We may have two correct answers to this question.
It depends on the year/s being discussed.
Yes,
Air power is uniquely qualified to attack the heart of a nation's ability to wage war,
Unfortunately bomber command was totally incapable of executing such attacks for the first two to three years of the war. First two anyway with such ability coming on line in the 3rd year.
The argument on the other side is that while BC was fruitlessly trying to bomb the German infrastructure in those first two to three years they were also denying the other RAF commands the needed resources to even play wack-a-mole. Which is sometimes called combine operations.
Costal command was starved of suitable (or even partially suitable) aircraft for Anti-sub and maritime strike during those years.
BC argued against providing Fighter Command with additional fighters for the defense of Britain because that would hinder Bomber Commands campaign to destroy German bomber factories and fuel reserves and thus end the air attacks on Britain.
Bomber Command only released the barest minimum of aircraft for army support and even then didn't allow them to train for the army support role leading to large losses of army personnel and the losses of many brave RAF crews trying to perform the support function with improper aircraft, improperly equipped and having been improperly trained.
Whatever Command accomplished to shorten the war from May of 1942 on has to be balanced against what Bomber Command cost the British armed forces as a whole from Sept 1939 to the summer of 1942 and in some cases beyond.
Lets remember that a large number of Bomber Commands "strategic" bombers in 1939/40 were Fairey Battles and Bristol Blenheim's. The ability to deliver devastating blows to the German infrastructure didn't exist. These bombers could not be used in daylight against strategic targets without horrendous losses and they couldn't find the right city at night let alone the right factory. That didn't stop BC from fighting tooth an nail to retain control over as many of these aircraft and squadrons as they could rather than give somebody the idea that, just perhaps, aircraft could take part in a tactical battle and affect the results.
What is especially damning is that BC knew they couldn't navigate at night from training exercises done over England before the war started. They knew they had no way to aim the bombs at night. They knew the Fairey Battle was not well suited to flying at night (vision problems form the cockpit for the pilot and the "navigator" had even less vision. They figured out by Dec of 1939 that even the Wellington with power turrets could not penetrate German airspace by daylight.
But instead of playing whack-a-mole in 1940-41 where they might have actual done some good or accomplished something, small as it might have been, They proceeded to loose hundreds of aircraft and aircrew without affecting the German war machine one bit or affecting the outcome of one land/sea battle.