Interview: Captain Eric Brown

[bigZ]

The decisive stopping of the Italian Navy at Taranto also helped the Japenese model their plans for Pearl Harbour. Thus dragging the US into the war. So one could argue the the swordfish had the biggest impact on the war.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I would not go as far as saying it had the biggest impacft for that type of aircraft but it certainly made its mark.

 

[syscom3]

The decisive stopping of the Italian Navy at Taranto also helped the Japenese model their plans for Pearl Harbour. Thus dragging the US into the war. So one could argue the the swordfish had the biggest impact on the war.

Using your logic, it was the Stuka's that initated the first bombings on Poland in Sept 1939 that had the biggest mark.

Stopping the Italian fleet at Taranto was not a decisive blow in the war. Italy still managed to fight on in the land war, and project its power in the Med through air power.

Being in on the two largest naval battles in history (Mariana's and Philipine Sea) was a decisive battle. Those were the death nails in the ability of the Japanese to project power in the Pacific.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Using your logic, it was the Stuka's that initated the first bombings on Poland in Sept 1939 that had the biggest mark.

Stopping the Italian fleet at Taranto was not a decisive blow in the war. Italy still managed to fight on in the land war, and project its power in the Med through air power.

Being in on the two largest naval battles in history (Mariana's and Philipine Sea) was a decisive battle. Those were the death nails in the ability of the Japanese to project power in the Pacific.

No you are completly wrong now. Taranto stopped the Italian Fleet and allowed the RN to completely control the Med. That is very desisive in my opinion. It had no effect on the PTO but it deffinatly had an effect on the victory in Europe.

The Marianas and Philippine Sea had not effect on the ETO only on the PTO, therefore they had a decisive effect on the outcome of the PTO but not the whole war itself.

Sorry Sys but you can give crecit to feats that other countries did as well...

 

[bigZ]

Forgive my inept explanation. I was not trying to say the Swordfish was the best at its role or that Operation Slapstick was the most decisive naval battle of WWII but trying to point out the repricussions that the Taronto raid made which not only effected the Med but would directly inspire the attack on the Pearl Harbour.

The Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, was the Naval Attache in Rome at the time and was in Taranto the day after the attack took place. He later stated that the way the British attacked the Italian fleet, using torpedo planes launched from aircraft carriers, gave him the basic idea on which the Pearl Harbour attack was based. He of course used far greater resources, some 300+ aircraft, instead of some 15 to 20 aircraft which attacked Taranto.

 

[syscom3]

No you are completly wrong now. Taranto stopped the Italian Fleet and allowed the RN to completely control the Med. That is very desisive in my opinion. It had no effect on the PTO but it deffinatly had an effect on the victory in Europe.

Partially correct. Taranto was a great victory at the time for the Brits, but it wouldn't have mattered what the Italian fleet was doing in the medium or long term, as airpower was quickly dominating the sea's.

The Marianas and Philippine Sea had not effect on the ETO only on the PTO, therefore they had a decisive effect on the outcome of the PTO but not the whole war itself.

True. Events in Europe ended up having little if any impact in events in the PTO and vice versa.

Sorry Sys but you can give crecit to feats that other countries did as well...

I already said the Swordfish was the best torpedo bomber of the early part of the war. And Taranto was a victory for the Brits. But whether the battle was ever fought, it was not decisive as the Med is not an open ocean with lots of room for fleets to maneuver.

 

[brickhistory]

True. Events in Europe ended up having little if any impact in events in the PTO and vice versa.

?Que?

On the strategic level, the whole "Europe First" strategy enumerated by FDR and Churchill meant that the Pacific Theater was hamstrung for reinforcements, supplies, etc until well into 1944.

The end of the European War meant that Stalin would turn towards Japan, definitely a factor in the end of the Pacific War

On a tactical level, among other issues, the scarcity of naval forces, particularly in carrier and destroyers was a consideration for both RN and US forces.

At one time in mid-1942, there were NO USN carriers fit for duty in the Pacific and we borrowed one from the British (HMS Victorious?).

The fact that carriers were sent to the Pacific in 1942-1943 meant that Atlantic convoys were many times left without air cover until the CVEs became available in mid-1943 in any numbers.

The lack of enough US destroyers in the Pacific due to them being used in the Atlantic played major roles in the disasters of Savo Island and other Guadelcanal sea battles.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I already said the Swordfish was the best torpedo bomber of the early part of the war. And Taranto was a victory for the Brits. But whether the battle was ever fought, it was not decisive as the Med is not an open ocean with lots of room for fleets to maneuver.

I disagree whoever controled the Med had the Suez Canal. Imagine if the Italian Navy had been left unscathed before the allies landed in Morocco and then later in Italy. The RN and the US Navy would have destroyed the Italian Navy then too but it would have been a bit more difficult to land those troops.

 

[syscom3]

?Que?

On the strategic level, the whole "Europe First" strategy enumerated by FDR and Churchill meant that the Pacific Theater was hamstrung for reinforcements, supplies, etc until well into 1944.

The facts dont bear that out. The US (and ANZAC forces) where on the offensive from 1943 throughout the Solomons and New Guinie. There was the invasion of the Aleutions to retake Attu and Kiska. Plus the USN began its Central Pacific offensive in earnest in 1943. Far from being hamstrung, the US industrial supememecy was making sure everyone was getting equipped.

The end of the European War meant that Stalin would turn towards Japan, definitely a factor in the end of the Pacific War

The war was essentially over for Japan before that happened. They had already been defeated militarily and physically. The B29's made sure of that.

On a tactical level, among other issues, the scarcity of naval forces, particularly in carrier and destroyers was a consideration for both RN and US forces.

What scarcity? in 1942? In 1943?

At one time in mid-1942, there were NO USN carriers fit for duty in the Pacific and we borrowed one from the British (HMS Victorious?).

You are referring to a couple month span in early 1943, when the US was getting its new Essex class carriers squared away. By the begining of summer 1943, the USN was going to deploy one fleet class carrier every month.

The fact that carriers were sent to the Pacific in 1942-1943 meant that Atlantic convoys were many times left without air cover until the CVEs became available in mid-1943 in any numbers.

And it didnt impact the course of events, did it.

The lack of enough US destroyers in the Pacific due to them being used in the Atlantic played major roles in the disasters of Savo Island and other Guadelcanal sea battles.

The disasters of the battles around Guadalcanal had more to do with supurb IJN doctrine and torpedo's and piss poor US leadership.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The war was essentially over for Japan before that happened. They had already been defeated militarily and physically. The B29's made sure of that.

That is the truth. Russia only declared war on Japan for 2 reasons.

1. Because they "technically" had to as an ally.

2. And probably the biggest reason was to try and secure land for themselves.

 

[brickhistory]

The facts dont bear that out. The US (and ANZAC forces) where on the offensive from 1943 throughout the Solomons and New Guinie. There was the invasion of the Aleutions to retake Attu and Kiska. Plus the USN began its Central Pacific offensive in earnest in 1943. Far from being hamstrung, the US industrial supememecy was making sure everyone was getting equipped.

The facts do bear that out. In shipping, manpower, aircraft - particularly heavy bombers - landing craft, and other logistical support, the Europe First strategy was a huge roadblock to Allied Pacific forces. One of the reasons the Normandy D-Day landings were delayed from May into June was the worldwide shortage of landing craft.

The successes and offensives mounted in spite of that in the Pacific is what's remarkable, but the events in Europe did affect the Pacific which is my point.

The war was essentially over for Japan before that happened. They had already been defeated militarily and physically. The B29's made sure of that.

Actually, the USN's unrestricted submarine warfare had far more to do with the defeat of Japan; the B-29s did magnificent work and I salute those crews, but the starvation and deprivation caused by the sinking of Japan's merchant fleet did most of the damage.

Russia's intent to enter the war shut off the last hope of Japan's peace party who were attempting to use the USSR as a middleman in seeking surrender terms. Again, the ending of the European conflict upset the status quo in the Pacific.

What scarcity? in 1942? In 1943?.

Until spring of 1943, when the US industries' outputs really started to be felt.

You are referring to a couple month span in early 1943, when the US was getting its new Essex class carriers squared away. By the begining of summer 1943, the USN was going to deploy one fleet class carrier every month.

Sorry, your point is? Yes, it was a couple of months, but because no US carriers were released from Atlantic/Med duty (USS Ranger, et al), the USN's Pacific drives were delayed, thus events in Europe affected the Pacific.

And it didnt impact the course of events, did it?

Hmm, winning the Battle of the Atlantic certainly did help the Allied cause. If they hadn't, even more resources would have been diverted from sailing west from California to stuff sailing east.

The disasters of the battles around Guadalcanal had more to do with supurb IJN doctrine and torpedo's and piss poor US leadership.

Agreed, the IJN performed well and the USN didn't, but more screening destroyers would have helped in detecting the IJN force at Savo and might have prevented further Japanese reinforcements to Guadalcanal. I admit the last line is pure conjecture on my part, but is based on study of the campaign.

 

[Glider]

There is a lot of sense in Bricks posting. The only observations that I would make are regarding the release of carriers from the Atlantic to the Pacific. As far as I can tell the Ranger is the only carrier that could have been released.
My understanding is that one reason why she wasn't moved to operational service is because the USN didn't consider her to be suitable for the front line. Most of her time being spent in training or as an aircraft transport.

 

[syscom3]

The facts do bear that out. In shipping, manpower, aircraft - particularly heavy bombers - landing craft, and other logistical support, the Europe First strategy was a huge roadblock to Allied Pacific forces. One of the reasons the Normandy D-Day landings were delayed from May into June was the worldwide shortage of landing craft.

One of the primary reasons the D-Day landings were posponed to May to June was SHAEF wanted the AF's to continue their poundings of the Germans. Plus I believe the weather forcast for the may invasion date was definatly not good (I know about the weather for June 6th too.....).

The successes and offensives mounted in spite of that in the Pacific is what's remarkable, but the events in Europe did affect the Pacific which is my point.

The allies were fighting in Italy throughout 1943, the same year the Allies began their multiple offensives in the PTO. The reason for the four month delay between the end of the Guadalcanal campaign and the invasion of New Georgia and Rendova had more to do with solving the unique logistical problems in that part of the world (how to get supplies from a cargo ship over a reef to an unimproved beach to a jungle supply dump in thick vicious mud, and vice versa). Once the PTO 1943 offensives began in earnest, it was a steamroller till the end. Nothing in Europe slowed it down. Nothing in Europe effected it. And vice versa.

Actually, the USN's unrestricted submarine warfare had far more to do with the defeat of Japan; the B-29s did magnificent work and I salute those crews, but the starvation and deprivation caused by the sinking of Japan's merchant fleet did most of the damage.

Correct. But it was the B29's that mined the coastal area's that shutdown the final bit of commerce, and systematically torched the japanese cities. The B29's shattered the civilian morale as they could be seen and felt. The sub blockade was out of site, out of mind.

Russia's intent to enter the war shut off the last hope of Japan's peace party who were attempting to use the USSR as a middleman in seeking surrender terms. Again, the ending of the European conflict upset the status quo in the Pacific.

Japan was going to surrender one way or another in Aug 1945. Russia had zero influence in the final analysis. By the way, how were lal those Russian troops going to find the amphib transport to invade a mountainous country in an area of the world known for inclimate weather at sea?

Until spring of 1943, when the US industries' outputs really started to be felt.

If you are referring to the carriers, they had been ordered in the 1939 and 1940 ship building program and were finally being completed.

Sorry, your point is? Yes, it was a couple of months, but because no US carriers were released from Atlantic/Med duty (USS Ranger, et al), the USN's Pacific drives were delayed, thus events in Europe affected the Pacific.

Now tell me what offensives in the PTO were delayed because of material being diverted to the ETO/MTO?

Hmm, winning the Battle of the Atlantic certainly did help the Allied cause. If they hadn't, even more resources would have been diverted from sailing west from California to stuff sailing east.

The battle of the Atlantic was won in 1943, right when the PTO offensives started up.

In 1942, aside from Guadalcanal, and a single US infantry division in NG helping the Aussies...... the Allies were building up their logistical forces in the PTO to support future offensives. And that was infrastructure that had to be built from scratch in difficult conditions. And untill that work was completed, all the material that could have gone to the PTO was sent to the ETO because it couldnt be used.

Agreed, the IJN performed well and the USN didn't, but more screening destroyers would have helped in detecting the IJN force at Savo and might have prevented further Japanese reinforcements to Guadalcanal. I admit the last line is pure conjecture on my part, but is based on study of the campaign.

The Battle of Savo Island was lost due to blunders by the allies from HQ down the line to the individual seaman. Plus to give the IJN their due..... they kicked our ass's with supurb night gunnery and torpedo's. No ammount of additional destroyers would have stopped the events of that night from occuring.

 

[brickhistory]

syscom3, obviously we are never going to agree, but still enjoy learning about the subject.

Back to the thread topic; since the RN's FAA did adopt the Avenger in place of the Stringbag and its successor, the Barracuda, one does wonder why Brown rated the 'bag better.......

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

National bias maybe? But then again the Barracuda was a British aircraft too.

 

[renrich]

No question that during WW2 the Hellcat was a safer a/c to operate off of carriers than the Corsair, especially with low time pilots. However when it came time to make a decision whether to deploy the Hellcat or Corsair on the carriers one of the deciding factors was that the spare parts for the F6F were already on their way and in fact the Corsair had almost been canceled by the Navy. But, at that time, most of the deck landing problems of the Corsair had been solved and many Navy pilots such as Blackburn were convinced that the F4U was a war winner. That saved the Corsair. On May 16, 1944, A Navy Evaluation Board, after a series of evaluation tests, concluded that the F4U1D was the best all-around fighter available and a suitable carrier a/c and it was recommended that carrier fighter and fighter-bomber units be converted to the F4U type. Interestingly, the first deployment of the Corsair in the Pacific by the US Navy is on Jan 9, 44 on board the Enterprise and they are night fighters. However, VF-17s F4U1As landed on carriers to refuel after acting as a CAP during strikes at Rabaul on Nov 11, 43. Later on the majority of the VMF fighters deployed(because of a shortage of Navy pilots) were embarked on CVEs. So apparently our Navy and Marines did not share Eric Brown's opinion of the Hellcat versus the Corsair. Also Brown's comparison of combat of the Hellcat or Corsair versus the FW190 does not take into account any deck landing characteristics.

 

[renrich]

Herr Adler, I think your earlier evaluation of Brown is correct and I think he is definitely not an objective authority. If you are talking about Royal Navy torpedo planes, don't forget the "successor" to the Stringbag, the Albacore. It may be that Brown just has a burr under his saddle because he was a Royal Navy captain and they could not get the RAF which controlled the development of all a/c before the war, to develop any good a/c for the Navy.