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Langsdorff was on a fools errand and paid the price.
I was only really discussing the logistics. He had used 2/3s of his main gun ammunition. Even if the force outside hadnt changed and his ship was undamaged he only had 20 minutes firing time left. Keeping a surface raider supplied wasnt easy, keeping a battle fleet supplied is an industry itself.Question about the carriers goes to one Ernest King.
So if you want to argue with him then be my guest.
Graf Spee was never in a trillion years going to make it back to Germany. It wasn't in a fit state anyway.
So you either scuttle, sail to Buenos Aires and intern or one way ticket to Valhalla.
Langsdorff was on a fools errand and paid the price.
Me too that's why I started the thread. Even Clark Reynold's "The Fast Carriers" doesn't really explain the planning behind the huge carrier numbers (but is still a great book).I'm wondering if there was a sort of formula. In addition to escort type ships planned for escort duty: for every carrier, 2 CA's, 4CL's, 8 destroyers are needed or something like that.
The only ship engaged in the Battle of the River Plate with Radar was Graf Spee.I think it must have unnerved Langsdorf that the British cruisers could shadow the Graf Spee night and day via radar for thousands of miles, keeping out of effective gunnery range the whole time. It was a long way from Uruguay to Germany. Scuttling Graf Spee was like a chessmaster laying down his king early in the game, when he can project out a certain victory by the opponent.
Ignoring for the moment the pre-war aircraft carriers, the US Navy built and planned to build an astounding number of aircraft carriers during World War II. The Navy ordered 36 Essex-class fleet carriers, and of that 24 were built. They ordered 9 Independence-class light carriers, all of which were built, they ordered 6 Midway-class "battle carriers", and 3 were built (seeing service after the war.) (I'll give them credit, they actually cancelled the other three during the war.) The Navy put in service over 100 escort carriers of various types. The Navy ordered 35 Commencement Bay-class super escort carriers. Of these, 19 were put into service and 19 were scrapped before completion.
My question is this: How did the Navy figure that this many aircraft carriers were necessary, did they crunch the numbers on the resources that would be necessary to build the carriers, crew the carriers, provide the aircraft, fuel, bombs, etc? The training? The escorts, bases, mobile replenishment, etc.? If anybody has a source for the numbers underlying the Navy's planning, I'd love to see it.
When it came to the wartime shipbuilding programmes such as the Maximum Effort Programme of 1942, orders were being placed for as many ships of each type as possible up to the capacity that each yard could take. At the same time yards tended to specialise in particular types of ship. So in 1940 2 Cleveland class cruisers ordered from Federal in New Jersey were cancelled to allow that yard to concentrate on producing destroyers, with new cruiser orders being placed elsewhere.I'm wondering if there was a sort of formula. In addition to escort type ships planned for escort duty: for every carrier, 2 CA's, 4CL's, 8 destroyers are needed or something like that.
PS - as someone alluded to already, the support logistics of an armed force in the field, especially during intense combat operations is massive and unbelievably complex. Imagine then, the epic logistical planning and execution of the D-Day invasion at Normandy. The above book's chapter about that invasion really conveys how staggering an accomplishment that invasion was.
Roughly 3,700 Kamikaze sorties during the Okinawa campaign, damaging more than 200 ships.4,000+ Kamikazes lined up ready to go. Several hundred put a number of fleet carriersR out of way during Okinawa.Ro