Improve That Design: How Aircraft Could Have Been Made Better

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I think the Japanese had some experience in slow-speed dogfights over China well before they entered WWII. The Chinese weren't flying any hustlers, mostly I-15s, some I-16s, the occasional Hawk. The IJN naval air corps built a good body of experience there, so far as my reading has shown. I don't know much about their army air ops, but one reason why everyone regards their naval aviators in 1941 as being premier was from this experience dating from 1937-38 and onward. They knew how to dogfight slow, and had the equipment that could do that very well indeed.

I should have been more specific, I meant the kind of experience against fighters of the type that Europe and the US were building at that time. Even during the Spanish Civil War, the lessons learned from the deployment of the Bf 109 took time to learn, in fact, many of the lessons from that conflict were ignored by Britain, the US etc. If anything, the Japanese experience from those conflicts you mention leaned further toward their accepted tactics and assured them they were on the right track. As mentioned, it wasn't until the BoB that the kind of fighter-versus-fighter combat that we acknowledge as being de rigeur emerged.

Japan certainly didn't have that experience and like I said, for the first year of the Pacific War the A6M and Ki-43 and their superior manoeuvrability and tactics reigned supreme. The US Navy's pilots couldn't defeat them one-on-one, so they outsmarted them, because they themselves were learning on the hoof, too. Thankfully, US manufacturers and the USN and USAAC heeded the lessons from the British and Germans scrapping it out over Britain and armour and self sealing tanks were being fitted at the time Japan attacked Pearl.
 
I should have been more specific, I meant the kind of experience against fighters of the type that Europe and the US were building at that time. Even during the Spanish Civil War, the lessons learned from the deployment of the Bf 109 took time to learn, in fact, many of the lessons from that conflict were ignored by Britain, the US etc. If anything, the Japanese experience from those conflicts you mention leaned further toward their accepted tactics and assured them they were on the right track. As mentioned, it wasn't until the BoB that the kind of fighter-versus-fighter combat that we acknowledge as being de rigeur emerged.

Japan certainly didn't have that experience and like I said, for the first year of the Pacific War the A6M and Ki-43 and their superior manoeuvrability and tactics reigned supreme. The US Navy's pilots couldn't defeat them one-on-one, so they outsmarted them, because they themselves were learning on the hoof, too. Thankfully, US manufacturers and the USN and USAAC heeded the lessons from the British and Germans scrapping it out over Britain and armour and self sealing tanks were being fitted at the time Japan attacked Pearl.

You're right (if I'm reading you true) that the Japanese certainly held onto WWI concepts of fighter combat -- i.e. dogfighting -- while the world moved on to higher-speed, heavier platforms, outfitted with better protection, working more with velocity in the vertical rather than tying 'em up.

But I don't agree that they were inexperienced with slow-speed dogfights. That was much of their combat regime in China. That was where they were blooded.
 
But I don't agree that they were inexperienced with slow-speed dogfights.

I think you might have missed what I said, Thump. I didn't say they were inexperienced in dogfight type combat, in fact I said the exact opposite in that the experience they had tended to reinforce what they believed was the right way to fly and flight. I meant that they had not yet learned the lessons of combat that were being learned during the BoB in the summer of 1940, so their experience in that kind of combat was limited.
 
I think you might have missed what I said, Thump. I didn't say they were inexperienced in dogfight type combat, in fact I said the exact opposite in that the experience they had tended to reinforce what they believed was the right way to fly and flight. I meant that they had not yet learned the lessons of combat that were being learned during the BoB in the summer of 1940, so their experience in that kind of combat was limited.

Allow me to pause and reread then, and forgive me if I'm misunderstanding.

ETA: I've reread, and you're right; I've misunderstood your point. I'm sorry for that.
 
I think you misread the IJN pilot's experience in China. The A5M was definitely a dogfighter, but the Zero was an energy fighter, faster and more powerful than anything the Chinese had.
USN pilots noted the Zero pilots' preferred method of attack during Coral Sea and Midway was a diving attack from the rear followed by a steep climb after recovering out front. Because the F4F was only marginally slower, and rolled better, the USN pilots were able to counter these moves.
 
It seems the lessons you learn fighting a less potent enemy will require a quick recalibration when you finally meet your match. How quickly and efficiently you can accomplish that will determine your prospects in the long slog of an attrition war.
 
t seems the lessons you learn fighting a less potent enemy will require a quick recalibration when you finally meet your match. How quickly and efficiently you can accomplish that will determine your prospects in the long slog of an attrition war.

Totally agree, especially in Japan's case. They did misinterpret a lot and completely underestimate how the United States would react, to their detriment.

What strikes me as interesting about this whole debate regarding the Japanese philosophy of manoeuvrability and little self protection for their aeroplanes is that we, the observers so many years later apply what we know and can only know in hindsight to argue that the Japanese were somehow stupid for doing so. The reality was that everyone was doing what the Japanese were doing, even the Americans. The P-36 was a decent dogfighter (that doesn't get nearly enough attention - I might be biased, I think it's cooler even than the P-40) and could out-manoeuvre the Spitfire and Hurricane, which in themselves were good dogfighters, which proves that manoeuvrability was definitely a virtue in fighters of the late 1930s vintage.

The Japanese took it to extremes in the A6M, of course, but we are so ingrained with that aircraft's history that we believe that it was the be-all and end-all of Japanese design philosophy, but it wasn't. No other fighter the Japanese built was just like the Zero - except other Zeroes of course. Even Horikoshi's subsequent designs eschewed the Zero's advantages for those things we think the Japanese ignored. Yes, the philosophy of the Ki-43 was the same as the A6M, but it wasn't achieved at the same expenses as the A6M. Its design was based on limited engine power, like the Zero, but we simply don't acknowledge that changes in fighter philosophy, like heavy armament, boom and zoom manoeuvres, armour plate and self-sealing tanks came as a result of experience with enemy aircraft, not strictly beforehand.

Combat in Europe, as I mentioned earlier illustrated the need for self-sealing tanks, armour plating and heavier armament, but as mentioned, these took time to implement. There were still Bf 109s in frontline service with only four machine gun-calibre weapons in the spring/summer of 1940. The RAF had frontline fighters with eight guns, more than anyone else's fighters at the time, but they still weren't heavy hitting enough and first contact with the enemy in late 1939 proved that the pilots still had to empty their magazines just to bring down a single Heinkel. Spitfires and Hurricanes didn't get heavy cannon as standard until after the Germans. The A6M had cannon as standard, ironically.

So, to conclude, what we were doing was little different to what the Japanese were doing. They took it quite far with the A6M, but it was not the norm. We like to think that these advantages our fighters had were a given because we've come to accept that, but in the first year to two years of WW2, they simply weren't.
 
It seems the lessons you learn fighting a less potent enemy will require a quick recalibration when you finally meet your match. How quickly and efficiently you can accomplish that will determine your prospects in the long slog of an attrition war.
Which is why I think the Ukrainians are training us. The recent conflicts the US has been involved in haven't been against a large army.
 
It seems the lessons you learn fighting a less potent enemy will require a quick recalibration when you finally meet your match. How quickly and efficiently you can accomplish that will determine your prospects in the long slog of an attrition war.

That whole "fighting the last war" thing is not very new.
 
The P-36 was a decent dogfighter (that doesn't get nearly enough attention
People tend to forget that the P-36 debuted at the same time as the Bf109 and Hurricane and was one of the Premier fighters of the day.

It's performance at Pearl Harbor is often overlooked by the P-40s, but it was first to draw blood in the U.S. involvement and many pilots (my Uncle Jimmy included) would have preferred to have taken it into battle over other American types early in the war.
 
People tend to forget that the P-36 debuted at the same time as the Bf109 and Hurricane and was one of the Premier fighters of the day.

Great machine!

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Hawk 75 static
 
Let's improve these RAF Lend Lease failures....

Vultee Vanguard

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Vought Chesapeake

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Brewster Bermuda

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Fine aircraft, but what can we amend for the Dauntless and Helldiver to meet RN/FAA needs? A folding wing might suffice on the former.

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I've intentionally left out the Brewster Buffalo as for many it's a obvious candidate. Though if available in sufficient numbers (4 squadrons cannot defend a land mass about the size of the UK) and properly used it could have done well in Malaya, IMO.
 
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The design was kept relatively compact (41 foot wingspan) and the wings were designed for strength, so folding was not an option because of that.
Given its success and robustness I can't fault its designers. It is noteworthy that Dauntless and Aichi D3A aside (granted, the two most important and successful naval DBs of the war) the other naval dive bombers, including the Skua, Loire-Nieuport LN.401, Vought SB2U, Curtiss SB2C, Stuka (prototype), Yokosuka D4Y and Aichi B7A had folding wings.
 
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