How good (or bad) was the P-38, really? (1 Viewer)

[GregP]

Went to a private party in Texas. PM sent.

 

[wuzak]

Went to a private party in Texas. PM sent.

I mean what sort of specs does it have? Such as engine type.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

How does converting the 354FG from end of November to beginning of Feb 1945 to P-47D illustrate that point? (SNIP). As to not having enough time to train with ground forces and learning the army support doctrine coming from the MTO? Lessons from Desert Air Force were integrated in training in US in early 1943 for all the FG's (including 354/357 and 363FG equipped with first P-39 then P-51B). If somebody like Brereton or Quesada stated such, then it should be considered.

For the 9th AF see below. For the doctrine used, start with FM 31–35 of 1942, Kutner in May 1943 noted its need for update. Then came FM 100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power, issued July 21, 1943, AAF headquarters' interpretation of experiences in North Africa. So not early 1943. But the US Army did not really accept the new manual and FM 31–35 would be the one later revised to incorporate wartime experiences. Then comes the reports of the USAAF staff in Britain not being interested in close air support.

The late 1942 and early 1943 ideas had been updated/superceded, for a start to early 1943 had seen little USAAF experience in such operations. It was not just the USAAF, the RAF in Britain was also behind in doctrine, not surprising. And yes, given the arrival times of the army units, the air units and the doctrines they had been trained with, the bomber escort requirements and the available training facilities there was not enough training time.

The 479th made major strides in P-38 air to air ratios under Zemke, when most of the 32 air to air victories occurred - a stark contrast in ratios to 20th, 55th, and 364th FG comparable success. When you dwell in data without context, subtle information can be overlooked.

June to August 1944, 479th FG, 434 sqn 18 kills, 435 sqn 2 kills, 436 sqn 4 kills. Given this data is taken as proof of major strides for a group it would say for a squadron. Or drill down further and discover Robin Olds claimed 5 kills out of the 24, so probably adding evidence of the gap between the exceptional combat pilot and the others. It actually says nothing about the P-38 given the variables involved, more about fitting data to a conclusion.

I'm not sure that you understand that in 'reality', at the point of attack, the LW could put up a fighter intercept on either weakly defended escorted bombers with fewer fighters in that volume - or attack a single box of bombers with only a squadron in immediate vicinity. So, typically (vs Rarely) all types (P-38, P-47 and P-51) could be outnumbered.

At the point of attack. So the size of the formation is reduced from group down to squadron or flight or section, a time is marked, a immediate distance decided and yes the formation is outnumbered. Meantime the other side can chose a different time and/or distance and declare they were the ones outnumbered in the immediate vicinity. In fact anyone can confidently use the method to show almost air combat saw both sides outnumbered.

General Lawrence Kuter alerted Arnold on October 29th, 1943 that intelligence reports indicated that Pointblank goal achievement was impossible prior to D-Day without major shift in priority. The result was issuance of priority focus on LW industry and Day Fighter Force resulting in Doolittle 'destroy in air and ground' orders and planning for Big Week. The destruction of day LW threat to D-Day beach heads was considered 'essential'. Continuing 'day bombing' was considered essential to draw the LW into a war of attrition.

Spaatz via Arnold, prevailed on Portal the necessity of 'all hands on deck' to highest 8th/15th AF (USSTAF) priority - namely destruction on LW prior to D-Day. The pissing contest with Leigh-Mallory was 'won' by Spaatz and 8th AF collected IX FC TDY until invasion, beginning December 1, 1943 when 354th started combat ops, followed by trade of 357FG Mustangs for 358FG P-47s as well as diverting the inbound 363rd P-51B FG. Later disagreements did not always go Spaatz's way during Oil Campaign when Eisenhower ordered 8th AF toward more D-Day support objectives,

It is always good to look at what an all out effort actually came down to, firstly the main anti rail and anti Luftwaffe targets, a/f airfields, bomb tonnages.

8th Air Force, bomb tonnages \\ 15th Air Force (ignoring m/y and A/f)
Month \ Total \ air ind. \ m/y \ a/f \\ total \ air ind.
Oct-43 \ 4708.5 \ 703.7 \ 437.3 \ 90.3 \\ \
Nov-43 \ 6416.8 \ 209.5 \ 901.4 \ 11 \\ 2629.2 \ 329
Dec-43 \ 11734.5 \ 0 \ 952.2 \ 873.4 \\ 4210.2 \ 100
Jan-44 \ 11679.2 \ 2150.6 \ 1865.6 \ 463.5 \\ 9716.9 \ 591
Feb-44 \ 18339.4 \ 3924.6 \ 1811.9 \ 2734.2 \\ 6321.1 \ 1407.4
Mar-44 \ 21046.6 \ 3533.1 \ 995.6 \ 5439.4 \\ 9833.6 \ 242
Apr-44 \ 24931.3 \ 6226.1 \ 2278.9 \ 7001.6 \\ 19404.1 \ 4256.9
May-44 \ 36006.6 \ 3278.6 \ 10019.1 \ 6722.8 \\ 27918.6 \ 2425.6

8th AF number 1 target for month, October 1943 Industrial Areas 1,695 tons, November Port Areas 3,336.8 tons, December Port Areas 3,344.5 tons
January 1944 V-1 sites 2,516.2 tons, February, March and April 1944 airfields, May 1944 Marshalling Yards. Not quite the all out attack on the Luftwaffe.

9th AF fighters,
14,105 airborne, 13,168 credit, 12,590 effective heavy bomber escort sorties for the war
15,745 airborne, 14,751 credit, 14,460 effective sorties by end April 1944.
Given the number of escort sorties done May 1944 and later by the 9th AF the 8th AF did not have the 9th AF fighters to D-day.

"On 2 May the 15th was cleared to go after Ploesti, versus the April raids where the target was officially the Ploesti marshalling yards which were surrounded by the refineries, but attacked with terrible accuracy, many missing the yards and ending up on the oil refineries."

"Cleared" only has context when a) that considering Ploesti Refinery was attacked by Halverson on the way to India and on August 1 1943 Tidal Wave attack. The reason to delay renewing Ploesti Oil targets and drive at M/Y was to assist Red Army. The 8th and 15th only began concentrated attacks on Refining and Chemical industry in May by plan. The May 5, 6, 18th Ploesti strikes were M/, as well as April 5th, 15th, 24th.

Point? So what?

So once again I do not put all the history, in this case the pre May 1944 USAAF attacks on Ploesti, so they are listed as relevant context, not "phone book". On 2 May 1944 the 15th attacked targets in Italy, on 5 May the targets were (O/R Oil refinery), aiming method, number of attacking bombers.

Ploesti \ M/Y \ Vis \ 33
Ploesti \ M/Y \ Vis \ 213
Podgorica \ T/T \ Vis \ 117
Ploesti/Telaejen \ O/PumpSt \ Vis \ 63
Ploesti \ M/Y \ H2X \ 74
Turnu Severin \ I/A \ Vis \ 39
Ploesti/Telaejen \ O/PumpSt \ H2X \ 36
Ploesti/Lumina \ O/R \ Vis \ 36
Ploesti/Astra Romano \ O/R \ Vis \ 33
Ploesti/Concordia Vega \ O/R \ Vis \ 30

Now for context, the USAAF General Spaatz wanted to bomb oil targets but was prevented until May 1944, one way he found to get around the prohibition in April 1944 was to attack a marshalling yard that just happened to be near surrounded by oil refineries with deliberately dispersed bomb patterns. I presume having given a name now further context along the lines of General Spaatz was born on.... is required, except it is phone book when written by others.

Plus there were no 6 May 1944 strikes on Ploesti by the heavy bombers, while on the 18th the targets were Ploesti/Romano Americano, Ploesti/Redeventa, Ploesti/Concordia Vega, Ploesti/Dacia Romano, refineries.

According to Bodie, the D-5-RE incorporated the wing structural improvements, and fixed external tank system for 165 gallon tanks to ferry to UK were jury rigged for several airframes. Curious regarding wing structural beef up for earlier blocks as they should be necessary for 500 # bomb or 108 gal combat tanks. Simply stated, the factory may have approved the pylon weight for earlier models given sufficient margins for max stress conditions on critical load paths.

Freeman states wing pylons for -15 but Depot mods were made to -5 and subsequent (IIRC Burtonwood) to introduce the Pylon and plumbing. External combat tanks were slaved from instrument vacuum system. I have not found records of wing rack/pylon mods for P-47C through D-2.

I have no data on whether the P-47D-5 had wing structural improvements that enabled later modification or whether the modifications were made using things like spare wings, I also have no evidence any US single seat fighter flew the ferry fight route to Britain. Ironically a US modified Spitfire did, part of an effort to convince the RAF to build such a version, the RAF found reasons why it could not be done.

You cannot state that the 9th Airforce was continually short of fighters without some risk of terminological inexcatitude. The 9th airforce wasnt a nation state and it had aircraft assigned to it. What you describe and Drgondog expanded upon is a force maximising the capabilities of what they had in an embarrassment of riches.

I work from the concept of authorised strength and in WWII US Aircraft terms start with the allocation between countries, after which the air forces then allocated aircraft, all of this according to projected production and requirements, which of course meant the plans always under or over shot. The allocations to the USSR were effectively fixed once made. The supply chain from the US meant it would take a long time to correct any major imbalances and often meant an over shoot of too much becoming too little or the other way around.

We now know what happened, we know Hitler's ideas saw Me262 allocated to bomber units ahead of fighter ones, making the Me262 very much a near end war fighter in terms of numbers deployed, not something like JG7 would be around in late 1944 and therefore have to calculate what sort of fighter force would be needed to continue to attack Germany with acceptable losses against numbers of an aircraft that had a higher performance and much more fuel available than the regular Luftwaffe fighters.

Having been given their allocations the commanders then planned operations that required those resources, they were entitled to expect that level of support.

Allied air sea rescue in Europe went into contested airspace, hence the need for fighters, and I assume there is no chance their P-47 were considered second line at the time? Given this discussion is nominally about the P-38 it is probably more useful to point out the 120 F-4 and 380 F-5 as they were delivered in 1942/43, the 299 F-6 began production in November 1944 and if you take February 1945 as the cut off date for available for Europe, 126 had been accepted. Which means before that there were a number of P-51 converted to reconnaissance versions, or at least used in reconnaissance units. The 9th AF reported it received 81 F-6 from new units, 54 from conversions, 84 as replacements and 75 from other sources. It ran what it calls F-6 sorties from December 1943, and P-51 reconnaissance from August 1944. These units needed their high performance machines given where they were operating. Inglewood built 1,988 P-51B and 6,502 D, Dallas 1,750 C, 1,454 D and 1,337 K. The P-47 allocation to the RAF meant the Hurricane production line could be shut down.

USAAF P-47 are credited with 15 V-1 including 1 by a search and rescue squadron, as far as I am aware these were opportunistic, the USAAF did not fly any P-47 diver patrols, similar for the 14 P-51 claims, the P-61 units shot down 10 V-1, they did fly patrols.

Innovations by the air force meant they could fly more often in bad weather. As far as the 9th AF was concerned it had to help a US Army short of artillery ammunition and tanks for much of the campaign in France. Ever read the US supply histories? The habit of simply discarding empty jerricans had a lot to do with where the US Army stopped in 1944. The army problems increased the calls for air power.

The first definition of shortage is not at authorised strength, the second is not having the strength to do what you actually need to do and then what you want to do, with of course need and want being subjective. I do not know whether there is evidence in US Army histories along the lines of "no air support, attack was therefore more costly" along with lack of aircraft as the reason, then there is the what if of applying more air power.

I do know the 9th air force was authorised to have 25% more pilots than aircraft in the units and that from June 1944 to April 1945 the aircraft on hand figure was less than the authorised one and from July 1944 to February 1945 the air force had 80 to 90% of its authorised fighter strength. So yes the 9th Air Force had a shortage or would a pilot over supply be a more prefered description? The following is monthly averages

Month / Authorised / On hand / In units / operational / pilots available (for operations)
Dec-43 / 38 / 66 / 66 / 62 / 104
Jan-44 / 96 / 144 / 92 / 62 / 86
Feb-44 / 307 / 463 / 261 / 184 / 251
Mar-44 / 595 / 760 / 528 / 371 / 398
Apr-44 / 854 / 1428 / 681 / 546 / 562
May-44 / 1536 / 1686 / 1349 / 995 / 1213
Jun-44 / 1642 / 1591 / 1385 / 1129 / 1595
Jul-44 / 1728 / 1462 / 1218 / 906 / 1643
Aug-44 / 1718 / 1524 / 1189 / 953 / 1585
Sep-44 / 1668 / 1502 / 1190 / 968 / 1681
Oct-44 / 1735 / 1515 / 1199 / 965 / 1729
Nov-44 / 1473 / 1351 / 996 / 830 / 1594
Dec-44 / 1436 / 1315 / 938 / 782 / 1499
Jan-45 / 1436 / 1129 / 821 / 685 / 1405
Feb-45 / 1484 / 1207 / 922 / 785 / 1391
Mar-45 / 1536 / 1420 / 1086 / 969 / 1488
Apr-45 / 1536 / 1505 / 1137 / 1027 / 1575
May-45 / 1341 / 1694 / 1306 / 1150 / 1832

The withdrawal of the Luftwaffe from near the front line was a big help to the 9th AF, it could cut down on things like bomber escort sorties, crowd airfields and so on, at the same time the Army really wanted more help.

For the record the British imported the first 2 P-47 in January 1944, then another 2 in April with imports continuing until the end of the war. Interestingly ofthe 825 recorded as arriving 353 were May to August 1944 out of 604 for the year, another 89 in January 1945. So an initial allocation then more attrition replacement.

Over in P-51 land the first RAF Merlin Mustangs arrived in September 1943, the 272 that arrived by the end of 1943 showing how big the RAF allocation had been, another 113 arrived in January and February. The US of course was taking losses but it had 266 P-51 in Britain end 1943 and 699 end February 1944. The numbers reflecting how much more the RAF wanted the P-51 versus the USAAF in the first half of 1943. The RAF allocations were cut.

To summarise any shortage that the 9th Airforce or any other allied airforce thought they had in late 1944 was obviously inside their own head.

I assume this conclusion has the full support of 12th Army Group command?

With reference to post #370, they didn't hold onto paper tanks. They were not going to last through the mission or, if they did, they were not reusable. The gasoline slowly ate through the sealer they coated the paper with and they were basically slowly leaking by about half to three quarters of the mission duration. At least, that's what some of the pilots who gave presentations every month at the Planes of Fame Museum said. I wasn't there, but I seriously doubt they were saving paper tanks. Steel drop tanks, sure, if possible.

Is the above meant to be a version of "I agree" or even once the paper tanks were filled they had a short life, whether taken into the air or not?

Since you have joined the discussion your definition of primary source material is?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Reference post # 326, FlyboyJ. Some years back the Planes of Fame had a Hurricane, a Spitfire IX, and a Grumman F4F (painted in British colors), both on loan from a private party in Texas. The party had a Spitfire III commissioned and it got the final tuning and test flights at Fighter Rebuilders in Chino. Some time later, they sent a 4-ship formation from Chino to Texas. Everyone was worried about the very-young Spitfire III, but it flew flawlessly. The Martet lost the prop (a Curtiss Electric) and it stayed in cruise pitch for the rest of the flight until they touched down in Tucson where it was repaired (new brushes). Not really an emergency as it turned out.

So, there is some evidence that the Curtiss Electric prop stays where it is if power is lost.

Cheers.

Yes - been established - for some reason my feeble memory had me believing it went into low pitch

 

[Peter Gunn]

Wow.

LOTS of data here, hats off to G Geoffrey Sinclair for all the work and drgondog as well. I only have one question because I can't seem to discern from reading this thread. Are you G Geoffrey Sinclair saying the P-38 was outnumbered more often or are you disputing it? I have no agenda and it's just my reading comprehension is low today, so not trying to argue just wanted some clarification. Also, welcome to the forum.

As for drgondog you still owe me a book pal.

 

[drgondog]

For the 9th AF see below. For the doctrine used, start with FM 31–35 of 1942, Kutner in May 1943 noted its need for update. Then came FM 100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power, issued July 21, 1943, AAF headquarters' interpretation of experiences in North Africa. So not early 1943. But the US Army did not really accept the new manual and FM 31–35 would be the one later revised to incorporate wartime experiences. Then comes the reports of the USAAF staff in Britain not being interested in close air support.

Too much - Prior to General Lawrence KUTER Asst CO Air Staff Plans authoring FM100-20, which was Signed by Gen Marshall on July 28, 1943, Kuter was Advisor toe CG VIII BC (Eaker) in 1942, then CO (Acting) Allied Air Support Command January, 1943. Air Vice Marshall Coningham CO Northwest African Tactical Air Forces authored a report regarding deployment of tactical air, including interdiction, CAS and TAC-R which was issued December 1942. Kuter approved/recommended Coningham Report to AAF-HQ - although his FM 100-20 primary focus was that "Air Superiority was Essential for the success of any major land operation", and "Control Must Be Exercised Through Control by Air Force Commander" - Directly contradicting FM 31-35 "Aviation in Support of Ground Forces" issued 4-42. From Spaatz and The Air War in Europe, page 215, "In practice FM 100-20 did no significantly change the method of air-ground support established by the US Army in Tunisia, because thanks to Spaatz, Tedder, Coningham and Eisenhower, they were already being used."

In summary, Brereton as CO of 9th AF in North Africa was already a veteran and disciple of 31-5 and 100-20 in ETO and any slight changes would have been instituted in July (latest) vi Air Training Command for the future P-38, P-47 and P-51 FG headed for England

Doctrine following Coningham's report began changing in Jan 1943 1943 excluding communication protocols already in place for (American )North African Tactical Airforce for both observation and P-39/P-40/Hurricane ops experience. Not everyone awaits from 'words on High" in the form of a Field Manual.

Repeat- Kuter's FM-100 was pointing to air superiority - not Close Air Support - doctrine.
Kuter was influential in the back-channel actions to see that the first deployment of P-51B was to ETO, then was the 'horse whisper' in Arnold's ear, when Eaker and Asst Sec War Lovett's letter to 'prioritize Long Range Escort' delivery to ETO' in June 1943. Eaker specifically requested delivery of P-38 and P-51B, but was asleep at the wheel when General Saville allocate ALL Mustangs (A36, P-51, P-51A, P-51B) to TAC globally. Arnold was first to step in and request that the Mustang III delivered and scheduled to be delivered be turned back over to US in England, Spaatz channeled direct control to 8th AF until end of May

Note - to state that USAAF staff in 8th AF (vs USAAF staff in Britain) not being interested in CAS is correct. Their job was to destroy the Luftwaffe prior to the Invasion.

The withdrawal of the Luftwaffe from near the front line was a big help to the 9th AF, it could cut down on things like bomber escort sorties, crowd airfields and so on, at the same time the Army really wanted more help.
For the record the British imported the first 2 P-47 in January 1944, then another 2 in April with imports continuing until the end of the war. Interestingly ofthe 825 recorded as arriving 353 were May to August 1944 out of 604 for the year, another 89 in January 1945. So an initial allocation then more attrition replacement.

Luftflotte 3 did NOT move from 'near front lines' depending on your definition of 'near'. They did not remove themselves until after Bodenplatte, approximately 8 months after 9th AF/IX FC ceased operations under 8th AF.

Over in P-51 land the first RAF Merlin Mustangs arrived in September 1943, the 272 that arrived by the end of 1943 showing how big the RAF allocation had been, another 113 arrived in January and February. The US of course was taking losses but it had 266 P-51 in Britain end 1943 and 699 end February 1944. The numbers reflecting how much more the RAF wanted the P-51 versus the USAAF in the first half of 1943. The RAF allocations were cut.

Your point is? I haven't looked at P-51C yet but approximately 1400 P-51B-1 and B-5 and C-1 were delivered by NAA in 1943. Until December 1943 ALL had been dedicated to AAF TAC, TAC-R and Training Command plus RAF. Arnold stepped and ordered that te P-51B/C be primarily directed to 8th AF and to cease conversion to F-6 until spring 1944.

I assume this conclusion has the full support of 12th Army Group command?

Is the above meant to be a version of "I agree" or even once the paper tanks were filled they had a short life, whether taken into the air or not?

Since you have joined the discussion your definition of primary source material is?

8th and 9th AF directed 'retain steel tanks if possible; in 1943 and drop empty impregnated 108gal if still full of fuel (rare - but frequent for Early Returns.

 

[GrauGeist]

I also have no evidence any US single seat fighter flew the ferry fight route to Britain.

Lefty Gardner's P-38 "Glacier Girl" was one such aircraft recovered from the "North Atlantic Ferry Route" (Greenland).

The route initially began in New Hampshire at Grenier AAB, then shortly after in Maine at Presque Isle AFB and Dow Field.

Then on to Newfoundland at Stephenville AB and RCAF Station Gander.

Next was RCAF Station Goose Bay in Labrador.

The next leg was over Greenland with Bluie West 1, Bluie West 8 and Bluie East 2.

After Greenland, was Meeks Field, Patterson Field and RAF Reykjavik in Iceland.

The next stop was RAF Vagar on the Faroe Islands.

Then on to Prestwick Airport in Scotland.

Next was RAF Nutts Corner in North Ireland and RAF Valley in Wales.

Lastly, came RAF St. Mawgan in England.

Plenty of evidence of single engine and multi-engined types making the journey, including the flight of P-38s and their guide B-17 that were forced down in Greenland, with one P-38 eventually being recovered and restored.

 

[tomo pauk]

P-47s did it, too, each with two 165 gal tanks under the wings. F. Dean notes such occurrence in August of 1943. Extra tanks have had also additional shackles, too, that connected the tanks with wing, so whole contraption was rather firm.

 

[Dash119]

Lefty Gardner's P-38 "Glacier Girl" was one such aircraft recovered from the "North Atlantic Ferry Route" (Greenland).

The route initially began in New Hampshire at Grenier AAB, then shortly after in Maine at Presque Isle AFB and Dow Field.

Then on to Newfoundland at Stephenville AB and RCAF Station Gander.

Next was RCAF Station Goose Bay in Labrador.

The next leg was over Greenland with Bluie West 1, Bluie West 8 and Bluie East 2.

After Greenland, was Meeks Field, Patterson Field and RAF Reykjavik in Iceland.

The next stop was RAF Vagar on the Faroe Islands.

Then on to Prestwick Airport in Scotland.

Next was RAF Nutts Corner in North Ireland and RAF Valley in Wales.

Lastly, came RAF St. Mawgan in England.

Plenty of evidence of single engine and multi-engined types making the journey, including the flight of P-38s and their guide B-17 that were forced down in Greenland, with one P-38 eventually being recovered and restored.

Glacier Girl was not Lefty Gardner's P-38, it was the one you mentioned at the end of your post as being recovered in Greenland. Lefty Gardner's P-38 is now the highly polished Red Bull P-38.

 

[GrauGeist]

Glacier Girl was not Lefty Gardner's P-38, it was the one you mentioned at the end of your post as being recovered in Greenland. Lefty Gardner's P-38 is now the highly polished Red Bull P-38.

Yeah, you're right...been a long day (so far), not sure why Lefty's name popped into my head instead of Rodney's.

 

[drgondog]

P-47s did it, too, each with two 165 gal tanks under the wings. F. Dean notes such occurrence in August of 1943. Extra tanks have had also additional shackles, too, that connected the tanks with wing, so whole contraption was rather firm.

IIRC - those were the aforementioned P-47-5 or -6 with first wing mod and specially rigged 165gallon Ferry Tanks -

 

[pbehn]

Allied air sea rescue in Europe went into contested airspace, hence the need for fighters, and I assume there is no chance their P-47 were considered second line at the time? Given this discussion is nominally about the P-38 it is probably more useful to point out the 120 F-4 and 380 F-5 as they were delivered in 1942/43, the 299 F-6 began production in November 1944 and if you take February 1945 as the cut off date for available for Europe, 126 had been accepted. Which means before that there were a number of P-51 converted to reconnaissance versions, or at least used in reconnaissance units. The 9th AF reported it received 81 F-6 from new units, 54 from conversions, 84 as replacements and 75 from other sources. It ran what it calls F-6 sorties from December 1943, and P-51 reconnaissance from August 1944. These units needed their high performance machines given where they were operating. Inglewood built 1,988 P-51B and 6,502 D, Dallas 1,750 C, 1,454 D and 1,337 K. The P-47 allocation to the RAF meant the Hurricane production line could be shut down.

USAAF P-47 are credited with 15 V-1 including 1 by a search and rescue squadron, as far as I am aware these were opportunistic, the USAAF did not fly any P-47 diver patrols, similar for the 14 P-51 claims, the P-61 units shot down 10 V-1, they did fly patrols.

Well Wikipedia states that P-47s were used they had armour and guns removed and engines boosted, perhaps not as part of Operation Diver because that was an RAF operation. Still if the P-47 wasnt part of any planned interception, imagine how many P-47s you need to have floating over the English Channel to come across enough V1s to shoot 15 of them down Goering would be livid. You have missed my point completely. For the F6 issue this site North American F-6 Mustang states
The F-6A was the first version of the Mustang to see active service with the USAAF, flying its first missions from Tunisia with the 154th Observation Squadron in April 1943. The RAF also used a number of their Mustangs at photographic reconnaissance aircraft.

Imagine what Herman would think of that? Of course it can be argued that the need for a long range escort had not been accepted in April 1943 but Herman never had the option of dedicating such a plane to such a unit from the start of the war

The first use of the Spitfire in actual operations was in PR. The first use of the P-38 was in PR. The first and main use by the British of the Mustang Mk I was tactical recon which is PR and ground attack. The first use of the Mosquito was in PR. The use of the highest performing planes to take pictures was a luxury Goering never had, it points to the disparity in strength. To do it, not only do you need the high performance aircraft not needed to do something else you also need thousands of people to look after the cameras, the the film and pictures and do the interpretation and then the reports.

 

[Greg Boeser]

The Bf-109, Bf-110, Fw-190 all were all built with recon variants.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

Well Wikipedia states that P-47s were used they had armour and guns removed and engines boosted, perhaps not as part of Operation Diver because that was an RAF operation. Still if the P-47 wasnt part of any planned interception, imagine how many P-47s you need to have floating over the English Channel to come across enough V1s to shoot 15 of them down Goering would be livid. You have missed my point completely. For the F6 issue this site North American F-6 Mustang states
The F-6A was the first version of the Mustang to see active service with the USAAF, flying its first missions from Tunisia with the 154th Observation Squadron in April 1943. The RAF also used a number of their Mustangs at photographic reconnaissance aircraft.

Imagine what Herman would think of that? Of course it can be argued that the need for a long range escort had not been accepted in April 1943 but Herman never had the option of dedicating such a plane to such a unit from the start of the war

The first use of the Spitfire in actual operations was in PR. The first use of the P-38 was in PR. The first and main use by the British of the Mustang Mk I was tactical recon which is PR and ground attack. The first use of the Mosquito was in PR. The use of the highest performing planes to take pictures was a luxury Goering never had, it points to the disparity in strength. To do it, not only do you need the high performance aircraft not needed to do something else you also need thousands of people to look after the cameras, the the film and pictures and do the interpretation and then the reports.

The RAF had a peak of 1700 at their main photograph interpretation site in WW2, a very large number of whom
were US personell.

Military Unit - Unit

www.forces-war-records.co.uk

The Luftwaffe actually did a pretty good job of PR work, and many of the vast number of pictures they took are available today:

Search | NCAP - National Collection of Aerial Photography

ncap.org.uk

 

[GrauGeist]

The Germans were also known to use certain types of preproduction aircraft for recon, like the Ar240 and Do335.

 

[pbehn]

The first definition of shortage is not at authorised strength, the second is not having the strength to do what you actually need to do and then what you want to do, with of course need and want being subjective. I do not know whether there is evidence in US Army histories along the lines of "no air support, attack was therefore more costly" along with lack of aircraft as the reason, then there is the what if of applying more air power.

I do know the 9th air force was authorised to have 25% more pilots than aircraft in the units and that from June 1944 to April 1945 the aircraft on hand figure was less than the authorised one and from July 1944 to February 1945 the air force had 80 to 90% of its authorised fighter strength. So yes the 9th Air Force had a shortage or would a pilot over supply be a more prefered description?

Your method of calculation for strength shows a permanent built in shortage, and since this method of calculation results in the force under discussion being short of aircraft after the surrender in May 1945 if ever I meet 12th Army group command in another life I will buy a round of drinks and congratulate them on their sense of humour.

Month / Authorised / On hand / In units / operational / pilots available (for operations)
Dec-44 / 1436 / 1315 / 938 / 782 / 1499
Jan-45 / 1436 / 1129 / 821 / 685 / 1405

These monthly averages show clearly that by the end of 1944 the 9th Airforce completely outnumbered the whole of the Luftwaffe, not only numerically by a huge margin but also in quality by an equally huge margin while still supposedly claiming to be short. In the LW pilots didnt generally get rested or moved upstairs or sent to clobber colleges or training schools after a certain number of missions or hours. Bodenplatte was a failure for many reasons, one of many reasons was because most pilots were very low hours and poorly trained however some were very high hours and very well trained aces. The low hours pilots would not get on your list of 1405-1499 pilots in the 9th Airforce, the Geswadercommodore and 5 group commanders plus 14 squadron leaders who were lost on Bodenplatte would have been accepted into the 9th but some of them would have been running it.

Over in P-51 land the first RAF Merlin Mustangs arrived in September 1943, the 272 that arrived by the end of 1943 showing how big the RAF allocation had been, another 113 arrived in January and February. The US of course was taking losses but it had 266 P-51 in Britain end 1943 and 699 end February 1944. The numbers reflecting how much more the RAF wanted the P-51 versus the USAAF in the first half of 1943. The RAF allocations were cut.

I assume this conclusion has the full support of 12th Army Group command?

With all the discussion of who wanted to do what, with what and to whom, please bear in mind that the USAF was limited in 1943 because the airfields it wanted to use were still under construction. Also the people to support this effort were still being trained and transported across the Atlantic.

 

[nuuumannn]

The Germans were also known to use certain types of preproduction aircraft for recon, like the Ar240 and Do335.

Yup, the Germans were a lot more organised and devoted much more to photo recon than any other major air force at the outbreak of WW2. The Germans via the Luftwaffe and the Intelligence service had a wide range of recon aircraft. The prototypes were largely used by an independent OKW that answered to Canaris in the Intelligence section and was headed by a fella called Rohweil, who corralled whatever he could and managed to get his hands on a motley fleet of types throughout the war, including those prototypes.

The Brits make much of Sidney Cotton the Australian's role in photographing German airfields and military sites with his Lockheed? Well, this guy Rohweil talked Lufthansa into doing the same and their He 111s, Do 17s and even Junkers W 33s had hidden cameras behind sliding hatches through which a large number of images were taken of French and other European military establishments, as well as British ones. Rohweil also had access to Do 17 and Ju 86 recon birds and so forth as well, in the Ju 86 powered by the Jumo 207s he had a very high altitude platform.

The first use of the Spitfire in actual operations was in PR.

Over on the continent, yes, but not with the RAF at home, the Spitfire first entered service and was first used as an interceptor. Its first action in WW2 was shooting down a Hurricane days after war was declared.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Too much - Prior to General Lawrence KUTER Asst CO Air Staff Plans authoring FM100-20, which was Signed by Gen Marshall on July 28, 1943, Kuter was Advisor toe CG VIII BC (Eaker) in 1942, then CO (Acting) Allied Air Support Command January, 1943. (SNIP)

In summary, Brereton as CO of 9th AF in North Africa was already a veteran and disciple of 31-5 and 100-20 in ETO and any slight changes would have been instituted in July (latest) vi Air Training Command for the future P-38, P-47 and P-51 FG headed for England

Doctrine following Coningham's report began changing in Jan 1943 1943 excluding communication protocols already in place for (American )North African Tactical Airforce for both observation and P-39/P-40/Hurricane ops experience. Not everyone awaits from 'words on High" in the form of a Field Manual.

I am not talking about what the forces in Tunisia did, rather what doctrine the units in North America were being trained under. That required FM 100-20 but that document was undermined by the ground forces not really accepting it. The claim was early 1943 for doctrine changes, now at least it is mid 1943, then comes the reality of the system actually absorbing the new ideas and passing them onto personnel who had been training using the old doctrine, order, counter order sort of stuff for a while. The result, coupled with arrival times in Britain, the bomber escort missions, available training facilities and the result was undertrained units. The RAF had even better access to the doctrine, but also found plenty of the home based units were still undertrained. The usual gap between experience of doing something versus being told this is how you do it. Word from on high is required to change a system training large numbers of personnel.

Repeat- Kuter's FM-100 was pointing to air superiority - not Close Air Support - doctrine.

Actually the officers not interested in close air support were part of 9th AF. And please show where I said anything about the "point" of the new doctrine.

Luftflotte 3 did NOT move from 'near front lines' depending on your definition of 'near'. They did not remove themselves until after Bodenplatte, approximately 8 months after 9th AF/IX FC ceased operations under 8th AF.

I should have written things better, Luftflotte 3 was bombed away from the front lines, as 1944 went on there was a Luftwaffe withdrawal from operations near the front lines, the airfields were being hit too much, the losses too great, as a result allied air operations near the front line rarely saw Luftwaffe fighters post July/August 1944, hence why the 9th was able to reduce bomber escorts, which would have helped make up for the shortage of fighters.

I looked at the whole of war statistics and it seems 1 fighter escort was provided for every 5 twin engined bomber sorties the 9th AF flew, plus any RAF escorts. The USAAF Statistical digest notes 93 losses of Medium and Light bombers to enemy aircraft in the ETO in 1944, 35 in May/June and 42 in December, the latter mostly relating to 23 December.

Your point is? I haven't looked at P-51C yet but approximately 1400 P-51B-1 and B-5 and C-1 were delivered by NAA in 1943. Until December 1943 ALL had been dedicated to AAF TAC, TAC-R and Training Command plus RAF. Arnold stepped and ordered that te P-51B/C be primarily directed to 8th AF and to cease conversion to F-6 until spring 1944.

I suggest reading more, instead of continually telling people you are not able to follow things. The idea was since P-47 and P-51 were being allocated to other forces the 9th AF could not therefore, by definition, be short of aircraft. After the RAF P-47 import figures I was showing how initially the RAF imports of P-51 was matching the USAAF, reflecting on where the Mustangs were going, the fact the USAAF had allocated its P-51 to the 9th AF was a separate and well known issue, as was the abrupt changes in allocations.

1943 acceptances, 310 P-51, 1,233 P-51B, 177 P-51C and 358 A-36A, I could give the breakdown by version and month but that is probably considered phone book.

Now a correction I meant to say single engined, not single seater fighter ferried by air fro the US to overseas commands.

P-47s did it, too, each with two 165 gal tanks under the wings. F. Dean notes such occurrence in August of 1943.

Thanks for the pointer to the entry in Dean. Looks like the one flight is given two entries, August, then August 25.

US ARMY SERVICE FORCES statistics, Appendix G USAAF aircraft shipped overseas says 29,146 fighters sent overseas by ship and 1,258 by air, yearly breakdown of by air being 433 in 1942, 396 in 1943, 61 in 1944 and 368 January to August 1945, given the number of P-38 known to be sent by air the single engine types went by sea except for some experiments or possible late war P-51 flights in the Pacific, and it is clear plenty of P-38 went by sea.

Well Wikipedia states that P-47s were used they had armour and guns removed and engines boosted, perhaps not as part of Operation Diver because that was an RAF operation. Still if the P-47 wasnt part of any planned interception, imagine how many P-47s you need to have floating over the English Channel to come across enough V1s to shoot 15 of them down Goering would be livid.

Try Diver Diver Diver by Brian Cull, complete lists of air claims against V-1, the day to day diary indicates USAAF pilots were largely seeing V-1 when on other operations, including hanging around the channel, plus in the early days a few deliberate patrols. So who authorised the aircraft modifications and sorties, on what days in what areas? Given it was quite clear early the USAAF would normally stay out of the operation.

The British Official History notes 12 June to 5 September 1944 9,017 V-1 launches, about 400 of these from aircraft, with 6,725 observed by the defences and 3,463 V-1 destroyed. So 86 days, average of over 100 launches per day. I do not have to imagine how many P-47 were floating over the channel, the answer is
P-47 in and outbound to France, or on training missions had their chances given the number of V-1.

As for the history of war production pages I tend to use them for spot the error games. Only the F-6D and K were produced, any other Mustang reconnaissance versions were converted.

You have missed my point completely. For the F6 issue this site North American F-6 Mustang states
The F-6A was the first version of the Mustang to see active service with the USAAF, flying its first missions from Tunisia with the 154th Observation Squadron in April 1943. The RAF also used a number of their Mustangs at photographic reconnaissance aircraft.

The point came across as 9th AF cannot have shortages as other units were receiving aircraft, P-47 and P-51, the RAF Mustangs in PR work were the Allison engined ones in 1944 anyway.

Your method of calculation for strength shows a permanent built in shortage, and since this method of calculation results in the force under discussion being short of aircraft after the surrender in May 1945 if ever I meet 12th Army group command in another life I will buy a round of drinks and congratulate them on their sense of humour.

Look at the figures again, for 1945, January deficiency 307, February 277, March 116, April 31, May surplus 353. As 1945 wore on the USAAF was actually bringing the 9th AF up to authorised strength. By the way the figures were copied from the official 9th AF report, I did not calculate them.

These monthly averages show clearly that by the end of 1944 the 9th Airforce completely outnumbered the whole of the Luftwaffe

Alfred Price, Luftwaffe Operational Units aircraft strength, 31 May 1944 4,928 (719 transports), 10 January 1945 4,566 (269 transports), 9 April 1945 3,331 (10 transports)
9th AF Bomber, fighter and reconnaissance aircraft on hand, averages for month May 1944 2,613, June 1944 2,763, January 1945 2,429, April 1945 2,862, but you really need to compare the Luftwaffe strengths with the respective US "in tactical units" figures 2,327, 2,424, 1,760, 2,111

Certainly the US had much better trained aircrew on average. Now why exactly is there a need to compare a USAAF formation meant to do tactical work to total enemy aircraft strength? More relevant to the 9th AF is the increase from 13 US Army divisions in the field end June 1944 to 61 end March 1945, including a couple meant for the Pacific but diverted because of the Ardennes offensive, plus numerous non divisional units, all of whom would like air support, to be provided by the 9th plus some units transferred from the 12th AF, with the 6th Army Group being paired with the French/US 1st Tactical Air Force, 12th AG with 9th AF. Plus the US Army had artillery ammunition and tank shortages plus those extra units and the 9th AF was under authorised strength.

Are you G Geoffrey Sinclair saying the P-38 was outnumbered more often or are you disputing it?

Start with the way in western Europe all the aircraft usually had working radios and could call for help while the fighters were cruising at 5 to 6 miles a minute. Assume the target formation is circling near the ground and all other aircraft are on intercept courses at a steady 6 miles per minute and have 60 seconds to intercept, that means any formations within a volume of 450 cubic miles could make it. Go to altitude and that increases.

So first question to what distance are the aircraft counted? At what point in the encounter? For how long? Do both sides have to shoot at each other or it is only if one side fires? One classic bounce firing pass and away against a larger formation counts as fighting outnumbered? If your formation encounters multiple enemy formations spaced out at over say half an hour whose total numbers are greater than yours have you fought outnumbered? Your formation encounters a larger enemy formation that takes no interest in you? Do any friendly non fighter aircraft present get counted? Hostile non fighter aircraft?

As you move around over the course of several minutes trying to engage or being engaged you can be the outnumbered or the one doing the outnumbering, until as so many have reported you suddenly find yourself alone in an apparently empty sky, with ultimate air supremacy of 1 to 0 or infinity to 1 odds.

The claim was the P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered, not occasionally, to do that you need to select times and distances accordingly. The P-38 certainly did not fight consistently heavily outnumbered unless such a selection is made.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Apropos of nothing but an observation on my part, or rather opinion.

Not knocking the Thunderbolt but I'd rather cruise to and from targets with something that actually got reasonable fuel usage. I was never impressed with the "long range" P-47 just because they stuffed an imperial sh!t ton more fuel into it. What I personally like is the ability of a Mustang to go further on the same amount (or less) fuel and still have the performance, I forget the gph for a P-51 at cruise but 100gph for the Jug is a pretty hefty number, not to mention the 300gph at combat settings.

I guess in the end it really doesn't matter except to me, burning less fuel to accomplish the mission seems not only more logical to me but saves fuel for more or future missions.

 

[pbehn]

Try Diver Diver Diver by Brian Cull, complete lists of air claims against V-1, the day to day diary indicates USAAF pilots were largely seeing V-1 when on other operations, including hanging around the channel, plus in the early days a few deliberate patrols. So who authorised the aircraft modifications and sorties, on what days in what areas? Given it was quite clear early the USAAF would normally stay out of the operation.

The British Official History notes 12 June to 5 September 1944 9,017 V-1 launches, about 400 of these from aircraft, with 6,725 observed by the defences and 3,463 V-1 destroyed. So 86 days, average of over 100 launches per day. I do not have to imagine how many P-47 were floating over the channel, the answer is
P-47 in and outbound to France, or on training missions had their chances given the number of V-1.

As for the history of war production pages I tend to use them for spot the error games. Only the F-6D and K were produced, any other Mustang reconnaissance versions were converted.

I said that P-47s were involved in anti V1 diver operations and you have just confirmed it, thankyou. The USA had a strategic interest in countering the V1 in case it turned up somewhere else and to this end they had the luxury of developing the M version. I am well aware of the numbers but if you think training flights just happened in the corridors where V1s were being sent and squadrons just happened to see V1s and be at the correct altitude and speed to attack one, then I beg to differ. If you are flying towards France you are aborting your mission, if you are flying from France they are coming from behind. In any case it doesnt change the point I was making, that the USA even by May 1944 had a huge surplus of planes and pilots, if you really wanted to make Herman's day, just tell him that an Air Sea rescue plane took a few minutes off the day job to shoot down a V1.