If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain

It's my view that Germany was not equipped to invade the UK....and as it turned out not equipped to win the Bob either anyways.
The BoB has been gamed many times - like a hypothetical invasion - and, ttbomk, the German side always loses.
(someone can correct me if I'm wrong there, please, I'd genuinely be interested)

I think they were fully aware of this...and I am disposed to the idea that the BoB was a gambit (the gambler at work, again).
If it worked then great for Germany but if not, well, it certainly helped Stalin to persuade himself that for the time being at least (and right up to and a little beyond the attack on the USSR) Germany wasn't intent on an invasion of Russia any time soon.
I am also of the opinion that the German leadership, blinded by the quick victories up to (and beyond) 1940, lost sight of the heavy losses that would later come back to haunt them.

But regardless assuming a German BoB 'win' (which really means 11 Group badly mauled remaining units withdrawn north....to join the still existing rest of the RAF) there are, as I see it, 2 glimmers of hope to the German plans in 1940.
Firstly Ultra was not what it would soon become and so German initiative would pertain with British forces planners largely reacting secondly political will.
One can never simply assume that the will to fight on endlessly regardless of cost (and even earlier than 1940 the Germans had shown themselves to have units with no regard whatsoever for the 'rules' of war or compassion for civilian casualties) would be universal.

Dogwalker the English countryside is not flat like the Russian Steppes or even the North African Desert, and unlike Southern Europe the weather changes from one day to the next and often sooner, this year we had snow as late as May and a heat wave in July sandwiched between heavy rains.
As far as Crete goes you have a very different understanding of events to Antony Beevor, Alan Clark, Christopher Buckley or any of the Authors and official histories I have read.

A few things to show what this "plain" was really like.





Taken out the back of Dover Castle.

Not quite get on top of the cliffs and it's "Bobs your Uncle" a nice stroll to Canterbury.

Landing at Folkestone actually offers easier terrain for advancement once ashore.

Brighton overs a lot more maneuver room both at the beach and inland and once past the coastal hills is a lot more plain like the area around Canterbury.

As for British supply at Crete, for the ships the supply point was Alexandria, Egypt.

The second photo shows the only way out of Dover without scaling the cliffs.
I've driven, or been driven, up that road many times without the heights either side being occupied by people intent on doing me mischief.
Cheers
Steve

The whole concept is a fantasy, the Germans are in no position to try an invasion in September 40, river barges are not going to make it across the Channel in October with the weather that prevails, not that the Germans could really be ready in just a few weeks anyway!

The Luftwaffe will be attrited by winning the BoB, the Kriegsmarine is, as noted, woefully understrength, there's no specialist equipment or vehicles to clear mines or obstacles, there's no specialist landing vessels for the infantry and their equipment, no specialist hospital ships to deal with casualties, no logistics ships, no tank landing vessels, the list is endless!

and where does this massive stock of mines Dogwalker seems to think exists needed to mine the channel come from, let alone the vessels/aircraft/TIME to lay them?

The whole concept is absurd!

Let's assume that characteristic German efficiency and organizational skills overcome the steep learning curve required to master the intricacies of amphibious landings and logistical support of amphibious operations. In other words, they master the operational art as unlikely as that is. Then whether Sea lion is conducted perfectly it still must be conducted with the equipment at hand. That's just one, but a significant problem:

from wikipedia: Operation Sea Lion - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"In 1940 the German Navy was ill-prepared for mounting an amphibious assault the size of Operation Sea Lion (something like the cross channel transport of 8 wehrmacht divisions, no?) . Lacking purpose-built landing craft and both doctrinal and practical experience with amphibious warfare, the Navy was largely starting from scratch. Some efforts had been made during the inter-war years to investigate landing military forces by sea, but inadequate funding severely limited any useful progress.[25]"

Comparatively the USMC was thought to be a specialized service, relatively well studied in this area and took about one year and an actual (A small, 1 division scale) operation to master the technique and even then had to overcome unforeseen problems in the future. (The USMC's first doctrinal manual on the topic was created in 1935). It is my understanding the Wehrmacht had NO doctrine established at the time.

"A Pionierlandungsboot (de).
The Navy had taken some small steps in remedying the landing craft situation with construction of the Pionierlandungsboot 39 (Engineer Landing Boat 39), a self-propelled shallow-draft vessel which could carry 45 infantrymen, two light vehicles or 20 tons of cargo and land on an open beach, unloading via a pair of clamshell doors at the bow. But by late September 1940 only two prototypes had been delivered.[26]
Recognising the need for an even larger craft capable of landing both tanks and infantry onto a hostile shore, the Navy began development of the 220-ton Marinefährprahm (MFP) but these too were unavailable in time for a landing on English soil in 1940, the first of them not being commissioned until April 1941.
Given barely two months to assemble a large seagoing invasion fleet, the Kriegsmarine opted to convert inland river barges into makeshift landing craft. Approximately 2,400 barges were collected from throughout Europe (860 from Germany, 1,200 from the Netherlands and Belgium and 350 from France). Of these, only about 800 were powered (some insufficiently); the rest had to be towed by tugs.[27]"

By contrast: The first USMC AmphTrac was deployed in their first amphibious operation at Guadalcanal in 1942. It's not the date that counts here, its the forethought put into the problem.

For Salerno, an operation that is barely called successful, it is my understanding that allies had a 4:1 advantage in combat aircraft of all types. It is also my understanding that at no time during the BoB did the Luftwaffe have anything near that scale an advantage. If that's incorrect, I am happy to be corrected.

I admit the RAF's fighter, bomber and coastal command may not have been ideally equipped and armed to repel a sea invasion but considering the nature of the unarmored high value targets, it didn't have to be. Horizontal bombing can sink such craft by the displaced water and concussive effects of the blasts. Machine gun fire would be simply devastating. fighter and ground attack aircraft sporting 8 x .303 mgs against unarmored open craft? My God!

With respect to losing the BoB, one should be very specific about what one is defining as winning. Even a so called RAF retreat to northern Britain does not necessarily mean complete abdication of staging air ops from bases further south. The start of WW2 is filled with examples of camouflaged bases that are made virtually undetectable even under attack by enemy air forces.

I reiterate, I see no time during which Sea Lion could have succeeded even in the most perfectly imagined scenario.

MY favorite insanity is: Oh we'll just stage the invasion at night. all I can say is "far easier said than done" (with Towed barges????).

Kryten said:

The whole concept is absurd!

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I think that's what several of us are saying
Cheers
Steve

Most members seem to discard the German plans/preparations/vessels, based on an Allied invasion 4 years later against a much stronger opponent. I think initiative and surprise would be a major asset for the Germans. Other than that, we will never know what would have happened. To play it safe, is to say it would never have worked.

Personally, I think England could be invaded, but supplying the invasion force might be the real issue.


Kris

How was this 'surprise' to be obtained? The RAF flew recon over the French ports all the time and would see the barges were not there. The RAF also would see increased activity in the ports.

The Germans may be able to put troops ashore, that may technically be an invasion. Putting enough troops ashore, not loosing a large percentage of troops before they get ashore, keeping the ones that do get ashore supplied and advancing a 100km or more all are very different things.

The Luftwaffe may be able to do a number of jobs, some of them it may be able to do better than the British could do at the time. But Air superiority does NOT mean that ALL the jobs that need doing can be done at the same time or in a short span of time.

If the bombers are laying hundreds of mines (assuming they are available) they are not bombing the defenses near/on the landing sites. If they are bombing the Beach defenses they are not bombing the naval bases. If they are bombing the navel bases they are not bombing the rail lines, roads, supply lines leading to the landing sites. If they are bombing anything in the invasion zone they are not bombing anything in the rest of Great Britain (armaments factories?) and keeping up the pressure.

And that is the big problem, EVERYTHING has to be done in just a few weeks. Wither the weather cooperates or not. Because as the time goes by the weather gets less cooperative.

Here are some excerpts from a little book I picked up once called Hitler's Naval war and despite its rather modest appearance is a very good and accurate account of the German war effort at sea, based on German archival information and originally written in German. Here is a bit from the chapter on Sealion.

"In all these French Channel ports the Germans found virtually no seaworthy craft that they could use. The British had taken the lot to help in their evacuation, or if not had destroyed them. This fact alone makes nonsense of the idea, sometimes expressed, that the Germans should have pursued the beaten foe and landed straight away on his island sanctuary. There were just no vessels at hand for such a purpose. Now they had to be bought painstakingly from Germany. At Dunkirk, [Lt Cdr Heinrich] Bartels, up till 10th September, had struggled to accommodate some sixty tugs towing 180 flat bottomed barges and some 120 motor boats. Aboard these ungainly craft, when the hour struck, the 17th and 35th Infantry Divisions were supposed to be transported to the English coast , as if they were merely crossing a river. Bartels had been concerned with the business for weeks and knew all about its difficulties. Before coming to Dunkirk he had headed a research team at Emden , which had tried out every imagineable landing technique - though without landing craft, for the German navy did not then possess any.

"The Embarkation at the departure ports might go alright. According to its size, each barge would take from thirty to seventy men, plus a few vehicles and horses, repeat, horses: the first wave divisions were to actually rely partly on horse drawn transport! But how were the conquerors, if they ever got as far as the enemy coast, to disembark? How could the improvised ramps be used for landing vehicles and light tanks, even without any opposition from the enemy? It was up to Bartels, by trial and error to find out. Each morning he sent through the streets a loud speaker van blaring the song Wir Fahren gegen England as a summons to the daily landing practise.

"At the other ports thing were much the same. At Ostend chief of the naval centre was Lt Cdr Erich Lehmann, who, on invasion day would have a convoy of about fifty ships and boats, plus twenty-five trains of barges to send off on their adventurous voyage. At Calais Kapt Gustav Kleikamp was responsible for 'Transport Force C', which in itself would be 16.5 kilometers long. But the largest force of these dubious craft - 'Transport Force D' - was concentrated at Boulogne. There the officer was Kapt Werner Lindenau, in charge of 165 trains of 330 barges, plus fifteen minesweepers and R boats and twenty five steam trawlers. With this armada, Lindenau was to set out in the afternoon of D-Day minus one and after crossing the Channel on a broad front - a voyage requiring four hours of broad daylight and the whole of the following night - land on the strip of east coast of Beachy Head, near the seaside resort of Eastbourne.

"Needless to say, Lindenau was more than dobtful as to whether his armada would ever get there. This contrasted with the eager optimism of General Officer commanding XXXVIII Corps, Erich von Manstein, who was to travel with him aboard the tender Hela. His was, however, the optimism of ignorance, and whatever Manstein's brilliance as a strategist on land, he might well be non plussed if the painfully slow and helpless trains of barges were set upon by a pack of British destroyers. The above named ports were not the only ones. Steamers, motor boats and more barge trains lay ready at Rotterdam, Antwerp and Le Havre. Though quite a number of vessels had blown themselves up on mines or been hit by British bombers, in mid September the invasion force totalled over 3,000 miscellaneous craft, and it seemed that 'D-day' could not be far off.

"Tell me your opinion", Raeder asked Bartels, after inspecting the preparations at Dunkirk, "do you think we shall make it across to England? Are you optimistic about it?"
Bartels was somewhat surprised by his Supreme Commander's question, but finally answered, "without optimism Herr Grossadmiral, the thing will be a flop from the start."

Considering they were written from a German perspective, these passages don't exactly inspire one with confidence.

the notion of towing low slung barges full of men in channel seas is bordering on unbelievable, the difficulties of landing troops who even survive the voyage is enormous, the excerpt mentions Eastbourne, I'm off there in two weeks for the air show, I can only imagine trying to struggle up those beaches of shale and pebble in combat order under fire!

That would have been nothing more than a living nightmare for those troops!

Regarding the weather, with which UK based members will be all too familiar. Dowding knew,and later wrote, that he only had to avoid defeat until November to "win" the upcoming Battle of Britain. We consider the battle to have started in mid July (10th officially) but most Germans don't consider it to have started until a month later. Boog for example states 8th August as the start date. This didn't leave the Luftwaffe much time. November might well be a bit pessimistic of Dowding too. The late autumn weather is often far from benevolent.

Incidentally Dowding never planned to withdraw Fighter Command north of the Thames prior to an invasion because this "would have exposed vital targets, military and civilian, to unimpeded attack." It would also cost Fighter Command the benefits of radar warning. There was a plan for withdrawal but only after an invasion force got ashore. That was never going to happen.

Cheers

Steve

Dogwalker said:

Was operating in an IDEAL situation of this scenario. Pratically no surfaces enemy forces. Landing forces composed of slow and unadapt boats (they didn't even had a single radio equipement onto them), no mines, but hadn't the air cover.
Result, RN held contact with the enemy for two days, facing heavy losses, and then Cunningam had to decide if the remaining units had to loose the contact in a orizontal direction or in a vertical one.
Not only. For these two days the performances of the RN appeared to be very sub standard. A force of three light cruisers and four destroyers wasn't able to deal with a single torpedo boat at 700m distance. A cruiser was damaged by a near miss of a torpedo, the RN ships even shoot themself, and two third of the flotilla was safe.
A second force of three cruisers and four destroyers gave up to act against the second flotilla, escorted by a single torpedo boat.
What happened? All the clueless of the RN had gathered in Crete? Or having to operate under very difficult conditions had degraded the performances of sailors who, in other circumstances, would have given the usual excellent proof of the RN?

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Compared to Sealion the Crete invasion force was well equipped with self powered and seaworthy boats - Caiques - which were requisitioned fishing boats designed for open sea conditions, whereas Sealion relied on towed barges which were not sea worthy and were considered suicidal by the German navy. The German navy, which was small to start with, was largely destroyed in Norway and would not be able to provide an escort which was, on average better than that at Crete. As for engaging the enemy destroyer:

KINGSTON, engaged an enemy destroyer at
7,000 yards, claiming two hits. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38296.pdf

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The RN should have pursued the convoy and destroyed it, but the RN was operating over 500 miles from their bases with absolutely no aircover which would not be the case in the Channel. How does a torpedo do damage from a near miss? It either hits or it doesn't! As for the RN shooting at their own ships, this seems to be another fantasy akin to your torpedo story.

Cause you think that in may 1941 all the German forces were were at Creete?

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The Italian navy in the Mediterranean was far stronger than the German navy in the Channel.

"turned the tail and run away"? At what speed they "run away" exactly? Three cruisers and four destroyers wasn't able to pursue some wooden fishing boat? The second landing attempt suffered light losses cause the C Force gave up to pursue them under the bombings.

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None of those troops landed on Crete, did they?

Two of the 5Th Destroyer Flotilla, sent to attack boats off the Cretan coast, were sunk without coming in contact with the targets on 23 may, then the flotilla withdrew. At that time the Germans had only partially seized an airfield. The evacuation order was issued only on 27 may.
On may 23 Cunningam informed it's superiors that daylight operations could no longer continue, but they refused (but at that point the bulk of his forces was already steaming to Alexandria). They would have taken different decisions in 1940? Or they would have sent the Home Fleet to certain destruction in full daylight?

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I don't know what history you are getting your information from, but it sounds more like a fictional novel than naval history:

41. Captain (D), Fifth Destroyer Flotilla, in
KELLY, with KASHMIR, KIPLING,
KELVIN and JACKAL
:had left Malta at
2i3O/2ist May and joined C.S-7 at i6oo/22nd.
At 2030/22nd KELLY, KASHMIR and KIPLING
were detached to look for survivors from
FIJI and half an hour later, KELVIN and
JACKAL were sent to try and pick up any
of GLOUCESTER'S crew who could be found.
C.S-7 however, subsequently ordered the search
to be abandoned and sent the 5th D.F. to patrol
inside Kissamo. and Canea Bays. On arrival
at the Anti Kithera Channel, KIPLING
developed a steering defect and 0.5 ordered her
to join C.S-7- Continuing into Canea Bay,
KELLY and KASHMIR encountered a troop
carrying caique, which they damaged badly by
gunfire. These two ships then carried out a
short bombardment of Maleme. '
Whilst withdrawing they encountered another caique which
they engaged and set on fire. KELVIN and
JACKAL weie detached to investigate' some
lights which the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Suda,
had reported being seen in Cane'aeBay. 'These
proved to be shore lights so KELVIN and
JACKAL withdrew independently and informed
the Commander-in-Chiefi Mediterranean ,by
signal (KELVIN's signal timed 0300C of 23rd
May
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38296.pdf

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The fact is, that until ordered to evacuate the Army from Crete, the RN maintained a nightly patrol around the island:

54. There had been indications that a landing
might take place at Sitia during the night
24th/25th. In order to deal with this landing,
a force consisting of AJAX (Senior Officer),
DIDO, KIMBERLEY and HOTSPUR left
Alexandria at 0800 on .the 24th May, with
orders to pass .through the Kaso Strait and
sweep the north coast of Crete during the night
24th/25th May. If nothing was sighted arid
time allowed, this force was also to. bombard
Maleme aerodrome

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.

62. AJAX, with her force, had retired to the
south-of Crete and was to carry out a repetition
of her sweep, during the night 25th/26th May,
•and if time allowed, bombard Maleme.
NAPIER, KELVIN and JACKAL left
Alexandria to relieve the destroyers with
AJAX...
(d) AJAX and her force had repeated the
sweep she had carried out on the previous
night and had again sighted nothing. This
force now consiste'd of AJAX, DIDO,
NAPIER, KELVIN and JACKAL and was
about to join Force A. • HOTSPUR,
IMPERIAL and KIMBERLEY having been
relieved, were now returning to Alexandria

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and no Axis forces were able to land until late on May 28th, which was well after the evacuation order.

If the German airforce couldn't stop the evacuation of several hundred thousand men at Dunkirk by a ragtag group of fishing boats, then how are they supposed to stop the entire Royal Navy from sailing in and destrying the invasion fleet?

Personally, if I were the British, I would wait until the Germans were about 2/3 of the way across the channel and then send every light cruiser and destroyer I had into the channel. There is really no need for large slow battleships and heavy cruisers. Light cruisers and destroyers would make difficult targets for the Luftwaffe to hit and would be easier to replace if they are sunk. Also, you don't need heavy guns to sink barges and tug boats. Quite honestly, light to medium AA guns(40mm type stuff) would be perfect for sinking unarmed barges and tugs. Could you imagine a RN destroyer closing to point blank range, sinking the tug boat and then at ranges so close, her main guns may not depress low enough to hit the target, they open fire on a crowded barge full of soldiers? If I got to choose to be on the invading force or the defending force, I would definately want to be on the defending side.

stona said:

You've got to go up the cliffs to get to the plain

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Shortround6 wrote that the terrain back of dover is Difficult. It Isn't. Simply as it. Every statement that describes that terrain as difficult is an invention. From Dover to Canterbury there aren't the Alps or every terrain charateristic that can described as "difficult". The cliffs, from the city, are only shallow hills. There are higher heights into the city of Rome.
If someone couldn't think of places to land other than under the cliffs north of the city, that's his problem.

Shortround6 said:

A few things to show what this "plain" was really like.

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I see a similar, or rougher, terrain every day. Is called "the plain north of Rome". You can google from the city to Bracciano lake, or Civitavecchia.

pattle said:

Dogwalker the English countryside is not flat like the Russian Steppes or even the North African Desert,

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As incredible as could seems, the countryside of the most part of Europe, including that in which the Germans were operating normally, it is not.

pattle said:

and unlike Southern Europe the weather...

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Sorry if I can't think of the English climate as particularly harsh.

Have you been to this area of southern England?
Unlike an ideal invasion area, the flat, wide beaches of the east coast, with flat, relatively open country, the terrain is not as flat, or 'plain like' as it may appear in aerial photos, or as you may think. It's very good defensive terrain, and terrible offensive terrain, with rolling hills, some steep and deep valleys, thick hedgerows and woods and, at that time, the road system was very basic, with only one, relatively narrow (2 x 1930's car width) road leading to and from Dover, for example.
It was/is not unlike the 'Bocage' country the Allies encountered 5 year later in Normandy.
But of course, that didn't cause any problems, delays or heavy casualties, did it ......

Silly me, the cliffs south of the "city" are ever so much easier.



View of the south cliffs from Folkestone towards Dover



Another view, same direction.

Difficult doesn't always have to do with sheer height. How high was Normandy on average?

Or were the Americans and British lazy incompetents trying to deal with hedge rows?

Three short but steep grades in a row with drops between each one may be better for the defense than one long shallow but ultimately higher grade/peak.

Broken ground can be difficult to deal with, there is no commanding height to get a view from( either for intelligence or artillery spotting). Lines of sight are short and there is lots of "dead" ground that flat trajectory weapons cannot reach.

Just because you don't need alpine gear doesn't mean a certain type of terrain is easy to fight over/advance on.

The point is that while Dover is the closest point to France it is one of the longest distances to London from Harwich to Portsmouth and while the terrain certainly isn't the equal of the Alps it is the the worst and most restrictive of the approaches to London.