Hi Joe
I am going to have to respectfully disagree with you on this one
In Russia, the Germans did rely on horse drawn transport, but not for their "long range" supply. Horses were used mostly to transport the artillery, and for local supply close to the front. Vehicles provided over 90% of the lift capability for the LOC supply requirements.
For the record also, whilst you are correct to say that the japanese were able to launch major offensives in 1941-2, the scale of these offensives were no where near those of a 22 division attack against the Soviets. And these extremely limited offensives very nearly derailed the japanese logistics network. The offensive into Burma in 1942 was by two divs, the offensive into Malaya was by three Divs, and in each case they very nearly ran out of supply, mostly because of a shortage of trucks. The two offensives of 1944 into southern China did involve about 18 Divs, however at no time were more than 8 Divs engaged in offensive operations at any given time. There is no instance that I know of after 1940 that the Japanese engaged in a major land offensive bigger than 10 divs.
It's not so much disagreeing with me. There are sources discussing their actual plans. You are rejecting them based on an out of thin air analysis you did before learning of those actual plans, it seems.
The German campaign in Russia in 1941 gained fewer miles per day than the French one in 1812. Obviously armies do not inherently require motor vehicles to conduct long range offensives. That assertion or implication doesn't stand even a cursory reading of military history. And anyway comparison to offensives against the Soviet west are not on point because the Japanese Manchurian base of operations was so much closer to the planned objective, Maritime Province. And a second stage longer range offensive going west, if that point had been reached, would obviously have relied on *rail* logistics. Also, considering only the Japanese offensives in 1941-42, most of which were supplied by sea over long distances from Japan, with *shipping* the critical logistical element, is comparing apples and oranges. The Japanese conducted much larger continental land offensives, as large or larger than the proposed one v Soviets, in China, and over much greater distances than an offensive from eastern Manchuria into the Soviet Maritime Province. Read "The History of the Sino Japanese War" by Hsu and Chang, the KMT official history, but it's accurate in basic description of campaigns. Tactically the KMT and Soviets were different, but it shows your analysis of inherent Japanese inability to conduct large long range offensives on land to be clearly wrong. The Japanese could, and had already.
So, your logistical theory why the Japanese would be greatly outnumbered against the Soviets in FE is just wrong. It's especially obvious considering opening border battles of such a campaign, where the Japanese force would be operating right from its bases, ridiculous in that case to assert a 5:1 Soviet numbers advantage, the Japanese had those 20+ divisions in Manchuria, that wasn't a plan but a fact. Then the initial offensives objectives were not all that far away in logistical terms. So the logistically incapable, or vastly outnumbered because of logistics, argument can be firmly rejected based on the facts.
As to whether an IJA offensive would have succeeded in terms of tactical and operational *combat* factors, that can be reasonably debated. However the IJA proved itself clearly superior man for man, combat power for combat power, in combat in relatively closed terrain v second string Allied ground units in 41-42, IOW v countries putting their highest military priorities elsewhere. The IJA was generally outnumbered in those campaigns but scored consistently rapid successes. It was of course always heavily outnumbered in China. But it would have had at least numerical parity with the Soviets in a campaign launched from eastern Manchuria, especially considering the numbers for Soviet FE are for the whole large region, only some of those opposite eastern Manchuria. And if the Japanese had found a way to wait* until the 1942 campaign season, they'd have had a pretty big numerical advantage, and lower quality of Soviet forces remaining.
*the main reason this is all moot is the US/Brit/Dutch oil embargo of July '41, in response to Vichy agreement to Japanese demand for bases in southern Indochina. Once that happened the Japanese had to either make big concessions to the West to get the embargo lifted (it was made it clear that just reversing the bases agreement wasn't enough) or attack the West. If attacking the West they obviously couldn't prevail against the Soviets at the same time as even they realized, which is why they rejected the IJA's plan to attack the USSR. So any 'what if' of Soviet-Japanese war has to assume the Japanese prevent the oil embargo, and also that the West doesn't slap on the embargo *for* attacking Britain's ally of convenience, the Soviets. But just assuming Japan can buy Western oil, they could choose '41 or '42 to attack the Soviets. The latter is as realistic at what is as the former.
Joe
