If italy Joined the allies World War 2

[swampyankee]

ONE point : if Italy was neutral or a Western ally ,there would be no German invasion of Yugoslavia .

Part of the reason for the invasion of Yugoslavia was the coup that overthrew the pro-German government, which reportedly enraged Hitler. Whether Germany and its allies, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria could tolerate a neutral on their border brings in a second set of conjectures. Given thatvall three had pre-existing issues with Yugoslavia, one wonders whether one of them would instigate an invasion.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey ljadw,

Sorry, I may have misunderstood what you are trying to say? If you are saying that what was done/when it was done/how what was done, could have been done better (since it at least seems logical to you) and that the high commands could have/should have known better (even without hindsight) then possibly you are correct.

If however, you are trying to say that what was done/when it was done/how what was done, was not done for the reasons stated (ie estimation of oil needed for operations and other such, the expected oil supply/production number, the envisioned methods of operations, the envisioned chances of success, etc) then you are very incorrect. Unless you think that all the participants (military, civil, enemy and domestic) and record keepers (both at the time and the historians since) are lying, there is almost no rational argument possible as to what was done/when it was done/how what was done/ and why it was done.

Incidentally, the military planning for operations today (pick any nation you choose) are still done pretty much exactly the same in essence as it was done in WWII. Sometimes they still get it wrong. You do your best in the planning and preparation of the main plans as you can, hope for the best (while realizing that the plans may not work out the way you hope), and put as much preparation for contingency and back-up plans as is practicable.

 

[ljadw]

Part of the reason for the invasion of Yugoslavia was the coup that overthrew the pro-German government, which reportedly enraged Hitler. Whether Germany and its allies, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria could tolerate a neutral on their border brings in a second set of conjectures. Given thatvall three had pre-existing issues with Yugoslavia, one wonders whether one of them would instigate an invasion.

And, why was there an anti-German /anti Italian coup in Yugoslavia ? Because. Italy, an enemy of Yugoslavia since more than 20 years,was in big problems because of its failed attack on Greece . And there was the danger that Yugoslavia would attack the Italian forces in Albania .
If Italy was a Western ally, it would not attack Greece and I see no reason why Yugoslavia would attack a Western ally .

 

[ljadw]

Hey ljadw,

Sorry, I may have misunderstood what you are trying to say? If you are saying that what was done/when it was done/how what was done, could have been done better (since it at least seems logical to you) and that the high commands could have/should have known better (even without hindsight) then possibly you are correct.

If however, you are trying to say that what was done/when it was done/how what was done, was not done for the reasons stated (ie estimation of oil needed for operations and other such, the expected oil supply/production number, the envisioned methods of operations, the envisioned chances of success, etc) then you are very incorrect. Unless you think that all the participants (military, civil, enemy and domestic) and record keepers (both at the time and the historians since) are lying, there is almost no rational argument possible as to what was done/when it was done/how what was done/ and why it was done.

Incidentally, the military planning for operations today (pick any nation you choose) are still done pretty much exactly the same in essence as it was done in WWII. Sometimes they still get it wrong. You do your best in the planning and preparation of the main plans as you can, hope for the best (while realizing that the plans may not work out the way you hope), and put as much preparation for contingency and back-up plans as is practicable.

I am saying that
a Japan was saddled with the war in China and that Japan needed to finish him very fast victoriously for political and economic reasons .
b This war was started because of the pressure of the army, not of the navy .
c The army was unable to finish him,as it could not break the resistance of 500 million Chinese .
d The army could,of course, not admit its mistake,and found a scapegoat : the US .It claimed that the KMT continued the war because the help it received /the help it expected to receive from the US and that if the US were expelled from the Pacific, immediately the war in China would be over . (In 1956 the French Army which was fighting in Algeria said the same and claimed that if Nasser was eliminated, the war in NA would be over,and the French with Britain and Israel attacked Egypt in 1956 ) .There are other such examples : in 1941 Germany attacked the USSR hoping that the fall of the USSR would force Britain to give up .
e all depended now on the IJN : if it said that it could not win against the US, Japan had lost and would cease to be a big power and the politicians and the army would blame the navy .
f If the navy said that it had enough fuel to fight 10 years against the US ,and this would prove to be wrong , the navy would be blamed .
g Thus,what did the navy? It covered its behind and said that it had only fuel for 3 years (for which there was no proof ) .If they had more fuel, no one would attack them . The admirals knew what the politicians wanted them to say and decided that if things went wrong, they would not be blamed . The German generals also knew what Hitler wanted to hear ,which was that they could easily defeat the Soviets,but they took their precautions,so that after the war they could say that they had warned Hitler .
h The truth is that the admirals could not know how much oil they would need to defeat the USN. Besides: there is no proof that with more oil they would have done better .
i About the importance of the embargo : even with an embargo war with the US was not inevitable : Japan could have ignored the embargo and could have continued business as usual . China could have collapsed .
Without an embargo war would be still possible or even likely :if Japan had no longer the foreign currency to buy oil from the US or the DEI, it would be obliged to start a war .

 

[Greg Boeser]

Pre-war projections are always wrong. The USN failed to reinforce Wake Island in time because operating a fleet in wartime consumed vastly greater amounts of fuel than operating a fleet in peacetime. The task force sent to reinforce Wake had to refuel and the delay allowed the Japanese to get there first. Which in the long run was in the US best interest. Not so much for the 1500 military and civilian personnel captured at Wake.

 

[SaparotRob]

Pre-war projections are always wrong. The USN failed to reinforce Wake Island in time because operating a fleet in wartime consumed vastly greater amounts of fuel than operating a fleet in peacetime. The task force sent to reinforce Wake had to refuel and the delay allowed the Japanese to get there first. Which in the long run was in the US best interest. Not so much for the 1500 military and civilian personnel captured at Wake.

I thought Wake and other outposts weren't reinforced due to treaty obligations. Until it was too late.

 

[swampyankee]

I am saying that
a Japan was saddled with the war in China and that Japan needed to finish him very fast victoriously for political and economic reasons .
b This war was started because of the pressure of the army, not of the navy .
c The army was unable to finish him,as it could not break the resistance of 500 million Chinese .
d The army could,of course, not admit its mistake,and found a scapegoat : the US .It claimed that the KMT continued the war because the help it received /the help it expected to receive from the US and that if the US were expelled from the Pacific, immediately the war in China would be over . (In 1956 the French Army which was fighting in Algeria said the same and claimed that if Nasser was eliminated, the war in NA would be over,and the French with Britain and Israel attacked Egypt in 1956 ) .There are other such examples : in 1941 Germany attacked the USSR hoping that the fall of the USSR would force Britain to give up .
e all depended now on the IJN : if it said that it could not win against the US, Japan had lost and would cease to be a big power and the politicians and the army would blame the navy .
f If the navy said that it had enough fuel to fight 10 years against the US ,and this would prove to be wrong , the navy would be blamed .
g Thus,what did the navy? It covered its behind and said that it had only fuel for 3 years (for which there was no proof ) .If they had more fuel, no one would attack them . The admirals knew what the politicians wanted them to say and decided that if things went wrong, they would not be blamed . The German generals also knew what Hitler wanted to hear ,which was that they could easily defeat the Soviets,but they took their precautions,so that after the war they could say that they had warned Hitler .
h The truth is that the admirals could not know how much oil they would need to defeat the USN. Besides: there is no proof that with more oil they would have done better .
i About the importance of the embargo : even with an embargo war with the US was not inevitable : Japan could have ignored the embargo and could have continued business as usual . China could have collapsed .
Without an embargo war would be still possible or even likely :if Japan had no longer the foreign currency to buy oil from the US or the DEI, it would be obliged to start a war .

Japan was only saddled with a war in China because they chose to start it. Perhaps it was out-of-control Japanese forces in China, but they were out control because the civilian government had no authority over them. A real government, as opposed to an imitation of one, could have dealt with the "rogues."

 

[Greg Boeser]

Nobody knows when too late is, until it is. The Marine defense battalion arrived in August 1941 and VMF 211 flew in on 4 December. No radar was available on the island.
In a sense, Wake was lost the moment the Japanese declared war. The US could not keep an isolated garrison closer to the enemy than the nearest friendly base supplied during wartime.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey ljaew,

re your point i: "About the importance of the embargo : even with an embargo war with the US was not inevitable : Japan could have ignored the embargo and could have continued business as usual ."

Question#1: Since the August 1941 embargo reduced the total Japanese "peacetime" imports of oil to about 8 million bbl annually, and since there was a need for 24 million bbl annually during said "peacetime" (of which the split was about 4.2 IJA/8.6 IJN /11.2 civilian million bbl per year) - how was Japan's oil needs to be met? Note that 8 does not equal 24.

re your point g: "Thus,what did the navy? It covered its behind and said that it had only fuel for 3 years (for which there was no proof ) .If they had more fuel, no one would attack them ."

Question#2: Where did you find this? The 3 years was a bare minimum, with no naval operations (ie no war with the US/UK Commonwealth/DEI/etc) and in effect a near complete stand down of its navy. And as far as I am aware, no one in Japan ever said "If they had more fuel, no one would attack them ."

re your point i: "if Japan had no longer the foreign currency to buy oil from the US or the DEI, it would be obliged to start a war ."

I am not sure you understand the meaning of embargo. Prior to 1941 Japan was buying 80% of its oil imports from the US, UK, and DEI. An embargo as occurred against Japan, meant that the US and DEI stopped selling oil to Japan . . period, regardless if Japan had currency or not. The UK had already stopped selling to Japan because of its own war-time needs, prior to the US/DEI embargo.

The simple fact is that the US wanted Japan out of China. (Although it is often argued as to the true nature of the US reasoning, relative to this discussion I do not think it matters if they were economic reasons, humanitarian reasons, some combination of the 2, or some other reason entirely.) There is no way that Japan could continue "as usual" with 8 million bbl of oil a year. 8 million bbl was not even enough to supply its pre-war civilian needs. This was the point of the US enacting a full embargo on Japan, and pressuring DEI to do likewise. The US also knew (via MAGIC et al) that Japan would almost certainly to go to war with the US if the earlier partial embargo continued, and Japan would have no nationally/politically acceptable choice at all if the embargo became complete.

 

[swampyankee]

And, why was there an anti-German /anti Italian coup in Yugoslavia ? Because. Italy, an enemy of Yugoslavia since more than 20 years,was in big problems because of its failed attack on Greece . And there was the danger that Yugoslavia would attack the Italian forces in Albania .
If Italy was a Western ally, it would not attack Greece and I see no reason why Yugoslavia would attack a Western ally .

The government of Yugoslavia before that coup was pro-German, which could mean 1) they would attack Albania or one of their other non-Axis neighbors 2) an anti-German coup could still occur, possibly because of refugees from German allies or because of general internal politics 3) there were pre-existing conflicts between Yugoslavia and its neighbors, including Hungary, Austria, Romania, and Bulgaria, although I'm not sure of their relative aggressiveness 4) there were significant German enclaves in Yugoslavia.

All the arguments that Italy was a net drag on Germany neglect that a) without Italy being a German ally, the Mediterranean is an Allied lake and Suez is under about as much threat as Panama b) there was a significant Italian presence on the Russian Front which, it should be remembered used about 70% of the German ground and air forces. The MTO was not a useless diversion for Germany, as there were significant RN losses there, many of which would not happen had Italy been uninvolved.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Yugoslav history makes interesting reading. The Regent of Yugoslavia tried to stay neutral but sided with the Axis, in the hopes of protecting the country from Italian aggression. A pro-allied coup followed, resulting in the Italian-German invasion.
Prince Paul's conditions for joining the Axis were that the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia would be respected, that Yugoslavia would not be called upon to contribute troops to the war effort and that Yugoslavia would not grant passage to foreign armies. The Yugoslav generals didn't like those terms, deposed the regent, and lost the country.

 

[ljadw]

Hey ljaew,

re your point i: "About the importance of the embargo : even with an embargo war with the US was not inevitable : Japan could have ignored the embargo and could have continued business as usual ."

Question#1: Since the August 1941 embargo reduced the total Japanese "peacetime" imports of oil to about 8 million bbl annually, and since there was a need for 24 million bbl annually during said "peacetime" (of which the split was about 4.2 IJA/8.6 IJN /11.2 civilian million bbl per year) - how was Japan's oil needs to be met? Note that 8 does not equal 24.

re your point g: "Thus,what did the navy? It covered its behind and said that it had only fuel for 3 years (for which there was no proof ) .If they had more fuel, no one would attack them ."

Question#2: Where did you find this? The 3 years was a bare minimum, with no naval operations (ie no war with the US/UK Commonwealth/DEI/etc) and in effect a near complete stand down of its navy. And as far as I am aware, no one in Japan ever said "If they had more fuel, no one would attack them ."

re your point i: "if Japan had no longer the foreign currency to buy oil from the US or the DEI, it would be obliged to start a war ."

I am not sure you understand the meaning of embargo. Prior to 1941 Japan was buying 80% of its oil imports from the US, UK, and DEI. An embargo as occurred against Japan, meant that the US and DEI stopped selling oil to Japan . . period, regardless if Japan had currency or not. The UK had already stopped selling to Japan because of its own war-time needs, prior to the US/DEI embargo.

The simple fact is that the US wanted Japan out of China. (Although it is often argued as to the true nature of the US reasoning, relative to this discussion I do not think it matters if they were economic reasons, humanitarian reasons, some combination of the 2, or some other reason entirely.) There is no way that Japan could continue "as usual" with 8 million bbl of oil a year. 8 million bbl was not even enough to supply its pre-war civilian needs. This was the point of the US enacting a full embargo on Japan, and pressuring DEI to do likewise. The US also knew (via MAGIC et al) that Japan would almost certainly to go to war with the US if the earlier partial embargo continued, and Japan would have no nationally/politically acceptable choice at all if the embargo became complete.

About point 1 : consumption of oil (which is not the same as needs ) does not only depend on imports :even with less imports,it would be possible to consume oil,because of the stocks .And, it was always possible to consume less oil .Japan consumed less oil in 1941/1942 than in 1940/1941 :22,65 million barrels against 28,6 million .
About the foreign currency : this is in the scenario without embargo : war would still be possible without embargo if Japan had no longer the needed money to buy oil or if US tankers could no longer transport the oil ( Japanese tankers could not do it on their own ) .
The truth is that embargo did not mean automatically war and that no embargo did not automatically mean no war .
The following figures are from ''Bankrupting the enemy '' P 165 ( I use rough figures )
Japan's oil fuel consumption
First column civilian
Second column military ( it is not specified how much was for the army and how much for the navy
31-32 12,28 million barrels / 2,64
32/33 14,68 /3,6
33/34 15,35 /4,27
34/35 18,1 / 4,55
35/36 23,55 / 5
36/37 22,15 /5,55
37/38 23,64/6,3
38/39 20,86/ 7,1
39/40 17,4 / 7,8
40/41 19,33 /9,22
41/42 10,5 /12,15
It was possible for Japan to diminish its imports already BEFORE the embargo :1937/1938 a total of 30 million and 25 million in 1939/1940 and even after the embargo it was possible to increase the consumption from 41,8 million in 41/42 to 44 million in 42/43 .

 

[ThomasP]

Hey ljaew,

Do you understand that the decrease in consumption in 41/42 was largely due the effects of the embargo, and that the increase in oil consumption from 41/42 thru 44 was made possible by the capture of oil producing fields and refineries, as well as some stocks?

 

[The Basket]

Yugoslav history makes interesting reading. The Regent of Yugoslavia tried to stay neutral but sided with the Axis, in the hopes of protecting the country from Italian aggression. A pro-allied coup followed, resulting in the Italian-German invasion.
Prince Paul's conditions for joining the Axis were that the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia would be respected, that Yugoslavia would not be called upon to contribute troops to the war effort and that Yugoslavia would not grant passage to foreign armies. The Yugoslav generals didn't like those terms, deposed the regent, and lost the country.

This is good stuff.

We are 100% axis but we not fight for you and we not let you in.

Er....let's see how this will end. I have zero knowledge on anything WW2 but this ain't gonna fly.

The Washington treaty did say no further fortification in the Pacific which was a win for the Japanese. But the treaty was dead by 1936 so plenty time to fix any fortification. Maybe Wake was never thought as a target.

But the treaty did mean Japan made some flexible ships so swings and roundabout.

 

[swampyankee]

Yugoslav history makes interesting reading. The Regent of Yugoslavia tried to stay neutral but sided with the Axis, in the hopes of protecting the country from Italian aggression. A pro-allied coup followed, resulting in the Italian-German invasion.
Prince Paul's conditions for joining the Axis were that the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia would be respected, that Yugoslavia would not be called upon to contribute troops to the war effort and that Yugoslavia would not grant passage to foreign armies. The Yugoslav generals didn't like those terms, deposed the regent, and lost the country.

If Yugoslavia remains an ally of Germany, at least with those conditions (which I don't see lasting past, say, somebody noticing the ship traffic through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean), I can't see this ending particularly well for them in this case, as being allied with Germany makes the country fair game for the Allies in all sorts of ways.

So:
Case 1: Yugoslavia is a nominal ally of Germany but contributes nothing. Allies have choices here, ranging from all those fun activities for which the SOE was famous to invading. Germany has choices, too, ranging from acceptance (yeah, that'll happen) to bribery through invasion.
Case 2: Yugoslavia permits Luftwaffe units to operate out of their country, inconveniencing the Allies, who respond in varied and sundry unpleasant ways. This also annoys those Yugoslav generals, who may depose the regency. The German forces on hand would likely take this badly, and turn Prince Paul into a Yugoslavian variant of Puyi (溥儀)
Case 3: Germany insists Yugoslavia be more helpful and permit basing Luftwaffe units and sufficient forces to protect them from Allied invasion. This also annoys those Yugoslav generals, who may depose the regency, possibly not the best plan with German forces rolling into the country.

Germany still doesn't get significant naval forces into the Mediterranean, and that sea remains an Allied lake.

 

[ljadw]

Hey ljaew,

Do you understand that the decrease in consumption in 41/42 was largely due the effects of the embargo, and that the increase in oil consumption from 41/42 thru 44 was made possible by the capture of oil producing fields and refineries, as well as some stocks?

I doubt that this was the case.
All we know for 41/42 is that there was an embargo and a decrease of imports,but there are no proofs that the embargo was the main cause of the decrease of imports: there had been in the past also reductions of imports,thus it is perfectly possible that without the embargo,there would have been a decrease in 1941 .
About the impact of the oil of the DEI : it has been strongly exaggerated , only a small part could be transported to Japan, most of it remained in the DEI.
Oil production in SEA
1942 26 million barrels,of which 10 million went to Japan
1943 50 million,of which 14 million went to Japan
1944 37 million of which 5 million went to Japan .
If we look at the stocks, it is obvious that the main reason for the increase thru 1944 was the possibility to use the reserves of oil.
The stocks were going down from 48,9 million barrels in December 1941 to 13,8 million in December 1944,while in that period 104 million barrels were produced/imported and every year the consumption was higher than the imports/production . This was made possible by using the stocks .
And, not all imports from SEA were used.
One example :1941 Stocks 48,9 Imports/production 26,2 Consumption 37 Consumption was 11 million higher than Imports/Production .
The result was that in 1942 the stocks went down to 38 million : minus 11 .
In 1942 the consumption was 13 million higher than Imports/Production and ..the stocks went down ... by 13 million from 38 to 25 .
For 1943 the consumption was 12 million higher than imports/production and the stocks fell by 12 million .
For 1944 the consumption was 9 million higher and the stocks decreased by 9 million .

 

[ThomasP]

Hey ljadw,

The DEI did not export any amount of crude oil, they had the refining facilities to process all the oil they produced, which pre-December 1941 was about 65 million bbl per year - over 2x what Japan consumption was pre-war. In 1942, despite the destruction of some of the facilities by the Dutch, the Japanese/DEI managed to produce around 25 million bbl of refined oil products, and in 1943 they managed to increase production to around 49 million bbl. This amount was more than the Japanese needed on the Japanese mainland, so only some of it was imported, while large stocks were built up in the DEI. Much of the refined products (FO, Avgas, motor oil, etc) was transported to other operational supply areas directly, as needed. The IJN for example routinely refueled in the DEI ports, and other ports directly supplied from the DEI.

The capture of the DEI oil fields and (more importantly) the refineries, all by itself, would have been capable of supplying the Japanese oil needs for the foreseeable future (we are talking decades here), and the production made up for any shortage of oil/oil products that might have occurred post US August 1941 embargo.

NOTE: I am not sure if you realize that the production numbers you listed for SE Asia are the numbers from the production for the DEI? During the war over 90% of the oil products that were consumed by the Japanese IJN, and over 80% of the oil products consumed by the IJA, originated in the DEI. Some were imported to the Japanese mainland and used or held in stock, while some were then transported to the Chinese front, or areas in the PTO.

 

[ljadw]

Hey ljadw,

The DEI did not export any amount of crude oil, they had the refining facilities to process all the oil they produced, which pre-December 1941 was about 65 million bbl per year - over 2x what Japan consumption was pre-war. In 1942, despite the destruction of some of the facilities by the Dutch, the Japanese/DEI managed to produce around 25 million bbl of refined oil products, and in 1943 they managed to increase production to around 49 million bbl. This amount was more than the Japanese needed on the Japanese mainland, so only some of it was imported, while large stocks were built up in the DEI. Much of the refined products (FO, Avgas, motor oil, etc) was transported to other operational supply areas directly, as needed. The IJN for example routinely refueled in the DEI ports, and other ports directly supplied from the DEI.

The capture of the DEI oil fields and (more importantly) the refineries, all by itself, would have been capable of supplying the Japanese oil needs for the foreseeable future (we are talking decades here), and the production made up for any shortage of oil/oil products that might have occurred post US August 1941 embargo.

NOTE: I am not sure if you realize that the production numbers you listed for SE Asia are the numbers from the production for the DEI? During the war over 90% of the oil products that were consumed by the Japanese IJN, and over 80% of the oil products consumed by the IJA, originated in the DEI. Some were imported to the Japanese mainland and used or held in stock, while some were then transported to the Chinese front, or areas in the PTO.

The fact remains that only a small part of the DEI oil was going to Japan,not because Japan did not need it , but because a shortage of tankers .In 1942 10 million barrels of DEI oil went to Japan, in 1943 14 million . That does not mean that Japan needed 4 million barrels more in 1943 than in 1942 .In 1944 5 million, that does not mean that Japan needed only 5 million in 1944 .
It is also questionable to say that the capture of the oil fields and refineries would have been capable of supplying the Japanese needs for the foreseeable future ,because Japan could not transport this oil:before the
war Japanese tankers could transport only 50 % of its oil imports .Other reason is that no one could known the Japanese oil needs in the future .
The traditional history (especially in the US ) is that the embargo was the main,or the only reason for PH .I strongly doubt this . In last instance ,the amount of the Japanese oil consumption was decided by Japan , not by the US .
Less imports/production does not automatically mean less consumption,it can also result in a higher consumption ( by using the stocks ) .
In 1939 the imports were lower than in 1938,but the stocks were higher,in 1942 the imports were higher than in 1941,but the stocks were lower .
Imports/Production, Stocks,Consumption are influencing each other and are influenced by each other ,but it is not so that imports/production are determining the stocks and consumption .In 1939 Japan bought less US oil than in 1938,it was not the US who decided to sell less oil to Japan .
In 1930 Japan bought $ 18,5 million on US oil, in 1931 16,3 million, in 193215,2 ,in 1933 14 and than Japan started to buy more : 1934 20,8 ,1935 25,3 ,etc .
Returning to the embargo : it is very well possible that even without the embargo Japan would have bought less oil and consumed less /or even more oil .
The decision to consume more /less oil was taken by the public/the government and less or more consumption would not obligatory mean /would not obligatory depend on the amount of the stocks or the amount of the production or imports .
To summarize : in 1941 there was an embargo and the production /imports went down by 50 % : from 50 million barrels in 1940 to 26 million barrels .
But there is no proof that this was caused by the embargo : it is possible that without embargo the imports/production would also have decreased by 50 % .It is also possible that without embargo the consumption would have decreased or that with embargo the consumption would have increased .

 

[Glider]

What I find interesting is that there is a lot of debate over the Japanese imports when in the real world the Italians had a similar problem.

 

[ljadw]

What I find interesting is that there is a lot of debate over the Japanese imports when in the real world the Italians had a similar problem.

Yes and no . The Italian oil problems ( very exaggerated after the war for obvious reasons ) were caused because of
1 the Italian DoW
2 the fact that the war was not evolving in the direction Italy had hoped .
Before the war,Italy bought oil from a lot of countries (including the USSR ) and the amount of oil was sufficient for Italy's ''needs ''. They could have bought more oil if needed, or less if less was needed .
Italy bought 143000 tons of oil in 1934 (1,3 million barrels ),220000 in 1935 (2 million bb) and 600000 ton in 1941(5 million bb) ,much less than Japan, because Italy was less depending on oil than Japan .
Example : the Regia Marina was operating as successfully as the IJN (or more successfully ) with less oil,because its missions were totally different .Its missions were mainly to protect the transports to the Balkans and to NA .
The missions of the IJN (which it had decided itself ) were different : the IJN was living with the past of the battle of Tsushima,which decided the war with Russia and wanted to copycat this battle .
Other difference : Japan started a war against an opponent who was superior in all aspects ,while Italy stated a war against what it thought to be two defeated opponents .Italy could have remained neutral in 1940,while the option of no war was much more difficult for Japan .