Japan and the Soviet Union

[parsifal]

removing the US from the equation is bound to have a massive effect on the outcome. However the indications from the wartime records are that the US intended to go war at any rate by March of 1942. The intentions of the US administration was to force the issue of the open door policy once the strategic bomber threat was in place in the philipinnes, and the Filipino army was sufficiently trained to defend the Philipinnes. That this whole strategy of the US administration at this time was wildly optimistic (the effects of the 100 B-17s planned for the Far East grossly over-estimated, and the abilities of the filipino army also overrated greatly) are irrelevant....the US was determined not to allow the Japanese exclusive rights in China, and that was that. Moreover by 1941, the US attitude towards Japoanese agression had hardened so much that they would not have even stood to allow for the continued occupation of Manchuria. Rossevelts policy against the Japanese had become so entrenched that he wanted "Open Door" policy to apply to the whole of China, including Manchuria.

In Europe, the US was also taking an increasingly impatient attitude towards Germany, such that effectively, a state of war existed between the two countries from about September '41 onward. Bottom line is this, the US was most unlikely to stand idly by for much longer than they did , except under the circumstances of a massive , fundamental change in foreign policy of both Axis camps. I just cannot see that happening, because for the Axis to comply with the US wishes, they would have to change their own fundamental makeup, in other words they would have to abandon their exapansionary and agressive policies almost in their entirety, and submit to free trade principals, the rights of self determination, and adopt essentially democratic domestic policies I just cannot see that happening

Under the most ideal of circumstances, the entry of the US may have been delayed by six months at most. In the case of the Japanese, that would, at minimum have required a pullout out of french IndoChina, and at least a truce in China, if they had tried to withdraw from mainland China, however, there would have been a civil war within Japan itself, and a rapid succession of political assassinations. The only scenariio that can make any sense in all of this is if we assumne a continued temporary presence in China by the Japanese, but a pull out from South east Asia, and a genuine drive for peace (but paradoxically no military pull out). Where does that leave us?

Well, for a start it means that the Japanese dont have access to the fifty divisions that constitute their army....instead they have access to about 6-8. They did not have a single armoured division operational in 1941, although they did have a number of armoured regiments. The Japanese air forces, between them could spare approximately 600 aircraft, with a further 300 on garrison in Machuria. The main shortages to be faced by the Japanese, however, would have been in the area of Motor transport. The Japanese had 16 independant motor transport groups (they call them companies, but I dont think they are companies in the western miltary sense) in the whole army in 1941, and 12 of them were fully occupied in China, providing logistic support to the expeditionary force. They were in the process of of forming another 2 independant "companies", so overall, they may have had access to 6 or so independant truck formations. The 12 "companies" in China were able to hold a static line for 31 divisions, but an army on the defensive, or not moving, is consuming roughly 1/3 the amount of supply that an army that is advancing or in comabt will consume. So in a defensive situation, where sea transport cannot be used, the 8 companies that might be available might be able to support up to 20 Divs in a static or defensive role, but in an offensive or attacking posture could only support about 6 divs. Moreover this rough formula is only valid for advances not exceeding 200 miles, for distances greater than that, you needed to double and triple your logistic support for each unit.

So this means that the Japanese could support about 6 divs on offensive operations to a depth of 200 miles, and about 3 divs to a depth of advance of about 500 miles. In western terms that amounts to about two corps initially and one coprs after that. .For the record, the Germans attacked the 3 million Russian in the west with no less than 36 Corps (not includiung the minior axis satellites) including 5 Corps of fully formed Panzers. They were supported by more than 200000 trucks, as compared to the 30000 that would be available to the Japanese. The Japanese would be faced by 500000 Soviet tropps (over 200000 of them the highly trained Siberians), so whereas the Germans have an odds ratio of about 1:1, with the advantages of surprise and tanks to support them, the Japanese will have odds of about 1:5 against them, and no tank supoport.

In the air, the Soviet far eastern airfleet amounted to approximately 3000 aircraft in June 1941, and this number actually increased throughout the Summer of 1941. The far eastern air reserves were not raided by the Soviet high command until December 1941, so here we have 3000 Soviet aircraft pitted against 1100 Japanese aircraft, of which no more than 140 will be zeroes, and no more that 40 will be Ki-43s. The remainder will be, mostly Ki-27s, and A5Ms, mostly, against an assortment of Soviet aircraft, ranging from I-15s through to Yak-1s. I believe the Japanese would do quite well in the air, as compared to what would happen to them on the ground, but they would nevertheless have been heavily outnumbered and with a much smaller capability to replace losses. Conversely Soviet pilot training was pretty attrocious in 1941, and their force organization even worse.

Returning briefly to the west, a retreating Japanese army in Asia would have freed up or allowed the equipment of (courtesy of enhanced Lend Lease) about 40 extra Allied Divisions, 11 Australian (including 3 already in the middle east but recalled in 1941, because of the threat of Japanese invasion), one New Zealand (retained in the Pacific for the same reason) and 32 Indian Divs (include about 6 in the middle east but held back because of equipment shortages). In addition, there are the equivalent of two British Divs no longer transferred from the Middle East to the far East, and the Prince Of Wales/Repulse, the Indomitabl;e, the three Illustriou class, a swag of cruisers, and 3 or four older battleships are no longer needed for service in the far east....wonder where they are going to go????

For the moment, lets be conservative, and assume that the Middleastern command is reinforced by no less than 12 extra Divs, and a gaggle of ships. This does not bode well for Rommel, and rather than undermanning the agheila line in December, the allies after the fall of Bengahzi continue their advance, capturing Tripoli by the end of November 1941. The threats to germany's southern front now are very serious, with the collapse of italy imminent. I estimate the Germans will be forced to withdraw at least 6-8 divs to counter this problem, along with at least 500 aircraft. Straight away there goes your reserves for Typhoon, so the net overall effect on the chances of Axis success have actually decreased by Japan not attacking in the Far East.

 

[Soren]

The Ki-201 wasn't a close copy of the me262, it shared some of the aerodynamics certainly and as mentioned the engine was modified on the basis of the photograph, but a copy it wasn't. The me163 was a copy but as we both agree too little too late for both aircraft.

I didn't say it was a direct copy, I said it was very close to being one, and that it sure was. Most people would call it copying a design if make two designs as similar as the Me262 Ki-201 were.

Take a peek:

And the point is that the Japanese recieved and immediately put into use technology given by the Germans.

I must have missed something, but I thought that Japan and Germany were both fighting the USA and the UK.

Glider there's a difference between fighting a war together and just fighting the same people. The Germans Japanese didn't cooperate in any operations together, which is what would've let to the sharing of information.

T26 and T28 tanks would do the job, but you are ignoring the fact that a small number of KV1 or T34 tanks would have the same effect against the Japanese as a Tiger against Sherman 75's. If Germany can spare a handfull of Tigers for Tunisia, then the Russians can spare a handful of modern tanks to face Japan.

I doubt that a KV1 or T34 would've had even a fraction of the same effect as the Tiger did against the Allíed tanks from 42 and onwards until the end of the war. The T-34 KV-1 both featurd piss poor optics, ill trained crews, no radios etc etc.. the effect wasn't even gonna come close to that of the Tiger.

Also these few available T-34's KV-1's were absolutely not gonna be used against the Japanese when the Germans were coming in full force from the west with no mighty US to be concerned about. This alone would've made the German drive even more swift and powerful.

The fact that you have a good prime mover doesn't mean that you army has solved its transport problems.

Not all of them no, but some of them. Like I've already mentioned the primary means of transportation was horse drawn, which is very reliable and well suited for long range advances. The motorized prime movers, of which the Japanese possessed some excellent ones, would tow the really heavy stuff along.

So again, in terms of landbased transportation the Japanese have got it sorted.

Besides you still haven't given any details of those Japanes Anti Tank aircraft and the Japanese transport aircraft. Its a bit like the Army Transport situation. Japn built the DC3 during the war which was second to none and better than the Ju52, but no one is going to pretend that Japan had a transport fleet to rival the Luftwaffe.

The navy would obviously transport the majority of the troops material to the eastern shores of Russia, from which point on the invasion would begin. And an invasion force with over 3 million Japanese troops could be launched, which was more than what the Soviets were gonna be capable of dealing with as the Germans were pushing through from the west.

As for transport a/c, they weren't needed in any massive numbers at all by the Japanese.

And like I said landbased transportation would be largely horse drawn, which although somewhat slow is very reliable and capable of negotiating the toughest terrains.

As for the AT a/c, well the Ki-41 could've fulfilled this role quite beautifully I believe.

 

[Soren]

Parsifal,

I'm heading for the bed in 1 min so I only have time to address one or two issues with your post for now, I'll address the rest later.

Anyway, are you saying that the Japanese only had 140 A6M's available in the summer of 1941 ? If so then you'd be severely mistaking. By June 1941 the first A6M3's were even being introduced.

The Japanese airforce would've wiped the VVS clear off the skies, there's no doubt about it.

As for the Siberian troops being experienced. from what exactly ? And how smart would it be to pit them against the Japanese when the Germans were steamrolling the Soviet forces in the west ?

If the Soviets had been forced to fight a two front war in 1941 then they would've been screwed beyond measure. They simply couldn't have done it.

Also lets not forget what the Japanese actually achieved in WW2, they held on for quite a while! And so had they concentrated their efforts against the Soviets instead then there's no doubt they would've done better, esp. in the air but also on the ground.

 

[stasoid]

The Japanese airforce would've wiped the VVS clear off the skies, there's no doubt about it.

Not so sure. Something quite opposite happened 2 years earlier at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. What would make it different in 41'? New A6Ms? Well, Russians had Yak-1, Lagg-3, Mig3s that were not available in 39 either.

The Soviets kept around a million men in the Far East throughout the war. At some point in late 41, 20 divisions (200.000 troops) were pulled out and transferred to the west to conduct a counteroffensive in the Battle of Moscow but that's about it, the rest stayed there untill the end of the war.

Ground invasion in Russia's Far East would also lead to a widespread guerrilla war. Considering that every local civilian was a hunter/pathfinder and practically every family kept at least one rifle at home, I dont think the Japanise would've managed to hold that territory for very long.

 

[JoeB]

So this means that the Japanese could support about 6 divs on offensive operations to a depth of 200 miles, and about 3 divs to a depth of advance of about 500 miles. In western terms that amounts to about two corps initially and one coprs after that. .For the record, the Germans attacked the 3 million Russian in the west with no less than 36 Corps (not includiung the minior axis satellites) including 5 Corps of fully formed Panzers. They were supported by more than 200000 trucks, as compared to the 30000 that would be available to the Japanese. The Japanese would be faced by 500000 Soviet tropps (over 200000 of them the highly trained Siberians), so whereas the Germans have an odds ratio of about 1:1, with the advantages of surprise and tanks to support them, the Japanese will have odds of about 1:5 against them, and no tank supoport.

The extrapolation from truck units to number of divisions isn't correct. The Japanese like the Germans mainly relied on horse transport. And the IJA covered quite large distances in offensive operations in China early in that war, then again in 1944, it was not a static army.

The Japanese had specific plan for war with the USSR in 1941, we don't have to speculate it. The Army General Staff plan was based on a force of 22 divisions (the Kwantung Army's 14, Korea Army's 2, 6 withdrawn from North China), total 850,000 men all in including non-divisional units. The Kwantung Army itself, in its typical semi-indepedence from Tokyo, conceived a plan to build its own strength to 20-25 divisions. The operation to expand Kwantung Army strength in 1941 in anticipation of attacking the Soviets was called Kantokuen, short in Japanese for Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers. Besides shifting of divisions it involved large scale transfer of filler personnel to fill out existing formations (war strength of old square type IJA divisions was 25k men, can't be counted equally with Soviet rifle divisions). The basic plan was to strike east from eastern Manchuria using the bulk of that force, in forested terrain where the Japanese inferiority in tanks would have been less important, just as the Soviets made slower progress on that front in August 1945 than elsewhere. In the original Army General Staff plan the war was to start in early September with goal of seizing the Maritime Province before winter shut down operations.

From July the Army's plan to attack the Soviets lost momentum with the cabinet compared to more urgent need to respond to the US/Brit/Dutch oil embargo, eventual decision to 'go south' instead. By 1942 the Kwantung Army had a larger numerical superiority over Soviet far east forces, but obviously Japan had made a large new commitment elsewhere. "Nomonhan" by Alvin Coox describes the 1939 conflict in tremendous detail but also has a chapter about the 1941 build up and plans.

Joe

 

[m kenny]

http://www.warbirdforum.com/nomonhan.htm

http://www.warbirdforum.com/russloss.htm

 

[Watanbe]

I don't think the USSR is capable of fighting a two front war against two powers. The Japanese might not be able to launch a successful land invasion, but they don't have to, they just have to tie up a couple million Soviet troops. I can't see the VVS dealing with the Luftwaffe and Japanese airforce, at least they certainly won't have air superiority. The Japanese Navy would obviously dominate the seas and could help the Army establish a foothold, which it could in theory just hold until German victory.

The Germans had a superb army and were very close to defeating the Soviets, the only thing that really saved them was being able to pump in fresh reinforcements. If the Japanese attack in the east your pool of fresh reinforcements gets dramatically reduced. The Germans had the Soviets on the ropes but couldn't delivered the knockout blow! A Japanese front gives them the opportunity to do this.

That being said, the Japanese Army really wasn't tailored to fighting in the sort of terrain it would expect to encounter. If the Germans gave the Japanese the production license to manufacturer panzerfausts or some sort of effective anti-tank it would be hard for the USSR to launch a successful attack. The Japanese knew how to fight a defensive war, as the US found out, albeit in a jungle terrain.

When reading about Soviets troop numbers and the amount of planes and tanks they managed to manufacturer it makes you realise just how impressive the German Army and equipment really was. Even considering the historic circumstances it was an amazing achievement to push Russia that close to defeat!

 

[Glider]

I didn't say it was a direct copy, I said it was very close to being one, and that it sure was. Most people would call it copying a design if make two designs as similar as the Me262 Ki-201 were.

It wasn't a copy but it did use the same aerodynamics. The Japanese aircraft was a lot smaller, its internal structure was different and it used different materials in its construction.
PS you did say it was a copy, you didn't say it was close to being a copy.

And the point is that the Japanese recieved and immediately put into use technology given by the Germans.

Not immediately. Development didn't start until November 1944 some months after the information arrived in Japan.

I doubt that a KV1 or T34 would've had even a fraction of the same effect as the Tiger did against the Allíed tanks from 42 and onwards until the end of the war. The T-34 KV-1 both featurd piss poor optics, ill trained crews, no radios etc etc.. the effect wasn't even gonna come close to that of the Tiger.

Despite the well known issues of the Russian tanks its easy to forget that these tanks came as a shock to the German Army who had considerable difficulty dealing with them when they first met them on the battlefield. I think you will agree that the German Army was better equipped with anti tank weapons than the Japanese.
At the end of the day the T34 and KV1 are impossible to penetrate wth Japanese anti tank weapons and have the ability to move at will around the battlefield and can destroy any Japanese tank.

Also these few available T-34's KV-1's were absolutely not gonna be used against the Japanese when the Germans were coming in full force from the west with no mighty US to be concerned about. This alone would've made the German drive even more swift and powerful.

As I said the T26 and T28 would do the job but if it became difficult a small number of the more modern tanks would have a huge impact. As I pointed out the Germans did this with the Tiger in Tunisia so there is form.

Not all of them no, but some of them. Like I've already mentioned the primary means of transportation was horse drawn, which is very reliable and well suited for long range advances. The motorized prime movers, of which the Japanese possessed some excellent ones, would tow the really heavy stuff along.

So again, in terms of landbased transportation the Japanese have got it sorted.

I suggest you read Parsifal's posting on the numbers as its a numbers game.

The navy would obviously transport the majority of the troops material to the eastern shores of Russia, from which point on the invasion would begin. And an invasion force with over 3 million Japanese troops could be launched, which was more than what the Soviets were gonna be capable of dealing with as the Germans were pushing through from the west.

Small point but important, the Japanese only had a small amphibious potential and didn't have the ability or equipment to do a large opposed landing. .

As for the AT a/c, well the Ki-41 could've fulfilled this role quite beautifully I believe.

I don't know about the Ki 41 can you point me in the right direction, thanks

 

[parsifal]

QUOTE=JoeB;523014]The extrapolation from truck units to number of divisions isn't correct. The Japanese like the Germans mainly relied on horse transport. And the IJA covered quite large distances in offensive operations in China early in that war, then again in 1944, it was not a static army.



The Japanese had specific plan for war with the USSR in 1941, we don't have to speculate it. The Army General Staff plan was based on a force of 22 divisions (the Kwantung Army's 14, Korea Army's 2, 6 withdrawn from North China), total 850,000 men all in including non-divisional units. The Kwantung Army itself, in its typical semi-indepedence from Tokyo, conceived a plan to build its own strength to 20-25 divisions. The operation to expand Kwantung Army strength in 1941 in anticipation of attacking the Soviets was called Kantokuen, short in Japanese for Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers. Besides shifting of divisions it involved large scale transfer of filler personnel to fill out existing formations (war strength of old square type IJA divisions was 25k men, can't be counted equally with Soviet rifle divisions). The basic plan was to strike east from eastern Manchuria using the bulk of that force, in forested terrain where the Japanese inferiority in tanks would have been less important, just as the Soviets made slower progress on that front in August 1945 than elsewhere. In the original Army General Staff plan the war was to start in early September with goal of seizing the Maritime Province before winter shut down operations.



From July the Army's plan to attack the Soviets lost momentum with the cabinet compared to more urgent need to respond to the US/Brit/Dutch oil embargo, eventual decision to 'go south' instead. By 1942 the Kwantung Army had a larger numerical superiority over Soviet far east forces, but obviously Japan had made a large new commitment elsewhere. "Nomonhan" by Alvin Coox describes the 1939 conflict in tremendous detail but also has a chapter about the 1941 build up and plans.



Joe[/QUOTE]


Hi Joe

I am going to have to respectfully disagree with you on this one

Horse drawn supply cannot replace truck borne supply over any distance for a modern army. They can provide fairly efficient supply in a divisional situation (from the Corps depots to the divisional depots, usually no more than 30 miles) but for Corps to Army level supply they are just not efficient enough to be really looked on as an adequate substitute for a modern army (Corps to Army supply lines are typically 50-100 miles long) Quite simply, the draught animals will eat more fodder than they can carry (especially in Russia) , once the supply lines exceed about 100 miles. In the modern era, non-motorised armies rely on railways for their "strategic" supply. after wwi this was heavily supplemented with motor transport. In Russia, motor transport was not just a luxury, it was vital. Even armies like the Rumanian and the Italian armies relied on MT to get the supplies from the railhead to the Corps HQs for distribution to the divs by non-motorised echelons



Usually supplies are not channelled through and army group, but the army to supply head lines can be anything really....in the Siberian context it might be several hundred miles very easily.



Moreover, all this wagon driven scenario fails to take into account that foraging in Siberia is not an option. There is insufficient native fodder to support large numbers of draft animals



In Russia, the Germans did rely on horse drawn transport, but not for their "long range" supply. Horses were used mostly to transport the artillery, and for local supply close to the front. Vehicles provided over 90% of the lift capability for the LOC supply requirements. Thats why the loss of soft skinned vehicles in 1941 was so critical, and was really the main constraint that prevented the capture of Moscow in December.



An issue also worth noting is the general lack of fodder available in Siberia. Much of it does not have open savannah grasslands. It is mostly subarctic tundra or conifer forest, neither of which have much in the way of fodder. Siberia is more akin to desert in terms of its groundcovers.



With all due respect, I just cannot see the japanese being able to support the 22 divs you mention. It looks like a typically unrealistic Japanese plan to me.



For the record also, whilst you are correct to say that the japanese were able to launch major offensives in 1941-2, the scale of these offensives were no where near those of a 22 division attack against the Soviets. And these extremely limited offensives very nearly derailed the japanese logistics network. The offensive into Burma in 1942 was by two divs, the offensive into Malaya was by three Divs, and in each case they very nearly ran out of supply, mostly because of a shortage of trucks. The two offensives of 1944 into southern China did involve about 18 Divs, however at no time were more than 8 Divs engaged in offensive operations at any given time. There is no instance that I know of after 1940 that the Japanese engaged in a major land offensive bigger than 10 divs.



It is also worth looking at the terrain that existing in the approaches to Vladivostock, which would have been the main objective of any Japanese offensive.

For comparison, I have attached a couple of Google Earth images, both at the same scale (wach map is approximately 200 km across), which show the relief and main transport lines. One is of the approaches to Moscow, and the other the border regions just north of Vladivostock. Immediately it should be apparent that the terrain in the Far East is very difficult. There is no direct route to the Port, and no cross border roads or rail lines to speak of. The narrow corridor through which the Japanese would have to advance was one of the most heavily fortified areas on earth at the time, comparable to the Maginot line in fact (your comment about the Russians being held up in 1945 by terrain is only half right, they were also held up by the strong Japanese border defencees that also existed on their side of the borde). The mountains shown on that releif map rise about 6000 feet above the surrounding valleys, in effect making them impassable to most armies.

 

[Juha]

Soren
Quote:" I doubt that a KV1 or T34 would've had even a fraction of the same effect as the Tiger did against the Allíed tanks from 42 and onwards until the end of the war."
I recommended that you read the history of 6th PzD, Brennpunkte. When they first met KVs one KV blocked the only supply route to the combat parts of the division and it took most of the day to knock that out and while German tried that the KV knocked out a battery of 50mm PaK 38s and one 88mm with its tractor. In the end another 88 knocked the KV out but in the end, IIRC, they needed combat engineers to make sure that the KV didn't make any more trouble. At the same time some 20-30 KVs and many T-26s attacked the combat units of the 6th PzD. They drove through most of its PzRgt which had to notice that their shells bounced off from KVs even from very short distance, in the end panzers, mostly ex-Czech Pz35(t)s, managed to knock out a few by using PzGr40s but most sailed past the panzers, overran much of A/T battalion and were eventually stopped by heavy field artillery batteries, behind which the PzRgt reformed. Panzergrenadiers suffered heavily and the situation was finally restored when neighbor 1st PzD came into rescue by turning around and hitting the Soviet formation to its right rear. But it was a quite a shock to 6th PzD.
Germans adapted to situation fast, they began to put into their forward kampfgruppen a couple 15cm sH 18s and a couple 88s but even later on there were cases when a few Soviet heavy tanks played havoc amongst German units.

Quote:" The Japanese airforce would've wiped the VVS clear off the skies, there's no doubt about it."

VVS in the end won the air superiority over battlefield at Nomonhan/Khalin Gol in 1939, why it would have been so different in1941.

And on troops, firstly Japan was involved in a major land war in China, most of its army was tided there and on the other hand Soviet Union kept significant forces along its southern border, that's why it could easily participate the occupation of Persia/Iran in August-Sept 41, IIRC some 3 Soviet armies participated that plus air and naval forces.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

I don't think the USSR is capable of fighting a two front war against two powers. The Japanese might not be able to launch a successful land invasion, but they don't have to, they just have to tie up a couple million Soviet troops. I can't see the VVS dealing with the Luftwaffe and Japanese airforce, at least they certainly won't have air superiority. The Japanese Navy would obviously dominate the seas and could help the Army establish a foothold, which it could in theory just hold until German victory.

The Soviets maintained a far easter milatry force structure of between 500000 and a million men, 2-4000 aircraft, and a small naval contingent. This proves that the Japanese would need to do more than just sit ther to have an effect on the battles in the west.

The Japanese have superior quality in the air in 1941, but the combined strength of their army and navy air forces did not exceed 2500 aircraft, and at least 1000 were needed just to hold the line in China. A further 500 or so were needed in the Home islands for training and defence, leaving about 1000 ready for operations elswhere. Of these fewer than 200 were front line fighters. And Japanese pilot replacements were pitifully slow, about 50-100 per month for both air forces. Against this the Soviets were curning out pilots (of far lesser quality) by the thousand

Even after the transfer of the Siberians to the Battle of Moscoe in December, the Soviets maintained an army in excess of half a million men. The units sent west were immedialtey replaced admittedly by untrained levies.


The Germans had a superb army and were very close to defeating the Soviets, the only thing that really saved them was being able to pump in fresh reinforcements. If the Japanese attack in the east your pool of fresh reinforcements gets dramatically reduced. The Germans had the Soviets on the ropes but couldn't delivered the knockout blow! A Japanese front gives them the opportunity to do this.

Err, by wars end, the Soviets were superior in quality to the majority of the German army. They had proven that they could defeat the germans in open battle. Whilst numbers were a part of this equation, it is often forgotten that the Soviets had an industrial base in 1938 that was only about two thirds that of the Germans. They had vastly superior manpower reserves, but a smaller industrial base. The Russians simply managed their war production more rationally. They produced tanks tanks inferior in quality but far cheaper to produce for example. This philosophy was repeated in every major category incidentally.

I would say that the laurels should go to the Russians for realizing what was needed to win the war, rather than prance around the battlefield with expensive toys that might look good, but which are so expensive as to make any chance of winning impossible.


When reading about Soviets troop numbers and the amount of planes and tanks they managed to manufacturer it makes you realise just how impressive the German Army and equipment really was. Even considering the historic circumstances it was an amazing achievement to push Russia that close to defeat!

The Germans came close to defeating the Russians at just one point, in 1941, and the more authoritative analyses demonstrate that this threat was never as dire as we in the West like to dream

 

[Soren]

Ki-46, not Ki-41. Typo on my part.

 

[Soren]

The Japanese successfully held on against the might of the US for over 4 years and some people now claim they couldn't have held their own in a war against a desperate USSR being steamrolled in the west by th German army. This is getting ridiculous.

By summer 1941 the Japanese had ready 2,250,000 well trained troops and another 4,500,000 million reserves. The amphibious capabilities of the Japanese were not poor either, they successfully operated in the Pacific for over 4 years, landing masses of troops on various locations. Furthermore the A6M3 had started shipments to the IJAF in July 41, and if the A6M2 was superior to anything the Soviets had then the A6M3 only nailed that case shut.

Without checking I believe around 600 Zeros could be deployed for attacks on the eastern border of Russia, and it wouldn't take long before they along with the number of Ki-43 and Ki-27 would sweep the VVS from the skies.

Also none of this can be compared to Khalkin Gol, that was a struggle between two nations, a one front war for both parties. And the Japanese who did very well to begin with lost merely because of a few major blunders made within the imperial high command. Still the losses were comparable for both sides. The invasion of the USSR in 1941 would've been an entirely different deal, with the situation looking very desperate and hopeless for the USSR as they were being steamrolled in the west by the German army. And the USSR simply wouldn't have been capable of holding a 3 million man invasion force from the east when they were being crushed beyond measure in the west.

And as for the T-34 KV-1 tanks being a shock to the German army, initially yes they were, but only because such a thing was never expected from the Soviets. The KV-1 proved difficult to knock out in the beginning, but on the other hand its' battlefield effectiveness was poor as-well, featuring no radio, poor optics and an ill trained crew. Only in a few instances did the KV-1 tanks manage to halt the Germans, but in general they were simply overrun and as described by various sources on the subject they really had no effect on the German advance at all. The T-34 was more of a shock in that is was fast mobile, but it still lacked a radio and again the Germans overcame it rather painlessly by use of teamwork.

Err, by wars end, the Soviets were superior in quality to the majority of the German army. They had proven that they could defeat the germans in open battle.

Not so. By mid 44 the average German recruit, while certainly not recieving the amount of training as in the previous years, was still better trained and equipped than the average Soviet soldier. And it showed on the battlefield.

The Soviets succeeded on the open battlefields purely by virtue of superior numbers, and as can be seen from the records also suffered far higher losses than the Germans in nearly every engagement, even at the very end of the war during the struggle for Berlin where the Germans still achieved roughly a 3:1 kill ratio.

 

[Juha]

Soren
Quote:" The Japanese successfully held on against the might of the US for over 4 years"
In 1946 Japan had surrendered and in ruins, I'd not call that successful resistance.

You still forget China, most of IJA was tied there.

Quote:" Furthermore the A6M3 had started shipments to the IJAF in July 41"

First of all IJNAF and where heck you got the date, A6M2 was the type used up to Guadalcanal at least.

Quote:" And the Japanese who did very well to begin with lost merely because of a few major blunders made within the imperial high command."

Did very well, you mean they succeeded to push Mongolian cavalry and border guards back or what? And what major blunders? Nomonhan/Khalkin Gol was Kwantung Army's show, Imperial HQ has very little to do with it.
BTW Ki-46 was Dinah, unarmed LR recon plane, armed version appeared only 45. Do you mean Ki-45 Nick. now it had a cannon but it was big and vulnerable.

In the end, remember CHINA.

Juha

 

[Soren]

My mistake it was June 42, so forget about the A6M3. Still atleast 500 A6M2 Type 21's were ready in July 41, and it was a far better a/c than any that the VVS possessed.

As for the Dinah, it could quite easily be armed with a 3.7cm AT gun or two of the like, which was well demonstrated later in the war when it was pretty fearsomely armed as a bomber destroyer. The Japanese wouldn't have waited long to introduce effective AT a/c as it would prove highly beneficial in a war against the Soviets, and it could simply be done by putting on large caliber guns on some of their existing designs. The Ki-51 could've in effect operated much the same was as the German Ju-87 Stuka, which proved a devastating weapon against Soviet armour. Also seeing that they were gonna fight the war litterally along side the Germans they'd no doubt be recieving a lot of designs from the Germans.

 

[Juha]

Soren
seriously. Ki-51 bomb load was 200kg, yes two hundred kg, so its lifting capacity was entirely different class than that of Ju 87D/G, so if 87G could carry 2 37mm cannon that really doesn't mean that Ki-51 could have done the same.

Ki-46 was rather un-manoeuvre a/c, and unprotected, so difficult to see how one could have made it a good ground attack a/c. Moreover, JAAF in real world developed a ground attack version of Ki-45 sometimes in1942/43, so it would have been the first choice. But its first service version, an escort fighter, began its operational life in mid-42, IIRC. Some realism in your scenarios, please.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

In fact the numbers of Zeroes available to the Japanese in December 1941 was 198 a/c, including the units attached to the carriers. My sources indicate that there were about 35 Oscars in and experimental trials unit, and a further 6 or 12 (records are unclear to me) of Tojos, again in an experimental unit.

The Ki-27s in front line service amounted to about 250 of which at least half were fully engaged in China. There were fewer than 50 Claudes in front line service, the remainder were in second line or training units. Dinahs amounted to less than 60 aircraft.There were hordes of Sonias, and these were effective ground support machines, but they were not pinpoint weapons, and could not hope to knock out Soviet tanks or pillboxes. They were roughly equivalent to the HS 123

There was little interservice co-operation and even less inter-Axis co-operation. The Japanese would never have asked, and the germans would never have provided, any help to the Japanese in the manner suggested.

Moreover whilst equipment was in short supply the over-riding determinant in Japanese air strength was the trained pilots they could call upon. There simply were not the depth of reserves to take on an opponent as prolific as the Russians. Even against the Allies, in the first half of 1942, they were pressed to win and maintain air supremacy. My best information is that in the period December 1941 to the end of April, the Japanese destroyed about 1200 allied aircraft, for the loss of about 250 of their own . Even if the Soviet loss rate is double that of the allies, and they lose 2400 aircraft to the Japanese 250,. I think the Russians would do far better than the allies actually, because they would be unlikley to be surprised (because the Soviet spy rings operating in Japan) and would be far more concentrated, and could rely on the generally attrocious operating conditions to take a heavy and steady toll. For comparison, in the first four months of Barbarossa, the germans had lost over 1200 aircraft to all causes against a Red Air Force only marginally larger than the Far Eastern air force.

I am not saying the Russians could not be beaten, but I also have strong doubts that it would a walkover either. I think in the space of a few short months the Japanese air forces would have been in deep trouble actually

 

[Soren]

seriously. Ki-51 bomb load was 200kg, yes two hundred kg, so its lifting capacity was entirely different class than that of Ju 87D/G, so if 87G could carry 2 37mm cannon that really doesn't mean that Ki-51 could have done the same.

What would keep it from mounting two 3.7cm cannons Juha ? I don't see why it wouldn't be capable of it. I should also mention that it did prove itself in the ground attack role in China Burma. So I think you're underestimating this a/c quite a lot.

As for the 200 kg capacity, I'm sure it could bring along more, the A6M could afterall carry more than that. It was probably just the std. load out.

At any rate I'm sure that a/c such as the B5M D3A could've performed quite satisfactorily in this role, being able to perform almost as good as the Stuka in the ground attack role I believe. The B5M could certainly easily accommodate two 3.7cm cannons, no problem, and I am sure the D3A easily could as-well.

Ki-46 was rather un-manoeuvre a/c, and unprotected, so difficult to see how one could have made it a good ground attack a/c.

Hold on a minute, where exactly do you have this from ? According to all I've read on Ki-46 it was a pretty good a/c with nice handling and a good load carrying capability. Now you're saying the exact opposite.

If you want realism Juha then how about you start basing your on arguments on it as-well.

Moreover, JAAF in real world developed a ground attack version of Ki-45 sometimes in1942/43, so it would have been the first choice. But its first service version, an escort fighter, began its operational life in mid-42, IIRC.

Some realism in your scenarios, please.

I can only suggest the same from you. I think my own arguments have been pretty well grounded so far.

 

[Glider]

The Japanese successfully held on against the might of the US for over 4 years and some people now claim they couldn't have held their own in a war against a desperate USSR being steamrolled in the west by th German army. This is getting ridiculous..

You are right it is getting ridiculous. There is a huge difference between fighting on Pacific Islands and Jungles where the tactic is dig in and sell your lives at as high a price as you can. To fighting on the wide open plains of Russia with nowhere to hide, dreadfull armour few anti tank guns and limited transport against a Russian Army that has amroured divisions.

By summer 1941 the Japanese had ready 2,250,000 well trained troops and another 4,500,000 million reserves. The amphibious capabilities of the Japanese were not poor either, they successfully operated in the Pacific for over 4 years, landing masses of troops on various locations.

I suggest you look up the ability of the IJN to land fighting troops in any number, it was very small and no Tank Landing craft. Indeed the first TLC they had were copied from RN Landing craft used at Dieppe, (there you go, some technology that was transferred in this case because the Germans let the Japanese look at the landing craft used..

.

Without checking I believe around 600 Zeros could be deployed for attacks on the eastern border of Russia, and it wouldn't take long before they along with the number of Ki-43 and Ki-27 would sweep the VVS from the skies. .

In December 1941 the Japanese only had about 400 Zeros operational and were still in the process of equipping their front line units.

.

And as for the T-34 KV-1 tanks being a shock to the German army, initially yes they were, but only because such a thing was never expected from the Soviets. The KV-1 proved difficult to knock out in the beginning, but on the other hand its' battlefield effectiveness was poor as-well, featuring no radio, poor optics and an ill trained crew. .

Can I ask how effective you think Japanese tanks would be as they also had no radio, ill trained crews (in tank warfare), as well as no anti tank guns (as most were fitted with a low velocity 57mm), no armour worth talking about (about 17mm in most), narrow tracks, slow speed and were also few in number?

 

[Soren]

There was little interservice co-operation and even less inter-Axis co-operation. The Japanese would never have asked, and the germans would never have provided, any help to the Japanese in the manner suggested.

Oh I fully disagree. In a joint operation as suggested they would ofcourse co-operate, there's no question about it.