Doolittle took over in 1944, and the Eighth continued to bomb well below 30,000 feet.
Since the subject of Renrich's comments concerned what did happen vs. what might have happened had the war continued, I found his points to have merit.
Hurricane IIc vs. B-17s B-24s
- Thread starter Jerry W. Loper
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Doolittle took over in 1944, and the Eighth continued to bomb well below 30,000 feet.
Since the subject of Renrich's comments concerned what did happen vs. what might have happened had the war continued, I found his points to have merit.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Dav, your post was very informative and obviously makes a lot of sense. I think another point is that the B29 was pressurized(?) and of course the B17s and B24s were not. I have read that at some times the casualties in the eighth air force caused by frostbite were higher than those caused by battle.
davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
I would guess that a contributing factor may have been that none of his aircraft could perform a mission at that height.
Yes, in the case of the B-24. The B-17's operational ceiling is quoted as 30k in one book on the campaign. (Westerman or Neillands). Other factors were also involved as mentioned including accuracy. Westerman (Flak: German AA defenses 1914-1945) also wrote that ultra high bombing missions were enshewed due to the impact on equipment and crew (as well as accuracy) This is not to say that a few missions wern't attempted but generally the lead BG's flew in at around 23-25k. Eaker's relief had nothing to do with misjudging the ceiling of German flak defenses.
Colin1
Senior Master Sergeant
So in other words, it was platform limitations that pegged strategic bombing at around the 25,000ft mark, rather than any Command preference
Nobody said it was
Your citing Eaker's replacement by Doolittle was suggestive that Eaker was relieved due to an error in judgement regarding enemy flak attributes and that changes were effected after his replacement (re: altitude). Neither was the case from what i have read. Platform limitations were one of the factors that helped determine USAAF altitude settings but not the only one.
Shortround6
Major General
I would note that the Germans designed, built and fielded higher velocity 88mm AA guns, 105mm AA guns and 128mm guns and were investigating even larger AA guns, all with idea of increasing the effective ceiling of the Flack defense.
See also the British AA gun history as well as the American 105 and 120mm AA guns.
An awful lot of weapons planned and built to defend against things that never really panned out.
But if the predictions had been true and the weapons not built were would the defense be?
See also the British AA gun history as well as the American 105 and 120mm AA guns.
An awful lot of weapons planned and built to defend against things that never really panned out.
But if the predictions had been true and the weapons not built were would the defense be?
davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
My research shows that the 10.5 Flak 38 did not have the range of the 88. The 12.8 Flak 40 had a much better range but fired at a rate of 10 rnd/min. They doubled up to get 20 rnd/min but still had a limit quantity of guns available.
drgondog
Major
I have heard repeatedly, by several individuals at a command level that their opinion bears weight, that Eaker was deemed to have failed to achieve the objectives necessary to make the case for US daylight strategic bombing - and the decision was made in the October timeframe.
In these discussions Eaker and Spaatz and Arnold were at odds regarding which changes in current strategy were required to a.) stop the bleeding and b.) win air superiority for the upcoming invasion.
The cornerstones of the debate were a.) switch to night bombing as requested by Churchill with a somewhat receptive audience in FDR, b.) violent disagreement from Eaker and Arnold for reasons ranging from training to equipment to logistics of cramming USAAF and RAF over UK in 10 hour window to perceieved ineffectiveness against both Luftwaffe and strategic targets.
From what I heard Eaker offered no real solutions and was not convinced that long range escort was the answer - as well as adamantly opposed to fighters ranging away from close escort.
Doolittle was a candidate for the 8th AF job but Eaker was well respected. The decision came down to Spaatz accepting the responsibilty for both the selection and the results of a new commander but USAAF Strategic Bombing doctrine was on the line and so was Spaatz's job.
The 8th conserved strength in late Oct through early January as the P-38 and then P-51 were evaluated for long range target capability... The reviews from Tommy Hitchcock who headed up 8th A technical evaluation were so glowing that the die was cast and the 354th FG was TDY from 9th AF to 8th and deals were cut to transfer 357FG to 8th in exchange for 358FG (jugs), as well as transfer all P-38s and P-47s to 9th AF TAC as all future deliveries for the P-51 were switched from 9th to 8th.
The die was cast in approximately November 1943 even before the first 354th FG mission was flown.. A HUGE gamble.
Flak effectiveness had nothing to do with the decision - it was all about killing the Luftwaffe as fast as possible and accept whatever casualties required by 8th BC to get the job done.
Doolittle made the command decision as new 8th AF CO and the infamous memo to 'seek the enemy in the air and on the ground' was one of his first, and early, directives.. I think January 11 but my memory is poor and I am away from my references. Many 8th BC Group Commander privately called Doolittle a 'murderer' for his decision to free up the escort as they envisioned a slaughter..
afaik the 10.5 flak 38 was best of original 8.8/56 but badest of longer 8.8/71
