If italy Joined the allies World War 2 (1 Viewer)

Would the allies have been succesful if italy had joined them


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I am sorry ljadw, while much of the information you have brought up is interesting, most of your assumptions in your last 2 posts make no sense and/or are contradictory.

re: 1. "Before the war, Italy [Japan] bought oil from a lot of countries (including the USSR [US/UK/DEI]) and the amount of oil was sufficient for Italy's [Japan's] "needs"."

Obvious, but a non-sequitur.

re: 2. "The fact remains that only a small part of the DEI oil was going to Japan, not because Japan did not need it, but because a shortage of tankers."

Japan started the war with ~4.5 million tons of tankers/transports, and built ~6 million tons of tankers/transports during the war. Japan ended the war with ~2.5 million tons of tankers/transports (much of which was immobilized in harbor by the mining operations) due to the sinking of the rest by the Allies (primarily the USN).

re 3. "In 1942 10 million barrels of DEI oil went to Japan, in 1943 14 million. That does not mean that Japan needed 4 million barrels more in 1943 than in 1942. In 1944 5 million, that does not mean that Japan needed only 5 million in 1944."

This contradicts your logic in #1 above. This is not a discussion about the possibility of Schrödinger's cat where the cat may be both dead and alive at the same time. Either Japan perceived the need for more (correctly or incorrectly), or actually needed more oil, in either case the threat of no affordable/reliable access to the amount of oil deemed necessary led to war.

The transport of only 5 million bbl of oil products to the Japanese mainland in 1945 also does not mean that they did not want/need to ship more to the mainland. They tried to import more, but the continued sinking of their tankers/transports prevented it.

As to the need to import to the Japanese mainland, I think I partially addressed that in my previous post. Most of the refined oil product from the DEI was shipped directly to the operational area where it was needed. Again, until the sinking of their tankers/transport eventually prevented this.

re 4. "It is also questionable to say that the capture of the oil fields and refineries would have been capable of supplying the Japanese needs for the foreseeable future, because Japan could not transport this oil: before the war Japanese tankers could transport only 50% of its oil imports. Other reason is that no one could known the Japanese oil needs in the future."

Japan would have built the tanker fleet needed if they had the time, to think that they would not means you would have to think they had less brains than a cucumber. The Japanese were just as smart as any of the western nations then, and are today.

As to "no one could have known the Japanese oil needs in the future", short of a failed war or some other catastrophic event, yes you can predict future needs to a reasonable degree. A ten year period estimate is used today for planning purposes of infrastructure needs by most nations, and works pretty well.

re 5. "The traditional history (especially in the US ) is that the embargo was the main, or the only reason for PH. I strongly doubt this. In last instance, the amount of the Japanese oil consumption was decided by Japan, not by the US."

The propaganda fed to the masses at the time really does not matter relative to this discussion. The US intercepted diplomatic communications during the run-up to Pearl Harbor, that clearly state the main reasons for the start of the war. They were the demands by the US that Japan pull out of China, and the US led embargo. Post-war US led debrief of Japanese political and military officials confirmed this. There have been thorough historical studies done since then that confirm this. And if the conclusions made/published by the US and other world nations that say this is so is not enough for you, there have been many historical studies done by the Japanese since WWII (including recent ones) that draw the same conclusions.

If you are interested, you might like to read the actual translations of the messages intercepted by Magic et al, I would direct you to this post in another thread:

"Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?"

PS The rest of the thread has a lot of good information related to the subject also.
 
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I am sorry ljadw, while much of the information you have brought up is interesting, most of your assumptions in your last 2 posts make no sense and/or are contradictory.

re: 1. "Before the war, Italy [Japan] bought oil from a lot of countries (including the USSR [US/UK/DEI]) and the amount of oil was sufficient for Italy's [Japan's] "needs"."

Obvious, but a non-sequitur.

re: 2. "The fact remains that only a small part of the DEI oil was going to Japan, not because Japan did not need it, but because a shortage of tankers."

Japan started the war with ~4.5 million tons of tankers/transports, and built ~6 million tons of tankers/transports during the war. Japan ended the war with ~2.5 million tons of tankers/transports (much of which was immobilized in harbor by the mining operations) due to the sinking of the rest by the Allies (primarily the USN).

re 3. "In 1942 10 million barrels of DEI oil went to Japan, in 1943 14 million. That does not mean that Japan needed 4 million barrels more in 1943 than in 1942. In 1944 5 million, that does not mean that Japan needed only 5 million in 1944."

This contradicts your logic in #1 above. This is not a discussion about the possibility of Schrödinger's cat where the cat may be both dead and alive at the same time. Either Japan perceived the need for more (correctly or incorrectly), or actually needed more oil, in either case the threat of no affordable/reliable access to the amount of oil deemed necessary led to war.

The transport of only 5 million bbl of oil products to the Japanese mainland in 1945 does also not mean that they did not want/need to ship more to the mainland. They tried to import more, but the continued sinking of their tankers/transports prevented it.

As to the need to import to the Japanese mainland, I think I partially addressed in my previous post. Most of the refined oil product from the DEI was shipped directly to the operational area where it was needed. Again, until the sinking of their tankers/transport eventually prevented this.

re 4. "It is also questionable to say that the capture of the oil fields and refineries would have been capable of supplying the Japanese needs for the foreseeable future, because Japan could not transport this oil: before the war Japanese tankers could transport only 50% of its oil imports. Other reason is that no one could known the Japanese oil needs in the future."

Japan would have built the tanker fleet needed if they had the time, to think that they would not would not means you would have to think they had less brains than a cucumber. The Japanese were just as smart as any of the western nations then, and are today.

As to "no one could have known the Japanese oil needs in the future", short of a failed war or some other catastrophic event, yes you can predict future needs to a reasonable degree. A ten year period estimate is used today for planning purposes of infrastructure needs by most nations, and works pretty well.

re 5. "The traditional history (especially in the US ) is that the embargo was the main, or the only reason for PH. I strongly doubt this. In last instance, the amount of the Japanese oil consumption was decided by Japan, not by the US."

The propaganda fed to the masses at the time really does not matter relative to this discussion. The US intercepted diplomatic communications during the run-up to Pearl Harbor, that clearly state the main reasons for the start of the war. They were the demands by the US that Japan pull out of China, and the US led embargo. Post-war US led debrief of Japanese political and military officials confirmed this. There have been thorough historical studies done since then that confirm this. And if the conclusions made/published by the US and other world nations that say this is so is not enough for you, there have been many historical studies done by the Japanese since WWII (including recent ones) that draw the same conclusions.

If you are interested, you might like to read the actual translations of the messages intercepted by Magic et al, I would direct you to this post in another thread:

"Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?"

PS The rest of the thread has a lot of good information related to the subject also.
About the importance of the embargo,war was also possible without embargo .
3 examples with no embargo but that still could result in war
US is at war with Germany and Japan remains neutral .
1 US withdraws all its tankers from the Pacific which makes that Japan can only transport 50 % of the oil it ''needs ''
2 US withdraws the Pacific Fleet ,which gives Japan a free hand .
3 US doubles/triples the price of its oil,and Japan can not pay this price
In these 3 examples, Japan can take the decision to take the oil of the DEI,which inevitably results in war with US .
Thus an embargo was not needed for war .
Now an example of peace with embargo : the day after the embargo is declared, the Chinese give up and Japan can withdraw a big part of its army and the military oil consumption decreases,this makes the embargo useless .
The importance of the embargo was depending on the military and economic situation of Japan, which was evolving independently of the embargo .In the HTL the consumption was in 1941 11 million barrels higher than the imports ,but if the consumption was not higher but lower than the imports,there was no reason for war .
The main reason for PH was the situation in China , not the embargo ( I never said that the embargo had no influence ),because ,with or without embargo, Japan could not continue indefinitely the war in China .
And,it could not lose him,neither win him .
 
Hey ljadw,

I am not trying to make fun of you when I say this, but re your examples 1,2,3 for "no embargo but that still could result in war" and the example "of peace with embargo : the day after the embargo is declared, the Chinese give up and Japan can withdraw a big part of its army and the military oil consumption decreases, this makes the embargo useless."

Another example of what could possibly have happened, resulting in an "example of peace with embargo", where Japan would not feel a need to go to war: Tiny green aliens could have appeared and given Japan a source of energy that could be used for powering their factories, ships, planes, land vehicle, etc, and only for defensive and peaceful purposes, along with a supply of whatever other natural resources they needed (steel, copper, etc).

There was/is no reason to think that any of them would have happened, except maybe #3 where the US would double/triple its prices.

To make decisions based on any of the examples above, based on assuming one or the other 'might' happen, would have been/would be at best incompetent on the part of the decision makers.
 
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Japan was going to be at war whether there was an embargo or not.

Japan's quest for the "Greater Asian Co-prosparity Sphere" was all inclusive of the Asian continent, regardless of what those nations wanted.

The problem was the Colonial possesions and the US - there was no way around getting their "Sphere" without involving ine or more western powers at some point.
 
Hey GrauGeist,

I do not know if war was inevitable, but there is no question it was very likely.

I do however think that the reason that Pearl Harbor happened, when it happened, is primarily due to the embargo. Without an embargo, Japan could simply have ignored the US (and everyone else) until the US decided to use military means, which I agree would probably have happened. I have often speculated as to how soon/when and that would have occurred, and what the excuse/actual reason would have been.
 
Even without the embargo, the US possessed the Philippines, which lay directly in Japan's path to Southeast Asia.

Either Japan makes a monumental effort to keep the US neutral (much like they did with the Soviets) in order to conduct their ongoing conquest of Asia or they have to take the Philippines by force to ensure their security.
I feel the later option would have been the war cabinet's eventual option.
So *if* Pearl Harbor was not attacked, it would have just been a matter of time before the Philippines was invaded.
 
Japan was going to be at war whether there was an embargo or not.

Japan's quest for the "Greater Asian Co-prosparity Sphere" was all inclusive of the Asian continent, regardless of what those nations wanted.

I'm not so sure about this part. My reading indicates that the debate between Northern and Southern attacks (i.e., Army plan vs Navy plan) extended into 1941. I don't know that GEACS was actually the motive; I suspect it was more a matter of trimming the Christmas tree after it had been raised.

I do agree that war was going to break out no matter the embargo. But I do think the embargo hastened its outbreak.

The problem was the Colonial possesions and the US - there was no way around getting their "Sphere" without involving ine or more western powers at some point.

... or attack the Soviets as the IJA wished to do. That cloistered feeling was the drive behind Japanese war ambitions at all, imo. No matter where they wished to expand, even against a sluggish China, they were going to have serious issues. None of those wars were really winnable for them, but they'd painted themselves into a corner, didn't they?
 
IJA didn't wish to attack USSR after Khalkhin Gol.

Inevitable is a funny word. Not sure if it perfectly suits. Germany and Japan went to war because they chose. It was not inevitable. Had they choose wiser actions then war would have been avoided.

Maybe on 7th December, war was inevitable but the choices to get there were not.

One good point raised is that Italy didn't go to war as France and Britain were already beaten and Mussolini wanted some easy action so jumped in late to try and get some prizes. So he chose easy pickings not war.
 
Invading Albania like a boss.

Italy were the winner of the Axis participation trophy 3 years running.

Maybe the Thug Life is not for you.
 

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This is extremely silly reasoning. History cannot be reversed and your hypothesis cannot be tested. In this case, the Russians have an expression (folk wisdom): "If my grandmother had balls, she would be my grandfather.

I think what-ifs have value as thought-experiments. It's the same reason we analyze failures in order to avoid them in the future -- or successes in order to hopefully replicate them.
 
I think what-ifs have value as thought-experiments. It's the same reason we analyze failures in order to avoid them in the future -- or successes in order to hopefully replicate them.

I agree that analysis of events is necessary, but how can you analyze events that did not happen? I don't see the point in your conclusions. It takes an incredible analytical mind to take into account all the factors of an event. I don't want to offend anyone, but are there any of you certified analysts, military strategists, historians, economists, geopoliticians...
 
I agree that analysis of events is necessary, but how can you analyze events that did not happen? I don't see the point in your conclusions. It takes an incredible analytical mind to take into account all the factors of an event. I don't want to offend anyone, but are there any of you certified analysts, military strategists, historians, economists, geopoliticians...
It's all hypothetical and no one has to be a "certified analysts, military strategists, historians, economists, geopoliticians." Are you?!?

If you don't like the discussion, don't participate, that simple
 
I agree that analysis of events is necessary, but how can you analyze events that did not happen? I don't see the point in your conclusions. It takes an incredible analytical mind to take into account all the factors of an event. I don't want to offend anyone, but are there any of you certified analysts, military strategists, historians, economists, geopoliticians...

Actually, one of the members here who participates in these discussions sometimes was indeed a staff planner in the British military. I've studied history informally for a few decades, though I have no degree in it.

How does one analyze events that haven't happened? By laying a hypothetical and then turning it over in order to see what the potential ramifications might be. That makes me consider factors I may not have considered.

If you don't like what-if threads, or don't find them useful, that's great. Don't read 'em. Problem solved.
 
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Actually, one of the members here who participates in these discussions sometimes was indeed a staff planner in the British military. I've studied history informally for a few decades, though I have no degree in it.

How does one analyze events that haven't happened? By laying a hypothetical and then turning it over in order to see what the potential ramifications might be. That makes me consider factors I may not have considered.

If you don't like what-if threads, or don't find them useful, that's great. Don't read 'em. Problem solved.
This is the first really sane explanation for what's going on here.
Agree that you can predict the correct outcome of some fictitious event with a small fraction of probability. The French built the "Maginot Line" and the Germans simply bypassed it. And so there is a high probability of a fatal error, which will dramatically affect the true result.
Although there is something interesting in this.
 
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This is the first really sane explanation for what's going on here.
Agree that you can predict the correct outcome of some fictitious event with a small fraction of probability. The French built the "Maginot Line" and the Germans simply bypassed it. And so there is a high probability of a fatal error, which will dramatically affect the true result.
Although there is something interesting in this.
It is questionable to say that there was a high probability of a fatal error that dramatically affected the true result .The truth is that France had not sufficient manpower and tried to solve this by building certifications .There could only be an error if there was an alternative that would produce better results .Without the ML,France would need more forces to defend its eastern border, but it had not these forces and would be compelled to take them from those who were located at the border with Belgium .
 

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