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The decisive stopping of the Italian Navy at Taranto also helped the Japenese model their plans for Pearl Harbour. Thus dragging the US into the war. So one could argue the the swordfish had the biggest impact on the war.
Using your logic, it was the Stuka's that initated the first bombings on Poland in Sept 1939 that had the biggest mark.
Stopping the Italian fleet at Taranto was not a decisive blow in the war. Italy still managed to fight on in the land war, and project its power in the Med through air power.
Being in on the two largest naval battles in history (Mariana's and Philipine Sea) was a decisive battle. Those were the death nails in the ability of the Japanese to project power in the Pacific.
No you are completly wrong now. Taranto stopped the Italian Fleet and allowed the RN to completely control the Med. That is very desisive in my opinion. It had no effect on the PTO but it deffinatly had an effect on the victory in Europe.
The Marianas and Philippine Sea had not effect on the ETO only on the PTO, therefore they had a decisive effect on the outcome of the PTO but not the whole war itself.
Sorry Sys but you can give crecit to feats that other countries did as well...
True. Events in Europe ended up having little if any impact in events in the PTO and vice versa.
I already said the Swordfish was the best torpedo bomber of the early part of the war. And Taranto was a victory for the Brits. But whether the battle was ever fought, it was not decisive as the Med is not an open ocean with lots of room for fleets to maneuver.
?Que?
On the strategic level, the whole "Europe First" strategy enumerated by FDR and Churchill meant that the Pacific Theater was hamstrung for reinforcements, supplies, etc until well into 1944.
The end of the European War meant that Stalin would turn towards Japan, definitely a factor in the end of the Pacific War
On a tactical level, among other issues, the scarcity of naval forces, particularly in carrier and destroyers was a consideration for both RN and US forces.
At one time in mid-1942, there were NO USN carriers fit for duty in the Pacific and we borrowed one from the British (HMS Victorious?).
The fact that carriers were sent to the Pacific in 1942-1943 meant that Atlantic convoys were many times left without air cover until the CVEs became available in mid-1943 in any numbers.
The lack of enough US destroyers in the Pacific due to them being used in the Atlantic played major roles in the disasters of Savo Island and other Guadelcanal sea battles.
The war was essentially over for Japan before that happened. They had already been defeated militarily and physically. The B29's made sure of that.
The facts dont bear that out. The US (and ANZAC forces) where on the offensive from 1943 throughout the Solomons and New Guinie. There was the invasion of the Aleutions to retake Attu and Kiska. Plus the USN began its Central Pacific offensive in earnest in 1943. Far from being hamstrung, the US industrial supememecy was making sure everyone was getting equipped.
The war was essentially over for Japan before that happened. They had already been defeated militarily and physically. The B29's made sure of that.
What scarcity? in 1942? In 1943?.
You are referring to a couple month span in early 1943, when the US was getting its new Essex class carriers squared away. By the begining of summer 1943, the USN was going to deploy one fleet class carrier every month.
And it didnt impact the course of events, did it?
The disasters of the battles around Guadalcanal had more to do with supurb IJN doctrine and torpedo's and piss poor US leadership.
The facts do bear that out. In shipping, manpower, aircraft - particularly heavy bombers - landing craft, and other logistical support, the Europe First strategy was a huge roadblock to Allied Pacific forces. One of the reasons the Normandy D-Day landings were delayed from May into June was the worldwide shortage of landing craft.
The successes and offensives mounted in spite of that in the Pacific is what's remarkable, but the events in Europe did affect the Pacific which is my point.
Actually, the USN's unrestricted submarine warfare had far more to do with the defeat of Japan; the B-29s did magnificent work and I salute those crews, but the starvation and deprivation caused by the sinking of Japan's merchant fleet did most of the damage.
Russia's intent to enter the war shut off the last hope of Japan's peace party who were attempting to use the USSR as a middleman in seeking surrender terms. Again, the ending of the European conflict upset the status quo in the Pacific.
Until spring of 1943, when the US industries' outputs really started to be felt.
Sorry, your point is? Yes, it was a couple of months, but because no US carriers were released from Atlantic/Med duty (USS Ranger, et al), the USN's Pacific drives were delayed, thus events in Europe affected the Pacific.
Hmm, winning the Battle of the Atlantic certainly did help the Allied cause. If they hadn't, even more resources would have been diverted from sailing west from California to stuff sailing east.
Agreed, the IJN performed well and the USN didn't, but more screening destroyers would have helped in detecting the IJN force at Savo and might have prevented further Japanese reinforcements to Guadalcanal. I admit the last line is pure conjecture on my part, but is based on study of the campaign.