I believe the thought process is called subtraction, you stated the range of the P-47 and the distance to Leipzig which is within your stated range, if the P-47 had the range to reach Hanover at the end of Jan 1944 then some of the 800 P-47s used for example on 20 Feb would have gone all the way to the target. But you know this because you state "The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank."
So I stated the Roger Freeman reported combat radius with 1 and 2 150/165 gallon drop tanks and the assumption was made I was assuming some P-47 on 20 February 1944 were in fact carrying two tanks, clearly I should not have included the 2 tank data. Though I listed where the P-47 saw combat, which were clearly (well) west of both Leipzig and Braunschweig, with the point of the data was to show the wiki P-47 only to the German border idea was incorrect.
This site describes Big Week as the apogee of the P-47 with regard to bomber escort
P-47 Thunderbolt with the USAAF – European Theatre of Operations.
I have posted a couple of times now the change over of the equipment of 8th AF fighter groups, what does the site add?
The P-38 was better than the P-47 and the P-51B C D were better than both.
If the objective was destruction of the Luftwaffe then the P-38 was not better than the P-47, given the number of kill claims lodged, even as a percentage of sorties. If the objective was to allow day bombers to strike at more distant targets with acceptable losses then the P-38 was better at least until mid 1944, after which the P-51 took over anyway.
The USA wasnt short of fighters, it was short of fighters that could do the job it wanted to. Quoting data for each type through out the war doesnt really show the true situation.
Given what I have read about the 9th Air Force being continually short of fighters, including the need for 1 P-51 group to convert to P-47 for a while in late 1944, the shortage of fighters was present. Then comes the 9th AF units being used for long range escort meant those units had less ability to prepare for their main purpose, the support of the armies, something that showed up post D-Day. Not just doing strikes but training with the ground forces and learning the new army support doctrine coming from the Mediterranean.
Can you please show me where I quoted data throughout the war. I chose January to May 1944 as that was the period the 8th Air Force generally used its fighters in a similar way, mostly escort, and presented the results. June 1944 on shows more diversification as far as I can tell.
That was like reading a phone book.
July 28th 1943 -The 4th and 56th and 78th FG used the 205 gal Ferry "Tub" tank and the 4th FG managed to penetrate to Emmerich, GY and attack a mixed force of 109s and 109s east of Rotterdam on the way back from R/V to find the returning bombers from either Kassel or Oschersleben - to score 9-1-5 for one loss.
The 'So What' was July was the first time for VIII FC to penetrate German border - not September..
First a complaint about presenting data, then comes the too little data. I noted the first use of the 108 gallon fuel tank in September, but did not include a history of 8th AF external fuel tanks from first combat use in July 1943, the part filled 200 gallon ferry tanks, such information will be added if I do not include it.
P-47D never had 550 mi Combat Radius until the P-47D-25 first entered combat operations in flight level strength mid May 1944 (snip)
479th FG destroyed (per VIII FC Victory Credits Board dated 9/45), for P-38J, from May 1944 through September 30th 1944 (last mixed P-38/P-51 mission) were credited with 32 air for the loss of 4 air to air, a ratio of 8:1. By contrast, the 4FG for the same 6.5 56FG 10.9, 78FG 6.9:1, 353rd 7.9:1, 355th 8.5:1, 356th 5.7:1, 359FG 6.8:1, 339th FG 9.1, 352FG 12.3, 357FG 10:1. W/O belaboring the higher ratios of 339th, 352nd, 355th, 357th than 479th P-38 record, the other four flew most of their missions in P-51.
Other P-38 Groups, extracting only P-38 (like 479th above) 20th 3.8:1, 55th 2.4:1 364th 1.8:1 - all others except 56th (P-47), 339th (P51) and 357th (P-51) flew with mixed types. Additionally the 479th achieved 122 for loss of 7 in P-51 for 17:4 ratio.
My Point? Not all P-38 combat records sucked.
Good to see confirmation of the P-47 with twin 150/165 gallon tanks combat radius.
First the dismissal of the longer range P-47 as not available until effectively post May 1944 or at least post February, then the data on how good the P-38 was as an air superiority fighter based on post May 1944 results. If the online listings are correct the 479th logged 24 kill claims on 11 different dates 22 June to 28 August 1944, with 6 of the dates for 1 kill. Another 8 claims out of the 40 on 26 and 28 September, with the results on the 26th being considered exceptional enough to warrant a citation. Then for example had the 25 August combat with 7 kills claimed not taken place the ratio would be 25 to 4, something over 6 to 1, similar for 1 more P-38 loss.
For the same time period, 4FG 132 kill claims, 56FG 172, 78FG 87.5, 353rd 107, 355th 123, 356th 57, 359FG 110, 339th FG 144, 352FG 213, 357FG 232.5. Which makes even the 356th about twice as robust an indicator of performance as an air superiority fighter. Given all the tactical variables involved in air combat the idea 32 kill claims versus 4 losses over 13 combat days, 6 of which were for 1 claim supports almost any claim is incorrect, beyond such figures could occur.
Using the USAAF Statistical Digest ETO fighters claimed 2,610 kills in the time period.
If you are looking to me for comfort or rebuttal re: "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered".
No, just marking it as proven false. The outnumbered P-38 comment was one reason I decided to post some data. My statement was noting the reality.
Expressed another way, the destruction of the Luftwaffe by USSTAF (8th and 15th AF) took first priority prior to Overlord - and subsequently got what Spaatz demanded to achieve the expected result. The 9th AF XI FC did not 'loan' their Fighter Groups - they were ordered to subordinate their P-47s,then P-51s and finally their P-38s - over Leigh Mallory's strenuous objections. Thus they were not 'loaned' they were assigned to operate under 8th AF HQ through end of May.
Pointblank directive of 14 June 1943 was a target list, which the air forces were working to, each in their own way. The conclusion as of late 1943 was the Luftwaffe day fighter force needed to be negated in order to continue day bombing. Whether that was lots of escorts near the bombers or allowing other tactics giving the escort fighters more operational flexibility became the topic of debate. Doolittle made it clear hunting Luftwaffe fighters was the priority.
The 9th AF deserves a place in the list of units given what its fighters were doing, while the 15th AF was facing limited Luftwaffe units plus axis allied forces and suffering for a time a higher bomber loss rate than the 8th. So who ordered the 9th to subordinate their fighter units to 8th AF? I use borrow as that is the term I remember from one of the air war histories. Along with the disagreement over Eisenhower gaining control of the heavy bombers and then what the bomber commanders pitched as their best way to do invasion support, often involving targets in Germany.
SHAEF gained control of Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force on 27 March 1944, staying that way until 16 September. The 17 April SHAEF directive noted priorities of Luftwaffe, particularly fighters, and Luftwaffe facilities and rail communications, particularly in France. I presume this is where the USAAF first priority destruction of Luftwaffe comes from. The destruction of the Luftwaffe would need to include the bomber, night fighter, reconnaissance and ground attack arms as well as the day fighters and in fact the day fighter force largely grew in numeric terms in 1944 and average equipment performance. What it did suffer was a major drop in pilot quality in the first 5 to 6 months of 1944 and it kept going down.
On 2 May the 15th was cleared to go after Ploesti, versus the April raids where the target was officially the Ploesti marshalling yards which were surrounded by the refineries, but attacked with terrible accuracy, many missing the yards and ending up on the oil refineries.
6 June the priorities were rail, army support, V weapons, Luftwaffe airfields and factories, with oil, E and U-boat pens added.
Bombing efforts January to June 1944, percentage of effort against targets in Germany, Bomber Command // 8th Air Force
Jan 89.1% // 70.1%
Feb 98.2% // 71.2%
Mar 71.0% // 69.6%
Apr 41.8% // 61.3%
May 22.6% // 55.2%
Jun 8.5% // 22.5%
Most of the rest of the effort was to targets in France, including V-1 launch sites.
I'm sorry, the first ID loss date I have for a -15RA MIA is 42-76449 - 360FS/353FG near Dummer Lake. April 11, 1944.
D-15RA #1 was 42-76119. Which Block serial are you using?
Not true that only belly tanks could be carried prior to -15RA/RE delivery to ETO as noted above. Depot Mod pylon/plumbing equipped P-47C through D-11 used 108 on pylons, and C/L in February 1944. The P-47D-6RA was first type released with strong wing and pylon as production feature - but no wing plumbing.
Interesting given 42-76449 is listed as a D-20. 8th AF P-47D-15 losses to 10 April 1944 from the loss list I have
21 January 1944, 42-75658, MACR 1849, Sqn 61 Gp 56
22 February 1944, 42-75647, MACR, 2671, Sqn 351 Gp 353
22 February 1944, 42-75653, MACR, 2673, Sqn 351 Gp 353
22 February 1944, 42-75814, MACR, 2701, Sqn 376 Gp 361
4 March 1944, 42-75850, MACR, 2793, Sqn 351 Gp 353
6 March 1944, 42-75635, MACR, 2714, Sqn 377 Gp 362
8 March 1944, 42-75672, MACR, 2734, Sqn 379 Gp 362
8 March 1944, 42-75697, MACR, 2844, Sqn 62 Gp 56
27 March 1944, 42-76249, MACR, 3443, Sqn 63 Gp 56
Model designation Army Aircraft, 11th Edition, January 1945.
The D-4-RA has redesigned main and auxiliary fuel tanks, G-9 booster pumps for external tanks, bomb shackles for 75 to 150 gallon external belly tank, elimination of provisions for 200 gallon belly tank.
D-6-RE Same as P-47D-5-RE except as follows: Redesigned preheater and access door; frameless gunsight; carburettor air thermometer covered in Spec. AN-GG-I-552, Dwg, AN5790-6, in lieu of the Type F-8 thermometer.
D-5, 7, 10 and 11 no mention of wing racks.
D-15-RA combat wing tank, pressurised fuel system for external tanks.
D-15-RE same as D-10-RE except for a lightened canopy, jettisonable in flight.
D-16-RE same as D-15-RA except type A-13 turbo regulator instead of A-17.
Roger Freeman says wing racks on the D-15.
