Kursk MkII - The Air Battle

[Altea]

Hi Erich

I am frustrated by the lack of finality and precision in the figures. Doing my best to come up with a balanced estimate of losses for both sides, but I alays knew it would be difficult. Happy to stand back and listen to what others have to say regarding strengths and losses.
.

No but you can always use mathematical frames or gaps
definition:
Conduct approximation of any of a number x is to find two numbers a and b such that a > x > b.
The magnitude of the framing is c = b - a


For sure, magnitude would be considerable, definite conclusion hard to establish, but it can be the object of anorther debate and we are very far from being there, now.

So, go on!

Regards

 

[Nikademus]

Bergstrom pretty much poo poo's the idea that a dedicated SB campaign against the USSR would have done much (end Vol II - BC/RS). Primary reasons would be the sheer distance, the lack of a dedicated, effective LR escort available to the Luftwaffe and the strength of the VVS rear area defenses. Any such attempt in his opinion would have incurred negligable results in exchange for potentially serious air losses. There was a reason why the Luftwaffe primarily restricted itself to occasional night raids against distant city targets like Moscow. The Moscow PVO was formidable in the same way that the Red Army reserves around the capital were. The Russians achieved miracles in production as well during a very trying time so adding some bomb damage to the mix IMO would not create an obstacle that they could not overcome. If the Germans could do it with all their economic issues, why not the Russians? Personally I don't see it as a magic bullet because the SB campaign for the west wasn't one either.

 

[Rivet]

Interesting post, Nickademus. Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister of Armaments, mentions Germany's efforts to reduce allied bombing efforts. Factories were moved into woods and underground, something that could not be done with the production of Fuels.

Soviet efforts were relegated to the removal of factories back from the range of German bombers. In a nation with thirteen time zones, this was easy, save for those factories already in place in Moscow (Lenses, Electrical Parts) whose tear-down and replacement elsewhere would have slowed production to a crawl. I'd made mention regarding the strategic bombing campaign here. Kursk was a tactical battle. Search down the list for General Wever and fire that puppy up again. Let's get Parsifal the facts he needs regarding losses. Regards

 

[Juha]

Hello
I'll not bother to open a dedicate "SB possibilities of LW in the East" tread, so a short comment. IIRC LW's June 43 small SB campaign wasn't very costly and delivered some effective blows to Soviet armament industry and PVO wasn't especially effective against those night raids.

IMHO main reason against a SB campaign a la RAF and USAAF by LW was that Germany's aircraft industry and fuel production didn't have capacity to produce comparative bomber force without drastically cutting some other essential production/consumption.

And in fact LW thought that it had figured out the Achilles Heel of Soviet war production, the electric grid. SU had lost 41-42 substantial part of its electrical production and Germans reasoned that there was not much reserve capacity anymore left and electrical plants, especially dams were veeery difficult to evacuate to more distance places from the front. Early 44 many bomber units were withdrawn from combat for intensive retraining for LR bombing sorties, but once again LW miss the train, before the training was completed SU had smashed AG Centre and the frontline had moved so much to the west that most of the vulnerable targets had become too distant for the He 111, which was thought to be the main type to be used in the attacks.

Juha

 

[Nikademus]

Hello
I'll not bother to open a dedicate "SB possibilities of LW in the East" tread, so a short comment. IIRC LW's June 43 small SB campaign wasn't very costly and delivered some effective blows to Soviet armament industry and PVO wasn't especially effective against those night raids.
Juha

I do not wish to derail the thread.....which is about Kursk....however I would be interested in hearing more about these "effective" blows on Soviet industry at night. My comment re: the PVO was in reference to the idea of a dedicated SB op during the day against targets. The Luftwaffe did perform a few night missions. I'm not aware of any lasting impact these raids had reading from Bergstrom's accounts or them.....same as with the few LRA night attacks on German targets. Both sides scored a few hits....but not anything to cause a panic. As with BC's night ops, such a thing would have taken time and a dedicated effort with substantially committed resources to saturate the target area. Feel free to PM me these details. I would be interested in reading them



I disagree that the LW "missed the boat" given it's current committments...which steers us back to Kursk By the time of Kursk, the LW was stretched to the limit as it was trying to provide limited and local battlefield superiority over the biggest land battle of 1943 against a reinvigorated and typically determined VVS.

 

[Juha]

Hello Nikodemus
because CoS of LFl 6 Friedrich Kless mentioned the June 43 SB missions in his article in Newton's Kursk The German View, it's not so much OT. Kless' point was that while effective the raids distracted bombers from attacks against land communications to Kursk just as the SU was strongly reinforcing its troops there. At least the attack on GAZ factory in Gorky was effective, even Soviet era publications admitted this see:

Gorky Automobile plant in the years of Great Patriotic war. /
"…The summer of 1943 brought the difficult trials to the warriors of the Soviet Army and the workers of the plant.
On the 4 of june, 1943 at 23.40 the air alert was declared. The enemy dropped high-explosive and incendiary bombs on the plant, lighted by the enemy's missiles. A lot of workshops, houses of Sotsgorod, offices, building were burnt. Water-supply was broken, there was nothing to extinguish the fires. In many workshops the wooden walls were set in fire. The substation, which was receiving the electricity from Gorenergo was put out of action by splinter of bomb. The plant was in the flame. More than 100 high-explosive bombs were dropped to the plant on the first day of air-bombing. Blacksmith '3, chassis workshop, the main conveyer, partially spring workshop and another workshops were put out of action. Several houses, children's garden, a hospital were destroyed in the plant's settlement.
But the enemies continued air-bombing. From 4 to 22 of june of 1943 they appeared at the same time over the plant. Many workshops were destroyed or capitally damaged, arterial communication networks were seriously damaged, the production cycle was impaired. At all enterprise 50 buildings and constructions, more than 9 thousand metres of conveyers, 5900 units of process equipment, 8 thousand of engines, 28 cranes, 8 workshops substations, 14 thousands of kits of instruments and many other were destroyed or damaged.
But despite the destructions, the plant continued to live and to work. The largest Gorky factories: лRed Sormovo", лThe engine of revolution", лRed Etna", the aeronautic factory of Orjonikidze and other enterprises were engaged in reconstructive work. Workers, restoring the plant, at the same time increased the tempoes of manufacturing. And on the 18 of august of 1943 all the workshops of the Gorky Automobile plant were working…."

"Miss the train" What I meant was that when in June 43 LW anyway used its resources to the attacks on Soviet armament industry, if the electric grid plan had the potential LW thought, June 43 was the time to implement it, 13 months later it was too late.

Juha

 

[Nikademus]

But despite the destructions, the plant continued to live and to work. The largest Gorky factories: лRed Sormovo", лThe engine of revolution", лRed Etna", the aeronautic factory of Orjonikidze and other enterprises were engaged in reconstructive work. Workers, restoring the plant, at the same time increased the tempoes of manufacturing. And on the 18 of august of 1943 all the workshops of the Gorky Automobile plant were working…."

I'd say this proves my point. For any SB campaign to be utimately effective, it must be sustained and dedicated, and even then it takes a long time to make a really serious impact. Doublely so if as with the above example you are talking raids at night. As with BC you cannot gurantee that every or even most raids, even with the numbers BC started employing would cause the required amount of damage via Area Bombing. Even in this one example, the long term results of the raid were negligable in the end. Production increased and the more bombers you devote to this task the less bombers are available for vital mission on the front as described in Bergstrom's three volumes.

One can argue the LW "missed the boat" back in the 30's when SB was contemplated but its debatable. There were some within the growing Luftwaffe who saw (with far more accuracy than SB's proponents) that a SB campaign's predicted ability to quickly smash civilian morale and/or industry was doubtful.

And i'd disagree that this isn't OT, so i'm going to cease here. The topic is Kursk and the air war directly over it.

 

[Altea]

I'd say this proves my point. For any SB campaign to be utimately effective, it was be sustained and dedicated, and even then it takes a long time to make a really serious impact. Doublely so if as with the above example you are talking raids at night. As with BC you cannot gurantee that every or even most raids, even with the numbers BC started employing would cause the required amount of damage via Area Bombing. Even in this one example, the long term results of the raid were negligable in the end. Production increased and the more bombers you devote to this task the less bombers are available for vital mission on the front as described in Bergstrom's three volumes.

This is rignt, since prior to the Kursk battle there were relentless struggle on EF for air superiority (with field attacks), raids over production centers and communications.

One can argue the LW "missed the boat" back in the 30's when SB was contemplated but its debatable. There were some within the growing Luftwaffe who saw (with far more accuracy than SB's proponents) that a SB campaign's predicted ability to quickly smash civilian morale and/or industry was doubtful.

This is true, i have red in a russian magazine that the means, time and coast were 28 times higher for the TB-7 programm (Pe-8 after Tupolev's arrest) than for a light fighter as an I-15 or I-16.

BTW TB-7 programm was lauched in 1934, it flew in dec 1936 and was not even fully operational in 41.
The B-17 in 1934, flew in 1935, and was not used oparationnaly before 1940.

Actually, i would like to know, what programm ReichLuftministerium would have like to sacrify or slow to develop the strategic bomber mid -30ies. The FW-190, the 109, the Stuka or something else?

And i'd disagree that this isn't OT, so i'm going to cease here. The topic is Kursk and the air war directly over it.

Well, about Strategic raids. Khazanov noticed from march to july 1943 some happy hits by Luft maid on the soviet industry, the best results were the lack of 800 planned Yak-1 from saratov factory during the Kursk battle , and total fail of Luft raids over Kursk communication centers and railroads. About 3 572 trains and 1 71789 wagons went to reinforce both Kursk fronts despide Luft efforts, on the same time ADD concentrated on german communication performed > 10 000 sorties at rear and 2 600 on close stations, considerably slowing german's armies (particulary Model's one) growth. No mention about 2th end 16 VA that performed more than 2 000 sorties on Heer's communications.

As someone wrote:. For any SB campaign to be utimately effective, it was be sustained and dedicated...

In French we say you can't have at the same time, the butter, the money for the butter...and the dairywoman ass!

TE, one has to make choices, sometimes...

Rivet I've a question that research on my part cannot resolve. Where would one find accurate information regarding the ground vehicle motor pools of either Luftwaffe or VVS units involved in the frontline effort during the 1943 efforts we are considering here? It is my believe, just a gut reaction, that operational efforts on both sides were hampered by the need to support the Infantry as a first priority in transportation. Any thoughts/new research venues regarding this aspect of the Kursk?

My thougts, the question is irrelevant, Russia 1943 is not Florida or Clafirornia owerdays. No hiways, no motorways, only spring razputitza (mud) that makes only vehicules with caterpillar tracks could be usefull...and trains.

Otherway, considering 600 000 moto-vehicules delivered to SU by LL, soviets were hugely beatting the germans at this point, even without local production deliveries!

Regards

 

[Juha]

Hello Altea
on development of heavy bombers: Halifax, specs reached Handley Page in Nov 1936, tended in March 1937, changed from twin to 4 engine concept during 1937, 1st flight of the prototype25 Oct 1939, 1st production a/c flew 11 Oct 1940, first combat mission 30 June 1941.

But what I meant the "missing the boat" wasn't a heavy bomber development but that just before LW was to be ready to deliver their massive attack on SU electricity generating plants and transferring systems they lost the Orel bulge and so the targets became too distance to the plane they had thought would carry the main burden of the attacks, the He 111H. So no need to sacrifice anything for a heavy bomber designs only earlier execution.

Quote:" Well, about Strategic raids. Khazanov noticed from march to july 1943 some happy hits by Luft maid on the soviet industry, the best results were the lack of 800 planned Yak-1 from saratov factory during the Kursk battle.."

I would say that more than some happy hits, over 1500 bombs hit the GAZ factory area in Gorgiy. Even if the tank production was not totally stopped, only in Aug 43 they succeeded to surpass the production figure of May 43, so maybe a production loss of 300 tanks, bad to Germans that the tanks were not T-34s but T-70ms. Also the automobile and armoured car production at GAZ was totally stopped for a while. BTW do you know if the production of SU-76M was affected by these raids on GAZ

Quote:" on the same time ADD concentrated on german communication performed > 10 000 sorties at rear and 2 600 on close stations, considerably slowing german's armies (particulary Model's one) growth. No mention about 2th end 16 VA that performed more than 2 000 sorties on Heer's communications."

As I wrote earlier, the CoS of the LFl 6, Friedfich Kless in his post-war study to US Army mentioned VVS attacks on the railconnections of LFl 6 areas, which according to him, didn't produce much problem to logistics On the other hand the increased partisan activity against those lines were more effective in disturbing rail transportation. Of course one must remember that the damage achieved by VVS indicated failures by the LFl 6 and the damages achieved by partisans indicated failures by the Heer.

Juha

 

[Altea]

Hello Juha

But what I meant the "missing the boat" wasn't a heavy bomber development but that just before LW was to be ready to deliver their massive attack on SU electricity generating plants and transferring systems they lost the Orel bulge and so the targets became too distance to the plane they had thought would carry the main burden of the attacks, the He 111H. So no need to sacrifice anything for a heavy bomber designs only earlier execution.

AFAIK the electricity network was not the Achille's heel of the soviet union but logistics, "communism + elecricity" programm launched by Lenin in 20ies was not just a propaganda slogan. The network was dense and oversecured by old unactivated stations working on peat or wood.

I would say that more than some happy hits, over 1500 bombs hit the GAZ factory area in Gorgiy. Even if the tank production was not totally stopped, only in Aug 43 they succeeded to surpass the production figure of May 43, so maybe a production loss of 300 tanks, bad to Germans that the tanks were not T-34s but T-70ms. Also the automobile and armoured car production at GAZ was totally stopped for a while. BTW do you know if the production of SU-76M was affected by these raids on GAZ

Difficult to say, the SU-76M made it's trials in may of 1943. First were delivered during Kursk battle in july. If the Luft bombing did not stopped or affected the process, it certainly did not facilitate it

As I wrote earlier, the CoS of the LFl 6, Friedfich Kless in his post-war study to US Army mentioned VVS attacks on the railconnections of LFl 6 areas, which according to him, didn't produce much problem to logistics On the other hand the increased partisan activity against those lines were more effective in disturbing rail transportation. Of course one must remember that the damage achieved by VVS indicated failures by the LFl 6 and the damages achieved by partisans indicated failures by the Heer.

It seems americans didn't trust him that much, from german collected docs:
Main rail junctions in Orel and Bryansk almost nightly raided Russian air force, - in the German chronicles. - The resultant loss of supplies and materials was immediately felt, as railroads are now serving not only the 2nd Panzer Army, but the prepared operation "Citadel". In Orel station, loaded with rations for one million soldiers, received a direct hit and burned. Spread a fire destroyed the army food store, which did not have time to disperse and whose contents are not moved to an underground storage facility*
*Rear Area Security in Russia. The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines. Washington: 1951. P. 27.

Regards

 

[Juha]

Hello Altea
thanks a lot for your answer.

Yes, it is entirely possible that Germans miscalculated, not the first time when an AF thought that it had find an Achilles' heel of enemy's war economy only to find out that nix or that it was impossible to produce enough damage to the system to have decisive outcome. Even if SU had lost significant part of its electricity production in 41-42, it had also lost many consumers of its electricity, big cities, mines and some factories.

LW was aware of the "communism + elecricity" programm, probably all were at that time, especially the big dam construction program was well known and they calculated that just because of that the psychological effect of the raids would have been great. But as you wrote they probably didn't fully understand the Soviet power grid.

And thanks a lot for the quote from Rear Area Security in Russia. The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines. Washington: 1951.

Juha

 

[Rivet]

Check with the initial producers of Soviet hydroelectric power generation, Juha. Siemens and Phillips- Germany was in possession of all of the drawings and scematics of the dams- Germany designed it all during the period after the first war when nobody wanted to rub shoulders with the two nations. Germany helped build, Germany got to use Soviet air space to train an air force and test equipment.

I've found a source of information regarding the clash of 41-45 between the SU and Hitler's Germany. See Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov, Air marshall during the period in question. Novikov was quite the writer, but not in English. Details.
Regards

Later edit with information just to prove I'm not hallucinating again. :

The Treaty of Rapallo between Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union was signed by German Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau and his Soviet colleague Georgy Chicherin on April 16, 1922, during the Genoa Economic Conference, annulling all mutual claims, restoring full diplomatic relations, and establishing the beginnings of close trade relationships, which made Weimar Germany the main trade and diplomatic partner of the Soviet Union.

 

[parsifal]

What were the results and the lessons learned from the battle? These are my initial thoughts.

LW had done quite well, but subsequent events were to show that they had in fact lost the battle. this is surprising....they had shot down more VVS aircraft and I think it fair to say in ground attacks had been more effective.

VVS operations are marked by the broad front tactics they adopted. Wheras LW ops were concentrated on one or two points, VVS attacks were much more broad. This meant results were slower to emerge, but more deeply felt once the effects started to bite. Each side were playing to their strengths, but the germans needed a quick result to win....when this failed to materialize LW wer staring at defeat....they had to disperse to counter the Soviet counterattacks, and once this occurred the great numerical advatages enjoyed by the VVS became decisive.

VVS realized the big drawback was the low level of proficiency for their pilots. With only 30-50hours on first line types for their pilots on average, they were no match for the LW...yet. Exchange ratios in combat were about 4:1 against them. but between July and the end of the year, VVS trainng was transformed, such that by the end of the year exchange rates were about 3:2 against the VVS. Their quality was now 'good enough", and they had a massive superiority of numbers.

in terms of types, I dont think there was a big quality differential. Each side had strengths and weaknesses for their aircraft and it seems to me after studying the tactics employed that each played to those strengths as much as possible. Il-2s, for example seemed to opt for low altitude attacks to maximize their bombing effect and minimze risk to their achilles heel....the radiator or oil cooler.

Soviet tactics semed to evolve to not trying to achive outright air superiority....they were a force deicated to the ground support mission, so all they were looking to do was provide cover to get the job done at tolerable losses, and to dny LW the ability undertake counterstrike operations. to the end, however, LW continued to extract a steady toll on VVS formations. It was never enough, and never of serious consequence to the VVS

 

[Juha]

Hello Rivet
I'm well aware of the Treaty of Rapallo. On Novikov's memoirs, there is at least some problems in them, for ex his memoirs gives totally wrong impression on the VVS air attacks on Finland on 25 June 41 .

Juha

 

[Rivet]

Altea- "Actually, i would like to know, what programm ReichLuftministerium would have like to sacrify or slow to develop the strategic bomber mid -30ies. The FW-190, the 109, the Stuka or something else?"

Well, Altea, my money would have been some of Ernst Heinkel's Strategic Bomber designs which probably would have swayed the lines on the map for a while. Heinkel's He-274/277 were as good as one could have worked for given the time
The Junkers 290 was the design with the greatest number of mission specific builds, though little usage of the A-4 variant as a bomber. The primary mission of the 290 was maritime reconaissance. The bomber was decendent of the Junkers-89.
As far as what might have screwed strategic bombers at the point in question might have been the acceptance of the Luftwaffe's using Zeppelins as a heavy bomber. They did re-commission the Hindenburg for detection of British radar establishments for a while, then packed her back in her box. Yeah, Kursk....

The period prior to Kursk saw a lot of upper-level commanders arrested for one anti-revolutionary whim or another. Photographs of the time that Soviet-German military ties existed show Soviet and German troops really buddy-buddy. No way would the Germans let SU get and hold Petsamo. The minerals in the area were essential to German economic planning. Regards

 

[Erich]

ah where is this thread going may I ask ................ seems to have gone OT. parsifal start throwing some WS LW stats for fighters/bombers/ground attack . . . . effective or not, etc....... ??

 

[parsifal]

I have a couple of new books just arrived, and hope these will contain some clue as to the impact of airpower on the ground battle. Need a few days to do this.....

 

[parsifal]

MJy starting thoughts on this issue is that the numbers of tanks destroyed by airpower for both sides is overstated for bth sides. I believe that airpowers main impact even in the direct support role was more subtle than by simple measure of the number of vehicles destroyed. Traditionally, airpower is responsible for about 5% of battle caualties. In Normandy, very few tanks were actually destryed by airpower, yet allied airpower was still decisive to the outcome.

With a more dedicated ground support role, the percentage of losses in Kursk might be as high as 10-12%, which puts the Soviet losses at about 150-200 tanks, and German losses at about 60-90 tanks. Yet these figures dont line up with the claims made by either side. Soviets in one engagement claim the destruction of 34 tanks in one engagement to just 26 Il-2s. German claims are around 500 Soviet tanks destroyed. I dont buy those numbers. Maybe 500 vehicles, but not 500 tanks.

Favoured weapoons are interesting....the germans rtended to favour guns whilst the Russians used an AT bomb, the PTB (Russian acronym for Anti-Tank Bomb)

 

[Erich]

agreed on vehicles destroyed for both sides they are not going to take much from cannon fire from either side. thinking we may have possibly 100 Soviet tanks destroyed by air power from a number of arms. from present research it looks like the 70 Soviet T-34's destroyed in one engagement by Hs 129's was probably a huge over-claim. the fact that when after the first pass the subsequent attacks came from all direction to confuse the truck-mounted Soviet triple AA proves that an accurate count is not justifiable.

 

[Juha]

Hello
according to Soviet staff studies of the 2nd Tank Army irreparable tank losses 6,5% were put out of action by aviation, and of the 1st TA only 2,0%. Source document in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 7 No 1 March 1994 p.114 Table 3.

Juha