How good (or bad) was the P-38, really?

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Somehow quoting does not seem to work for me. The point of my original message was here is the data, make up your own mind.

When it comes to the monthly summaries the 8th Air Force uses Heavy Bomber Support sorties, they start in April 1943 where the only date fighters and bombers flew on the same day was the 17th, 115 Bombers to Bremen, 81 fighters to Blankenburg/Bruges/Flushing, another 59 fighters as part of Circus 285, attacking a power station at Zeebrugge, two other circus operations were run that day, one before and one after the Zeebrugge operation, to targets in France, plus 2 Rodeos, 455 RAF+USAAF offensive fighter sorties, 3 fighters lost, 2 damaged. So if the 8th Air Force fighter sorties to Zeebrugge at least are counted as heavy bomber support so must be the RAF ones. My understanding is during 1943 the RAF began acting as insertion and withdrawal cover given the Spitfire's shorter range. Also over the course of the war the 9th Air Force flew 12,950 effective heavy bomber escort sorties, at a loss rate of 7.75 per thousand credit sorties, versus 4.22 when escorting medium bombers. At some point someone makes a decision sorties on the day are either too far away or at too different a time to count as heavy bomber support. I do suspect the 17 April Circus 285 sorties are really medium bomber support but stuck into the only bomber support column available in the report.

By definition until the 28 July 1943 mission all 8th AF fighter cover for missions to Germany was either insertion, withdrawal or support. Relay as defined by Hammel is the tactic of fighters flying independently to a sector then patrolling it as the bombers pass through. The 8th AF had 3 operational P-47 groups from 13 April to 12 August 1943, gaining a fourth that day, whatever fighter tactics change was made in June and July 1943 it was not due to extra US fighters, it would have been nudged by the RAF reporting from the various operations over France that bomber raids attracted Luftwaffe fighters, versus fighter only operations to similar areas, plus the US bomber losses.

The 8ths "Heavy Bomber support" sorties were from April to December 1943 were
119, 603, 697, 1,284, 1,496, 1,758, 2,513, 4,110, 4,811 versus
407, 1,676, 1,225, 1,042, 759, 1,462, 760, 337, 254 other fighter sorties, versus
353, 1,217, 1,128, 1,609, 1,653, 2,088, 1,911, 2,483, 4,730 heavy bomber sorties

I agree the total strength in the units is not the same as the number available to be sent or even the number willing to be sent in a given day. If we are going to use available for combat, then operational crews need to be addressed, not just aircraft, April 1944 8th Air Force daily average for the month, 1st Line tactical aircraft, fighters, 1,305 assigned to air force, 1,060 on hand with tactical units, 784 fully operational, crews, 1,279 assigned, 953 available, effective combat strength of fighter force 775. Or if you like P-38 July 1944, 1 operational group, 82 aircraft on station, 67 fully operational, 113 crews, 89 fully operational, effective strength 67. There is also combat experience, as of 21 December 1943 only 29.2% of the P-38 pilots had 21 to 60 hours and they were the most experienced, versus 61.5% of P-47 pilots who had at least 21 hours.

I gave 2 months worth of data which gave the number sent and lost but apparently the number of effective sorties needs to be added? My December 1943 figures are 386 P-38 sorties to 351 P-51. I did not make any comment about "more on escort". Simply put in late 1943/early 1944 the relative numbers of P-38 and P-51 fluctuated as new groups arrived. The point of the P-38 strength data was to show how long the 8th Air Force kept operating the P-38 and how some P-47 groups were converted first. It was also as the only Luftwaffe strength figure included was also a total strength. I am still in search of the evidence the P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered.

In terms of numbers E R Hooton has the sortie totals by the USAAF escort fighters to Germany versus Jagdkorps I (which controlled the fighters defending Germany) day fighter sorties
month USAAF / Luftwaffe
10/43 3,033 / 3,840
11/43 2,800 / 2,531
12/43 4,926 / 1,153
01/44 6,187 / 3,315
02/44 9,914 / 4,242
03/44 13,584 / 3,672
04/44 14,811 / 4,505

The 8th notes its 1944 attrition rate as 25.1% for P-38 (January to October), 19.9% P-47, 20.7% for the P-51 based on authorised group strength of 75 aircraft.

According to the 8th Air Force January to May 1944 inclusive heavy bomber support made up 86.6% P-38, 91.3% P-47 and 90.7% of P-51 sorties dispatched (excluding unused spares), this sortie definition applies to the following figures
January to May 1944, 10,568 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 9,148 heavy bomber support.
June 1944, 7,345 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 2,757 heavy bomber support. (P-47 7,358/3,861, P-51 10,447/6,958)
July 1944, 3,704 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 2,927 heavy bomber support
August 1944, 1,382 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 815 heavy bomber support
September 1944, 683 P-38 sorties dispatched of which 348 heavy bomber support

Little difference in employment until post Overlord. A total of 26 P-38 sorties sent in October, all heavy bomber support. As of this month the 8th Air Force reports its P-38 units had claimed 264 kills in the air since August 1942 versus 358 losses on operations, versus 1,469 P-47 kills and 644 losses and 1,783 P-51 kills and 887 losses.

The P-38 without dive flaps was restricted to mach 0.65, the flaps raised the effective dive speed by around 20 mph but made recovery safer. Mach tuck began at about mach 0.74. It is my understanding with its good acceleration and climb but poor diving ability, the Luftwaffe pilots tended to worry more about P-38 below them than above.

I pulled the original data from a number of messages which had been using Air War Europa by Eric Hammel, the messages made it clear the book was about US air operations in Europe, Richard Davis agrees the first use of window by the 8th AF was on 20 December 1943, which would also be the first daylight use. It was me that did not explicitly put in first day or first US, I thought it was obvious.

When did "assigned sweeps" become a common tactic, the 8th had more than one fighter group per bomb wing/division as of mid August 1943, with the wings renamed divisions on 13 September 1943. And how does this tie into the idea of the fighter groups having A, B and even C formations?

A final point, it seems the heavy bomber groups were all given strength increases between around November 1943 and June 1944, the average bombers per group rising from the high 30s to the mid/low 60s. So this happened over the six months after the decision to increase the size of a group.

However the fighter groups are another story. By early 1944 they were certainly authorised to have the larger size but reality was, on average, they stayed at the old strength until later in 1944, no real change in strength per group before July 1944, they hover around the old strength of 75. The number of operational fighters per group does jump from the high 50s/low 60s to the high 60s in October 1944 implying the groups were finally able to increase their size. (December 1944 the 14 P-51 groups had 1,185 aircraft on station) Around a year after the increase had been authorised. I know the 9th AF fighter groups were complaining they were short of aircraft, so presumably the same applies to the 8th, especially given the desire to convert to P-51s.

So the figures are saying the average 8th AF fighter group was no bigger in mid 1944 than in mid 1943 but the bomber groups were around 50% larger. And note there were extra operational strength boosts for the bombers due to better supplies of spare parts and replacement aircraft. It also helps explain the anxieties of the 8th AF command about fighter numbers, the number of bomber groups looked the same but there were more bombers to escort.

 

[tonycat77]

Was the armament deemed sufficient?
Probably against JP aircraft, but 4x.50mm and a 20mm doesn't feel like much in europe, or was it enough because the center position increased accuracy?
Did pilots use the engines to create diferential thrust to increase their instant turn rate?
I like the stall in the p-38, the plane doesn't swing to one side due to torque like a single engine does, was that used a lot? (i know of that p-38 tale against a ki-43 by using that)

 

[GrauGeist]

Was the armament deemed sufficient?
Probably against JP aircraft, but 4x.50mm and a 20mm doesn't feel like much in europe, or was it enough because the center position increased accuracy?
Did pilots use the engines to create diferential thrust to increase their instant turn rate?
I like the stall in the p-38, the plane doesn't swing to one side due to torque like a single engine does, was that used a lot? (i know of that p-38 tale against a ki-43 by using that)

Considering that in the early years of the war, the standard armamament of European fighters was .30 caliber (.303, 7.92mm, etc.), the P-38 was heavily armed.
And to add to that, the P-38 was firing from the centerline, so no convergence as well as RoF not being interrupted by firing through a propellor arc.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Did pilots use the engines to create diferential thrust to increase their instant turn rate?

If you think about it, this doesn't make a lot of sense. In a high G turn the aerodynamics are practically identical to a sharp pull up or a dive recovery. The plane is in a near vertical bank pulling into the lift vector, or UP from the pilot's perspective. In this case differential thrust simply means less than maximum total thrust available, and you need all the thrust you can get to minimize energy decay. The only possible advantage of differential thrust might be to enhance the P38's notoriously sluggish roll rate and get it established in the high G turn quicker. But once established, both engines should go to WEP.

 

[drgondog]

Somehow quoting does not seem to work for me. The point of my original message was here is the data, make up your own mind.

What (or which) point are you trying to make?

When it comes to the monthly summaries the 8th Air Force uses Heavy Bomber Support sorties, they start in April 1943 where the only date fighters and bombers flew on the same day was the 17th, 115 Bombers to Bremen, 81 fighters to Blankenburg/Bruges/Flushing, another 59 fighters as part of Circus 285, attacking a power station at Zeebrugge, two other circus operations were run that day, one before and one after the Zeebrugge operation, to targets in France, plus 2 Rodeos, 455 RAF+USAAF offensive fighter sorties, 3 fighters lost, 2 damaged. So if the 8th Air Force fighter sorties to Zeebrugge at least are counted as heavy bomber support so must be the RAF ones. My understanding is during 1943 the RAF began acting as insertion and withdrawal cover given the Spitfire's shorter range. Also over the course of the war the 9th Air Force flew 12,950 effective heavy bomber escort sorties, at a loss rate of 7.75 per thousand credit sorties, versus 4.22 when escorting medium bombers. At some point someone makes a decision sorties on the day are either too far away or at too different a time to count as heavy bomber support. I do suspect the 17 April Circus 285 sorties are really medium bomber support but stuck into the only bomber support column available in the report.

8th AF 3rd BW (B-26 Marauder) initiated combat operations in mid-May, 1943. Virtually all Fighter operations of VIII FC were a.) Sweeps, or b.) Patrols in April/May and June with occasional (and defined) Penetration or Withdrawal Escort Support of bombers (1st, 2nd and 4th BW (Heavy Bombers) and 3rd BW (Medium - B-26 only - Bombers beginning in May. What is your point?

By definition until the 28 July 1943 mission all 8th AF fighter cover for missions to Germany was either insertion, withdrawal or support. Relay as defined by Hammel is the tactic of fighters flying independently to a sector then patrolling it as the bombers pass through. The 8th AF had 3 operational P-47 groups from 13 April to 12 August 1943, gaining a fourth that day, whatever fighter tactics change was made in June and July 1943 it was not due to extra US fighters, it would have been nudged by the RAF reporting from the various operations over France that bomber raids attracted Luftwaffe fighters, versus fighter only operations to similar areas, plus the US bomber losses.

The dominant named 'action' noun for VIII FC during until June was Sweep and Patrol, with occasional Penetration and Withdrawal Support (Escort vs Patrol or Sweep) in which a defined R/V to meet and provide Escort as 'attached' close escort could be characterized - it was Not to loiter at a R/V as the bomber task forces traveled through. The tactic of continuous escort of a box of bombers, created the variations for high and side coverage inwhich fighters had to 'Ess' to stay with their assigned box. Why/what is the point that fighter tactics changed by 'nudges' from RAF? For context, the entire VIII BC attack strength in mid 1943 was less than one BD in 1944.

The 8ths "Heavy Bomber support" sorties were from April to December 1943 were
119, 603, 697, 1,284, 1,496, 1,758, 2,513, 4,110, 4,811 versus
407, 1,676, 1,225, 1,042, 759, 1,462, 760, 337, 254 other fighter sorties, versus
353, 1,217, 1,128, 1,609, 1,653, 2,088, 1,911, 2,483, 4,730 heavy bomber sorties

So, ??? as you pointed out, the 8th AF began VIII FC with the 4th in fall 1942, added operations from 56th and 78th FG in April, 353rd in August, 352nd and 355th in September and 55th FG in October - and so on as the 356th, and the rest of what would be VIII and IX FC were added through May 1944 when operational control of IX FC reverted back from detached for VIII BC pre-D Day to 9th AF for TAC.

I agree the total strength in the units is not the same as the number available to be sent or even the number willing to be sent in a given day. If we are going to use available for combat, then operational crews need to be addressed, not just aircraft, April 1944 8th Air Force daily average for the month, 1st Line tactical aircraft, fighters, 1,305 assigned to air force, 1,060 on hand with tactical units, 784 fully operational, crews, 1,279 assigned, 953 available, effective combat strength of fighter force 775. Or if you like P-38 July 1944, 1 operational group, 82 aircraft on station, 67 fully operational, 113 crews, 89 fully operational, effective strength 67. There is also combat experience, as of 21 December 1943 only 29.2% of the P-38 pilots had 21 to 60 hours and they were the most experienced, versus 61.5% of P-47 pilots who had at least 21 hours.

The 'number available' were largely dispatched on every mission performed by VIII and IX FC in escort operations conducted to protect VIII BC - with the occsaional odd Sweeps and Dive bombing attacks 1943/1944 through D-Day. Your point? It was RARE that any operational FG maintained 'available' near the level 'Authorized and Issued'. Organizationally VIII and IX FC staffed ~10 pilots per flight and 20-25 Fighters per squadron. As you parse Dispatched versus Effective you will easily see the number of aborts or MIA due to mechanical failure, weather, etc. Your Point?

I gave 2 months worth of data which gave the number sent and lost but apparently the number of effective sorties needs to be added? My December 1943 figures are 386 P-38 sorties to 351 P-51. I did not make any comment about "more on escort". Simply put in late 1943/early 1944 the relative numbers of P-38 and P-51 fluctuated as new groups arrived. The point of the P-38 strength data was to show how long the 8th Air Force kept operating the P-38 and how some P-47 groups were converted first. It was also as the only Luftwaffe strength figure included was also a total strength. I am still in search of the evidence the P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered.

The P-38 experience could only be characterized as 'heavily outnumbered in combat operations' as the same when one single squadron of P-47s or P-51s were locally outnumbered. When only one P38, or P-47 or P-51 FG was performing Target Escort in any period late 1943 through D-Day, it could easily be outnumbered by Gruppe level attack force. Not necessarily outfought - but outnumbered in a cubic mile volume.

In terms of numbers E R Hooton has the sortie totals by the USAAF escort fighters to Germany versus Jagdkorps I (which controlled the fighters defending Germany) day fighter sorties
month USAAF / Luftwaffe
10/43 3,033 / 3,840
11/43 2,800 / 2,531
12/43 4,926 / 1,153
01/44 6,187 / 3,315
02/44 9,914 / 4,242
03/44 13,584 / 3,672
04/44 14,811 / 4,505

Sigh. Dig out the number of sorties of AAF fighters that never encountered resistance during Penetration or Withdrawal by the bulk of the LW Day Fighters - because the Jagdkorp tactics were to reserve most attacking forces outside the range of Spitfire and P47. You should reflect that the relay system broken into Penetration, Target and Withdrawal escort legs to bring all VIII/IX P-47 assets into play for LF 3 and other western deployed JGs, as the P-51/P-38 performed deep penetration attacks on heavily defended targets

When did "assigned sweeps" become a common tactic, the 8th had more than one fighter group per bomb wing/division as of mid August 1943, with the wings renamed divisions on 13 September 1943. And how does this tie into the idea of the fighter groups having A, B and even C formations?

In October/November 1942. General Monk Hunter was enamored with Sweeps and Patrols - the LW generally ignored them. The effect of 'one FG per BD' in 1943 was more or less meaningless as target escort was impossible from West Germany and deeper due to inadequate P-47 range. The concept and execution of A and B groups of reinforced squadron 20-30 ships each began in Fall 1944 - entirely due to increased Actual TO&E as production from US augmented the Fighter groups. If you study the 8th AF in detail, you will note that A-Z was no enough to uniquely assign squadron codes - hence the introduction of 'underscore' on the specific a/c code.

A final point, it seems the heavy bomber groups were all given strength increases between around November 1943 and June 1944, the average bombers per group rising from the high 30s to the mid/low 60s. So this happened over the six months after the decision to increase the size of a group.

In early 1943 each squadron of a BG could put up 6-9 bombers per squadron, 20-36 per Group attack for MaximumEffort. Reduced Group level attacks weren't because the squadron operational strength was only 6-9 B-17/B-24 (except after heavy losses), it was because usually only 3 BS would be tasked to go on a given day - and rest the 4th.

However the fighter groups are another story. By early 1944 they were certainly authorised to have the larger size but reality was, on average, they stayed at the old strength until later in 1944, no real change in strength per group before July 1944, they hover around the old strength of 75. The number of operational fighters per group does jump from the high 50s/low 60s to the high 60s in October 1944 implying the groups were finally able to increase their size. (December 1944 the 14 P-51 groups had 1,185 aircraft on station) Around a year after the increase had been authorised. I know the 9th AF fighter groups were complaining they were short of aircraft, so presumably the same applies to the 8th, especially given the desire to convert to P-51s.

So the figures are saying the average 8th AF fighter group was no bigger in mid 1944 than in mid 1943 but the bomber groups were around 50% larger. And note there were extra operational strength boosts for the bombers due to better supplies of spare parts and replacement aircraft. It also helps explain the anxieties of the 8th AF command about fighter numbers, the number of bomber groups looked the same but there were more bombers to escort.

Generally true, see my comments above

 

[tomo pauk]

Was the armament deemed sufficient?
Probably against JP aircraft, but 4x.50mm and a 20mm doesn't feel like much in europe, or was it enough because the center position increased accuracy?

It is more about 'what kind of target we're shooting at', rather than 'how much of firepower enemy counterpart has'? In other words - it does not matter that Fw 190 has 4 cannons or no canons, since it's cannons are no defence at all even against 4 HMGs (as proven by P-51B, even aganst the Bf 110s). Granted, the .50s on the P-51Bs were harder hitting than the .50s in 1939, or even in 1942.
The 20mm Hispano was supposed to be worth of 3 HMGs, making the P-38 having the equivalent of 7 HMGs; US .50s were among the most powerful .50s in 1944-45.

Considering that in the early years of the war, the standard armamament of European fighters was .30 caliber (.303, 7.92mm, etc.), the P-38 was heavily armed.
And to add to that, the P-38 was firing from the centerline, so no convergence as well as RoF not being interrupted by firing through a propellor arc.

Convergence probably mattered, since a good shooter and/or good pilot will have all of his weapons hitting the target in the same time.
P-38 was not around in the early years of the war, though. Even then a lot of European fighters have had one or two 20mm cannons. By the time the P-38 was flying in a shooting war (from Summer of 1942 on), British fighters and Fw 190s have had one or two pairs of cannons aboard, with or without one or two pairs of LMGs to help out.
Granted, the Bf 109, Italian and Soviet fighters (bar La-5) were lighter armed on aggregate.

 

[Greg Boeser]

3rd BW flew two missions in May '43. Unescorted and at low level. None returned from second mission. Entire Marauder force was then pulled from operations to retrain for medium altitude bombing. Operations resumed in mid-July, heavily escorted by RAF Spitfires.

 

[Dash119]

Whats left of my old A&P school today - we used to have about 4 or 5 test cells in the rear of the building.

View attachment 638282


View attachment 638283

FLYBOYJ ,

What was the name of that school. I think that was the one I went to in 1980 for about six weeks...

 

[FLYBOYJ]

FLYBOYJ ,

What was the name of that school. I think that was the one I went to in 1980 for about six weeks...

West Los Angeles Airport College Center

 

[Dash119]

West Los Angeles Airport College Center

Yeah, that didn't sound familiar. Google search refreshed my memory, it was Northrop University, which was also very close to LAX, and is now closed.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Yeah, that didn't sound familiar. Google search refreshed my memory, it was Northrop University, which was also very close to LAX, and is now closed.

Yep, our crosstown rivals. Their A&P program was 18 months and a faster pace, the tuition was a few thousand back then. The school I went to was 6 months longer and if I recall paid about $500 over the 24 month period for books, tuition and various fees.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

One day my quote will work. The point of my message was here is the data, make up your own mind. Since the reply is "what point" please provide what additional information is required, in sentence or two without adjectives or adverbs.

" Virtually all Fighter operations of VIII FC were a.) Sweeps, or b.) Patrols in April/May and June"
The posted statistics make that clear. Why substitute "virtually" when the actual data is available? Then later query why the figures are posted at all? Apparently the fact some P-38 groups arrived in 1944 is the problem with the figures?

"The dominant named 'action' noun for VIII FC during until June was Sweep and Patrol, with occasional Penetration and Withdrawal Support (Escort vs Patrol or Sweep)"
Who exactly is saying the US did relay fighter escort tactics in 1943? It was in 1944.

"Why/what is the point that fighter tactics changed by 'nudges' from RAF?"
Because the RAF experience from 1942 and into 1943, those number 2 group attacks and then the USAAF ones, was the best place to find Luftwaffe fighters was near allied bombers. Not the near separate war the US fighters and bombers were doing into mid 1943.

"For context, the entire VIII BC attack strength in mid 1943 was less than one BD in 1944"
This has what to do with the tactics employed in 1943? One of the under reported factors in the bomber air war was the USAAF attacks in the November 1943 to February 1944 period were very important, they denied the Jagdwaffe its usual winter lull, rest and re-equip. Combined with the major increase in effort towards the end of 1943 as the B-24 groups returned from the Mediterranean and new groups arrived. So 12,577 tons of bombs dropped in December 1943, versus 10,962 tons dropped August 1942 to end June 1943.

So I agree the total strength in the units is not the same as the number available to be sent or even the number willing to be sent in a given day and get a reply "your point?" Should I have disagreed?

"The P-38 experience could only be characterized as 'heavily outnumbered in combat operations' as the same when one single squadron of P-47s or P-51s were locally outnumbered. When only one P38, or P-47 or P-51 FG was performing Target Escort in any period late 1943 through D-Day, it could easily be outnumbered by Gruppe level attack force. Not necessarily outfought - but outnumbered in a cubic mile volume. "
I notice the change to out numbered in combat operations. The first most obvious point is why a cubic mile of space, given the fighters were moving around 5 miles per minute? Surely the space limit must vary with visibility, from 10/10 cloud to CAVU. Next comes the implied idea those Luftwaffe gruppes launched 30+ aircraft consistently, and even then needed several to "heavily outnumber" a US fighter group formation. Then comes the implied idea those Luftwaffe fighters were after the escort when their main mission was the bombers. Given bomber density that cubic mile could see the Luftwaffe outnumbered by US aircraft.

A pair of fighters bouncing a squadron, one firing pass and then sensible withdrawal is also fighting heavily out numbered.

"Sigh. Dig out the number of sorties of AAF fighters that never encountered resistance..."
There is no point until we do the same for the Luftwaffe units, especially in winter given the lack of instrument flying training, things like Luftwaffe fighters launched but recalled given new information on the target I want to compare like with like, not every sortie in the air on one side and a fraction of those sorties on the other.

"In October/November 1942. General Monk Hunter was enamored with Sweeps and Patrols "
The figures quoted say this continued until mid 1943. I was assuming assigned sweep was the designation of the 1944 tactic but clearly not.

"The concept and execution of A and B groups of reinforced squadron 20-30 ships each began in Fall 1944 "
Should this be Northern Spring 1944?

"If you study the 8th AF in detail, you will note that A-Z was no enough to uniquely assign squadron codes - hence the introduction of 'underscore' on the specific a/c code. "
Bomber Command three flight squadrons, either a bar or a small 2 added. I have noted the average strength figures meant the fighter groups were generally under 26 aircraft per squadron until mid/late 1944.

"Generally true, see my comments above"
actually the comments say nothing about average USAAF group strength movements.

So at the moment there is no evidence of "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered", instead there is compare numbers in a cubic mile, it must have happened, but no idea on how often and whether the Luftwaffe fighters were after the P-38 or even noticed them, just as long as they are proximate enough it counts, any US bombers in the area do not count.
For what it is worth it looks like during 1943 on average the Luftwaffe lost two fighters shot down by the bombers per three 8th Air Force heavy bomber the fighters shot down, in early 1944, after a general up gunning, the ratio was 1 fighter to 2 bombers, the USAAF bombers were quite dangerous, then add all the damaged Luftwaffe fighters and that impact on a strained maintenance and spare parts system.

Did you know in December 1943, with 1,153 defensive sorties versus 4,926 US fighter and 3,552 bomber sorties, the Luftflotte Reich fought consistently heavily outnumbered, over 7 to 1 in the airspace over Germany?

Did you know the US 2nd Armoured Division fought consistently outnumbered, given at D day there was something like 10 panzer divisions present in OB West?

I am still in search of the evidence the P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered, not transited an arbitrary volume of airspace the same time as a number of Luftwaffe fighters, but actually found themselves engaged during a mission by formations of Luftwaffe fighters intent on attacking or forced to attack the P-38.

324 P-38 escort sorties in November 1943, 2,531 defensive, at say 3 to 1 for consistently heavily outnumbered the Luftflotte Reich was devoting nearly 40% of its defensive effort to consistently attacking P-38 formations.
386 P-38 escort sorties in December 1943, 1,153 defensive sorties, for 3 to 1 Luftflotte Reich spent the month attacking P-38 formations.

Another way is looking at the admittedly incomplete Luftwaffe claims on days of heavy P-38 losses, since heavily outnumbered must mean say 3 gruppen claiming kills per 25 P-38 sorties. P-38 losses and Luftwaffe claims

13 November 1943, 45 sent (55th) 7 lost, plus 2 write offs, I/JG1 claimed 1, II/JG1 claimed 5, III/JG1 claimed 1, I/JG11 claimed 1, II/JG11 claimed 3, II/ZG26 claimed 2, JGr26 claimed 1

29 November 1943, 38 sent (55th), 8 or 9 lost, 5/JG3 claimed 2, III/JG1 claimed 7.

5 January 1944, 70 P-38 sent (20th, 55th), 7 lost (3 from 20th, 4 from 55th), 1 Luftwaffe claim by II/NJG3

31 January 1944 (Fighter bomber mission) 47 P-38 sent (55th), 6 lost, 1 write off, I/JG1 claimed 4, III/JG3 claimed 3.

11 February 1944, 82 sent (20th, 55th), 8 lost (all from 20th), I/NJG102 claimed 1, II/JG2 claimed 1, II/JG3 claimed 4, II/JG26 claimed 2, III/JG26 claimed 2, II/ZG26 claimed 2

15 April 1944, sweeps and strafes, 132 P-38 sent (20th, 55th, 364th), 11 lost (3 from 55th, 8 from 364th), I/JG11 claimed 4, III/JG11 claimed 7, II/JG51 claimed 4.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The claimed kill rates should reflect, on average, the amount of combat seen, similar for loss rates but these are also dependent on ability to take damage and how far from friendly territory the damage occurs. Drawing from the 8th Air Force Monthly reports in US Archives Record Group 18 Entry 7 box 5682, January to May 1944 inclusive,
10,568 P-38 sorties, mostly escort but 264.6 tons of bombs dropped, 202 lost on operations, 135 kills claimed in the air
32,366 P-47 sorties, mostly escort but 353.9 tons of bombs dropped, 227 lost on operations, 732 kills claimed in the air
13,013 P-51 sorties, mostly escort but 106.4 tons of bombs dropped, 245 lost on operations, 832 kills claimed in the air
P-38 losses include 8 accidents and 41 write offs, P-47 losses include 12 accidents and 32 write offs, P-51 losses include 13 accidents and 21 write offs.

So in losses per sortie, for every 1 P-47 lost, 2.68 P-51 and 2.73 P-38 were lost
In kills claimed per sortie, for every 1 by a P-38, 1.77 P-47 and 5.01 P-51.

Using AIR 22/371 in those 5 months the USAAF fighters used 98,688 cannon rounds and 20,827,439 0.50 inch rounds. Given P-38 150 rounds 20mm, 2,000 0.50 inch, P-47 3,400 rounds 0.50 inch, P-51 1,200 rounds 0.50 inch about 6.2% of the 20mm and 14.2% of the 0.50 inch ammunition carried was used.

 

[drgondog]

The claimed kill rates should reflect, on average, the amount of combat seen, similar for loss rates but these are also dependent on ability to take damage and how far from friendly territory the damage occurs. Drawing from the 8th Air Force Monthly reports in US Archives Record Group 18 Entry 7 box 5682, January to May 1944 inclusive,
10,568 P-38 sorties, mostly escort but 264.6 tons of bombs dropped, 202 lost on operations, 135 kills claimed in the air
32,366 P-47 sorties, mostly escort but 353.9 tons of bombs dropped, 227 lost on operations, 732 kills claimed in the air
13,013 P-51 sorties, mostly escort but 106.4 tons of bombs dropped, 245 lost on operations, 832 kills claimed in the air
P-38 losses include 8 accidents and 41 write offs, P-47 losses include 12 accidents and 32 write offs, P-51 losses include 13 accidents and 21 write offs.

So in losses per sortie, for every 1 P-47 lost, 2.68 P-51 and 2.73 P-38 were lost
In kills claimed per sortie, for every 1 by a P-38, 1.77 P-47 and 5.01 P-51.

Using AIR 22/371 in those 5 months the USAAF fighters used 98,688 cannon rounds and 20,827,439 0.50 inch rounds. Given P-38 150 rounds 20mm, 2,000 0.50 inch, P-47 3,400 rounds 0.50 inch, P-51 1,200 rounds 0.50 inch about 6.2% of the 20mm and 14.2% of the 0.50 inch ammunition carried was used.

So, pull your statistical detail and throw in a.) average range per sortie, b.) Number of heavily defended airfields attacked, c.) Number of German aircraft destroyed in air and on ground, d.) number of LW attacks n bombers defended - by each aircraft type..

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Interesting project.
"a.) average range per sortie"
Requires individual US unit histories, is greatest distance from base good enough or must the data be route miles, to take into account the various course changes?

"b.) Number of heavily defended airfields attacked"
as per (a) plus the definition of heavily defended, do the defences include any airborne Luftwaffe fighters or just flak, in which case how many flak guns of what calibre what distance from the airfield defines heavily, this will also require Wehrmacht records given all three branches of the military had AA units and at a daily level given the changes over the 5 months. Plus whether the guns were actually capable of firing that day. Which brings up the next point, what if surprise is achieved and few to none of the flak guns engage?

"c.) Number of German aircraft destroyed in air and on ground, "
Air has already given, destroyed on ground see below.

"d.) number of LW attacks n bombers defended - by each aircraft type."
This will firstly require Luftwaffe records, to eliminate US fighter encounters with home bound Luftwaffe units and other units not tasked with bomber attacks. Then comes the definition of defended, is it simply be every other encounter, like for example bouncing Luftwaffe fighters tens of miles from any US bomber formation, given there were always the missed interceptions, or must the bombers be within a certain distance, if so, what? The latter will require US bomber formation records, not just the fighter ones. Do the US fighters need to do some shooting or simply be near the Luftwaffe units? Do we need Luftwaffe records indicating the Luftwaffe fighters avoided the US bombers because of US fighter attack or simply presence?

I might be able to arrange for archive visits or alternatively for copies of the relevant records to be made, which will probably take longer The US will probably take a week or more of copying and then a couple of months or more of analysis depending on whether it is just fighter units and maximum distance or more detail is required, the German records considerably longer given the number of units involved. How do you wish to pay the people for their research time? An upfront deposit will be required given the amount of work. Paying for a scoping study to obtain a more solid budget is recommended, senior researchers cost more then junior but are more likely to have some records already copied and analysed. Are the researchers allowed to publish the results?

Destroyed on ground, January to May 1944, P-38 66, P-47 195, P-51 500, or on a per sortie basis, for every 1 P-47 claim, 1.66 P-38 claims, 11.64 P-51 claims. Put it another way destroyed on the ground was 21% of P-47 kill claims, 33% of P-38 and 38% of P-51. January to May 1944.

So at the moment there is no evidence of "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered", just requests for lots more data, indicating the claim lacks evidence.

 

[GrauGeist]

Interesting project.
"a.) average range per sortie"
Requires individual US unit histories, is greatest distance from base good enough or must the data be route miles, to take into account the various course changes?

"b.) Number of heavily defended airfields attacked"
as per (a) plus the definition of heavily defended, do the defences include any airborne Luftwaffe fighters or just flak, in which case how many flak guns of what calibre what distance from the airfield defines heavily, this will also require Wehrmacht records given all three branches of the military had AA units and at a daily level given the changes over the 5 months. Plus whether the guns were actually capable of firing that day. Which brings up the next point, what if surprise is achieved and few to none of the flak guns engage?

"c.) Number of German aircraft destroyed in air and on ground, "
Air has already given, destroyed on ground see below.

"d.) number of LW attacks n bombers defended - by each aircraft type."
This will firstly require Luftwaffe records, to eliminate US fighter encounters with home bound Luftwaffe units and other units not tasked with bomber attacks. Then comes the definition of defended, is it simply be every other encounter, like for example bouncing Luftwaffe fighters tens of miles from any US bomber formation, given there were always the missed interceptions, or must the bombers be within a certain distance, if so, what? The latter will require US bomber formation records, not just the fighter ones. Do the US fighters need to do some shooting or simply be near the Luftwaffe units? Do we need Luftwaffe records indicating the Luftwaffe fighters avoided the US bombers because of US fighter attack or simply presence?

I might be able to arrange for archive visits or alternatively for copies of the relevant records to be made, which will probably take longer The US will probably take a week or more of copying and then a couple of months or more of analysis depending on whether it is just fighter units and maximum distance or more detail is required, the German records considerably longer given the number of units involved. How do you wish to pay the people for their research time? An upfront deposit will be required given the amount of work. Paying for a scoping study to obtain a more solid budget is recommended, senior researchers cost more then junior but are more likely to have some records already copied and analysed. Are the researchers allowed to publish the results?

Destroyed on ground, January to May 1944, P-38 66, P-47 195, P-51 500, or on a per sortie basis, for every 1 P-47 claim, 1.66 P-38 claims, 11.64 P-51 claims. Put it another way destroyed on the ground was 21% of P-47 kill claims, 33% of P-38 and 38% of P-51. January to May 1944.

So at the moment there is no evidence of "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered", just requests for lots more data, indicating the claim lacks evidence.

Just curious, but what are the ETO stats of the P-38, P-47 and P-51 between September 1943 and 1 January 1944?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Just curious, but what are the ETO stats of the P-38, P-47 and P-51 between September 1943 and 1 January 1944?

Ah, reply, not quote button. After checking, almost all the 8th AF 1943 data I have is under fighters, not individual types, I suggest consulting Mighty Eighth War Diary or perhaps the Eighth Air Force Museum. P-38 started operations on 15 October 1943.

According to the Mighty Eighth War Diary, despatched P-38 sorties, 36 on 15th October, 39 on 16th, 35 on 17th, 33 on 18th, 37 on 19th, all sweeps, no claims, 1 MIA on the 18th, 39 escort sorties on 20th, 42 sweep sorties on 22nd, 48 sweep sorties on 24th, no claims or losses. The next problem/opportunity is officially the early P-51 operations were by units of the Ninth Air Force.

8th AF fighter operations, by month September to December 1943, note this report has different sortie definitions to the monthly reports. Only in air claims made.

September 3,220 total sorties less spares and abandoned operations, 2,945 effective/credit sorties, 1,758 heavy bomber support, 1,462 strafing/bombing/sweeps, 14 fighters MIA all P-47, claims 41 destroyed, 2 probable, 8 damaged. Rounds expended per enemy aircraft destroyed 1,767. Flying hours per operational sortie 2.1
October 3,273 total sorties less spares and abandoned operations, 2,971 effective/credit sorties, 2,513 heavy bomber support, 760 strafing/bombing/sweeps, 10 fighters MIA (9-P-47, 1 P-38, plus 4 P-47 Category E), claims 73 destroyed, 11 probable, 40 damaged. Rounds expended per enemy aircraft destroyed 1,933. Flying hours per operational sortie 2.2
November 1943, 4,447 total sorties less spares and abandoned operations, 3,955 effective/credit sorties, 4,110 heavy bomber support, 337 strafing/bombing/sweeps, 67 sorties dropped 16.8 tons of bombs (68x500 pound HE), 55 fighters MIA (35-P-47, 18 P-38 (which adds to 53, seems that is the correct total), plus 7 P-47 and 4 P-38 Category E), claims 104 destroyed, 27 probable, 57 damaged. Rounds expended per enemy aircraft destroyed 2,228. Flying hours per operational sortie 2.5
December 1943, 5,065 total sorties less spares and abandoned operations, 4,519 effective/credit sorties, 4,811 heavy bomber support, 254 strafing/bombing/sweeps, 42 sorties dropped 10.5 tons of bombs (42x500 pound HE, 5x120 pound frag.), 31 fighters MIA (25-P-47, 6 P-38, plus 2 P-47 and 5 P-38 Category E), claims 82 destroyed, 14 probable, 35 damaged. Rounds expended per enemy aircraft destroyed 2,307. Flying hours per operational sortie 2.7

Ninth Air Force, P-51 December 1943, 415 total sorties, 325 effective/credit sorties, 7 fighters MIA, claims 9 destroyed, 2 probable, 13 damaged, 961 operational flying hours. No P-38 or P-47 sorties. For the period 16 October 1943 to 8 May 1945 9th AF fighters, escort of heavy bombers, 14,105 sorties, 13,156 credit, 12,590 effective, 102 MIA or category E, making up 5.1% of total credit sortie effort.

Putting aside the 1942 operations of the 1st, 31st and 55th fighter groups, in operationally declared order, 8th AF fighter groups, official dates
March 1943, 4th FG from Spitfire to P-47, to P-51 on 26th February 1944.
8 April 1943, 56th FG P-47 operational
8 April 1943, 78th FG P-47 operational, to P-51 on 21 December 1944.
12 August 1943, 353rd FG P-47 operational, to P-51 30 September 1944.
9 September 1943, 352nd FG P-47 operational, to P-51 7 April 1944.
9 September 1943, 355th FG P-47 operational, to P-51 3 March 1944.
15 October 1943, 356th FG P-47 operational, to P-51 on 6 November 1944
15 October 1943, 55th FG P-38 operational, to P-51 on 14 July 1944
13 December 1943, 359th FG P-47 operational, to P-51 on 4 May 1944
28 December 1943, 20th FG P-38 operational, to P-51 on 17 July 1944
20 December 1943, 358th FG P-47 operational, exchanged for 9th AF 357th FG P-51 2 February 1944.
21 January 1944, 361st FG P-47 operational, to P-51 on 12 May 1944
10 February 1944, 357th FG P-51 flies first 8th AF mission
3 March 1944, 364th FG P-38 operational, to P-51 on 28 July 1944
30 April 1944, 339th FG P-51 operational
26 May 1944, 479th FG P-38 operational, to P-51 on 27 September 1944

Of the 5,222 kill claims in the air by 8th AF fighters, 1,948 Fw190, 2,535.5 Bf109, 185 Bf110, 130 Me262, 82 Ju-88 and 74 Me410 were the top six, ignoring the 146 "other and unknown" category. The first low level strafing attack was carried out on 25 February 1944.

 

[GrauGeist]

My point of the specific time period of September 1943 to 1 January 1944 was to point out that the P-38 was dominant in statistics because it was the primary USAAF fighter in the ETO at that time.

As the transition to the P-47 and P-51 in 1944 took place, the P-38's statistics would have tapered off as it was being replaced.

So if one were so inclined, they could make the case that the P-47's performance was poor when compared to the P-38's between 9/43 and 1/44 - just as one could use the numbers to say the P-38's performance was poor when compared to the P-47/P-51 between 1/44 and 12/44.

Numbers are great, context is even better...

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

My point of the specific time period of September 1943 to 1 January 1944 was to point out that the P-38 was dominant in statistics because it was the primary USAAF fighter in the ETO at that time.

If the above is P-38, not P-47 what does dominant in the statistics mean? It cannot be sorties or kill claims. Operational 8th AF fighter groups, end of month
August 1943, 4 P-47
September 1943, 6 P-47
October 1943, 7 P-47, 1 P-38, 12.5% P-38
November 1943, 7 P-47, 1 P-38, 12.5% P-38
December 1943, 9 P-47, 2 P-28, 18.2% P-38
January 1944, 10 P-47, 2 P-38, 20% P-38
February 1944, 8 P-47, 2 P-38, 2 P-51, 16.7% P-38
March 1944, 7 P-47, 3 P-51, 3 P-38, 23.1% P-38
April 1944, 6 P-47, 5 P-51, 3 P-38, 21.4% P-38
May 1944, 4 P-47, 7 P-51, 4 P-38, 26.7% P-38
June 1944, 4 P-47, 7 P-51, 4 P-38, 26.7% P-38
July 1944, 4 P-47, 10 P-51, 1 P-38, 7.7% P-38
August 1944, 4 P-47, 10 P-51, 1 P-38, 7.7% P-38
September 1944, 3 P-47, 12 P-51

Meantime end February 1944 the 9th air force had 2 P-51 and 3 P-47 groups., it had 2 P-51 and 8 P-47 groups before its first P-38 group in April 1944, as of end May it was 18 Fighter Groups 2 P-51, 13 P-47, 3 P-38, in time order the P-38 were numbers 11, 13 and 17.

Seen the Richard Davis 8th AF raids list, every raid, including targets of opportunity etc. They show the 8th pulling back to stay more within escort range in the final third (or more) of 1943 and definitely after second Schweinfurt, which meant at the time largely P-47 range, at the same time winter cut the daylight hours available, making longer distance raids problematical. The P-38 and P-51 enabled the 8th to go deeper.

As the transition to the P-47 and P-51 in 1944 took place, the P-38's statistics would have tapered off as it was being replaced.

Using ETO as the criteria the P-38 contribution was holding at 20 or so or under percent for much of the first half of 1944, 18% end 1943, 21% end May 1944. The above shows the reduction in 8th AF P-38, the 9th took until 1945 before two if its P-38 groups were converted, 1 each to P-47 and P-51. I deliberately chose January to May as that was the period where the 8th's fighter groups were mostly tasked with escort at about the same percentage of effort for each type.

So if one were so inclined, they could make the case that the P-47's performance was poor when compared to the P-38's between 9/43 and 1/44 - just as one could use the numbers to say the P-38's performance was poor when compared to the P-47/P-51 between 1/44 and 12/44.

Numbers are great, context is even better...

Please do be the one so inclined to make such a comparison, the P-38 stayed a minority of USAAF fighter sorties and an even smaller minority of kill claims, so what criteria are used to show P-38 superiority? And it would need to be October to December 1943, given no P-38 in September.

Slogans can sound great, data enables even better conclusions.

For those who wonder about an early D-Day, the 9th AF fighter sorties for the first half of 1944 go 370, 1,966, 5,080, 7,914, 21,074, 29,990, the 9th AF fighter units cut their arrival times quite close. The 8th's fighters were not as late, 6,615, 9,012, 11,349, 14,242, 15,745, 25,463. Total USAAF fighter sorties with January set to 1 become, 1, 1.6, 2.4, 3.2, 5.3, 7.9.

 

[drgondog]

If the above is P-38, not P-47 what does dominant in the statistics mean? It cannot be sorties or kill claims. Operational 8th AF fighter groups, end of month
August 1943, 4 P-47
September 1943, 6 P-47
October 1943, 7 P-47, 1 P-38, 12.5% P-38
November 1943, 7 P-47, 1 P-38, 12.5% P-38
December 1943, 9 P-47, 2 P-28, 18.2% P-38
January 1944, 10 P-47, 2 P-38, 20% P-38
February 1944, 8 P-47, 2 P-38, 2 P-51, 16.7% P-38
March 1944, 7 P-47, 3 P-51, 3 P-38, 23.1% P-38
April 1944, 6 P-47, 5 P-51, 3 P-38, 21.4% P-38
May 1944, 4 P-47, 7 P-51, 4 P-38, 26.7% P-38
June 1944, 4 P-47, 7 P-51, 4 P-38, 26.7% P-38
July 1944, 4 P-47, 10 P-51, 1 P-38, 7.7% P-38
August 1944, 4 P-47, 10 P-51, 1 P-38, 7.7% P-38
September 1944, 3 P-47, 12 P-51

Meantime end February 1944 the 9th air force had 2 P-51 and 3 P-47 groups., it had 2 P-51 and 8 P-47 groups before its first P-38 group in April 1944, as of end May it was 18 Fighter Groups 2 P-51, 13 P-47, 3 P-38, in time order the P-38 were numbers 11, 13 and 17.

Seen the Richard Davis 8th AF raids list, every raid, including targets of opportunity etc. They show the 8th pulling back to stay more within escort range in the final third (or more) of 1943 and definitely after second Schweinfurt, which meant at the time largely P-47 range, at the same time winter cut the daylight hours available, making longer distance raids problematical. The P-38 and P-51 enabled the 8th to go deeper.

Using ETO as the criteria the P-38 contribution was holding at 20 or so or under percent for much of the first half of 1944, 18% end 1943, 21% end May 1944. The above shows the reduction in 8th AF P-38, the 9th took until 1945 before two if its P-38 groups were converted, 1 each to P-47 and P-51. I deliberately chose January to May as that was the period where the 8th's fighter groups were mostly tasked with escort at about the same percentage of effort for each type.

Please do be the one so inclined to make such a comparison, the P-38 stayed a minority of USAAF fighter sorties and an even smaller minority of kill claims, so what criteria are used to show P-38 superiority? And it would need to be October to December 1943, given no P-38 in September.

Slogans can sound great, data enables even better conclusions.

For those who wonder about an early D-Day, the 9th AF fighter sorties for the first half of 1944 go 370, 1,966, 5,080, 7,914, 21,074, 29,990, the 9th AF fighter units cut their arrival times quite close. The 8th's fighters were not as late, 6,615, 9,012, 11,349, 14,242, 15,745, 25,463. Total USAAF fighter sorties with January set to 1 become, 1, 1.6, 2.4, 3.2, 5.3, 7.9.

For the life of me I have zero idea what you wish to prove?
IF P-38 sucked air to air is your message, you perhaps could conclude that through May, but if you look at 479th FG May through September 1944, you would be stumped if you try to explain its VERY high Victory Credit to loss ratio - air to air..

If the P-38 had the worst Effective vs Deployed ratio, a plot of aborts/losses without enemy action, take your accumulated data and make a stab at it just using Take Off vs Return to Base absent combat action and plot it month by month and compare similarly versus P-47 and P-51 from April 1943 and December 1943 through September 1944.

If the P-38 lagged in productivity vs P-51 in Ground Destruction of LW aircraft, - show it month to month in the form of a plot as a f(sorties). Conversely if you wish to assert (either way) regarding LW destroyed on the ground vs losses due to strafing - collect the data, cite your sources and plot the data into tangible and visual format.

You stated "Slogans can sound great, data enables even better conclusions". Data without context only confuses any message you are trying to make.

I could belabor the point regarding context and communication but will just comment that your presentations are a steady stream of statistics that never seem to be framed to answer a question or assert/postulate a claim that you wish to make..