Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Because context is everything. for example mission 226 on 20 Feb 1944 had 94 P-38 Lightnings, 668 P-47 Thunderbolts and 73 P-51 Mustangs. From Wiki
Keep in mind that no one is trying to make a point, aparently...
Suggest you go to Greg's Airplanes etc on YouTube. Watch his 38 vids. I suspect his assessments of the 38 are as good as we're going to get at this remove.
Simply because presenting data with no content is like looking at binary code for a JCL desck. So, now as a champion of 'data makes your day', what POINT do you comprehend or opinion that You wish to opine based on the dump?
So context,
So I am to go away and find the data, it will not be supplied, definition of VERY high is? Using the online US kill claims, 479th FG monthly May to September, 0, 1, 4, 19, 42. Of the September 1944 kills 27 on the 26th and 13 on the 28th. So 2 combats and the 8th AF says the group officially changed to P-51 on the 27th, but all of the 26th and 28th claims were made by P-38 pilots? The citation the 479th received for the 26th says combat near Munster, Mighty Eighth War Diary says the P-38 were on Market Garden support in Holland.
So the destroyed on ground figures are requested, supplied, complaints of too much data are followed by more data is required and it should be presented graphically. After all I collected the data, cited the sources, put it into a tangible format, claims per sortie sent and am told not good enough.
"Like people with autism, people with Asperger's syndrome have a dreadful time understanding what is going on, socially. They do not always pay attention to the social scene in which they find themselves, and even when they do, they are often not able to make sense of what they see, or to respond appropriately."
It was me that stated the German border because thats how far P-47s took the B-17s on the Schweinfurt raids. I know where these places are because I worked there for 9 years, I used take my wife shopping in Braunschweig and Hanover..
I am being serious, I would be interested to know the thought processes behind the question.
As far as I am aware non paper external tanks were often held onto unless hostile aircraft were encountered, at least before the idea of strafing targets on the way home became general practice.
That was like reading a phone book.
July 28th 1943 -The 4th and 56th and 78th FG used the 205 gal Ferry "Tub" tank and the 4th FG managed to penetrate to Emmerich, GY and attack a mixed force of 109s and 109s east of Rotterdam on the way back from R/V to find the returning bombers from either Kassel or Oschersleben - to score 9-1-5 for one loss.
P-47D never had 550 mi Combat Radius until the P-47D-25 first entered combat operations in flight level strength mid May 1944 - and only then with a.) wing pylons, b. 2x 108 Gal externals and c.) with 370 gallons of internal fuel (from 305), could the P-47D get close to Berlin/Leipzig. The P-47C/D prior to P-47D-15, were modified with Depot mod wing changes to achieve Hamburg, Brunswick, Stuttgart at 400-425m CR. The Group level force of equivalent D-16s weren't flying to Brunswick/Stuttgart radii until the end of March.
Your data for late September was for a mixed force of P-51 and P-38 beginning with 9-26.
Sorry about that. Prior data dumps were like dumpster diving when one doesn't know what to looks for.
I believe that one of the points is that one can't reach macro conclusions without essential data to parse, analyze and arrive at conclusions? I am well aware of the limitations of available data - I have devoted 40 years to gathering and parsing and gathering more and parsing more to arrive at postulates, claims base on facts but not 100% sourced, and qualified opinions.
Expressed another way, the destruction of the Luftwaffe by USSTAF (8th and 15th AF) took first priority prior to Overlord - and subsequently got what Spaatz demanded to achieve the expected result. The 9th AF XI FC did not 'loan' their Fighter Groups - they were ordered to subordinate
I'm sorry, the first ID loss date I have for a -15RA MIA is 42-76449 - 360FS/353FG near Dummer Lake. April 11, 1944.
I believe the thought process is called subtraction, you stated the range of the P-47 and the distance to Leipzig which is within your stated range, if the P-47 had the range to reach Hanover at the end of Jan 1944 then some of the 800 P-47s used for example on 20 Feb would have gone all the way to the target. But you know this because you state "The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank." Drgondog has expanded on this in his post.
Yes it was unescorted because at the time it couldnt be escorted. The raid was to the Rostock area but specifically Tutow airfield, on the coast directly north of Berlin. This was to put pressure on the LW, previous raids had seen the LW send aircraft from places like Tutow, that particular raid was to show they had to defend all Germany at all times or allow a free hit. This site describes Big Week as the apogee of the P-47 with regard to bomber escort P-47 Thunderbolt with the USAAF – European Theatre of Operations. The P-38 was better than the P-47 and the P-51B C D were better than both. So the P-47 was gradually replaced by both initially and then the P-38 was also replaced by the P-51. All three were improved in their lives but the basic difference remained, improving the range of the P-47 just gave bigger shoulders for the other two to stand on.
So I stated the Roger Freeman reported combat radius with 1 and 2 150/165 gallon drop tanks and the assumption was made I was assuming some P-47 on 20 February 1944 were in fact carrying two tanks, clearly I should not have included the 2 tank data. Though I listed where the P-47 saw combat, which were clearly (well) west of both Leipzig and Braunschweig, with the point of the data was to show the wiki P-47 only to the German border idea was incorrect.
I have posted a couple of times now the change over of the equipment of 8th AF fighter groups, what does the site add?
If the objective was destruction of the Luftwaffe then the P-38 was not better than the P-47, given the number of kill claims lodged, even as a percentage of sorties. If the objective was to allow day bombers to strike at more distant targets with acceptable losses then the P-38 was better at least until mid 1944, after which the P-51 took over anyway.
Given what I have read about the 9th Air Force being continually short of fighters, including the need for 1 P-51 group to convert to P-47 for a while in late 1944, the shortage of fighters was present. Then comes the 9th AF units being used for long range escort meant those units had less ability to prepare for their main purpose, the support of the armies, something that showed up post D-Day. Not just doing strikes but training with the ground forces and learning the new army support doctrine coming from the Mediterranean.
First a complaint about presenting data, then comes the too little data. I noted the first use of the 108 gallon fuel tank in September, but did not include a history of 8th AF external fuel tanks from first combat use in July 1943, the part filled 200 gallon ferry tanks, such information will be added if I do not include it.
Good to see confirmation of the P-47 with twin 150/165 gallon tanks combat radius.
No, just marking it as proven false. The outnumbered P-38 comment was one reason I decided to post some data. My statement was noting the reality.
Pointblank directive of 14 June 1943 was a target list, which the air forces were working to, each in their own way. The conclusion as of late 1943 was the Luftwaffe day fighter force needed to be negated in order to continue day bombing. Whether that was lots of escorts near the bombers or allowing other tactics giving the escort fighters more operational flexibility became the topic of debate. Doolittle made it clear hunting Luftwaffe fighters was the priority.
Interesting given 42-76449 is listed as a D-20. 8th AF P-47D-15 losses to 10 April 1944 from the loss list I have
Agree. And the first goal stated by Ira Eaker when he requested (appealed) both P-38s and P-51s in June 1943 from Arnold. The destruction of the Luftwaffe as number one priority for 8th AF emerged in January 1944 and prosecuted by Doolittle.
If you say so. The 479th made major strides in P-38 air to air ratios under Zemke, when most of the 32 air to air victories occurred - a stark contrast in ratios to 20th, 55th, and 364th FG comparable success. When you dwell in data without context, subtle information can be overlooked.
Leaving IX FC out of the discussion for the moment (with 354FG by far the dominant contributor ) Using USAF Study 85 and Dr. Frank Olynyk's and USAFHRC, the total number of Victory Credits for VIII FC from January 1944 through May 1944 was 2041 Victory Credits. P-38H/J (141), P-47C/D (752), P-51B/C (1,146).
I'm not sure that you understand that in 'reality', at the point of attack, the LW could put up a fighter intercept on either weakly defended escorted bombers with fewer fighters in that volume - or attack a single box of bombers with only a squadron in immediate vicinity. So, typically (vs Rarely) all types (P-38, P-47 and P-51) could be outnumbered. So, what? The 'deficiency' of results for the P-38 in context of air to air victories wasn't 'being outnumbered' because they were no different in this respect. The differences were a.) easy to see and consequently plan an attack, b.) out dive for evasion purposes, and c.) complex cockpit operations causing engine/turbo failures - not experienced by P-51 or P-47 fighter groups.
General Lawrence Kuter alerted Arnold on October 29th, 1943 that intelligence reports indicated that Pointblank goal achievement was impossible prior to D-Day without major shift in priority. The result was issuance of priority focus on LW industry and Day Fighter Force resulting in Doolittle 'destroy in air and ground' orders and planning for Big Week. The destruction of day LW threat to D-Day beach heads was considered 'essential'. Continuing 'day bombing' was considered essential to draw the LW into a war of attrition.
Spaatz via Arnold, prevailed on Portal the necessity of 'all hands on deck' to highest 8th/15th AF (USSTAF) priority - namely destruction on LW prior to D-Day. The pissing contest with Leigh-Mallory was 'won' by Spaatz and 8th AF collected IX FC TDY until invasion, beginning December 1, 1943 when 354th started combat ops, followed by trade of 357FG Mustangs for 358FG P-47s as well as diverting the inbound 363rd P-51B FG. Later disagreements did not always go Spaatz's way during Oil Campaign when Eisenhower ordered 8th AF toward more D-Day support objectives,
See above for 'first priority date' via Kuter memo to Arnold Oct 29th 1943. The asset reduction for aircraft other than day fighters was focused on industry base for airframes, engines and repair facilities - as well as Oil/Chemical plants on May 12.
You are correct, I used Bodie instead of John Andrade "US Military Aircraft Designation and Series". So, he result is that the data I used wa for the 3rd block of P-47D-RE (and also looked to -15-RE for which there were no losses) which began at 42-75615, ending at 42-76384 with 254 P-47D-16-RE imbedded in 2nd Block.
According to Bodie, the D-5-RE incorporated the wing structural improvements, and fixed external tank system for 165 gallon tanks to ferry to UK were jury rigged for several airframes. Curious regarding wing structural beef up for earlier blocks as they should be necessary for 500 # bomb or 108 gal combat tanks. Simply stated, the factory may have approved the pylon weight for earlier models given sufficient margins for max stress conditions on critical load paths.
Freeman states wing pylons for -15 but Depot mods were made to -5 and subsequent (IIRC Burtonwood) to introduce the Pylon and plumbing. External combat tanks were slaved from instrument vacuum system. I have not found records of wing rack/pylon mods for P-47C through D-2.
