How effective were gunners in planes?

Very interesting discussion. Brings to mind a question: I wonder how many people were killed on the ground by bullets, shells and shrapnel? The friendly fire in a bomber formation is one question. It seems impossible for bombers not to be inadvertant targets for other bomber's defensive fire. In the Pacific, there are a number of examples of our AC in the CAP during a raid being shot down by fire from US vessels and sometimes the ships themselves became victims of friendly fire. By the way, I believe that the radio gunner in the B17 was deleted fairly early in the war and late in the ETO the waist gunners were left at home with the positions sealed up.

renrich said:

Very interesting discussion. Brings to mind a question: I wonder how many people were killed on the ground by bullets, shells and shrapnel? The friendly fire in a bomber formation is one question. It seems impossible for bombers not to be inadvertant targets for other bomber's defensive fire. In the Pacific, there are a number of examples of our AC in the CAP during a raid being shot down by fire from US vessels and sometimes the ships themselves became victims of friendly fire. By the way, I believe that the radio gunner in the B17 was deleted fairly early in the war and late in the ETO the waist gunners were left at home with the positions sealed up.

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Rich - the late model G's had 'sealed' up waist guns to get the gunners out of the cold slipstream (as well as tail gunner's backside.) That would have been from early 1944 forward IIRC. It had a gimbal similar to the cheek guns.

I think they realized the radio hatch gun was worthless, but good psychlogically speaking. I still see a lot of late 1944 shots with it still intact.

I didn't realize that late in the war they left the waist gunners home -

I think an interesting question would be how did the German pilots feel about attacking bomber formation of many boxes, how did it affect their strategy, did it rush their decision making or cause them to make lower probability of success attacks, did it cause a high degree of anxiety? I am sure they would have perfered they were lightly armed. Also, what was the bomber kills against fighter kills during the time when escorts were not available (unfortunately, we won't know how many fighters attacks were aborted by damage, etc. or how many bomber attacks were aborted).

I am not sure bullet counts tell a lot, we had plenty of bullets. Lower Pk of each bullet can be made up of lots of bullets.

I think I remember reading in a book, it may have been a "Wing and a Prayer," where the author said on some missions late in the war where weight and fuel was a real consideration and fighter opposition was expected to be light, the waist gunners and guns were left off and another point I seem to remember is that sometimes only one waist gunner was carried(to man one side or another.) Was that common practise in B24s? I believe the radio gun was deleted not only because of weight and ineffectiveness but because that opening led to a draft that froze the radioman and the waist gunners. At one point I read that there were more crewmen in the hospital from frostbite than from battle wounds. Sometimes the effectiveness of bomber defensive guns was a big factor. In Lundstrom, he speaks of a formation of TBDs(I think) that drove off a Zero with well coordinated fire from the aft 30 cal mgs. Of course a fighter pilot might might be a little more leary of attacking a formation of bombers when the defensive fire is well directed when the deep blue sea waits below.

renrich said:

Very interesting discussion. Brings to mind a question: I wonder how many people were killed on the ground by bullets, shells and shrapnel? The friendly fire in a bomber formation is one question. It seems impossible for bombers not to be inadvertant targets for other bomber's defensive fire.

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A big reason for civil defense measures like warning sirens and shelters was protection from falling flak shells and fragments, not just enemy bombs. There are stories from various wars of the sound of flak fragments raining down, very dangerous if outdoors but pretty easily addressed by taking cover.

Looking at B-29 mission reports from Korea: their defensive guns were pretty ineffective downing MiG-15's, of questionable deterrence value even in that situation: the opposing fighters were closing so fast it might have been hard for them to realize they were under fire! But at least the B-29's seldom shot each other up, proper procedures and training seemed to avoid that for the most part (with a few exceptions).

On unarmed (or much more lightly armed) day bombers it would be rare for a particular exsting plane to be able to evade interception just by removing its defensive armament, in practical bombing operations. Another situation is bombers designed and optimized from get go to avoid interception. That was the great hope in the 1930's, and true in certain real situations (Soviet SB's v Italian CR32's and German fighters pre Bf109, over Spain), also true of some WWII bombers but in usually limited roles (Mosquite, Ar234) and again that was the original concept of most postwar jet bombers. But such immunity was always temporary till a faster fighter came along. You couldn't be sure it would still be true by the time the plane was operational in large numbers (many arguments in favor of expanding such a concept in WWII are using hindsight in that key respect).

Daylight bombers with light armament could be rapidly destroyed when caught by opposing fighters. Heavily armed bombers could significantly slow down and limit their losses to opposing fighters, especially if a particular interception wasn't numerous, and/or friendly fighters were around to break it up after awhile. What heavily armed bombers couldn't do in almost cases was inflict cumulatively unacceptable losses on the intercepting fighter force by themselves, but the intercepting fighters would eventually inflict cumulatively unacceptable losses on unescorted day bombers.

Night bombers were a different situation, can't be discussd as smooth continuation from heavily armed day bombers. WWII era night fighter attacks were almost always from astern and usually below: top and forward firing armament was almost completely useless at night. If the night fighters adopted particular tactics of approach and upward firing armament, then even tail and bottom gunners would rarely see them until the nightfighter had opened fire. Even if gunners did see night fighters before the fighters fired, doctrine in some AF's/theaters was not to fire first in case the fighter hadn't already spotted the bomber.

Joe

Renrich, I think the B17's and B24's also had their belly turrets removed in the later months of the war.

In 1945, the fighter escorts were so numerous and the quality of the LW so poor, it was no longer needed to have those gun positions.

Plus the aircraft gained in performance by not having the weight and drag acting on it.

I wonder how much energy a 50 cal bullet would have falling from 20000 feet or so and would it still be spinning or would it be tumbling. Likewise, what would a 20mm or 30mm cannon shell be doing after falling from that altitude and would it explode when it hit the ground(or a person, horse or cow.) Soren, where are you when we need you?

Well the meantime,

Some 30mm HE shells had self-destruct mechanisms, others would only arm when there was sufficient spin iirc. (would disarm when it slowd down) But the latter would obviously still be dangerous.

Komet weapons: MK 108 cannon

Don't know about the 20mm.

Any lump of metal falling from over a few hundred feet won't do you a lot of good if it hits you.
During the BOB and the Blitz collecting shrapnel and spent rounds became a real past time for many kids, hence the invention of the Butterfly bomb.
By maiming the kids you block the hospitals.

I haven't studied comparative kill stats, but I have read some things former Luftwaffe pilots wrote. One said something to the effect of, "Every time you attacked an American bomber formation, your life flashed before your eyes" (not an exact translation). Another described attacking American bombers as "like picking up a porcupine that was on fire." That tells me a lot.

Also, everything I've read said flak was a much greater danger to American bombers than German fighters and that American bombers gave as well as they got. The fighters didn't have nearly the ability to absorb damage as the bombers. Looking at it impartially, and noting the fighters couldn't damage a bomber without facing almost directly at one (all forward firing weapons), I would imagine the number of fighters damaged versus destroyed when going up against bombers was MUCH greater than any other type of fight. Even if a fighter didn't get shot down, a couple .50 rounds into an engine or prop would tend to fark up a German pilot's day.



-Irish

I think it's pretty conclusive that the gunners could not adequately defend bombers against competent opposition and that the gunners reduced the bomb load that could be carried to a given target. The question is whether they reduced the bomb load enough to increase net casualties.

The two waist gunners and their guns and ammunition in a B-17 or B-24 probably weighed about 1,000 lb, which had to come out of fuel or bombload. Depending on range, that can be as much as 25%, which means that many more bombers are needed for a given effect on a target: 100 planes instead of 80, and each aircraft craft has a larger crew, say ten instead of eight.

Our P-51 escort aircraft all but eliminated enemy fighter attacks late in the war. Otherwise, our greatest defense was the fire power of a close formation in flight preventing them from passing through it. A B-17 tail gunner friend of mine was credited with downing an ME-262. Obviously the skill of the gunner played a big part in their success.

would you say bill that the defensive firepower of the box formations was generally successful, or generally not successful in stopping or deterring enemy fighters diving through that box formation?

At the end of the day, those guns are there for protection purposes rather than bringing down the enemy. Bringing down the enemy was a bonus, but surviving the attack was surely the more important task....

parsifal said:

would you say bill that the defensive firepower of the box formations was generally successful, or generally not successful in stopping or deterring enemy fighters diving through that box formation?

At the end of the day, those guns are there for protection purposes rather than bringing down the enemy. Bringing down the enemy was a bonus, but surviving the attack was surely the more important task....

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I think successful if tight enough. You are correct our guns were for defensive protection. The same was true with our fighter escort. They were not looking for a fight. Their goal was to protect the bomber stream.

I believe the defensive fire of the bomber formation reduced losses by a huge amount simply by making the attacking aircraft keep their speed high. Without it, attacking aircraft could approach as slowly as they liked as if shooting at a towed target. Ultimately they couldn't keep losses down to an acceptable level, but they did have some effect and did cause enemy losses, though not enough.

kool kitty89 said:

Unless you consider the Mossie's (or other fast-bomber) tactics, trade armament for speed and maneuverability to evade interception. (not going to happen on a 4-engine heavy...)

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Night encounters were very different to day and the data is not interchangeable but an RAF bomber taking a 'corkscrew' evasion of a night fighter was all but impossible to follow and the night fighter had to go back to finding a new target.

On a different tack; Fairey's experience with the gunner in the Fairey Battle led them to (pre-war) abandon the position feeling that the fire of a hand held machine gun was not worth the extra weight and drag so the Fulmar (and it's light bomber ancestor) and the Firefly did without and smoothed the crew position into the fuselage instead.

billrunnels said:

I think successful if tight enough. You are correct our guns were for defensive protection. The same was true with our fighter escort. They were not looking for a fight. Their goal was to protect the bomber stream.

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As the LW fighter force diminished in effectiveness towards the end of the war it was flak concentrations that became the most dangerous enemy assets against the bomber formations.

Cheers

billrunnels said:

Our P-51 escort aircraft all but eliminated enemy fighter attacks late in the war. Otherwise, our greatest defense was the fire power of a close formation in flight preventing them from passing through it. A B-17 tail gunner friend of mine was credited with downing an ME-262. Obviously the skill of the gunner played a big part in their success.

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An Me-262 credit for a gunner must have been a huge achievement taking into consideration the greater proximity speed the jet fighter had compared to conventional interceptors.
I read sometime ago that frontal attack from Me-262s were useless as there was no time to align an accurate salvo due to the combined closing speed. Therefore, it was either by the flanks or the rear that the jets preferred to attack the heavies.

Cheers

Bill,
During the those final days of the air war over Europe when the Me-262 entered the fray, did you and your peers receive sufficient information from intelligence officers about it?

Cheers

airminded88 said:

An Me-262 credit for a gunner must have been a huge achievement taking into consideration the greater proximity speed the jet fighter had compared to conventional interceptors.
I read sometime ago that frontal attack from Me-262s were useless as there was no time to align an accurate salvo due to the combined closing speed. Therefore, it was either by the flanks or the rear that the jets preferred to attack the heavies.

Cheers

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My tail gunner friend said the 262 came around the tail of his B-17 and he sawed part of one wing off with fire.