Impact of much stronger Taranto raid, Nov 1940?

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We can look at history and say that the end of Guadalcanal campaign was the end of Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Completing forgetting what was going on in China and Burma.

But again to say 1942 wasn't a successful year is mind boggling to me.

But you see things knowing what will happen next. So the loss of carriers was important but they were going to be replaced. So if Japan had time then they would have been replaced.

Japan lost the war because in many ways but it was a series of decisions that led to 1945. Had decision been different then the war may have gone on longer or American public opinion may have rejected the losses. Or had the Americans focused heavily on the defeat of Germany or even an Indian uprising that kicked the British out.

To say the loss of Kirishima and Hiei is important is over stating thier importance. What difference would these 2 ships have made? Not a lot. An Iowa would be able to destroy a Kongo at any range day or night. And an Iowa is faster.

So the Japanese could have turned it around in 1943 but we know that didn't happen. But they were still fighting on and in China with operation Ichi Go they were still advancing.
 
You do bring up some good points. I hadn't considered an Indian revolt. However, the Japanese knew they would lose any ship building race. They couldn't turn it around. They couldn't resupply their forces at Guadalcanal. They were digging in to make recapture of territory by the Allies too bloody to consider. Japan had captured oil fields but didn't build up the merchant marine to get that sweet, sweet crude to the home islands. They had been stopped.
 
Japan genuinely believed Germany would win and acted accordingly.

So can anyone see a problem here?

Guadalcanal is not Tokyo.

The Kongos were replaceable as all the Japanese needed to do was order 2 more from Vickers. Sorted
Have you ever visited Barrow? I have a few times. It's alright. I guess.
 
The Basket said:
Japan genuinely believed Germany would win and acted accordingly.
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Which was plain dumb. By autumn 1941 the Japanese embassy in Moscow was reporting back to Tokyo of a seemingly endless wave of reinforcements heading westward to meet the Germans. By late October, the German forces had been halted outside both Moscow and Leningrad, and were clearly overstretched and worn out. Meanwhile it was clear by summer 1941 that the Germans were not going to find an easy victory in the Western Desert campaign. By spring 1941 the Battle of the Atlantic was already turning against the German navy, with more ships getting through the U-Boats, and the German surface fleet either destroyed or under repair in port. Meanwhile between the ETO war's 1939 beginning up to autumn 1941 the Wallies have commissioned five battleships (3xKGV, 2xNC), five fleet carriers (4xRN,1xUSN), won the Battle of Britain and are rapidly resupplying the USSR with materials and food. The Japanese embassies in Berlin, Moscow, London, Washington and Rome must have been aware of much of the above points.

How, looking at all this did the Japanese believe the Germans would win? Which brings me back to my original post and purpose of this thread. Will a crushing destruction in Nov 1940 of the Italian fleet by the FAA have any impact on Japanese perception of Wallied resolve and of the Axis' chances of victory in the ETO?

What would it take to shake Japan of its convictions? First, a strong Taranto Raid that completely scuppers the Italian navy and port facility. Second, Britain scores a significant victory with Operation Battleaxe in June 1941. With the Italians and Germans visibly on the run and the siege of Tobruk relieved. Added to this, with Britain victorious in the BoB, the KM surface fleet sunk and mothballed the Japanese would have to shake their heads a little.

Most importantly, an earlier British victory in the Western Desert means more combat experienced troops and arms are available for the PTO. Come September 1941, the IJA sitting in their newly acquired barracks in FIC may look across at Malaya as three combat-blooded Australian divisions arrive at Singapore to join their greener colleagues from the Australian 8th Div. Throw in some now available British light tanks units and a greater RAAF/RAF presence and Japan is going to step back.
 
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The Basket said:
But again to say 1942 wasn't a successful year is mind boggling to me.
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I didn't say it wasn't a successful year. I wrote that if you look at the losses compared to successes, it looks like a draw, at best, to me. It was a successful six months, followed by six months of losses that in terms of military potential put paid to any idea of successfully prosecuting the war.

The Basket said:
To say the loss of Kirishima and Hiei is important is over stating thier importance. What difference would these 2 ships have made? Not a lot. An Iowa would be able to destroy a Kongo at any range day or night. And an Iowa is faster.
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Sure, if your time-machine is in good working order (although it should be noted that the Iowas weren't needed). Guess what happened immediately after the two BCs were sunk in 1942?

That's right: the Japanese lost the 'Canal. Had the two BCs pounded Handerson on 13 Nov, would Cactus AF been able to sink Hiei? Probably not. Now move to the next night: South Dakota still has its breakers opening from its own salvoes, disabling its fire control and radars, but now there's an extra BC to shoot at it.

The loss of those two BCs ramified immediately on both the military situation as well as the Japanese decision to evacuate.
 
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The Basket said:
The fact that 2 battleships sailed a week later showed that Taranto was not a huge success.
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Oh dear, I feel someone is making things up to justify their position. Conte Di Cavour was not raised until July 1941 and never sailed again, becoming a hulk. Littorio remained in situ until mid-December following the disarming of an unexploded torpedo and it didn't return to the fleet until March/April 1941, and Caio Duilio remained in situ until January 1941, when it was refloated, returning to the fleet in May.

The Basket said:
And I am their tutor.
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Wow, presumptuous much?

According to people who are not sitting at a computer desk in 2021, Judgement was a success. It changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean if only momentarily, and it caused morale in the Italian navy to plummet. At the time the raid reduced the available number of battleships the Italians had operational by 50%. That is a huge loss margin and utterly unsustainable, whichever way you look at it. It achieved the objectives that Cunningham set out, by reducing the number of available Italian battleships. In normal language, if a campaign's objectives are achieved that constitutes success.
 
Admiral Beez said:
Then Churchill, if being honest needs to own his biggest failure,
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Gallipoli was not Churchill's failure. Churchill was 1st lord of the Admiralty, he had no say over the land offensive. He took the rap for it, but he wasn't the cause of its failure. You can blame Hamilton and Kitchener for that. Hamilton embarked from Alex with his ships in disarray; the useful stuff had been packed at the bottom, which, after reaching Mudros he turned the ships around and sent them back to Alex. By this time the Turks had figured out what was going on and reinforced the peninsula, which had been previously almost barren of Turkish troops up to that point. Churchill opposed Hamilton's appointment and protested to Kitchener, but of course, he had no say in the matter.

And even from the naval standpoint in the Dardanelles, the British/French coalition so very nearly achieved their objectives in defeating the Turkish forts, which were running out of ammunition but following the sinking of three obsolete (even by 1915 standards) battleships, the task force commander Sackville Carden got cold feet and withdrew his ships. His 2IC Keyes, seeing the benefit of their position urged him to continue, but Carden was ill and was not in a good state of mind and was relieved. None of this was on Churchill, but of course, as the top man, he took the fall.
 
SaparotRob said:
Yet both Guadalcanal and Tokyo had been bombed by US forces. Sorry, had to throw that in.
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Now keep an eye out for an example of my greatness. I hope you're watching carefully.

I have been accused of making things up to justify my position. Which is I don't mind being called a liar when I am actually lying but not when telling the truth.

The 2 battleships in question are Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare.

Not sure if Vittorio Veneto is a good battleship name because I always crave ice cream when ever I hear the name. A Vittorio Veneto would have a vanilla base covered in chocolate.
 
If one is to understand the great mystery of Naval warfare, one must study all its aspects, not just the dogmatic narrow view of the battleships.

What if I told you there was a ship in Pearl Harbour on the day of the attack which was untouched. It will sink 26 Japanese ships?

That was the submarine USS Tautog. So maybe the IJN should have attacked submarines rather than battleships.
 
nuuumannn said:
Gallipoli was not Churchill's failure. Churchill was 1st lord of the Admiralty, he had no say over the land offensive.
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Much of the failure at Gallipoli is attributed to the Royal Navy's abandonment of the ground offensives over fears of more battleships being mined and sunk, which was a cause of much debate in the House of Commons at the time. But to be fair that was more a Fisher than Churchill thing.

The British and CW ground forces were very close to victory at Gallipoli until the RN and their NGFS left the field. Sounds like the Battle of Yorktown in 1781 where the RN left Cornwallis to his fate. But in the RN's defence they'd just been soundly beaten by the French at the Battle of the Chesapeake. The RN at Gallipoli has no excuse - sure some obsolete pre-dreadnoughts were lost, but they were all destined for the scrap heap shortly.

IMO, the failure to reinforce Malaya and Singapore falls on Churchill. In Sept 1940, Japan occupies FIC. Once the Battle of Britain was over Churchill should have reinforced Malaya. From late 1939 onwards Britain had Hawker Hurricanes being build in Canada that could have easily been shipped to Vancouver and then onto Singapore. He could have left the RN's submarines in Malaya to monitor the Thai and FIC coast and watch Formosa. Yes, the Greece and North African campaigns were heating up, but there was still kit to send to Malaya and Australia. It's perhaps worth noting that for all his travels, Churchill never once visited Australia or Malaya to assess for himself what's what.
 
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The number of ships present would not have made much of a difference in the outcome of the land war, not at all. That was lost through the ineptitude of the leaders in not seeing the situation they were walking into, which arose owing to their own incompetence. In advance of the British landings at V Beach the fort at Seddul Bahir was heavily pounded by naval guns, but yes, this was an issue raised, even though there was little more ships could have done to change the situation on land.

Not only that, but as I mentioned earlier the withdrawal of the fleet from the Dardanelles was a result of Carden's decision-making rather than Churchill. That small minefield that the three battleships got caught in was hastily laid by a small vessel that is widely celebrated by the Turks to this day Ottoman minelayer Nusret - Wikipedia because of the role it played in stemming the coalition advance, but in context, the refusal of the coalition commanding officer to continue brought an end to the campaign, not the minefield. Minesweeping was vigorously carried out in advance of the fleet. Aircraft from Ark Royal were used for spotting fields, the first-ever use of aeroplanes in this role, but the one that those battleships were caught in was freshly laid and was missed by the methods employed. The loss of those ships had little impact on the size of the gathered fleet and being so near to breaking through the defences, was simply the abandonment of the tactical situation.
 
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The Basket said:
Not sure if Vittorio Veneto is a good battleship name because I always crave ice cream when ever I hear the name. A Vittorio Veneto would have a vanilla base covered in chocolate.
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Hi

As I am sure you must know, Vittorio Veneto was a famous Italian victory in October 1918, a "Caporetto in reverse". I suppose 'Saratogo' may not be a good ship's name as it could sound to some like a 'medical complaint'? Naming of ships have some form of 'history' behind them.

Mike
 
I actually don't know who Vittorio Veneto was. I thought he was the first guy who put pepperoni on Pizza.
 
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