drgondog
Major
I suspect tongue firmly in cheek. That said, Arnold was well aware during the Spanish Civil War, Blitzkrieg and then Battle of Britain - that the bomber frequently did not get through. The primary issues for both the Brits and US were a.) a single engine fighter with the fuel weight fraction necessary to extend to target range could not compete with the interceptors of the day, and b.) that multi engine aircraft with the fuel fraction potential, would be equally handicapped, but the only technologically feasible (at that time) escort solution. He personally changed the Kilner-Lindbergh and Emmons Report recommendations of low priority for long range (1500 miles) fighter to first, was his own vision that a 'back up' contingency that B-17 high speed and altitude would not be enough to support the Army Air Force War Plans Directive in the future.
Three factors in early-mid 1942 changed the game. Rolls-Royce took the initiative to push the hybrid Merlin 60 series engine/Mustang graft. NAA was finally supported by Arnold and the Planning/Military Requirements Divisions to recognize the Allison Mustang as superior to both the P-40 and P-39 - and run over Echols at MD who recommended converting Mustang production to B-25s. Arnold personally met with top RAF officials along with Winant and Hitchcock in May 1942 to get a briefing on the 'hybrid'. At that moment in time Packard was well on its way to production tooling for the 1650-3, but RAF/and the BAM were already discussing possible license production of NA-91 w/Merlin 65 in Britain.
The political maneuvering between AAF-HQ, AAF-MD, NAA, GM, Allison and RAF/BAM as the 'projects' unfolded in May-June 1942 when AAF awarded NA-101 conversion of two NA-91 airframes from Allison to Packard 1650-3 were intense (understatement).
Another extremely important intiative by AAF was the Long Range Extension Program initiated in March/April 1942 which embraced not only external combat tank integration into the contractor specifications but also mandated increasing internal fuel. Lockheed was already in compliance with external rack/fuel feed plumbing in the P-38, NAA had already integrated the same into the forthcoming A-36 and was testing in NA-83 AM118 in May. Republic figured out what was required to install the plumbing and racks as kits for P-47C/D through the P-47D-11 but they were very labor and time intensive throughout 1943 after first testing in June 1943.
