their land-based counterparts. So the retention of bomb carrying capabilities even during the period in the late 30s where fighter-bombers seemed to disappear from interest. This may have been one more area important for the 109T had the kriegsmarine actually gotten its own air force (and aircraft carriers). A navalized Ju 87 was already planned, but using the Bf 109T as the primary carrier-borne fighter/fighter-bomber might make a great deal of sense. And an aircraft carrier force (not to mention coordinated Navy-controlled land-based patrol aircraft) would have made a huge impact on the Atlantic Theater. Considering allocating Jumo 211B/C/D powered versions of the 109T and Fi 167 might have made it a more attractive prospect to LW logistics as well -less sapping of limited DB engine resources while the Jumo engine's poorer altitude performance would be less significant and slight advantage in take-off power might be an advantage in spite of the slightly higher weight and frontal area)
I'd also forgotten one factor on Naval fighters over their land based counterparts: with the strictly limited capacity for aircraft (and maintenance resources) on carriers, having fewer, more general-purpose/versatile types is more important than with their land-based counterparts. So the retention of bomb carrying capabilities even during the period in the late 30s where fighter-bombers seemed to disappear from interest. This may have been one more area important for the 109T had the kriegsmarine actually gotten its own air force (and aircraft carriers). A navalized Ju 87 was already planned, but using the Bf 109T as the primary carrier-borne fighter/fighter-bomber might make a great deal of sense. And an aircraft carrier force (not to mention coordinated Navy-controlled land-based patrol aircraft) would have made a huge impact on the Atlantic Theater. Considering allocating Jumo 211B/C/D powered versions of the 109T and Fi 167 might have made it a more attractive prospect to LW logistics as well -less sapping of limited DB engine resources while the Jumo engine's poorer altitude performance would be less significant and slight advantage in take-off power might be an advantage in spite of the slightly higher weight and frontal area)
Wouldn't development have improved had more interest and investments been made in aircraft carrier development? (including putting emphasis there in place of Bismark and Tirpitz?) Then again, with the lack of experience and necessary learning curve there, it might have been better to forgo development entirely and focus on land based Naval aircraft operations. (in that case, the likes of the Fw 187 might be more interesting as far as fighters go)The GRAF ZEPPELIN was a deeply flawed design that reflected the near total lack of experience the KM had with this type of ship. Its planned aircraft complement was 40 a/c with just 10 Me109T and 10 Ju87s, the remainder of the complement was to be Fi167s.
In 1942, when plans were dusted off and revived to get the carrier into service, it was planned to place 15 modified Bf 109fs and 25 Ju87s on the carrier.
Indeed, increased fuel capacity along with wider track, inward retracting landing gear would likely be required to be really acceptable in carrier operations. (the wing slats should have made for fairly smooth take-off and landing operations, though, with little concern of dropping wings or torque rolling when near stalling) Granted, most of those changes would also be extremely useful for the land-based 109 counterparts.In both cases, neither of the subtypes (109T and 109F(T)), were designed to carry bombs, and I strongly suspect that in both cases, any attempt to carry things with these aircraft would have been to get fuel capacity increased, as for both types endurance was far too limited to do anything else.
Was that a similar mechanism to the catapults used to launch aircraft from German battleships?Graf Zeppelin had an inefficient catapult system, which kept her 'spot rate" (the rate that she could launch and retrieve aircraft) well down compared to even the British carriers.
The Graf Zepplin's compressed air system was only good for about 18 aircraft before it had to recharge it's reservoirs.Was that a similar mechanism to the catapults used to launch aircraft from German battleships?
Wouldn't development have improved had more interest and investments been made in aircraft carrier development? (including putting emphasis there in place of Bismark and Tirpitz?) Then again, with the lack of experience and necessary learning curve there, it might have been better to forgo development entirely and focus on land based Naval aircraft operations. (in that case, the likes of the Fw 187 might be more interesting as far as fighters go)
Indeed, increased fuel capacity along with wider track, inward retracting landing gear would likely be required to be really acceptable in carrier operations. (the wing slats should have made for fairly smooth take-off and landing operations, though, with little concern of dropping wings or torque rolling when near stalling) Granted, most of those changes would also be extremely useful for the land-based 109 counterparts.
A purpose-built carrier-borne fighter might be more attractive, though. (still likely using DB or Jumo engines given the power, drag and fuel consumption limits of the BMW and Bramo 9 cylinder radials) A 1200 ps Jumo engined fighter with similar general characteristics to the F2A or F4F would make sense in the early-war timeframe. (that would include the fuel capacity and range of those fighters)
A good catapult system is also less necessary if most/all aircraft have good STOL capabilities. Was that a similar mechanism to the catapults used to launch aircraft from German battleships?
Ah yes, but highly unlikely to ever occur. Aircraft design and procurement for the carrier remained at all times firmly the prerogative of the LW, not the fleet, and the LW was never going to expend resources designing and developing a purpose built carrier design.
But they did with the Me 155. The German's did have next to no experience with Aircraft Carriers, but couldn't they consult with Japan about their designs, etc?
The IJN had developed landing lights as described at http://www.ussessexcv9.org/pdfs/Japanese Carrier Operations.pdf. There was a good thread on IJN carrier operations including very good information from Shinpachi Japanese Carrier Operations....snip....
Japanese spot rates were good for a number of reasons. They had very simple deck procedures for example. The deck officer would simply dop a white flag and the deck strike would roll down the deck and take off one after the other. Because Japanese a/c were so light, most of the time they could do away with the need for any catapults. There were no batsmen to help guide in the returning flyers, from memory all the flyers got was streamers or smoke across the deck to indicate wind speed and strength.
...snip...