Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

I have posted this before, many people focus on a few things , like trucks or tanks or P-39 airplanes.

How about things like

Armor plate, no alloy, not fabricated 39,283,679 lbs.
Ferrochrome 7,820,3l3 lbs.
Ferromolybdenum 5,357,500 lbs.
Ferrovanadium 1,074,190 lbs.
Welding rods & wire, excl. electric 8,088,498 lbs.
Steel bars, cold finished 425,331,742 tons
Lathes 2,644
Turret lathes 3,073
Engine lathes & bench type 999
Engine, incL tool-room lathes 3,340
Electric locamotives railway mining 87
Steam turbine generator sets 991
Cars, railway, freight, over 10 ton 9,029

in the section for 1945
Trinitrotoluene (TNT) 31,831,984 lbs.

The trucks were important but they were part of the visible lend lease.
The behind the scenes stuff allowed the Russians to fabricate a lot of their own weapons from materials supplied to them.

Please spend some time going through the list, there is some fluff or items that would not make a lot of difference but there is an awful lot of stuff that helped the Russians build the quantity of materials (tanks, trucks, guns, shells) that rolled out of their own factories.

none of which were available to the USSR in any quantity from overseas sources.

You can count the number of ships arriving in the USSR on one hand in 1941.

I'm intrigued to have explained how and why the USSR will collapse well before Stalingrad.

At the end of November 1941, only 670 Soviet tanks were available to defend Moscow—that is, in the recently formed Kalinin, Western, and Southwestern Fronts. Only 205 of these tanks were heavy or medium types, and most of their strength was concentrated in the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the Southwestern Front two tank brigades (30 tanks).
Given the disruption to Soviet production and Red Army losses, the Soviet Union was understandably eager to put British armor into action as soon as possible. According to Biriukov's service diary, the first 20 British tanks arrived at the Soviet tank training school in Kazan on November 28, 1941. Simultaneously, a further 120 tanks were unloaded at the port of Archangel in northern Russia. Courses on the British tanks for Soviet crews started during November as the first tanks, with British assistance, were being assembled from their in-transit states and undergoing testing by Soviet specialists. British tanks, which far outweighed any US assistance at the time,

The tanks reached the front lines from mid December, and were certainly useful. Researchers estimate that British-supplied tanks made up 10 to 20 percent of the entire heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of January 1942, and certainly made up a significant proportion of tanks available as reinforcements at this critical point in the fighting. By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 266 tanks out of the 750 promised. but this was still just a drop in the ocean. And it is worth noting that deliveries of tanks and aircraft were afforded high priority for shipments to the USSR.

The British Military Mission to Moscow noted that by December 9, about 50 British tanks had already been in action with Soviet forces. The first of these units to have seen action seems to have been the 138th Independent Tank Battalion (with 12 British tanks), which was involved in stemming the advance of German units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in late November. In fact the British intercepted German communications indicating that German forces had first come in contact with British tanks on the Eastern front on November 26, 1941.

The exploits of the British-equipped 136th Independent Tank Battalion are perhaps the most widely noted in the archives. It was part of a scratch operational group of the Western Front consisting of the 18th Rifle Brigade, two ski battalions, the 5th and 20th Tank Brigades, and the 140th Independent Tank Battalion. The 136th Independent Tank Battalion was combined with the latter to produce a tank group of only twenty-one tanks, which was to operate with the two ski battalions against German forces advancing to the west of Moscow in early December. Other largely British-equipped tank units in action with the Western Front from early December were the 131st Independent Tank Brigade, which fought to the east of Tula, south of Moscow, and 146th Tank Brigade, in the region of Kriukovo to the immediate west of the Soviet capital.

While the Matilda Mk II and Valentine tanks supplied by the British were certainly inferior to the Soviets' homegrown T-34 and KV-1, it is important to note that Soviet production of the T-34 (and to a lesser extent the KV series), was only just getting seriously underway in 1942, and Soviet production was well below plan targets. And though rapid increases in tank firepower would soon render the 40mm two-pounder main gun of the Matilda and Valentine suitable for use on light tanks only, the armor protection of these British models put them firmly in the heavy and medium categories, respectively. Both were superior to all but the Soviet KV-1 and T-34 in armor, and indeed even their much maligned winter cross-country performance was comparable to most Soviet tanks excluding the KV-1 and T-34.

A steady stream of British-made tanks continued to flow into the Red Army through the spring and summer of 1942. Canada would eventually produce 1,420 Valentines, almost exclusively for delivery to the Soviet Union. By July 1942 the Red Army had 13,500 tanks in service, with more than 8 percent of those imported, and more than half of those British.

Lend-Lease aircraft deliveries were also of significance during the Battle of Moscow. While Soviet pilots praised the maneuverability of the homegrown I-153 Chaika and I-16 Ishak fighters—still in use in significant numbers in late 1941—both types were certainly obsolete and inferior in almost all regards to the British-supplied Hurricane. The Hurricane was rugged and tried and tested, and as useful at that point as many potentially superior Soviet designs such as the LaGG-3 and MiG-3. There were apparently 463 LaGG-3s in the Soviet inventory by the time of the Moscow counteroffensive, and it was an aircraft with numerous defects. At the end of 1941 there were greater numbers of the MiG-3, but the plane was considered difficult to fly. The Yak-1, arguably the best of the batch, and superior in most regards to the Hurricane, suffered from airframe and engine defects in early war production aircraft.

A total of 699 Lend-Lease aircraft had been delivered to Archangel by the time the Arctic convoys switched to Murmansk in December 1941. Of these, 99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks were in service with the Soviet air defense forces on January 1, 1942, out of a total of 1,470 fighters. About 15 percent of the aircraft of the 6th Fighter Air Corps defending Moscow were Tomahawks or Hurricanes.


A significant, but not critical effort for the early part of the conflict. That came much later.

parsifal said:

none of which were available to the USSR in any quantity from overseas sources.

You can count the number of ships arriving in the USSR on one hand in 1941.

I'm intrigued to have explained how and why the USSR will collapse well before Stalingrad.

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Please Parsifal, I expect better from you.

1941 Operation Dervish arrives 31 August 1941 with 6 freighters carring wool, rubber and tin and 15 crated Hurricanes, 24 more are flown off the carrier Argus but two are damaged.

Convoy PQ 1 arrives Oct 11th 1941. 11 merchantmen loaded with raw materials, 20 tanks and 193 crated hawker hurricane fighter aircraft.

Convoy PQ 2 arrives Oct 30th 6 merchantmen according to some sources but this site says 11 ships Arnold Hague convoy database - PQ convoys

Convoy PQ 3 arrives Nov 22 1941, 8 merchant ships according to wiki, 7 ships according to Arnold Hague

Convoy PQ 4 arrives Nov 30th with 8 merchant ships (both sources)

Convoy PQ 5 arrives Dec 13th with 7 merchant ships (both sources)

and finally PQ 6 arrives Dec 20th with 8 merchant ships (both sources)

convoys PQ 7A and 7B had both sailed before the year ended but would not arrive until Jan 11th and 12th. 7A had two merchants one of which was sunk and 7B had 9 merchant ships all of which made to Russia

Not counting PQ 7a & 7b that gives 54 (or 59?) merchant ships arriving in 1941 which is certainly not a lot as later things went but certainly a nice boost for the Russians. a further 135 ships made it 1942 although 59 (or more?) are lost.

This is pretty much the extent of it, as the southern route is not in operation yet, ships are arriving but unloading is slow and the transfer of cargo from the ports to Russia can only with the greatest charity even be called a trickle.

shoulda said number of convoys....my error. It still does not alter the insignificance of lend lease in 1941. Lend Lease became a factor in the winter counterattacks, but not before. Soviet defence was achieved with virtually no outside help.

Hyperwar provides some useful details on the US Lend lease aid packages to various countries. The breakdown in dollar value of the aid is as follows (in millions of dollars)

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/BigL-5.html

1941: $20

1942: $1,376

1943: $2,436 (by deduction)

1944: $4074

1945: $2, 764


British aid in 1941 was approximately 10x that number. But even at $200m the extent of aid in 1941 was just a spit in the bucket. 1942 was significant, but after the debacle of PQ17 it was scaled back until the winter....after stalingrad

The Arctic convoys were the main access route to the USSR until mid 1943, after that, until the end of the war, the main supply routes became the rail connection through Iran and the Pacific access route.

The arctic convoys ran in two series, following the first convoy, code-named Operation Dervish, which sailed at the end of August 1941.

The first series, PQ (outbound) and QP (homebound), ran from September 1941 to September 1942. These convoys generally ran twice monthly, but were interrupted in the summer of 1942 when the series was suspended after the disaster of PQ17 and again in the autumn after the final convoy of the series, PQ18, due to lengthening daylight hours and the preparations for Operation Torch, which sucked out all available shipping from the allies.

The second series of convoys, JW (outbound) and RA (homebound) ran from late December 1942 until the end of the war, though with interruptions in the summer of 1943 and again in the summer of 1944. These interruptions were quite lengthy.

A lot has been written about the importance of the Pacific link, but in reality this route was quite minor until 1943. The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, and until 1943 by far the most important. It was also the most dangerous. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7 percent was lost, while 93 percent arrived safely. This constituted some 23 percent of the total aid to the USSR during the war.

The Persian corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid-1943. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27 percent of the total. The Pacific route opened in August 1941, but was affected by the start of hostilities between Japan and the Western allies. After December 1941, only Soviet ships could be used and as Japan and the USSR observed a strict neutrality towards each other, only non-military goods could be transported. Nevertheless, 8,244,000 tons of goods went by this route, 50 percent of the total which was impressive. The Pacific route was generally ice bound as only a few cargoes used the port of Vladivostock. More northern Pacific ports were usually icebound in winter.

. From July through December 1942 small Soviet convoys assembled in Providence Bay Siberia to be escorted north through the Bering Strait and west along the Northern route by Icebreakers. A total of 452,393 tons passed through this route in 1942…..a very small proportion of the total 1942 effort. A significant part of this supply was fuel and provisions for the airfield construction crews building the air and road links bridge between Alaska and Siberia (these were paid for under lend lease). Provisions for the airfields were transferred to river vessels and barges on the estuaries of large Siberian rivers. Remaining ships continued westbound and were the only seaborne cargoes to reach Archangel while J W convoys were suspended through the summers of 1943 and 1944.

Later in the war Lend Lease came to be a very significant factor for the Russians, but in the context of the defensive battles of 1941, it was a marginal issue at best. Armies on the attack need anything from 3 to 6 times the logistic support compared to a force operating on the defence. Lend Lease became important once the SU swung over to the offensive. This was true from the earliest days of the Eastern Front. Germany should have switched to a defensive footing far earlier than she did. Because she did not she ended up losing. Manstein exercised an interesting variation to the classic defensive/offensive posture. The problem with pure defence is that it forfeits initiative which at times can be critical. Mansteins mobile defence, or offense/defence strategy offered an interesting variation to those traditional concepts, that may well have paid some dividends had Hitler relinquished his crushing insistence on micromanaging everything at the front.

.... following Kursk the German found themselves in a critical bind ... the Soviets were now able to advance faster than the Heer could retreat .... Lend-Lease mobility. To say L-L aid was not crucial to survival before Kursk is probably correct but Matilda tanks were in the Battle of Moscow, Valentines later, and Churchill tanks at Kursk. The mere appearance of 'aid' was a signal to Germans that the USSR was not fighting alone. That's a powerful message.

One can say that the British were not sending very good tanks to the Russians, but that has to looked at in context too.
One book claims the Russians built 6274 tanks in 1941, however "only" 3,014 of them were T-34s which is still a good number.
1818 of them were T-60 light tanks

It weighed about 6 tons, had a 70hp engine and was worth considerable less than German MK II tank as a fighting vehicle. It really bad conditions (snow/mud) they sometimes had to be towed by the T-34s. The 20mm cannon used the same ammo as the 20mm aircraft gun (it was just the aircraft gun slightly modified) but was considerably less powerful than the German 20mm gun.
Even a few hundred Matildas/ Valentines were a considerable increase in fighting power compared to a similar number of these tin cans.
The Russians would build another 4,474 of these things in 1942 to try to tide them over the shortage of tanks The same book claims the Russians lost 15,000 tanks in 1942 compared to the Germans losing 2,648 (on all fronts)
The Russians in 1942 alos built 4,883 T-70 light tanks.

Still a two man tank (one man in the turret) with lousy vision, a lousy rate of fire and/or engagement, no radio.

If the British lend lease tanks were not up to T-34 standards they certainly beat the heck out of these things. So the British supplied tanks may not have been decisive but were a welcome addition to the Soviet Forces

evangilder said:

There were at least 2 B-24s to fly 100+ missions in the 380th Bomb Group, 42-72799 "Male Call" and 42-100209 "Rough Knight". The 380th was part of the 5th AF in the Pacific. Not sure about European theater B-24s. Also check 42-40323 "Frenisi" <free and easy> from the 307th BG (Also Pacific). That one flew 104 missions before returning to the US for a war bond drive. It is rumored that Frenisi never lost a member of her crew.

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307th BG 44-40587 "Susie" also flew 100+ combat missions

NightHawk said:

what was the most important battle of ww2 ?
1.Stalingrad
2.Normandy
3.El alamain
4.BOB
5.kursk

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The Battle of the Atlantic. Soldiers can't fight if they can't eat.

The BoB meant a war of attrition (Battle of the Atlantic, CBO) in the West for Germany. The Battle of Moscow meant a war of attrition in the East for Germany. Everything else is grapes fallen off the vine, to my thinking. Germany could not fight two battles of attrition at one time.

The most important battle was the Battle of the Atlantic.

If lost the UK would have had to capitulate or at best withdraw from active combat. There would be no Second Front and no Lend Lease supplies to Russia with the significant chance that Russia would have fallen.

Its almost true to say that the only battle that the Allies couldn't afford to lose, was the Battle of the Atlantic

Glider said:

The most important battle was the Battle of the Atlantic.

If lost the UK would have had to capitulate or at best withdraw from active combat. There would be no Second Front and no Lend Lease supplies to Russia with the significant chance that Russia would have fallen.

Its almost true to say that the only battle that the Allies couldn't afford to lose, was the Battle of the Atlantic

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What is the meaning of ''if lost " ?
That there would be no Second Front if Britain was out, is probable but not certain .
That without LL the USSR would have fallen is unlikely and also improbable .
Besides, the ''loss '' of the Battle of the Atlantic would not mean that the USSR would not receive LL supplies : LL supplies went also to Russia through the Pacific (50 % )and via the ME (27 % ).

I got to go with Glider. The Battle of the Atlantic was the most important battle.

SaparotRob said:

I got to go with Glider. The Battle of the Atlantic was the most important battle.

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I doubt that there was something in WWII that could be rated as the most important battle .Besides, the ''battle ''of the Atlantic started on September 3 1939 and stopped on May 8 1945 ,which means that it is questionable to talk about the Battle of the Atlantic, or the Northern Atlantic: battles do not last 6 years .
WWII was ,as WWI, a war of attrition, the outcome of which was known on September 1939/for WWI on August 1 1914, and separate battles had only a minor importance .

This battle did last for six years.

'Battle of Atlantic' is probably a misnomer. 'The Atlantic campaign' is probably a better name for what was going on during all these dark months and years, and consisted of many fights and battles.
Just like we will not call the fighting - that also took maky months/years - in Pacific as a 'Battle of Pacific'. Or the 'North-Afican Campaign', instead of 'Battle of North Africa'.

The words ''Battle of ..''were invented by the tabloids( written and other ones ) because their readers/lookers had not the patience to read/listen to complicated explanations, and because it was /is too difficult for the average journalist to write/tell such stories .
Since 100 years people hear nothing else than blahblah about the Battle of the Marne, of the Somme, 1st,2nd and third Ypres, the Battle of France, of Britain, of the Atlantic, of Berlin,etc,etc .

ljadw said:

The words ''Battle of ..''were invented by the tabloids( written and other ones ) because their readers/lookers had not the patience to read/listen to complicated explanations, and because it was /is too difficult for the average journalist to write/tell such stories .
Since 100 years people hear nothing else than blahblah about the Battle of the Marne, of the Somme, 1st,2nd and third Ypres, the Battle of France, of Britain, of the Atlantic, of Berlin,etc,etc .

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Not true, Blenheim palace was named after a battle, it has a different name in German and French because the Germans were near Hochstadt not Blindheim. Battle of Blenheim - Wikipedia The Battle of Blenheim (German: Zweite Schlacht bei Höchstädt; French: Bataille de Höchstädt; Dutch: Slag bij Blenheim)

My wife was born in Inkerman street, all the streets there were named after Crimean war battles. Many football stands have a "kop" in UK because they were built at the time of battles in South Africa Liverpool FCs stand's full name is Spion Kop, this was by the people at the time not tabloids. See the origins and history of Liverpool's famous Spion Kop in photos

In Churchills speech 18 June 1940 he said "

"What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation.." so they were both named by senior figures not tabloids.

Many gates and railway stations are named after battles in Paris and one in London that I know of.

Pretty sure the phrase "Battle of..." has been in use far longer than that:
"Battle of Phillippi"
"Battle of Thermopylae"
"Battle of Kalinga"
"Battle of Actium"
"Battle of Zama"
"Battle of Carchemish"
"Battle of Cannae"
"Battle of Plataea"

All of the above occurred in antiquity and are written about in contemporary texts and are referred to as "battles" with the event's name following.

It is an old term.