Hawker Hurricane Mk. IIB vs. Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat

Wouldn't the statistics during the BOB be skewed a bit that alledgedly the Spits were supposed to go after the 109s (far more dangerous than the bombers) and the Hurricanes were supposed to go after the bombers. An example how stats can be misleading: In the Pacific, the Hellcat had 5257 kills and only 270 losses to enemy AC, Really good ratio. The Corsair had 2155 kills and 189 losses to enemy AC. Very clear that Hellcat better than Corsair. Right? Not necessarily. On a closer look, Hellcat shot down 1445 bombers and 3718 fighters, while Corsair shot down only 478 bombers but killed 1662 fighters. Add to that the Corsair was in action several months before Hellcat in the Solomons when there were many veteran IJN pilots still around. Corsairs were proportionately much more likely to be engaged against fighters with veteran pilots than were Hellcats. Stats can be deceiving.

Oh JoeB!.........

Hi Slaterat,

>Bungay is outright guilty of statisical manipulation to the verge of lying. First you need to examine his sampling. He has chosen July 10th as the beginning, and that date is , speaking very generally here, considered the start of the BoB. His sample ends on Aug 11. Why pick this date? Why not use sampling from the entire BoB?

Hm, I don't take quite as dim a view on Bungay's perspective as you do.

Ending the sample on August 11 can be explained from the distinction his book makes between the fighting over the channel and that over the British island itself. August 13 was Goering's "Eagle Day". Additionally, using the entire Battle of Britain period would have lead to the mixing of data of unprotected and modified (or newly-built), protected Hurricanes, so I think his choice can be justified.

>On that day a force of about 36 Hurrricanes from various squadrons fell into a very well arranged trap.

Well, for the scope of the evaluation, it doesn't really matter how the Hurricanes were hit, just what happened to them after they were hit. If the trap was set above the sea, there is a possible problem with regard to statistics though: If a significant number of Hurricane pilots drowned after bailing out successfully, it would make the Hurricane look overly dangerous. The same might have happened had that bailed out of Spitfires, after all.

>Allowing for other variables the survival rate is overall about the same.

Well, but what was the combat sortie rate?

>In any case the deficiencies in the protection for the reserve fuel tank were fully rectified in all Hurricane Mk IIs.

Good to know, as the Hurricane II is our main object of interest in this thread

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Hohun,

Look at Bungays last line in your scan.
" The hurricane was twice as dangerous to fly as the spitfire"

Results from the BoB prove that this statement is simply untrue.

There are lots of variables ie sortie rate, size of enemy force engaged, advance radar warning , different tactics employed ect. That is why all statistacal conclusions need to be carefully scrutinized.

Other considersations for Hurricane squadrons at the time ,would be fatigue and losses from the Battle of France. Spitfires also got their conversions to constant speed propellers earlier, spits being converted by July 20th and Hurricanes not complete until Aug 15.

Slaterat

Hi Slaterat,

>Look at Bungays last line in your scan.
>" The hurricane was twice as dangerous to fly as the spitfire"

Hm, for the period in question, this appears to be quite accurate. One could argue that the Spitfire due to its higher speed was more likely to survive after being hit as it could escape more easily, but the Hurricane record after taking hits from bombers suggests ease of escape is not the critical factor.

>There are lots of variables ie sortie rate, size of enemy force engaged, advance radar warning , different tactics employed ect.

Hm, generally true, but do you have any suggestion what effect specifically could result in such a significant bias of the results? It doesn't seem to be anything obvious at least.

>Other considersations for Hurricane squadrons at the time ,would be fatigue and losses from the Battle of France. Spitfires also got their conversions to constant speed propellers earlier, spits being converted by July 20th and Hurricanes not complete until Aug 15.

Considering that we're talking exclusively about aircraft that have been hit anyway, I'm not sure these factors really make a difference. Propeller type at least would seem to fall under the "easier escape" line of reasoning if viewed from the "of all aircraft hit ..." perspective ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

If more Hurricanes focused on Bombers and Spits on Bf 109's in the BoB, then the Hurricane mught be more likely to be hit where it hurts. The defensive fire would be more likely to hit the nose, engine, and nose fuel tank than being hit from the rear. This would mean more likely to burn. (be it glycol or fuel)

kool kitty89 said:

If more Hurricanes focused on Bombers and Spits on Bf 109's in the BoB, then the Hurricane mught be more likely to be hit where it hurts. The defensive fire would be more likely to hit the nose, engine, and nose fuel tank than being hit from the rear. This would mean more likely to burn. (be it glycol or fuel)

Click to expand...

The tactic of having the Hurris go for the bombers while the Spits engaged the 109s was a good one, but in practice it was rarely the case. Often it was only one squadron at a time making contact, and they just split their force of whatever planes they were flying and did their best.

The net reusults show a tendancy for the role splitting, but it wasn't the case in a great many combats.

Claidemore

Seems the thread has gone slightly askew.

So what did we figure out? Hurri IIB? F4F-4? Even draw?



Elvis

Hi Joe,

Since you left me without an answer here, I'll simply consider what you wrote here an answer.

Quoting your post on "Hurricane and Spit V v Zero combats":

"And if they had met more, and the Seafire had done well, 'tactics' (except by distorting that word to mean 'all human factors') wouldn't necessarily have been the main difference v the Darwin debacle. Umpteenthly, those Spit units claimed to have adjusted their tactics and done better, it's just that Japanese accounts don't support that version of events very well (again, Allied accounts don't support the claims of the Zeroes well either, we're counting by recorded losses)."

"Distorting that word to mean 'all human factors'" ... that's obviously a direct answer to my last reply to you, which you failed to answer in this thread.

Allow me to remind you that I have quoted my definition of tactics from Merriam-Webster, and as far as I can tell, Merriam-Webster's reputation is not one for distorting the English language. Additionally, allow my to point out that you have not posted a contradicting definition.

I pointed out my source, I quoted the definition, I even offered you the phrase "employment of forces on the battlefield" as alternative formulation in case you don't like "tactics" to be used in the sense suggested by Webster's.

The you go on with "all human factors". Well, if you look at my post above, you'll find that I have listed three basic categories:

1) Technology
2) "Human material"
3) Tactics.

I did not include "all human factors" in "tactics" but in fact specifically excluded some. I also made it clear that I'm not religious about these categories if you could provide good arguments why something should be in a different category.

My point on tactics has at least partially been followed by Koolkitty, Slaterat, Basket and Claidemore (I hope I read you correctly, guys!), while as far as I can see, your "intangible performance factors" theory (post #126 of this thread) has not found much support.

Well, and your reply? "Distorting that word [tactics] to mean 'all human factors'".

It's pretty obvious that I'm not distorting anything (my definition is from Merriam-Webster - as far as I can tell, yours is a product of your own imagination), and that I have clearly not used "tactics" to describe "all human factors".

So why do you pretend I did? That's an unfair move, and as its a rather accurately aimed "inaccuracy" in representing my words, no-one is going to convince that you merely screwed up accidentally.

Joe, I've been much nicer to you than you deserve, and this latest little backstabbing attempt of yours shows me that you are not appreciating that as you should.

So you either come up with a decent response to my post #195 in this thread in the next couple of days, or I'll put you on my ignore list.

As a hint, I have since that post #195 contributed some information here that you could use to strengthen your position. You're welcome to use it for that purpose.

Kind regards,

Henning (HoHun)

I think you made your point Hohun : ) I wouldn't put Joe on your ignore list though, he does make valid contributions to threads. After all he pointed out "Bloody Shambles " too me. I'll post some more on the series when I get a chance, I've read the middle volume and I am half way through the first.

Slaterat

Yeah he's got a lot of good info.

Joe Baugher's Home Page

American Military Aircraft


But this "tactics" argument realy seems a bit confused...

kool kitty89 said:

Yeah he's got a lot of good info.

Joe Baugher's Home Page

American Military Aircraft


But this "tactics" argument realy seems a bit confused...

Click to expand...

Ahhh...that's not me, but those are good pages.

One approach to plane combat effectiveness is to work from performance stats, assuming that a given degree of degree of advantage in a certain stat will confer a certain degree of advantage in combat effectiveness. This approach might also consider results of controlled tests or anecdotes about practice dogfights between planes on the same side. But the approach essentially ignores actual combat results. Because, those actual combat results are 'polluted' by other variables like differences in tactics (in the narrow sense), and much more importantly by differences in human factors in the broader sense (how well trained, motivated, led, adequately fed in some cases!, etc. the pilots on each side were besides what actual 'tactics' are used), plus numbers, tactical situation, etc etc. But the plane performance approach assumes that plane and other factors can be distinguished by analysis, so in fact combat results don't tell us anything we didn't already know, we already knew the plane effectiveness by analyzing the stats, any discrepancy between that analysis and the actual historical results 'must' be something else; if actual results were never brought up at all it wouldn't really affect that kind of analysis.

I simply doubt that approach, that's really all. I don't see how it's confused or confusing. I think instead that combat results *might* *suggest* to us that our combat effectiveness analysis based on performance stats *might* have holes in it. Ie. I think the large discrepancy in Hurricane and F4F combat record v early war Japanese fighters *suggests* that *maybe* a performance analysis that finds them about equal v such opponents *might* be missing something. Of course you are, or anyone else is, free to disagree.

Joe

Good points Joe, but I would like to defend analysis of planes based on stats/trials/anecdotes by referring to the historical record.

Trials and tests of captured aircraft were used historicaly to suggest changes/improvements of combat planes already in use, and were also used to influence design of future combat planes.

Anecdotal evidence from pilots was also used extensively. If enough pilots said they needed something, or observed a superiority in their opponents planes, the designers and manufacturers listened to them. For example RAF pilots reported FW190s rolling and split-essing away from them easily, next thing you know they are testing clipped wing Spits and putting them into service. (Trials of a captured FW would also have influenced that decision.)

The Soviets made hundreds of small modifications in response to pilot requests and they ended up with a couple top notch fighters in the La7 and Yak 3.

A lot of 'airmchair' experts like to discount pilot accounts, saying they need actual numbers to 'prove' anything. I think they are ignoring a huge resource with that attitude.

Combat reports, inaccurate as they were during wartime, were also examined. Poor combat records led to various planes being withdrawn, allocated to other jobs etc.

Since the people who were making decisions on these combat planes at the time used all these methods of analysis, it seems that we can't be too far off the mark by doing the same thing.

Besides, it's fun.

Claidemore

JoeB said:

Ahhh...that's not me, but those are good pages.
Joe

Click to expand...

Oh... (and all along I've been thinking that was you)

Henning,

Here's another example of how flawed Bungays theory is .

As already mentioned the spits entire fuel load was carried just forward of the pilot. The fuel was carried in two seperate tanks the top one of 48 gals and the lower one of 37 gals capacity. The catch is that in spit mkI and IIs the top tank was not self sealing,the bottom one is. Check out the spit II pilots notes. So basically as far as fuel tank protection goes early spit and hurricanes are about on par, slight advantage to the cane as its reserve tank is only 28 gals compared to the spits top tank of 48 gals. So the difference in survivability, during the early part of the BoB must be due to some other factor. In any case, over the course of the entire BoB, the survivability was the same.

JoeB

I think I can speak for everyone here , and agree with you that combat assessment based solely on performance is flawed. Thats why forums like this one exist. Simply keeping a score card of K/D ratio doesn't answer all the questions either. Both historical context and combat results must certainly have a place in any evaluation of combat aircraft.

Slaterat

renrich said:

Wouldn't the statistics during the BOB be skewed a bit that alledgedly the Spits were supposed to go after the 109s (far more dangerous than the bombers) and the Hurricanes were supposed to go after the bombers. An example how stats can be misleading: In the Pacific, the Hellcat had 5257 kills and only 270 losses to enemy AC, Really good ratio. The Corsair had 2155 kills and 189 losses to enemy AC. Very clear that Hellcat better than Corsair. Right? Not necessarily. On a closer look, Hellcat shot down 1445 bombers and 3718 fighters, while Corsair shot down only 478 bombers but killed 1662 fighters. Add to that the Corsair was in action several months before Hellcat in the Solomons when there were many veteran IJN pilots still around. Corsairs were proportionately much more likely to be engaged against fighters with veteran pilots than were Hellcats. Stats can be deceiving.

Click to expand...

I believe the reason for this lower # of kills in the corsair didn't pass, or wasn't used by navy crews, but where split between the RN carriers, after the seafire, proved poor or numerous undercarriage incidents, so RN switched to corsairs, and was also used by marines, so more where lost to AA fire, in support of land based operations, or to bomb land targets...

didn't pass is a ppor wording, better with the naval procurement board used or purchased grumman aircraft, specifically desiigned for carrier operations..f2f, f4f, f6f. I know the USN carriers launched corsairs, but maybe someone can elaborate as i think these where flown by marine pilots rather then naval aviators??

bf109 Emil

slaterat said:

Henning,

Here's another example of how flawed Bungays theory is .

As already mentioned the spits entire fuel load was carried just forward of the pilot. The fuel was carried in two seperate tanks the top one of 48 gals and the lower one of 37 gals capacity. The catch is that in spit mkI and IIs the top tank was not self sealing,the bottom one is. Check out the spit II pilots notes. So basically as far as fuel tank protection goes early spit and hurricanes are about on par, slight advantage to the cane as its reserve tank is only 28 gals compared to the spits top tank of 48 gals. So the difference in survivability, during the early part of the BoB must be due to some other factor. In any case, over the course of the entire BoB, the survivability was the same.

JoeB

I think I can speak for everyone here , and agree with you that combat assessment based solely on performance is flawed. Thats why forums like this one exist. Simply keeping a score card of K/D ratio doesn't answer all the questions either. Both historical context and combat results must certainly have a place in any evaluation of combat aircraft.

Slaterat

Click to expand...

I don't believe the upper tank was ever self sealing I stand to be corrected but spent much time checking it out with a set of good resources

Hi Joe,

>But the plane performance approach assumes that plane and other factors can be distinguished by analysis, so in fact combat results don't tell us anything we didn't already know, we already knew the plane effectiveness by analyzing the stats, any discrepancy between that analysis and the actual historical results 'must' be something else; if actual results were never brought up at all it wouldn't really affect that kind of analysis.

I wouldn't disagree with that. What you're looking for when you are doing an analysis of performance (and other engineering aspects) is really the combat potential of the aircraft, and the best tactics to turn the potential into reality.

However, I'd qualify the "wouldn't really affect" bit by saying that the evaluation of actual combat results is beneficial to check one's assumptions over what factors are important in combat. That's why I thought your post regarding the various factors like cockpit visibility for deflection shooting was a good one, even though my assessment of the impact of these points is different from yours.

Another reason to rely on combat reports is to check if the historical performance data we have is in the ballpark ... usually, "ballpark" type accuracy is the best we can hope for since combat was not really a good environment for performance measurements. For example, Kelly's account of the action over Singapore allowed this kind of reality check, and it went fairly well with the data we have on Hurricane II and A6M2.

>I simply doubt that approach, that's really all.

Hm, I think it's usefulness should be beyond doubt (remember the Shaw quote), at least when you're trying to determine combat potential of and best tactics for a type.

However, I'll admit that if you're looking at history with a different type of question in your mind, the performance analysis approach might not yield an answer at all. "Why did the F4F so well historically?" cannot be answered from an engineering analysis alone, since it combined some obvious strengths with relatively poor performance while facing an enemy with good performance (and some obvious weaknesses, too).

>I think instead that combat results *might* *suggest* to us that our combat effectiveness analysis based on performance stats *might* have holes in it. Ie. I think the large discrepancy in Hurricane and F4F combat record v early war Japanese fighters *suggests* that *maybe* a performance analysis that finds them about equal v such opponents *might* be missing something.

That's basically correct, but it can only serve to highlight the need for a detailed analysis. You pointed out these "intangible performance factors" earlier in this thread, but in my opinion, factors with an impact large enough to create the large discrepance you noted would not go unnoticed in the historical records.

With regard to the *mights*, it's important to remember that in the absence of data, we cannot decide whether an overlooked aspect of performance or a superiority in the tactics of one side is the more likely cause for what we observe. It might as well be the one as it might be the other, so all we can learn from your statement is that we should gather as much data as we can before trying to arrive at any conclusions.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Hi Slaterat,

>Here's another example of how flawed Bungays theory is .

Hm, he actually suggests an alternative possibility for the Hurricane's vulnerability too, namely the wing tanks which increase the vulnerable area of the aircraft.

And he mentions a fire-proof bulkhead in front of the Spitfire pilots that the Hurricane didn't have in the early period, but were retrofitted with later.

The numbers for the early period appear to support the hypothesis of a greater vulnerability of the Hurricane, so we seem to have engineering aspects and actual combat results in agreement here.

>In any case, over the course of the entire BoB, the survivability was the same.

Do we really have numbers for the entire Battle that are comparable in focus to those provided by Bungay? I'd love to see them!

If they do indeed show equal survivability for both types over the entire Battle, that could eiother mean that the loss numbers early on are a statistical fluke, or that the retro-fitted Hurricane was much tougher than the Spitfire, making good what the unprotected variants had lost early on

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

The Mustang had most of its fuel in wing root tanks (all on early models) and the RAF regarded it as a pretty rugged a/c.

The P-40 had a fair amount of fuel in wing tanks as well iirc, and ruggedness was one of it's prominant characteristics. (moreso than the P-51 due to the "miles" of plumbing running from the engine to the radiator, opposed to the P-40's radiator directly below the engine making a much smaller target)