Japanese air power in a hypotetical invasion of the USSR in 1941

Most of them realized new Japan's reality as a democratic nation soon to be an ordinary citizen.
It is interesting for me knowing the historical relationship with you over the Eurasian Continent, MM
Thanks again for your information.

A Happy New Year.

Shinpachi said:

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In any local books about the incident, I have never read any description that JGHQ supported the battle.
They did not only support the battle but ordered Masanobu Tsuji - a Commander of Kanto-gun (Kwantung army) to
withdraw his troops immediately after the first conflict.

Conflicts with Soviet Union were not their immediate concern when they were busy in China.
It was Commander Tsuji's dogma but I guess that the Japanese had been misunderstood that they were
interested in Soviet territory so soon. Total war with Soviet Union might have come but that would not have been
before the victory in China even if there had not been Pearl Harbor.

After ww2, Tsuji answered an interview "I could have won Nomonhan if JGHQ had fully supported me".
Selfish. For your knowledge, He is regarded as "Absolute Evil" in my country.

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The Japanese policies leading to clashes with the Soviet Union over 1938-9 may not have originated solely in Manchuria or be due only to Colonel Masanobu Tsuji. The Vice Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army from August 1937 to December 1938 was Lieutenant-General Tada Hayao (多田 駿 which I think is sometimes also read as Tada Shun). In January 1938, Tada and the Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in attempted to see the Emperor to petition him to seek peace with China. According to Michael Barnhart's "Japan Prepares for Total War" page 112, Tada was willing to enlarge the Changkufeng Incident in July 1938 to put pressure on the Japanese Government to break off fighting against China (Tada had earlier transferred significant forces North of the Wall). Although Tada had been moved from his position after December 1938, it is possible that those attempting to oppose the war with China were also important in encouraging an aggressive policy in Manchuria.

I apologise if you are not interested in Nomonhan but do your Japanese sources discuss such conflicts amongst the Tokyo leadership? For example, Barnhart references Bōeichō, Daihon'ei rikugubu, vol. 1, 553-54 but that probably only relates troop movements rather than motivations.

Shinpachi said:

After ww2, Tsuji answered an interview "I could have won Nomonhan if JGHQ had fully supported me".

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I always belived on this, BINGO! Thank you Shimpachi, in the West we are too much subjected to a Soviet/Russian view of the conflict in Mongolia. It's interesting to see what the Japanese think about it.

Don't know if it's truth, but a member in other forum posted something supporting this:

The other thing to consider is very few of the Japanese units actually retired, even when the situation went bad. The Quality of the units was also somewhat suspect, with the 23rd Division being one of the worse units in China.

The battle had several distinct phases, and the Japanese came within a whisker of winning several times. Before they got screwed over by logistics or their own High command.

When the Elite 26th Regt was on the west side of the river they got attacked by a huge amount of armour. Infantry in the open with 4x 37mm ATG's, and 12x Regimental guns dating from 1906. There is No Cover, its just a flat plain with some grass.
Result was the Infantry took out around 70 odd tanks (10-30 more killed by the guns, I forget the exact number), and caused the Russians to withdraw. Then they had to withdraw as they had no supplies left.

Equally on the east bank the Japanese did what they do best. They launched a series of infantry assaults at night. Pulling back into cover during daytime to avoid the massed Soviet arty. They managed to destroy 7 of the 8 Soviet Bridges. Some were destroyed by suicide teams infiltrating short distances. The last ridge would have been reached in another night or two's attack. Which was well within the capabilities of the 23rd Div.
However the high command ordered the attack to pull back to its start line. This was due to them wanting to carry out a coordinated grand offensive with the Japanese heavy artillery now being emplaced.

In the final phase of the battle the Ioki Detachment Gave such a kicking to overwhelming soviet forces, that the Unit commander was relieved of his command. The Soviets attacked with an armoured Division, and get stopped dead by a Japanese cavalry company with some light support. The Soviets had to use reserve units including Airborne troops, but still found it tough going.

About the air power, the new Soviet planes and tactics certainly helped them, but in my view was not the only factor. The Japanese doctrine always called for offensive, and the Kwantung Army Air Force couldn't launch offensive operations by the IGHQ orders, as well as have replacements for tired pilots.

Of course that if Stalin wanted to put more strenght against the Japanese if they won, they would have problems. The problem is the Japanese were aware of this, that's why they didn't let the Nomonhan Incident to escalate. They were not yet ready for a war against the Soviets.

tyrodtom said:

The Japanese Army couldn't even defeat China, a fight they chose.
China, a country that had practically no modern manufacturing base, all their arms and most of their supplies came from other countries. It seems they could chase the Nationalist all over China, but never pin down enough of them to decisively defeat them. Chiang Kai-shek was much more concerned about putting down the Communists than expelling the Japanese. I wonder how much success Japan would have had in China, if Chiang hadn't been fighting two wars, with the Japanese being the secondary threat?

If Japan couldn't even defeat a backward China, how could they even have any chance against a fairly modern, industrialized power like Russia.

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Japan won every major battle vs. China at the Army Group level. (there were some army or below army level defeats of course like the Changsha battles....no army in WWII won EVERY single skirmish/battle) China's army could not as a whole stand in the field with the far more professionally trained and equipped Imperial Japanese Army, a fact Chiang and his KMT cronies were well aware, hence their "Lets you and him fight" policy throughout WWII despite FDR's vision of Chiang becoming an Asian leader.

Many people assume Japan was trying to "Conquor" China aka through a complete military invasion and occupation. That was never Japan's goal, nor did they have the resources to occupy such a huge country....a fact they were well aware of. What they wanted after mid level officers got the ball rolling was for Chiang to come to terms favorable to Japan after which Japan would withdraw it's troops which would then have freed up one of the IJA's arms for other concerns......including the Russian bear. Problem was that Chiang refused to come to the table...and after the early costly defeats on the battlefield, mostly refused to fight as well and withdrew into the far interior of China. Chiang was also far more worried about Mao and internal threats from within his own party than the Japanese. It was a complicated situation. To oversimplify it....China became Japan's "Vietnam" a conventional war that bogged down into a stalemate by simple fact of the country's huge size and an enemy "government" that refused to come to terms. The US "won" all it's major battles in Vietnam too with it's superior firepower and total air domination but ultimately "lost" it's war as well.

My copy of Coxx's book is currently packed away but from what i recall. (and apologies if I get some things muddled) he did summarize the Kwantung buildup in mid-late 41 to it's peak strength which was formidable and could have if nothing else, fully occupied the Soviets in the Far East depriving Stalin of even trading out trained men and equipment in exchange for raw recruits. Would it have altered the war? Possibly. A Soviet collapse after the disasters of 41 was not out of the realm of possibility. But in the end the Northerners lost out to the Southerners. A northern attack posed serious risk for potential gains that were less solid...."possible" link up with Germans....."possible" defeat of Soviets.....etc etc. But in addition to the spectre of Nomanhan and costly bogged down battles there were serious questions about who would benefit the most......why risk the Bear's teeth for Hitler's sake? In the end the Northern argument hinged on eliminating the Soviet "Threat" to Japanese long term security but the plan did not inspire confidence. The Southern argument on the other hand seemed more downhill and the potential resource riches were tangible.....Japanese autarky.

I'm a Vietnam vet, i'm quite aware of the parallels.

Nikademus said:

A northern attack posed serious risk for potential gains that were less solid

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Roosevelt and Churchill were supporting Stalin, just like they were supporting Chiang. Even before the Lend-Lease, the Americans were already selling weaponry for the Russians. Since the "Chinese Incident" was already reason to fear an oil embargo, if they attacked Russia, then an embargo would be much likely. If the Russians resisted, as they already proved capable in 1939, then Japan would be doomed. The Southerners didn't won for nothing, their plan was better.

I did not know Russians were so proud of their battles in Nomonhan.
Masanobu Tsuji would have been happy to hear that.

Hayao Tada had nothing to do with the incident.
He is famous here as a man who only made sound remarks to his nation to be defeated by ambitious Hideki Tojo.
I was born in the same town as he. So, I should be more proud of him...

Shinpachi said:

I did not know Russians were so proud of their battles in Nomonhan.
Masanobu Tsuji would have been happy to hear that.

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LOL!

Hey Shinpachi, I just found this: Nomonhan - Masanobu Tsuji - Google Livros

You can confirm that Tsuji really wrote this book? (don't know if was not a mistake from Google, didn't find it in other places)

He got famous after ww2 because he became a bestseller writer based on his experience.
That had not only made the allies harder to punish him but made him possible to become a politician.
Absolute Evil can do anything.

You know Shinpachi, I don't understand many articles from Nomonhan I read here in the West. They always mention how well-equipped Zhukov forces were, the limitations of the IJA that Tsuji mentioned, and the Japanese failure to detect the Soviet offensive. But in the conclusion, all of them mention that the IJA didn't attacked in 1941, because it proved vastly inferior in Nomonhan. I simply don't see a sense in this. It would be like say the Red Army was incapable because the Winter War (and many belived so, including Hitler). If the Japanese had attacked with full support and still ended defeated, then I would agree with this. You people in Japan naturally have a much better view of this conflict IMHO.

As I said, I am not interested in the Nomonhan Incident because Japanese army was not ready for making war with the Soviet Union.
To fight seriously, IJA would have to stop all war in China and needed full supports from the navy but it was too early.
Nomonhan was Tsuji's dogma and not a sane battle from every angle.

Jenisch said:

You know Shinpachi, I don't understand many articles from Nomonhan I read here in the West. They always mention how well-equipped Zhukov forces were, the limitations of the IJA that Tsuji mentioned, and the Japanese failure to detect the Soviet offensive. But in the conclusion, all of them mention that the IJA didn't attacked in 1941, because it proved vastly inferior in Nomonhan. I simply don't see a sense in this. It would be like say the Red Army was incapable because the Winter War (and many belived so, including Hitler).

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I agree. It's completely a myth that the Japanese didn't go to war with the USSR in 1941 because of the Nomonhan incident in '39. The IJA, rightly or not, did not think that the 1939 war showed them to be inferior to the Soviets. Moreover and as you point out, the Nomonhan War was a 'Winter War' scale operation relative to the 'Barbarossa' scale that a 1941 Japanese attack on USSR would have been (of course the Winter War was much larger than Nomonhan, and Barbarossa much larger than any Japanese attack on USSR would have been, but relatively speaking it's a reasonable comparison).

Also, an attack in 1941 would have been eastward from Manchuria into the Soviet Maritime Province (area along the Pacific coast), not on the western border of Manchuria, with Mongolia, where the Nomonhan incident occurred. The terrain in the east was very different, forested and with mountains in places, not like the open treeless plains of the Mongolian border which were probably the best terrain for mechanized forces of any theater in WWII except maybe eastern Libya-western Egypt.

As mentioned, there was still a very serious high order strategic issue of whether the IJA had enough spare strength to launch a campaign against Russia without an actual withdrawal in China. They thought they had sufficient strength, but it certainly would have dictated a more passive approach in China, and would have made any military reaction to Anglo-American economic warfare much more difficult. And it required that the Soviets start withdrawing forces from the Far East to meet the German attack, which at first they did not do, but had began doing in the second half of '41, or at least Japanese intelligence concluded so. And even then, the most basic question is what could such an attack have achieved for Japan strategically, even assuming it was militarily successful? Again it would have been a fairly limited objective attack to seize the portion of the USSR east of Manchuria, not somehow march west a few 1000 miles to Moscow, as some seem to imagine when the idea is brought up.

But the defeat at Nomonhan absolutely did not rule out an attack on the Soviets from the IJA POV. If anything it was the opposite. Alvin Coox was mentioned earlier in the thread. His great book 'Nomonhan', in the later chapters details the IJA's plans for attacking the Soviets in 1941, and the large buildup in IJA forces in Manchuria after the 1939 war. The IJA had an active plan to attack the Soviets in the late summer-fall of 1941, after the Germans had attacked though not in diplomatic coordination with them. It was only shelved by the Imperial Cabinet after the Anglo-American oil embargo that same summer.

Joe

"... there was still a very serious high order strategic issue of whether the IJA had enough spare strength to launch a campaign against Russia without an actual withdrawal in China. "

If Japan as an Axis Partner had attacked the Soviets - the ONLY way it could have worked was a "Pearl Harbor" in the Soviet east- seizing facilities and driving west using the rail lines. Leap-frogging .... like they did in the islands. A successful co-ordinated attack such as that - in Stalin's deep rear in June 1941 - would have changed the course of Barbarossa, IMHO.

MM

JoeB said:

I agree. It's completely a myth that the Japanese didn't go to war with the USSR in 1941 because of the Nomonhan incident in '39. The IJA, rightly or not, did not think that the 1939 war showed them to be inferior to the Soviets. Moreover and as you point out, the Nomonhan War was a 'Winter War' scale operation relative to the 'Barbarossa' scale that a 1941 Japanese attack on USSR would have been (of course the Winter War was much larger than Nomonhan, and Barbarossa much larger than any Japanese attack on USSR would have been, but relatively speaking it's a reasonable comparison).

Also, an attack in 1941 would have been eastward from Manchuria into the Soviet Maritime Province (area along the Pacific coast), not on the western border of Manchuria, with Mongolia, where the Nomonhan incident occurred. The terrain in the east was very different, forested and with mountains in places, not like the open treeless plains of the Mongolian border which were probably the best terrain for mechanized forces of any theater in WWII except maybe eastern Libya-western Egypt.

As mentioned, there was still a very serious high order strategic issue of whether the IJA had enough spare strength to launch a campaign against Russia without an actual withdrawal in China. They thought they had sufficient strength, but it certainly would have dictated a more passive approach in China, and would have made any military reaction to Anglo-American economic warfare much more difficult. And it required that the Soviets start withdrawing forces from the Far East to meet the German attack, which at first they did not do, but had began doing in the second half of '41, or at least Japanese intelligence concluded so. And even then, the most basic question is what could such an attack have achieved for Japan strategically, even assuming it was militarily successful? Again it would have been a fairly limited objective attack to seize the portion of the USSR east of Manchuria, not somehow march west a few 1000 miles to Moscow, as some seem to imagine when the idea is brought up.

But the defeat at Nomonhan absolutely did not rule out an attack on the Soviets from the IJA POV. If anything it was the opposite. Alvin Coox was mentioned earlier in the thread. His great book 'Nomonhan', in the later chapters details the IJA's plans for attacking the Soviets in 1941, and the large buildup in IJA forces in Manchuria after the 1939 war. The IJA had an active plan to attack the Soviets in the late summer-fall of 1941, after the Germans had attacked though not in diplomatic coordination with them. It was only shelved by the Imperial Cabinet after the Anglo-American oil embargo that same summer.

Joe

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People underestimate Showa Japan saying it didn't have great interest for modern equipament. Dr. Jiro Horikoshi for example, could not put armor in the Zero only because it didn't have a more powerful engine to fit with the IJN specifications. Yes, most Zeros were vulnerable, but in compensation they did have an excellent range - with the only competitor early in the war in this regard the still less numerous P-38. The Zero, as well as the Ki-43, were offensive fighters. As long as the Japanese could use them to bomb the hell of the enemy, they were adequate machines to provide cover for the bombers. Some people point it was just the Allies change to energy tactics and all was lost for them. Not so simple in my view. Even because it's a myth the Japanese themselfs didn't used such tactics.

Other excellent Japanese aircraft like the Ki-84 fighter, the Ki-67 bomber and the B7A carrier attack aircraft were being developed before the war. All could not enter in service earlier and in numbers because the war with the US and lack of resources, combined with the war in China prevented this.

The IJA had several modern tank and vehicle designs. Unfornately, most could not reach production or only few numbers were avaliable due to the resources being placed in the IJN due to the Pacific War.

There were defects in the IJA? Surely, everyone had deffects. I think the IJA was not the best Army around, specially in terms of technology, but neither they were hordes of soldiers just employing Banzai charges like some people say. They were enemies to respect, and surely were respected by their enemies (unfortnately not so vice versa, specially for poor civilians and their prisioners).

I considerate the "Chinese Incident" as worst thing that could have happened to Imperial Japan. It put them in conflict with the US, and consequentely not allowed them to perhaps crush the Soviets with Hitler. This could have resulted the Axis victory in the war.

You will have a hard time finding any battles where the Japanese Army did not use a Banzai charge at least once. Several times even in the early stages of the battle.

It was a problem that some Japanese commanders recognized. Banzai charges were discouraged by the commanders at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but they still occured on a small scale, at the last.

tyrodtom said:

You will have a hard time finding any battles where the Japanese Army did not use a Banzai charge at least once. Several times even in the early stages of the battle.

It was a problem that some Japanese commanders recognized. Banzai charges were discouraged by the commanders at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but they still occured on a small scale, at the last.

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Well, there are reports of human wave attacks by the Soviets against both the Finns and the Germans. Not at the sterotype scale thought. The US Army also frequentely launched frontal attacks against the enemy in Europe. The Banzai charges are not much different IMHO. Particularly when the Japanese were in the offensive.

You need to study infantry tactics if you think frontal attacks and Banzai charges are similiar, IMHO.

It's true the Soviets did use human wave attacks on the eastern front, but one thing the human wave attack has in common with the Banzai attack is it's usual failure against a entrenched opponent.

But you weaken your argument when first you say the Japanese didn't employ the Banzai frequently, then you switch to other forces used it too.

tyrodtom said:

You need to study infantry tactics if you think frontal attacks and Banzai charges are similiar, IMHO.

It's true the Soviets did use human wave attacks on the eastern front, but one thing the human wave attack has in common with the Banzai attack is it's usual failure against a entrenched opponent.

But you weaken your argument when first you say the Japanese didn't employ the Banzai frequently, then you switch to other forces used it too.

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banzai_charge:

Banzai charge (from the Japanese battle cry "banzai") was a term applied during World War II by the Allied forces to human wave attacks mounted by infantry forces of the Imperial Japanese Army. The name Gyokusai (Japanese: 玉砕, honorable suicide; literally "jade shards") was however used by the Naikaku Johōkyoku (Cabinet Information Bureau) and the media of the Imperial Japanese regime. These attacks were usually launched as a suicide attack to avoid surrender and dishonor or as a final attempt at maximizing the odds of success in the face of usually numerically superior Allied forces.

This is a Wikipedia mistake?

I don't disagree with Wiki's definition of a Banzai attack, but you seem to have no idea what you call a " frontal attack" is, as carried out by the U.S. Army, Marines etc. is.