The reason I was comparing the 9th airforce to the whole of the L/W was because the 9th Airforce both before and after Operation Bodenplatte outnumbered the LW in every way. Any discussion of shortages in the 9th Airforce in the period December 1944 to January 1945 is utterly absurd. Same with shortages of tanks and ammunition, US and allied forces had huge numbers of both, not having them exactly where you want isnt a shortage it is a logistics problem and logistics has won many battles and wars.
How good (or bad) was the P-38, really?
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Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 935
- Sep 30, 2021
Actually you were trying to imply the USAAF had so many surplus P-47 they could sent lots on V-1 patrols, now comes the attempt to change the claim.
If that was correct the claims would not be made, including the one about the 9th AF being short of aircraft in May 1945.
Alternatively I can read the Diver book and note where the pilot's own words are used to describe what they were doing. Apart from encounters that resulted in shoot downs it is clear there was bending of the rules for things like training if only to see what the V-1 looked like. Is the idea the US fighter units withdrawing from France did not keep a look out behind? As an aside 9th AF P-47 flew 475,052 hours on operations, 134,029 hours on training, November 1943 to May 1945.
So now it is time to change the claim, go from fighters to planes and pilots. So essentially as of end April 1944 the US could have shut down pilot training and aircraft production, the 105,794 aircraft the USAAF Statistical Digest says were built May 1944 to August 1945 inclusive were totally unnecessary? Were the 42,964 USAAF crews that graduated May 1944 to August 1944, out of 80,744 trained since 1942 (15,424 fighter crews out of 36,795)? USAAF Statistical Digest, table 52. Or does huge surplus not cover the remainder of the war requirements, including replacements for tour expired personnel? After all 7,176 out of 10,297 P-47 and 1,789 out of 2,360 P-51 pilots graduated in May 1944 or later. The 9th AF had 1,769 fighter pilots killed, missing or wounded.
The USAAF had 9,459 heavy bombers end April 1944 and 8,839 losses May 1944 to end August 1945. Medium bombers 4,399 on hand, 4,288 losses
Except in the records of the 9th AF and Luftwaffe quartermaster of course and by anyone else who can count. To come to the conclusion either the size of the 9th is doubled or more, or the size of the Luftwaffe is halved or more. Then comes the idea a force dedicated to tactical support of a growing army field force should have its capacity measured by how well it outnumbers the enemy air force, not how well it can fill air support requirements. Still given the 9th AF is reported to be outnumbering the Luftwaffe by itself, and the 8th AF easily outnumbered the 9th AF, by around 2 to 1 at times post June 1944, then throw in the RAF, those P-38s must have been fighting a well outnumbered enemy, And even if there were indeed more Luftwaffe fighters near some P-38 over Germany just count all those P-38 in the US, France and Britain and there is no shortage of P-38 over Germany.
The RAF Air Historical Branch used the captured Luftwaffe Quartermaster records to create Translation VII/107 Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability Tables August 1938 to April 1945. Available not only in most good archives (AIR 20/7706 in UK) but given the report's circulation no doubt in other repositories, I have not checked if a copy is available on the web. The tables start off weekly but move to 3 times per month. These records are clearly where Alfred Price was drawing some data from. However Price seems to be only using strength in operational units, the tables are all units except training ones, so below is date, Price, AHB VII/107
31 May 1944 4,928 (719 transports), 6,967 (934 transports)
10 January 1945 4,566 (269 transports), 6,936 (488 transports)
9 April 1945, 3,331 (10 transports), (13 April) 5,072 (no transport, twin engined fighter or fighter bomber figures reported)
So now a new time period 2 months, why exactly was that time period chosen?
Your appreciation is very Washington of you, in the disputes over supplies to the ETO Washington would at times include those in the US allocated to the ETO.
Interesting logic that if someone else has the item desired even a hemisphere away followed by a unilateral the declaration they obviously do not need it therefore there cannot be a shortage. Piled on top of this is we won therefore we had enough, ignoring the trade off between sending a machine or shell versus a person. Your boat might be leaking but you have no problem, plenty of pumps and plugs are available around the world.
Extracts from US Army supply histories.
On 15th of August 1944 there are no reserves of Shermans, tanks earmarked as replacements for units arriving later are issued.
End September 1944 First army was down to 85% of authorised tanks and so reorganised its tank units, 2nd and 3rd armoured gave up 32 Shermans, the other armoured divisions 18, tank battalions gave up 4 Shermans. Some 50 to 60% of the trucks in the Omaha beach port area are not working. Some of the provisional truck battalions raised to cope with the emergency are by now nicknamed Truck Destroyer Battalions.
By the end of November 1944 there are 3,344 tanks in theatre versus the authorised strength of 3,409 plus 937 in reserve. By now there are German PoWs in French coal mines and logging camps.
During December 1944 US forces in Italy will release 150 tanks for the forces in France and 21st Army group will transfer 351 Shermans to US forces. The
US cancels further shipments of Shermans to the British until the US tank situation in Europe is corrected, probably around April 1945, rather than attempt to transfer more of the British reserves, the Shermans from 21st Army Group are considered transferred, not loaned
So I suppose the US Army decided ex British meant they could plug into British roadside assistance? The Italian Shermans were the sports model?
During February 1945 the armies were back to full Sherman tank strength 5,255, plus 179 in reserve, there were another 940 in the "theatre pipelines", this was still 721 tanks short of authorised strength.
The theatre had upped ammunition requirements in January 1944, then in March and again in May. Washington agreed to try and meet the requirements but noted predicted shortages by D+30 in most major types with some of these shortages persisting to D+60. The problem was the US had cut ammunition production in 1943, even closing plants in the winter of 1943/44, in response to the accumulation of excess stocks in North Africa in early 1943, it would take time to wind the production system back up again. In January 1944 the watchwords were retrenchment and no over production. Ammunition plants were shut down or switched to things like fertiliser, synthetic rubber and avgas production. In March 1944 increases in 240 mm howitzer ammunition were authorised, in April this was extended to the 8 inch and 155mm gun and howitzers and the 4.5 inch gun. In May the War Department authorised expansions in medium artillery production, guns and ammunition and assigned the highest priority to additional ammunition manufacturing capability, but this would for the most part take until 1945 to increase production. Heavy artillery ammunition production was to be doubled in 7 months and tripled in 13 months. In June and July substantial increases in bomb production were added to the expansion plan, later including Tallboy and Grand Slam bombs. Plants that had been shut down a few months or even weeks before had to be reopened. Positions in plants were opened to women for the first time to overcome the labour shortages. The heavy artillery expansion program required new facilities costing around $203,000,000.
Ammunition variation was a problem that needed careful attention. Mass produced ammunition at multiple plants often has different ballistic qualities within but especially between batches, "lots". It is best to keep the lots together. The greater the uncertainty over relative performance the greater the safety margins needed, and the harder it was to pre register artillery. It took until the third quarter of 1944 to largely eliminate lots being split up by the transport system.
Almost no heavy artillery ammunition was shipped to Europe between October 1943 and June 1944, despite the theatre being around 20% below authorised levels in May. Light and Medium artillery ammunition shipments had also been effectively stopped between January and May 1944, despite the theatre having 75% or authorised levels in May.
On 21st September 1944 First army replies to a request on ammunition consumption by pointing out it has never been supplied at the authorised rate and so the army is not able to determine whether the rate is adequate.
22nd November 1944 Eisenhower transmits Bradley's response to the ammunition situation word for word to Marshall. The 12th Army group could attack until 15th December exhausting most reserves, the lack of 105 and 155mm howitzer ammunition would force static operations assuming no enemy attacks.
During November 21st Army group releases 100 25 pounders and 60 days ammunition supply to 12th Army group, they are divided up amongst the three US armies. The loan is renewed for another 60 days in January. This comes at a time when British consumption of 25 pounder ammunition exceeds supply by around 1.5 million rounds per month.
The US army decided the 25 pounder was superior?
Also the US forces in Europe are using in 10 days the ammunition expected to last 35 days, and more mortar shells in a day than used in a month in North Africa.
The significant lack of 8 inch ammunition means less than half the guns in theatre are used in action in 1945.
17 August 1944, to give an idea of the shipping situation a ship, presumably loaded with medical supplies arrives in Europe on this day, it finally begins unloading on 10th December.
During November 1944 the supply system deliberately creates, or rather, deliberately does not fix a cigarette shortage. Authorised US army stocks of winter clothing in the UK go to zero, units in the UK are directed to return overcoats and arctics so they can be sent to the front line troops.
On 27th November supply stocks of cigarettes are down to 3 days with the armies and none in the rear areas. There is the anticipated reaction, with visiting congress members becoming involved. The supply people promise to send more cigarettes as soon as the winter clothing is shipped to the units. Apparently as an extreme example one ship containing 1,200,000 blankets had been docked 7 times at Le Havre without being unloaded. Winter clothing is airlifted from the ports to the armies, bypassing the intermediate depots. With winter gear in short supply the US buys 300,000 blankets from Spain originally made for the German army. Portugal sells large numbers of blankets, towels and so on to the US. "front line troops fought through a large part of the winter inadequately clothed".
During February 1945 a proposal to raise 25 gasoline supply companies using German PoWs with US officers is approved. By the end of April there were 260,000 German PoWs used as labourers on the continent.
During March 1945 US Army men in sedentary jobs will be ordered to take 10% cut in rations because of the food situation. Articles appear in the French press about the food situation including a claim the allies are taking the food. The actual balance is 280,000 tons in aid versus purchase of 70,000 tons.
At Liege is the company Fabrique Nationale des Armes de Guerre, which holds the Browning patents, enabling it to manufacture much US army equipment. Also at Liege is Englebert and Company, for tyre manufacture, recap and repair, initially aided by 50 tons of Buna (synthetic rubber) and 2 tons of natural rubber captured at Malmedy. Belgian industry will supply around 1,000 different types of items before the war is over. This includes 200 complete 60 mm mortars and modifications to 60 and 81 mm mortars.
French industry will also be used. Early September First army Ordnance section negotiates a contract with Gnome-Rhone to overhaul tank engines, starting with 200 unserviceable engines brought to France, due to a lack of overhaul capacity in England. After a test batch the company does all 200 engines by late September, and provides 1st Army with its only replacement engines in 4 months of campaigning. This supply is very welcome given over 200 engines had already been sent to England for rebuilding and another 170 awaited the journey. Third Army follows the precedent and also sends tank engines to Gnome-Rhone. A lack of spare parts prevents a full overhaul of most engines leading to a high failure rate until parts can be provided for full overhauls.
November 1944, In the 5 months since D-day 1st Army has received 562 truck engines, including 400 it had given back to COMZ in July, versus the planned 4,000 engines. Engines are so precious they are sent back under armed guard at times, the one to be reconditioned not released until a good engine is presented.
Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
Ok, we`ve reached the stage of "Portugal sells blankets", and "cigarette shortages" in a thread about the P-38.
I`ve long since given up trying to work out what on earth is even being discussed here.
I`ve long since given up trying to work out what on earth is even being discussed here.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 935
- Sep 30, 2021
Toss away everything after "Extracts from US Army supply histories." That is just examples of the problems the US had in supplying field forces caused the inevitable attempts to forecast the future from inadequate data, compounded by the time it took to confirm any problems, undertake corrective action and then ship the stuff to where it was wanted. The US had never supplied army groups in the field for example and had little WWII data to work from. The Overlord plan had the allies reaching the German border and therefore the winter snow lines a year after the landings, so in summer, but the border was reached in early Autumn. Just note the reduction in the expected number of army heavy weapons would have an impact on the amount and type of air support requested.
The thing that had my attention in the Army supplies message was how quickly even the USAAF in a quite favourable situation would lose strength if the supply of aircraft was turned off.
As for the rest I think one strand goes like the 9th AF could not be short of aircraft because the US system was not short of aircraft, not only that but the 9th alone outnumbered the entire Luftwaffe, which means with the 8th, 15th and 12th AF the USAAF must have outnumbered the Luftwaffe between 5 and 10 to 1, on the other side is the USAAF fighters over Germany usually fought outnumbered, at least on escort duties. Also from November 1943 to May 1944 the USAAF went all out attacking the Luftwaffe, except that does not quite fit with the 8th AF targets attacked, they certainly did a lot, but such targets were under half of the bombs dropped and the day raids could not really hurt most arms of the Luftwaffe.
By the way there were the expected big air battles caused by Operation Overlord, in terms of allied fighter kill claims, for the RAF June and July 1944 are the fourth and fifth highest months, after May, August and September 1940. For the USAAF fighters in the European Theater of Operations, June 1944 is sixth and July 1944 tenth in terms of air to air kill claims. The top 5 are, in order, December, May, September, August and November 1944, or to end July 1944 June and July 1944 were numbers 2 and 6. What had changed was the decrease in skill/training of the average Luftwaffe day fighter pilot, which made the allied task that much easier and the great increase in available allied airpower, both numbers and experience as lower casualty rates meant the average allied airman had more missions completed than previously.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
What a superfluous dissertation to a simple comment... 
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
The bacon is for "superfluous ".
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
To include P-38s, right?
GregP
Major
Merlin, configured with early exhaust outlets. There aren't enough Merlins around to get EXACTLY the right dash number, so they built a good one and configure it to look like the correct engine.
GregP
Major
This is beginning to look like a quartermaster annual report from the Department of Redundancy Department.
Greg Boeser
2nd Lieutenant
Wow. That's a lot of info, Geoff. Thanks for the big picture overview. Lots of good information on the overall supply situation. Stuff that gets overlooked in the typical "which was better?" discussion. While the focus of this thread seems to be on the FGs equipped with P-38s from late '43 in NW Europe, people seem to ignore the experiences of the early groups sent to North Africa. Early losses there in the 1st and 14th FGs forced the USAAF to strip the UK based 78th FG of all its P-38s and most of the pilots. The group subsequently re-equipping with P-47s before it could become operational. Likewise, the 82nd, arriving in North Africa slightly later, had half their strength stripped to bolster the 1st and 14th.
Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
Luftwaffe training hours changed throughout the war, but there was actually not a dramatic reduction until July 1944 onwards.
If you read Leigh Mallory`s Overlord Diary, you can see that it was basically a damp squib, none of the expected huge air battles in direct opposition to the ground invasion occured in the aftermath of the invasion.
D-Day +1
D-Day +4
D-Day +6
D-Day +23
Having said all that, its still a mystery to me what on earth any of this has to do with P-38`s....
They said there were problems with cockpit heating so P-38s did need some blankets.
Greg Boeser
2nd Lieutenant
I wasnt trying to imply anything. I specifically stated that. Not only were P-47s being used for Air/Sea rescue, and informal diver missions they were being used for sight seeing flights or diversions to see things to tell the grand children in later years, thanks for the information. You can add to your aside of 134,029 hours spent on training the historical fact that a majority of operations performed prior to D-Day in ground attack on northern France apart from the Normandy beaches were part of a diversion to mislead the Germans that the landing area would be somewhere else than the Normandy beaches. This with an aircraft far superior to anything Goering had for high altitude combat apart from the 262.
1 I didnt say that you did. Only pilots with full training plus approx 200 hours on front line type and experience actually matter in a fighter battle. Tour expired pilots were my point, Goering didnt have the concept of tour expired pilots.
2 Goering didnt have many heavy bombers by May 1944 many of his medium bombers were also lost in the Baby Blitz. Operation Steinbock 524 bombers used 324 lost including 46 He 177s.
3 Coupled with your later comment "So now a new time period 2 months, why exactly was that time period chosen?" Well you provided the information so why wouldnt I quote it, compare your quoted quartermasters report to how many aircraft with trained and mainly untrained pilots were involved in Operation Bodenplatte, which took place in the middle of your quoted figures. Numbers vary but losses were around 250 and that wiped out the LW as an effective fighting force according to Galland and most other pilots of the period and historians of the subject, but then, they werent quartermasters
Any discussion of shortage of tanks in USA forces, UK forces or Russian forces at the end of September 1944 is just laugh out loud funny, you obviously have access to a wealth of information but the conclusions you come to are just hilarious.
Now, what about the P-38?
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ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
"Truck Destroyer Battalions" LOL Thank you for that, I had never heard that expression before.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 935
- Sep 30, 2021
Sure, it is a well known fact all air forces fought outnumbered most of the time and even at the same time at the same and different places, while they were really competing in the best paint job and unit emblem events.To include P-38s, right?
And the definition of a primary source document for this redundant redundancy is? Does it have to be issued from the main or spare redundancy department?
Nice stuff, firstly are the Leigh-Mallory diaries available online?
Yes, the well known training hours diagram but training is only one part of what you need. The way the Jagdwaffe lost so much collective experience in the first 5 months of 1944 is not relevant? Also the idea there was this big drop in Luftwaffe training hours in July 1944 which requires interpreting the diagram literally so all three air forces apparently did these (big) training hour movements at the same time, up or down. No gradual declines or increases being masked by the time periods being averaged.
And reports to 12 June are supposed to be enough to respond to data from June and July? The again well known reality it took time for the Luftwaffe to move and then the discovery of how bad the airfield and supply situation was in France. In any case as Williamson Murray reports by 11 June 5 Gruppen had been sent back to Germany because of the losses they had taken. Also Leigh-Mallory did not have control of all allied fighters present.
If this is the definition of huge go ahead, it does mean "Big Week" did not see any big air battles, rather like June/July 1944 it was a series of combats that collectively added up to a big result. So Big week becomes "Lots of little battles week" that added up to something big. After all USAAF fighters claimed 341 kills in the air and 1 on the ground in February 1944, versus 470 and 148 in June and 407 and 153 in July. If the idea is the June and July battle results are not big, then assuming they are "Medium Month" then the USAAF had "Little Week" in February to keep things consistent with fighter kill claims. The RAF went from around 81 claims in the air and 11 on the ground in February to 316 in the air and 3 on the ground in June and 322 in the air in July, using the Fighter Command War Diaries. So collectively allied fighters in the ETO claimed the destruction of 434 Luftwaffe aircraft in February, 937 in June and 882 in July. Luftwaffe losses in the early part of 1944 were bad, those starting in June while trying to hold the allied summer offensives on three fronts were even worse. The USAAF thinks it lost 243 aircraft to enemy aircraft, out of 292 losses in February 1944, 284 out of 904 for June, 150 out of 712 for July. Fighter Command War Diaries notes 74 aircrafct lost on operations in February, 374 June and 240 in August.
Did Leigh-Mallory discontinue bombing of Luftwaffe airfields, along with a significant drop in fighter cover for his operations, given the lack of Luftwaffe? The 9th AF October 1943 to May 1945 devoted a bit over 14% of its total fighter sorties to escorting fighter bombers, area patrols or sweeps. By end June Leigh-Mallory is denigrating the USAAF attack on Luftwaffe strategy and actually making it clear the heavy bombers should be doing more tactical support, as per his ideas.
I noted the allied fighter kill claims and the amount of air combat they represent, the fact allied airpower kept the Luftwaffe unable to mount effective operations is clear, they did that by destroying the enemy in the air and on the ground throughout the time period. Given the results I consider the battles to be big as per definitions like Big Week.
Peripheral, more so given the convoy cover sorties P-38 did, it is more about noting that while the Luftwaffe lost heavily January to May 1944, that did not stop a major effort against the invasion, with the earlier Luftwaffe losses going a long way in stopping effective opposition, along with the systematic strikes on airfields in range. Sort of like the story of the 2 fighters strafing the D-day beaches versus the other under 100 Luftwaffe sorties that day, plus more at night., with plenty of people going with 2 sorties total for the day.
Actually implying as can be seen the ideas were lots of P-47s on V-1 patrols or attempting to shoot down V-1 meant the 9th AF did not have a shortage. Is the idea the USAAF had such poor flying discipline that there was enough of such bending of the rules it had a noticeable impact on performance?
So unable to back up the latest claim time to change subject to the well known allied air strategy to keep the Germans guessing where the invasion was, not only that but ground attack operations were done using aircraft with superior high altitude performance, without thinking that through and asking where were the specific low altitude performers. All the USAAF fighters in France in 1944 and most of the RAF ones were all optimised to perform best at 20,000 feet or higher, yet those doing support operations rarely flew much above 10,000 or so feet, the reality of the air forces had to work with what they had which was from decisions made years previously. By the way the V weapons bombings come into play, note where the sites were and how bombing many of them contributed to the deception.
The claim was the USAAF had a big pilot and aircraft surplus in May 1944 which is clearly wrong and this is the response. So the Luftwaffe lost many pilots on 1 January 1945 means the quartermaster strength records during the war are wrong. Above we have the Luftwaffe ineffective in June 1944, now it is January 1945. And once again it is good to know loss of Luftwaffe day fighter pilots meant the entire Luftwaffe was gone.
Where was the comparison with the quartermaster report?
The attempts to convince the world people disagreeing are really agreeing does explain how really wrong strength figures can be used along with insisting they are correct. Plus fleeing forward to another topic until everyone ends up back at the start. It has more to do with exploring the mental defences against unliked news.
The wiped out effective fighting force in the air are credited with 446 USAAF ETO losses in air in something over 4 months in 1945, versus 877 in 1943, the MTO figures were 1,264 in 1943 and 34 in 1945. So 1943 losses of 2,141 including some to axis allied forces versus 480 in about third of the year in 1945.
In general creating laughter makes the world a little better, unless the laughter is the shrill, desperate, hysterical or defence against reality type. If conclusions are very wrong it is easy for many people to provide the actual facts, not opinions or verbiage using the standard various ways humans dismiss news they dislike or disagree with.
As to what happens next it would depend on whether claims keep being made that the state and size of the US Army in France had no impact on the 9th Air Force. Or whether aircraft strengths are incorrectly stated. Or the concept of shortage required it to be system wide, not unit specific. And strengths based on the total size of the enemy, not the mission the unit has.
Introducing the supply stuff helps identify those who are really interested in the topic compared with those with a casual interest. So Patton's drive across France has a lot more interest versus as the US Army leaves Normandy it leaves behind over 2 million jerricans, scattered about the area, think of them being able to do at least 1 trip mid July to end August 1944, and what that could mean to the ability of the army to over run territory instead of having to fight for it later.
Is this an invitation to provide the detailed breakdown of 9th AF P-38 operations? Or is that classified as too much data? Or to much real data to be met with please look over there instead, or imaginings of what was going on? The detailed strength figures will totally refute the claim the 9th AF was bigger than the Luftwaffe for a start.
1. It was you who said they were trying to catch a look. In fact the guys were probably well meaning in their intentions, but its very easy for two or more pilots to converge on something like a V1 and not see each other until they are about to have a collision.
2. If the deception plan was so well known how is it not known by you that it was before D-Day. The first V1 launches were from the Pas de Calais on 12 June, then the south coast on London on 15/16 June after which Eisenhower prioritized attacks on launch sites.
3 Relative to the LF they had an abundance of riches in all things, the allies could put more heavy bombers in the air than Germany ever built any day they chose and then do the same the next day.
drgondog
Major
I tried - but my eyes glazed over the repeated phone book recitals. Boring at best.
BTW to your assertion that 'the P-38 was never outnumbered' I suggest that a macro level your statement is untrue from from 1942 to near V-E Day when compared to LW Day Fighter Arm in ETO and MTO. Silly, Yes? Then peel it down to October 15 1943 or two for December through February 1944. One then two P-38 FG Vs LW Day fighter mix of Bf 109, Fw 190 and Bf 110? Yes? December 1943 More LW units have transferred to West and continue through May 1944, but total P-38 ETO strength rises to 6 (4 8th AF/2 9th AF) then declines to one by end of1944. Has the P-38 unit total achieved parity? Is the question of outnumber/outnumbered in question for Macro view? How about micro? Can you cite instances of major concentrations of P-38s being deployed against inferior LW foces? Take the MTO - three total P-38 FG from November 1942 through VE Day. Same questions.
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